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To REVISE, OR NOT TO REVISE: THAT Is THE QUESTION
MARK R. KRAVITZt
The Denver University Law Review is to be congratulated on organizing this wonderful issue on civil justice reform. The Law Review has
compiled an exceptionally knowledgeable and talented group of authors,
who have provided us with thoughtful and intriguing suggestions for
changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For example, Justice
Rebecca Love Kourlis and her colleagues at the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System take head on the difficult and
controversial subject of pleading standards at a time when practitioners,
jurists, academics, and legislators are debating the meaning of the Supreme Court's decisions in Iqbal and Twombly. 1 Judge Lee H. Rosenthal,
Chair of the Judicial Conference's Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, discusses discovery and judicial control of discovery,
which very well may lie at the heart of the controversy over pleading
standards. 2 Indeed, it is the cost associated with the operation of the Federal Rules, and discovery in particular, that leads Professor Jay Tidmarsh
to suggest that in designing and interpreting our procedural rules, we
replace the vision on which our modem procedural system was built-

t
United States District Judge, District of Connecticut. The author has served as Chair of the
Civil Rules Advisory Committee since June 2007. Before that, the author served as a member of the
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure from 2001 to 2007. The sentiments expressed in this article are the author's alone and do not reflect the views of the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee or the Standing Committee. The author wishes to thank Professor Edward H. Cooper,
Reporter to the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, for his insights and assistance. Any errors or mistakes of judgment are the author's alone.
1. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 548-49 (2007); Rebecca Love Kourlis, Jordan M. Singer & Natalie Knowlton, Reinvigorating
Pleadings, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 245, 246 (2010) ("We need a civil justice system that encourages
the filing of meritorious claims and one that allows those claims to be honed and resolved efficiently. We need, in other words, a process that begins to narrow and focus issues as soon as a legitimate
claim is filed."); see also Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (1st Sess.
2009) ("A court shall not dismiss a complaint under subdivision (b)(6), (c) or (e) of Rule 12 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of the claim which would entitle the plaintiff to relief."); Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S.1504, 111 th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009) ("Except as otherwise expressly provided by
an Act of Congress or by an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which takes effect
after the date of enactment of this Act, a Federal court shall not dismiss a complaint under rule
12(b)(6) or (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except under the standards set forth by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)").
2. Lee H. Rosenthal, From Rules of Procedureto How Lawyers Litigate: 'Twixt the Cup and
the Lip, 87 DENY. U. L. REv. 227, 231 (2010) ("Many studies and surveys analyzing the civil litigation system have concluded that the critical element in bridging the gap between the rules and their
application is making the district judge more accessible to the lawyers, more involved in the details
of discovery in cases that need such involvement, more present in the cases that require such supervision.").
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the principle that each case should be resolved "on its merits.",3 Professor
Stephen Subrin, too, does not shirk from the task at hand-he challenges
the underlying "transsubstantive" philosophy of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.4 In the midst of these challenges to the concepts that
undergird our federal rules, Professor Samuel Jordan reminds us that the
Civil Rules are not the only source of authority for procedural requirements. 5 Inherent judicial power also plays a role in the procedural mix.
Finally, Professor Jeffrey Stempel cautions us that rules aside, the quality
of justice we provide litigants is based on the competence and integrity
of our decision makers-the judges. 6 These and many other terrific articles in this issue provide important suggestions for rule changes that
certainly will be fodder for the Judicial Conference's Civil Rules Advisory Committee for years to come.
Of course, this outpouring of proposed revisions to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure raises a foundational question that is apparent
from the title of this Introduction: When is it appropriate to change the
rules? In other words, what principles should guide the Civil Rules
Committee in deciding when it is time to revise a rule and how to revise
it? Unfortunately, there is no guidebook or manual that provides an answer to that recurrent question. Instead, it is a matter of judgment. Yet
the question remains: What factors and interests, beyond the simple merits of any particular rule change, should the Civil Rules Committee balance in exercising its considerable judgment to revise the rules? This
Introduction proposes to explore those factors and interests but not as a
matter of high theory. There will be no references to heuristics (moral,
cognitive, or otherwise), game theory, or normative principles. I will
leave such detailed analysis to the Academy. Rather, my observations are
practical ones based on my seat at the rule-making table since 2001.

3.
Jay Tidmarsh, Resolving Cases "On the Merits," 87 DENY. U. L. REV. 407, 428 (2010)
("[D]espite its prominence in constructing our modem American procedural system, providing the
parties a full opportunity to participate in litigating a case is not the foundation on which to build a
procedural system.").
4.

Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure:An Article on Adjust-

ing the "One Show Fits All" Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 377 (2010) ("I have argued for
three decades that the underlying transubstantive philosophy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
is flawed.").
5. Samuel P. Jordan, Situating InherentPower Within a Rules Regime, 87 DENV. U. L. REV.
311, 311 (2010) ("But important though they are, the rules do not tell the whole federal procedural
story."); see also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) ("'[C]ertain implied powers
must necessarily result [to the federal courts] from the nature of their institution,' powers 'which
cannot be dispensed with ... because they are necessary to the exercise of all others."' (quoting
United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812))).
6. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Refocusing Away From Rules Reform and Devoting More Attention
to the Deciders, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 335, 335 (2010) ("During the past quarter-century, the legal
system has devoted an inordinate amount of time and energy revising litigation rules relative to...
the more pressing problems of adjudication weakness related to the quality, temperament, neutrality,
and support of the system's judges and the resources devoted to the system.").
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The Rules Enabling Act-that marvelous treaty between the Judiciary and Congress-recently celebrated its seventy-fifth anniversary. 7
The statute provides the Supreme Court with the "power to prescribe
general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in
the United States district courts . . . and courts of appeals," so long as
those rules do "not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." s In
1935, the Supreme Court appointed a blue ribbon advisory committee to
draft the rules of civil procedure, the first rules adopted under the Rules
Enabling Act. Adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in September 1938 is often described as the "Big Bang." 9 And for good reason.
What Charles E. Clark (Dean of the Yale Law School and later Judge of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit) and his colleagues wrought was a complete re-making of the civil justice system in
America.'
No similar revolutions are likely to recur anytime soon. Yet, as
Judge Clark and his colleague Yale Law School Professor James W.
Moore recognized, the wonderful rules that the blue ribbon committee
fashioned could not remain unchanged. As they put it:
Unless some permanent machinery is provided whereby continual
supervision and change can be made, little is gained over legislative
control of the functioning of the Court. It must be recognized that
procedure is not an end in itself, but merely a means to an end, a tool
rather than a product, and that procedural rules must be continually
reexamined and reformed in order to be kept workable. It is hoped,
therefore, that the [Supreme] Court will develop some permanent

7.
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). For a history of the enactment of the Rules Enabling Act, see
Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith:Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986); Stephen N.
Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The FederalRules of Civil Procedure in Historical
Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
8.
28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)-(b).
9. See Steven S. Gensler, Justness! Speed! Inexpense! An Introduction to the Revolution of
1938 Revisited: The Role and Future of Federal Rules, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 257, 262-63 (2008);
Richard L Marcus, Not Dead Yet, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 299, 300 (2008); Laurens Walker, The End of
the New Deal and the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,82 IOWA L. REV. 1269, 1273 (1997).
10.
Richard L. Marcus, Reform Through Rulemaking?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 901,901-02 (2002)
("[T]hese giants are seen to have accomplished 'a major triumph of law reform' that 'transformed
civil litigation [and] . . . reshaped civil procedure.' Beyond that, 'they have influenced procedural
thinking in every court in this land... and indeed have become part of the consciousness of lawyers,
judges, and scholars who worry about and live with issues of judicial procedure."' (alterations in
original) (quoting Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-substantive Virtues in the
FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2237 (1989); Stephen C. Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling Judges, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1998, at 229, 233; and David L. Shapiro, FederalRule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969,
1969 (1989))); see also B.H. Carey, In Favor of Uniformity, 3 F.R.D. 505, 507 (1945) (stating that
the Federal Rules are "one of the greatest contributions to the free and unhampered administration of
law and justice ever struck off by any group of men since the dawn of civilized law").
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means whereby changes and improvements in the rules may be suggested and adopted as experience points to their necessity."
In 1958, Congress created the Judicial Conference of the United
States. The Judicial Conference consists of the chief judge of every judicial circuit, the chief judge of the Court of International Trade, a district
judge from each circuit, and is presided over by the Chief Justice of the
United States. Reflecting the sentiment of Judge Clark and Professor
Moore, Congress charged the Judicial Conference with carrying on "a
continuous study of the operation and effect" of the rules prescribed by
the Rules Enabling Act, and with recommending "from time to time"
such changes in and additions to those rules as the Conference "may
deem desirable to promote simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, the just determination of litigation, and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay." 12 In practice, the Judicial Conference carries
on its "continuous study" of the operation and effect of the rules through
the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, and the
various advisory committees that work under the direction of the Standing Committee. 13 One of those advisory committees is the Civil Rules
Advisory Committee, which studies and makes recommendations to the
Standing Committee and the Judicial Conference regarding the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
I will not here describe at length the rule-making process. 14 Suffice
it to say that it is slow, deliberate and utterly transparent-and purposely
so. As one commentator put it, "Today's process.., requires more steps
to amend a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure than it does to amend the
U.S. Constitution., 15 The Civil Rules Committee receives suggestions for
rule changes from many sources, including lawyers, judges, bar groups
and associations, academics, and even Congress. 16 Most rules that make
it through this process have been considered for at least three years;
many rules are considered for quite a bit longer.
11.
Charles E. Clark & James Wm. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE L.J.
387, 392 (1935).
12.
28 U.S.C. § 331 (2006).
13.
Id. § 2073.
14.
For a comprehensive description of the rules process, see Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of
the FederalRulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1655 (1995); see also Brooke D. Coleman,
Recovering Access: Rethinking the Structure of Federal Civil Rulemaking, 39 N.M. L. REV. 261
(2009).
15.
Yeazell, supra note 10, at 229, 235; see also Catherine T. Struve, The Paradoxof Delegation: Interpreting the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1103 (2002) ("A

proposed new Rule, or a proposed amendment to an existing Rule, undergoes at least seven stages of
formal comment and review, in a process involving five separate institutions: the Advisory Committee on Civil rules, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Supreme Court, and Congress.").
16.
Currently the Rules Committee is considering changes to Rule 45. The Committee's Rule
45 effort was sparked entirely by suggestions from lawyers that the Committee needed to look closely at Rule 45. CIVI. RuLES ADVISORY COMM., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., MINuES:

NOVEMBER 17 AND 18, at 9 (2008), http://www.uscourts.gov/ruleslMinuteslCVI 1-2008-min.pdf.
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Time is needed for a number of reasons. For one, all of the committees concerned with our procedural rules are committed to gathering empirical data about the operation of the rules and any proposed rule
17
changes so that we better understand the likely effect of rule revisions.
Gathering and analyzing empirical data takes time. For another, the rules
committees seek to thoroughly canvass the bench, the bar, and the Academy about proposed rule changes. It is not unusual for the Civil Rules
Committee to hold several "mini-conferences" with lawyers, law professors, and judges even before a rule revision is proposed by an advisory
committee. Once a change is proposed, the advisory committee must
hold several hearings on the proposed revision.' 8 Often, changes. to existing proposals are made in response to those hearings, and on occasion,
the rules committees decide to abandon a proposed change based on the
input received at the hearings.' 9 Therefore, as the Supreme Court observed recently, "[T]he rulemaking process has important virtues. It
draws on the collective experience of bench and bar, and it facilitates the
adoption of measured, practical solutions. 2 °
Most of those associated with the rules process believe that little or
nothing is to be gained by trying to shorten the process. The motto of the
various rules committees derives from that of the medical profession:
First, do no harm. Care must be taken in revising old rules and fashioning new ones, for unintended and adverse consequences abound. As Professor Tidmarsh reminds us, "All the rules... are interwoven. As with a
17.
See, e.g., Laurens Walker, Avoiding Surprisefrom FederalCivil Rulemaking: The Role of
Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 569, 572-73 (1994); Thomas E. Willging, Pastand Potential
Uses of EmpiricalResearch in Civil Rulemaking, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121, 1124 (2002).
18.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(b) (2006).
19.
One commentator has proposed that the rules process be extended even further. The
author suggests that Congress authorize the federal districts to test promising rules changes for five
years if the proposal secures Judicial Conference approval. See Carl Tobias, A Modest Reform for
FederalProceduralRulemaking, LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Spring/Summer 2001, at 283, 286-87
("With the information that the rule amendment entities derive from that experimentation, the revisors could recalibrate contemplated alterations. Those responsible for rule amendment might then
recommend formal modifications with greater confidence about how the nascent measures would
operate practically, while members of the bench and bar, as well as litigants, could comment on the
suggested changes in a manner informed by experience of how they actually function."). In 1991, in
response to the Civil Justice Reform Act, the Civil Rules Committee proposed amending Rule 83 to
explicitly permit a district, subject to Judicial Conference approval, to adopt experimental local roles
inconsistent with the Civil Rules, provided they were consistent with applicable federal statutes and
limited in duration to five years or less. During the public comment period, the Committee received
some criticisms of this proposal, but ultimately recommended adoption of the revision largely unchanged. Several months later, the Standing Committee recommitted this proposal to the Civil Rules
Advisory Committee for further study. The proposed amendment never resurfaced. The published
proposal appears in Proposed Rules, 137 F.R.D. 53, 72 (1991); Amendments to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 533 (1993) (letter to Hon. Robert E. Keeton); id at 517 (communication from the Chief Justice).
20.
Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 609 (2009) (citation omitted); see also
id. ("We expect that the combination of standard postjudgment appeals, § 1292(b) appeals, mandamus, and contempt appeals will continue to provide adequate protection to litigants ordered to disclose materials purportedly subject to the attorney-client privilege. Any further avenue for immediate appeal of such rulings should be furnished, if at all, through rulemaking, with the opportunity
for full airing it provides.").
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'21
spider's web, a tug on a single rule can collapse the entire structure.
The rules committees must, therefore, take their time lest in revision,
they do more harm than good.

Of course, the merits of any proposed rule revision is the central focus of the work of the Civil Rules Committee. The authors in this Issue
have, quite predictably, made a good case for each of the particular revisions they propose. That often happens. The proponents of rule changes
are persuasive in presenting their case. And when that happens, the Civil
Rules Committee must look beyond the particular merits of any individual rule revisions to other factors and interests. In short, the Committee
must balance several, often competing, interests and influences in deciding whether to propose a change to the rules, even one that on its face
appears meritorious.
A preeminent consideration is always the Rules Enabling Act itself.
That law provides the rules committees with authority to promulgate
procedural changes, but enjoins them from abridging, enlarging or modifying "any substantive right., 22 Much has been written about the often
illusory distinction between procedure and substance,23 and I will not
venture into those waters here. But it is important to understand that the
advisory committees and the Standing Committee are very much cognizant of their important, yet limited, roles. When a rules committee believes that a proposed change comes too close to the substantive line, it
will, instead, suggest legislation for Congress to consider. That happened
with class actions-a subject addressed by Elizabeth Cabraser in her
article.24 The Civil Rules Committee's suggestions prompted a change in
the Judicial Conference position that contributed to the ultimate passage
of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,25 and there are many other

21.
Tidmarsh, supra note 3, at 407.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
23.
See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 392 (1989) (acknowledging "the logical morass of distinguishing substantive and procedural rules" and that "this Court's rulemaking
under the enabling Acts has been substantive and political in the sense that the rules of procedure
have important effects on the substantive rights of litigants"); Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficiency, 87 GEO. L.J.
887, 889 (1999) ("Even supporters of court rulemaking at times conceded that procedure and substance were 'inextricably intertwined,' that ostensibly procedural rules sometimes involved policy
choices, and that such choices had important substantive effects."); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Undemocratic Legislation, 87 YALE L.J. 1284, 1289 (1977) (reviewing JACK B. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF
COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES (1977)) ('his does not mean there are no interesting and
engaging questions in locating the boundaries of 'procedure,' .... These questions, however, are not
different in kind or degree of significance from those arising out of rules such as the scope of 'standing to sue' or abstention, or deference to pending state court proceedings ... rules that the Supreme
Court must periodically reexamine .... ).
24. See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Apportioning Due Process: Preservingthe Right to Affordable
Justice, 87 DENY. U. L. REv. 437, 448 (2010) ("Despite the class action-and plaintiffs' lawyerbashing that attended the passage of [the Class Action Fairness Act], the Act itself, albeit plagued by
internal inconsistencies and undefined terms, announced benign goals.").
25. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2006)).
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similar examples.26 Professor Spencer's suggestion for expanding federal
court jurisdiction by abrogating Rule 4's territorial limitation on personal
jurisdiction might qualify as a change that perhaps Congress should consider.27 After all, Congress has, from time to time, enacted statutes providing for nationwide jurisdiction. Therefore, this is something Congress
can do if it concludes that it is sensible to delink the personal jurisdictional reach of federal courts from the limits of state-court jurisdiction,
and to provide for nationwide personal jurisdiction in federal courts.
I might add that this conversation between the rules committees and
Congress is not a one-way street. Occasionally, Congress asks the rules
committees to propose appropriate rules. Congress did so in victims'
rights legislation, the recent bankruptcy reform statute, and the federal
evidence rule regarding disclosure of privileged information.28
Another important interest is that of stability. 29 If the rules are constantly changing, the players-parties, lawyers and judges-cannot possibly keep track of the "rules of the game., 30 I dare say that many lawyers, and even judges, recall from memory what the rules say or said
(perhaps from law school), and do not look them up each time a given
rule is implicated in their case. There is nothing wrong with this simple
26. A recent example is the amendments to Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
were proposed by the Standing Committee and enacted by Congress. Act of Sept. 19, 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-322, 122 Stat. 3537 (addressing waiver of the attorney-client privilege and the work product
doctrine). Recent amendments to various time provisions of federal statutes also followed suggestions by the Standing Committee for the statutory changes to accommodate recent changes on time
computation rules, which went into effect on December 1, 2009. See, e.g., Statutory Time-Periods
Technical Amendments Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-16, 123 Stat. 1607; see also Proposed
Amendments Submitted to the Congress (2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/supct0309.html.
27. A. Benjamin Spencer, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction for our Federal Courts, 87
DENV. U. L. REV. 325, 326 (2010) ("[W]hether the jurisdictional reach of state courts should be the
measuring rod for the jurisdictional reach of federal courts is another matter."). Rule 4(k)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for personal jurisdiction nationwide, but it is very narrow,
applying only to a claim arising under federal law, and only to a defendant who has sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole to satisfy due process requirements, but who is, for whatever
reason, not subject to jurisdiction in any state's courts of general jurisdiction. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2).
As the Advisory Committee note acknowledges, the rule fills in a small gap. Id. advisory committee's notes to 1993 amendment. Rule 4(k)(2) is certainly of a different dimension than the rule Professor Spencer envisions.
28. See, e.g., Crime Victims' Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2006); Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended
at 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2006)); FED. R. EvID. 502; COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE (Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/supctOI08/ExcerptST

Report -re_
CRRules.pdf COMM.

ON RULEs OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, EXCERPT FROM THIE REPORT

OF THE JUDICIAL

CONFERENCE (Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/supctOl08/
ExcerptSTReport-reBKRules.pdf; COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REPORT
OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON EVIDENCE RULES (Federal Rules of Evidence).

29. Charles Clark expressed the view that "the amending process will operate with comparative infrequency." Charles E. Clark, "Clarifying" Amendments to the FederalRules?, 14 OHIO ST.
L.J. 241, 242 (1953).
30. See Stempel, supra note 6, at 346-47 ("[S]erial revision of the text of the Rules ('tinkering' to those less supportive) continues, without much evidence to suggest it has improved the federal adjudication process.").

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:2

fact of life. Therefore, when the text of rules or their location constantly
changes, that presents special problems for both lawyers and judges. The
rule book must be stable and predictable.
There has been a fair amount of change recently. The Civil Rules
were completely restyled; rules regarding electronic discovery were added; new rules on how time is computed went into effect as of December
1, 2009; and a new rule governing summary judgment-a rule that is
implicated in many cases-was recently proposed with an effective date
of December 1, 2010. These significant rule changes place a special burden on those proposing civil rule revisions to justify their need. For if the
need is not great, then perhaps we should let lawyers and judges catch
their collective breath and get comfortable with the current rule regime
before changing the rules yet again. In short, stability should matter.
Changing technology often cuts against the need for stability, however. The electronic discovery rules are an object lesson. The rules spoke
of "paper" at a time when the world was moving to electrons. Keeping
the rules stable meant ignoring the vast changes that technology had already brought to those outside the courthouse.31 In the words of Judge
Clark and Professor Moore, the rules were no longer "workable" when it
came to electronic discovery. And so the rules had to change. The Civil
Rules Committee is currently besieged by suggestions for tinkering with
the electronic discovery rules. Some changes are suggested in this issue.
Surely some revision will be needed. To date, however, the committee
has decided to let the current electronic discovery rules continue to operate (at least for a while longer) both to promote stability and also to see
how the rules operate in practice so that we have a good empirical base
on which to consider any changes. As Judge Rosenthal, Chair of the
Standing Committee, commented recently, "[W]e are always balancing
the need to keep the3 system
current without changing the Rules so often
2
that it is disrupting.'
The Civil Rules Committee is always alert when a proposed rule
change may favor one group of litigants over another. A proposed
change may appear sensible on its face. But, if in practice the proposed
change is likely to advantage one group at the expense of another, that
fact may counsel against a change. That said, circumstances may emerge
that require redressing an imbalance that has emerged in practice; some
31.
See Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 229 n.14 ("[A] system of discovery control that fails to
take account of the special needs and unique impact of the computer age is destined to fail." (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Ma-

trix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561, 589-92, 628 (2001))).
32.
Celebrating a Masterpiece: The 75th Anniversary of the Rules Enabling Act, THIRD
BRANCH, Oct. 2009, at 6,available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/2009-10/article0l .cfm#; see also
Patrick Oot, Anne Kershaw & Herb Roitblat, Mandating Reasonableness in a Reasonable Inquiry,

87 DENY. U. L. REV.533, 535 (2010) ("As technology continues to imbed itself in the social fabric
of our lives, lawyers representing clients must take on the task of learning how technology works
and how it affects us, both before and after litigation is commenced.").
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of the electronic discovery rules that the Committee adopted in 2006 may
fall within that description. In short, the rules must not only be fair in
their application, they also must be perceived to be fair by litigants. As
Elizabeth Cabraser discusses in her article, due process must be shared
equitably, and "[d]ue process does not exist if it is not shared among
adversaries. 33
Recently, while considering changes to Rule 56(a), the Civil Rules
Committee found that a proposed change might favor either defendants
or plaintiffs. The ambiguous word "shall" was replaced by "should" in
the Style Project, encountering little resistance, even as the Committee
Note expressly embraced discretion to deny summary judgment even
when there is no genuine "issue" of material fact. When "should" was
carried forward in the proposed Rule 56 revisions, defense counsel
awoke and protested vigorously, arguing that the Committee should
change "should" to "must." Further research showed a real divide in case
pronouncements. Therefore, defying the clearest of all the Style Project
commands, the Civil Rules Committee restored "shall" to avoid favoring
either defendants or plaintiffs.34
The scope of any proposed rule change also matters. The Civil
Rules Committee typically deals with essentially two types of changes.
Some changes are really just clarifications or tweaking of the existing
rules. Often, clarifications appear to be appropriate. But upon further
review, the Committee learns that most judges have properly interpreted
and administered the rule as written; the rule is being applied consistently and in an even-handed manner in most instances. The question at that
point is whether to change the rule when few have it wrong. Before proposing rules changes, the Civil Rules Committee needs to know that
there is some practice or approach that a change to the rule can improve
or alter in a positive manner for a significant group of cases. Is the problem in the rule text, or in its application by a few judges? 35 If the latter, a
rule change may not be needed if a significant number of cases will not
be affected by the rule revision. In those circumstances, the hope is that
over time the judges who got it wrong will see the error of their ways and
the ship will right itself.
Even if the problem does in fact lie with the text of the rule, but not
many cases would be affected by a change, the Civil Rules Committee
may decide to postpone changes to see how case law develops. Alterna33.

Cabraser, supra note 24, at 472.

34.
CiviL RULES ADVISORY COMM., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT TO
STANDING COMMrrEE: MAY 2009, at 20-21 (2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/CV05-

2009.pdf.
35. See Gordon W. Netzorg & Tobin D. Kern, ProportionalDiscovery-Making it the Norm,
Rather than the Exception, 87 DENV. U. L. REv. 513, 527 (2010) ("[W]hile proportionality limits are
available, in practice the guidelines are rarely used. Instead, proportionality takes a back seat to the
strong presumption in favor of broad and liberal discovery."); see also Subrin, supra note 4.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:2
36

tively, the particular rule in question may not be used much in practice.
For example, the Committee has frequently been urged to consider
changes to Rule 68 dealing with offers of judgment, and that subject remains on the Civil Rules Committee's agenda. Jay Horowitz's article
focuses on Rule 68 and discusses several potential and important revisions.37 The Committee recognizes that the text and structure of Rule 68
could be refined. But in practice, Rule 68 is currently used infrequently
by lawyers-a fact noted in the title to Mr. Horowitz's article. Therefore,
the Civil Rules Committee has not seen a need to act promptly on the
many suggestions for changes in Rule 68. Furthermore, any likely
changes to Rule 68 would entail dramatic revision, with the attendant
controversy that comes with bold change-a subject addressed below.

Nevertheless, on occasion rules need to be tweaked to eliminate a
latent or patent ambiguity, or to bring the rule into line with statutory
changes or practice developments.38 When such tinkering revisions are in
order, the Civil Rules Committee wisely tends to do them in batches so
that lawyers and judges do not have to remain on continuing alert to
changes. Too many minor changes can undermine stability.
Large rule changes are often controversial to some degree and pose
special problems. These are not tinkering changes but instead major
changes to the way in which lawyers practice in the federal courts. Some
large proposed rule changes may result in rather complex and complicated frameworks. Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure commands that the rules be "construed and administered to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding., 39 In his article, Professor Bone suggests several textual improvements to what he terms this "master rule" to account for today's litigation
36.
For example, in 2006 the Civil Rules Committee considered changes to Rule 15(c)(3)(B),
dealing with relation back. The Committee decided not to make suggested amendments to Rule
15(c) because, as reported by Professor Cooper, the Committee's Reporter, the "committee had not
found any significant problems with the current rule in practice, notwithstanding the theoretical
problems that seem to lurk in the rule's text. Moreover, the proposed changes would be very difficult
to make because they raise complex issues under the Rules Enabling Act. Therefore, the committee
had removed it from the agenda." COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., MINUTES: JUNE 22-23, at 21 (2006), http:l/www.uscourts.gov/rules/
MinutesST06-2006-min.pdf.
37.
See Jay Horowitz, Rule 68: The Settlement Promotion Tool That Has Not Promoted
Settlements, 87 DENV. U. L. REv. 485, 486 (2010) (proposing ways of remedying the "dysfunctional
situation" posed by Rule 68 and making it "more useful"); see also William P. Lynch, Rule 68
Offers of Judgment: Lessons from the New Mexico Experience,39 N.M. L. REv. 349 (2009).
38.

See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 14 (1977)

("Rules, like legislation, permit a whole multitude of possible procedural and related issues to be
decided at once, with a possible saving of judicial energy in individual cases."). But see Hazard,
supra note 23, at 1290 ("Rules as they are now developed--drafted by academic technicians, approved by a committee of expert practitioners, widely disseminated for comment, and submitted to
Congress-represent the product of a process markedly superior to that currently used to develop
delegated legislation of infinitely greater variety and complexity, but entitled to a strong presumption
of validity."). See generally Struve, supra note 15, at 1123-69.
39.
FED.R. Ciy. P. 1.

2010]

TO REVISE, OR NOT TO REVISE

culture.4° Professor Bone would change Rule 1 so that the rules would be
construed and administered "to distribute the risk of outcome error fairly
and efficiently with due regard for party participation appropriate to the
case, due process and other constitutional constraints, and practical limitations on a judge's ability to predict consequences accurately and assess
system-wide effects.' 4 1 I must say that I favor the simplicity and brevity
of the current rule. Personal preferences aside, however, unless and until
Rule 1 is revised, the Civil Rules Committee will likely continue to endeavor to follow the dictates of the master rule and will seek to reduce
complexity, not increase it, so as to foster the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. Complicated constructs are, therefore,
not particularly favored.
Some large revisions are truly revolutionary in nature, and raise for
the Civil Rules Committee the question whether incremental change is
better than a dramatic make-over. There will always be those who favor
bold change. As one author put it:
[1]t is again time to consider bold reforms to our procedural system.
Today our system faces pressures and challenges across numerous
fronts, and modest tweaking of this rule or that doctrine cannot address the system's fundamental crisis.... The time for clear-eyed critique and for imagination about the next procedural moment is
42
now.
If a revolutionary change is controversial-and most are-it might
well be better to adopt the entire change, rather than dragging out the
controversy for years and years. As Judge Charles Clark once observed,
"[H]alfiearted reform is worse than none at all-having4 3all the vices of
novelty and none of the virtues of lasting improvement.'
Certainly, the changes in pleading standards suggested in Justice
Kourlis's article are revolutionary and controversial, as are those suggested by Professor Tidmarsh. 44 Professor Subrin's suggestion for abandoning the philosophical principle underlying the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure-that the same rules should apply to all cases regardless of the
substantive laws that govern those cases-would also count as a "bold"

See Robert G. Bone, Improving Rule 1: A Master Rule for the FederalRules, 87 DENV. U.
40.
L. REV. 287 (2010).
41.
Id. at 300; see also id. at 301 ("My proposal guides and constrains not by dictating precise
results-that would be impractical and inadvisable given the inevitability and desirability of some
case-specific discretion-but by orienting the thought process of trial judges, framing the type of
analysis they should conduct, and identifying the factors that should be taken into account.").
Jay Tidmarsh, Pound's Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 513, 516-17 (2006)
42.
(emphasis added).
43.
Charles E. Clark, The FederalRules of Civil Procedure1938-1958: Two Decades of the
FederalCivil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 435,451 (1958).
44.
See generallyKourlis, Singer & Knowlton, supra note 1; Tidmarsh, supranote 3 (proposing alterations to pleading standards).
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change.45 Indeed, any effort to change that foundational assumption
would certainly qualify as another "Big Bang."
At the same time, incremental change can have benefits. It allows
the Civil Rules Committee-not to mention the bench and bar-to see
how a change works in practice before instituting further revision. Interested parties can thus become comfortable with the change and see the
benefit of the next increment. In consequence, the controversy that attended the original proposal may well diminish or even vanish.
From time to time, the Civil Rules Committee also considers
whether to embody best practices in the rules themselves. Some of the
rule changes proposed in this issue could fit within that category. Consider, for example, Judge Rosenthal's suggestions for two changes in
Rule 16, for in-court hearings and for pre-motion conferences in connection with discovery disputes.46 Consider also Daniel Girard and Todd
Espinosa's three intriguing suggestions for changes in the discovery rules
designed to overcome judicial reluctance to enforce the current rule regime. 47 Yet in considering best practice changes, the Civil Rules Committee must balance whether it is best to have general rules that give
judges and lawyers flexibility to adopt a variety of practices or whether
to insist on a national, best practices model. It may be that a certain practice has become so entrenched that it should be included in the rules.
However, sometimes one person's best practice is another's worst
45.
See Subrin, supra note 4, at 394 ("There is no sensible reason why some cases cannot
maintain the advantages of the Federal Rule wide-open, equity-based procedural system while others
are handled with a more contained system that has the restraint advantages historically associated
with common law procedure."). Professor Burbank has put it this way:
The meaning of the Enabling Act aside, the normative question whether we are well
served today by a rule-making enterprise that continues to frame rules and amendments
for all cases filed in federal district court, no matter what the source or content of the
substantive law, has been a subject of vigorous discussion and debate in the literature.
Defenders of this foundational assumption have, by and large, ignored the fact that those
questioning it are not calling for wholly different procedural regimes for different bodies
of substantive law. The call in this respect has been for consideration of altering only discrete Federal Rules, or portions thereof, that do not satisfactorily implement the policies
underlying a body of substantive law or a particular scheme of substantive rights, with all
other Federal Rules remaining applicable.
Stephen B. Burbank, Pleadingand the Dilemmas of "GeneralRules," 2009 Wis. L. REV. 535, 54243 (2009).
46.
See Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 242 ("Neither of these procedures is suggested as a rule.
That would be inconsistent with the flexibility that Rule 16 embodies. But many judges already use
these or similar procedures and have found them to be a helpful way of using the many tools that
Rule 16 provides to identify, early in the case, opportunities for effective control of discovery.").
47.
See Daniel C. Girard & Todd . Espinosa, Proposed Amendments to the FederalRules to
Control Litigation Costs By Limiting Discovery Tactics, 87 DENY. U. L. REv. 473 (2010) (proposing: (1) to revise Rule 26(b)(1)(B) to explicitly require the party or attorney to certify that the responses are not evasive; (2) to amend Rule 34(b)(2)(B) and Rule 37(a)(3)(B)(iv) to address the now
common practice of producing rather than permitting inspection of documents; and (3) to add a
provision to Rule 34(b)(2)(C) that requires the responding party to specify whether documents are
being withheld on the basis of any asserted defense); see also Oot, Kershaw & Roitblat, supra note
32, at 535 ("Quite simply, litigants require tools and guidance to help them develop discovery
processes to meet the standards of Rule I and provide a clear path to alternatives to traditional methodologies.").
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nightmare. Best practices also evolve over time. Perhaps, then, it is better
to adopt rules that allow judges and lawyers flexibility so they can continue to experiment with practices that work best, rather than imposing a
single best practices model. 48 Of course, the countervailing interest-and
there always is one-is the need for national uniformity in what is supposed to be a uniform federal system.49
I am certain that I have not exhausted the list of factors and interests
the Civil Rules Committee must balance in deciding whether to change
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Nevertheless, I have tried to give a
flavor of the balance the committee members must strike in deciding
whether to exercise their considerable judgment to revise the rules, or
not.
This is an important year for the Civil Rules Advisory Committee.
2010, the Committee and others will take stock of the state of
May
In
civil justice in the United States courts at a major conference to be held
at Duke Law School. In his great article about Professor Moore and his
contribution to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Professor Robert
Cover wrote that Professor Moore "always envisioned the Federal Rules
as a tool which embodies a practical philosophy of procedure, one which
liberates the courts to achieve substantive ends. 5 ° I like to think that is
what the Civil Rules Committee continues to do to this day-to provide
judges the procedures necessary to "liberate" them to decide individual
cases on their substantive merits with competence and integrity. In this
sense (and perhaps predictably, given my membership in the judicial
"cult"), I take issue with the premise of Professor Stempel's article, at
least insofar as rulemaking is concerned, that "[w]e have accepted too
much mediocrity in both the application of law and in legal outcomes. 51
And with apologies to Professor Tidmarsh, while we must not ignore the
cost of operating our federal procedural system, I, for one, continue to
believe that we need procedural rules in place that allow judges to reSeveral years ago, the Rules Committee considered a proposal on simplified procedure.
48.
See Edward H. Cooper, Simplified Rules of FederalProcedure?, 100 MICH. L. REv. 1794, 1800-01
(2002). This sensible proposal was not adopted in part because many members of the Committee felt
that Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure already allowed judges to adopt such procedures in appropriate cases with the consent of counsel. A new rule was not needed. Simplified procedure may yet again return to the Rules Committee's docket.
See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, FederalRule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practiceof Rule49.
making, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1969, 1974 (1989) ("The hope of the rulemakers, I believe, was a good
deal more ambitious. They wanted lawyers who went into any federal court (and a growing number
of lawyers had practices that focused on the federal courts in a number of states, rather than on
federal and state courts within a single state) to know what to expect and not to have to undergo an
initiation period or to rely heavily on the wisdom of local practitioners. They wanted to eliminate
petty haggling over pointless distinctions among types of cases, and to treat as many cases as possible under the same general rubric.").
Robert M. Cover, ForJames Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84
50.
YALE L.J. 718, 739-40 (1975).
See Stempel, supra note 6, at 345.
51.
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solve individual cases "on their merits," in the sense in which Roscoe
Pound used those terms. In its continuing effort to achieve the lofty goals
Professor Moore set for the rulemakers, I am certain the Civil Rules
Committee will want to consider, possibly within the framework I have
set forth above, the proposals discussed in this important Issue of the
Denver University Law Review.

FROM RULES OF PROCEDURE TO How LAWYERS LITIGATE:
'TWIXT THE CUP AND THE Lip
LEE H. ROSENTHAL
There's many a slip 'twixt cup and lip
- Old English Proverb
INTRODUCTION

The 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure brought a new era to
civil litigation in the United States. The rules replaced formalistic pleading with notice pleading; replaced extremely limited discovery with rules
that "went farther than any single system anywhere";' and replaced varying rules with a single set of rules that would apply in every federal trial
court and to every kind of civil case in the country. After seventy years,
one would think that what the rules mean and how they apply would
have achieved both clarity and stability. However, we are still debating
such fundamental questions as how to unpack the notice-pleading standard of Rule 82 and the extent to which special rules should apply to different kinds of cases or different districts as an exception to transsubstantivity or national uniformity.
Many of the ongoing debates are about discovery. The 2007 and
2009 Supreme Court decisions on the sufficiency of pleading were
based, in part, on a concern that discovery is so expensive and burdensome that pleadings must be found sufficient before discovery is allowed
to begin.3 Many of the relatively recent additions to local rules are driven
t Lee H. Rosenthal is a United States District Judge in the Southern District of Texas.
Judge Rosenthal served as a member, then Chair, of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and since 2007 has served as Chair of the Judicial Conference
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure. This article represents Judge Rosenthal's own views.
Andrea Kuperman, Judge Rosenthal's law clerk, contributed to this article.
1. Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The HistoricalBackground of the 1938
FederalDiscovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REv. 691,726 (1998).
2.
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1947-54 (2009) (analyzing the level of
specificity in pleadings required to avoid dismissal); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
554-70 (2007) (same).
3.
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 ("Probably, then, it is only by taking care to require allegations that reach the level suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the potentially enormous
expense of discovery in cases with no 'reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process will
reveal relevant evidence' to support a § 1 claim." (alteration in original) (quoting Dura Pharms., Inc.
v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005))); see also lqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (noting that "the question
presented by a motion to dismiss a complaint for insufficient pleadings does not turn on the controls
placed upon the discovery process," and that the "rejection of the careful-case-management approach is especially important in suits where Government-official defendants are entitled to assert
the defense of qualified immunity" because "[t]he basic thrust of the qualified-immunity doctrine is
to free officials from the concerns of litigation, including 'avoidance of disruptive discovery' (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
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by pressure to address electronic discovery problems.4 Other additions
are driven by a belief that certain kinds of cases, such as patent disputes,
require a special set of rules.5 Since their inception in 1938, the rules of
discovery have been revised with what some view as distressing frequency. And yet the rulemakers continue to hear that the rules are inadequate
to control discovery costs and burdens.
The expressions of discontent over discovery are well known. Discovery, it is said, is overused by aggressive plaintiffs and is met with
obstruction by reluctant defendants. 6 The adversarial nature of lawyers
and litigants and the incentives of the hourly fee are said to combine to
encourage attempts to discover "any and all" potential evidence and attempts to resist any discovery. 7 It is said that the use or even the threat of
broad discovery discourages potential plaintiffs from filing cases and,
when cases are filed, encourages settlements, often on terms that do not
reflect the strength or weakness of the merits of the claim or defense. 8 It
is also said that discovery diminishes the willingness to try cases and
helps explain the continued decline in trials. 9
Many of the criticisms leveled against discovery today sound similar to those raised in the debates in the 1930s over the broad discovery
provisions in the newly proposed civil rules. The drafting and adoption
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were accompanied by expres-

4. See, e.g., E. & W.D. ARK. CT. R. 26.1(4)(e) (requiring the report filed under FED. R. CIv.
P. 26(f) to "contain the parties' views and proposals regarding" certain matters, including "problems
which the parties anticipate may arise in connection with electronic or computer-based discovery");
D. COLO. CT. R. app. f (providing instructions for preparation of a scheduling order, which should
contain a report of preconference discovery and meeting under FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) that includes: a
"[s]tatement as to whether the parties anticipate that their claims or defenses will involve extensive
electronically stored information, or that a substantial amount of disclosure or discovery will involve
information or records maintained in electronic form"; in cases involving such electronic discovery,
an indication of "what steps [the parties] have taken or will take to (i) preserve electronically stored
information; (ii) facilitate discovery of electronically stored information; (iii) limit associated discovery costs and delay; and (iv) avoid discovery disputes relating to electronic discovery"; and a
description of "any agreements the parties have reached for asserting claims of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation materials after production of computer-generated records"); S.D. GA. CT.
R. 26(f) Report (stating that a report under FED. R. CIv. P. 26(f) should include, if the case involves
electronic discovery, a statement as to "whether the parties have reached an agreement regarding the
preservation, disclosure, or discovery of electronically stored information" and an identification of
"any issues regarding electronically stored information as to which the parties have been unable to
reach an agreement"; and, if the case involves privilege or work-product claims, a statement as to
"whether the parties have reached an agreement regarding the procedures for asserting claims of
privilege or protection after production of either electronic or other discovery material"); N.D. OHIO
CT. R. 16.3(b)(2)(F) (referencing a default standard for conducting electronic discovery if the parties
have not agreed).
5. See, e.g., N.D. CAL. PATENT L.R. 1-1 ("Patent Local Rules"); N.D. ILL. L.R. 3.4 ("Notice
of Claims Involving Patents or Trademarks"); S.D. TEX. P.R. 1-1 ("Rules of Practice for Patent
Cases in the Southern District of Texas"); E.D. TEX. P.R. 1-1 app. m ("Rules of Practice for Patent
Cases").
6. See Subrin, supra note 1, at 706.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 706-07.
9.
Id. at 707.
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sions of deep concern over the liberal discovery they provided. t In 2009,
the 1930s debates over discovery rules sound both modern and familiar.
William DeWitt Mitchell, then-Chairman of the Judicial Conference's
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, woried in the 1930s that, "[w]e are
going to have an outburst against this discovery business unless we can
hedge it about with some appearance of safety against fishing expeditions."1 1 Another Committee member, Robert G. Dodge, emphasized
that, "[iun some way the courts must have control... and power to check
abuses." 12 The demands for meaningful limits and controls on discovery
have been loud and vigorous for decades.1 3 These demands
have received
14
discovery.
electronic
of
advent
the
with
force
renewed
The discovery rules have been revised more frequently than any
other section. The frequency of changes-in 1946, 1970, 1983, 1991,
1993, 2000, and 2006-in part reflects the extent to which changes in
technology, commerce, and business have impacted the practice of law
and the laudable commitment of rulemakers to keep the rules abreast
10. Id. at 706-07 ("A discovery-skeptic both in the 1930s and today might share the concerns
expressed during the Advisory Committee drafting process or in the debates about the Federal Rules:
that expanded discovery provisions, combined with the adversarial nature of lawyers and their
clients and the natural desire of attorneys to earn a good living, would result in extreme attempts to
resist disclosure and to discover every shred of potential evidence; that the actual utilization of
discovery or even the threat thereof would dramatically influence what cases are brought and how
they are settled in ways that may not reflect the true merits of a lawsuit or potential lawsuit; that
expansive discovery provisions would require courts to spend significant time ruling on discovery
motions; and that expanded discovery would diminish the use and importance of trial in open
court.").
11.
Id. at 722 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Proceedings of the Meeting of the
Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure of the Supreme Court of the United States (Feb.
22, 1935), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE: COMMrTrEES ON RULES OF PRACrICE
AND PROCEDURES, 1935-1988, microformed on CIS No. CI-206-59 (Cong. Info. Serv.)).

12.
Id. at 721 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Proceedings of the Meeting of the
Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure of the Supreme Court of the United States (Feb.
22, 1935), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE: COMMrITEES ON RULES OF PRACICE
AND PROCEDURES, 1935-1988, microformed on CIS Nos. CI-209-59 to -60 (Cong. Info. Serv.)).

13.
See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, Discovery ContainmentRedux, 39 B.C. L. REv. 747, 752-53
(1998) (describing rising opposition to broad discovery); Maurice Rosenberg & Warren R. King,
Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough is Enough, 1981 BYU L. REV. 579, 579
(1981) (noting that "[rlecent years have witnessed a torrent of criticism of the practice of pretrial
discovery in federal litigation," and noting one commentator's concern that "'[u]nnecessary intrusions into the privacy of the individual, high costs to the litigants, and correspondingly unfair use of
the discovery process as a lever toward settlement have come to be part of some lawyers' trial strategy."' (quoting William H. Erickson, The Pound ConferenceRecommendations: A Blueprintfor the
Justice System in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277, 288 (1978))).
14.
See, e.g., Thomas Y. Allman, The Need for Federal Standards Regarding Electronic
Discovery, 68 DEF. COUNS. J. 206, 206 (2001) ("[T]here is an urgent need to treat the discovery of
electronic records differently from traditional documents, and amendments to the Federal Rules are
necessary to help impose order in an area of the law that is both unpredictable and increasingly
subject to abuse."); Richard L. Marcus, Confronting the Future: Coping with Discovery of Electronic Material, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. Spring/Summer 2001, at 253, 259-60 (discussing rising
concerns about electronic discovery); Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation
Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561, 589-92, 628 (2001) (arguing that the costs and burdens of electronic
discovery are "substantially greater" than the costs and burdens involved in traditional discovery,
and concluding that "a system of discovery control that fails to take account of the special needs and
unique impact of the computer age is destined to fail").
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with fundamental changes in practice. The frequent changes also, in part,
reflect the continued complaints about discovery and the ongoing efforts
to locate reasonable limits on the broad discovery that the rules allow.
There continues to be a demand for rule changes that will better control
discovery costs and burdens and reduce the attendant delays. That deserves to be the subject of unremitting study. The Rules Committees
have the task of monitoring the rules to ensure that they are working
properly, and that responsibility has been met with diligent commitment.15 At the same time, many suggestions that the rules should be
amended to provide for "X" are appropriately met by pointing out that
the rules already, in fact, provide for "X."
There appears to be a gap between the cup of the rules and the lip of
judges, lawyers, and litigants applying them. The inevitable lag between
the proposal of new rules or rule changes and their adoption is part of the
reason and itself counsels against overly frequent amendments. But if the
existing rules are not used, and those rules are believed to be well designed, then it is appropriate to ask why and how to best address that gap.
Professor Steven Gensler recently wrote that it is not necessary to
look for a new rule to state the goal of civil procedure reform.16 Rule 1
already states that goal in elegant terms: "to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. ' 7 Professor
Gensler is surely right. Nor is it necessary to look for a new rule to state
the defining criteria of proper discovery, consistent with Rule 1. Since
1983, Rule 26 has spelled out the proportionality limits on all types of
discovery. Many of the rule changes before and after 1983 can be described as giving judges tools to control toward proportionality.

15. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006) (giving the Supreme Court the "power to prescribe
general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district
courts (including proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals"); id. § 2073
(authorizing the Judicial Conference to prescribe procedures for consideration of proposed rules,
establish committees to assist with the rulemaking process, and establish a standing committee to
review proposals of other committees and to make recommendations to the Judicial Conference);
U.S. Courts, Federal Rulemaking, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/procedurejc.htm (last visited Jan. 4,
2010) ("Each Advisory Committee shall carry on 'a continuous study of the operation and effect of
the general rules of practice and procedure now or hereafter in use' in its particular field, taking into
consideration suggestions and recommendations received from any source, new statutes and court
decisions affecting the rules, and legal commentary.... The Standing Committee shall coordinate
the work of the several Advisory Committees, make suggestions of proposals to be studied by them,
consider proposals recommended by the Advisory Committees, and transmit such proposals with its
recommendation to the Judicial Conference, or recommit them to the appropriate Advisory Committee for further study and consideration.").
16. Steven S. Gensler, Justness! Speed! Inexpense!: An Introduction to The Revolution of
1938 Revisited: The Role and Future of the Federal Rules, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 257, 273 (2008) (observing that "[t]o the extent the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have a rallying cry, it is found in
Rule 1 and it is this: 'Justness! Speed! Inexpense!"'; and noting that "[i]f there is agreement among
our contributors [to the symposium], it may be that the future of federal rulemaking depends not on
finding new ideals but on fidelity to the ones we have").
17. FED. R. Civ.P. 1.
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The theme of this symposium issue is to identify a single change
that should-and could-be made to improve civil litigation. Is there a
single rule or procedure that can be changed to achieve the proportionality in discovery that is essential to just, speedy, and inexpensive case
resolution? No. Have the Federal Rules been changed to try to do so?
Yes, repeatedly. Is there a theme to the rule changes that offers guidance? Yes, and it is a familiar one. Many of the changes to the discovery
rules were designed to increase judicial supervision over pretrial work,
particularly discovery.
At the same time, the rulemakers have recognized that many cases
do not require close judicial supervision or the added burdens that such
supervision can impose, such as detailed discovery plans. Rule changes
have attempted to facilitate the district judge's active involvement in the
cases that need it, when such involvement is likely to be most effective,
and to allow the attorneys and parties otherwise to manage the cases. Yet
the gap from the cup of these rules to the lip of the judges tasked with
providing such supervision, and the lawyers and parties tasked with invoking it, seems to remain. The gap limits the rules' effectiveness and
may push toward other changes that may be less desirable or have more
far-reaching consequences. Reminding ourselves of the potential benefits
available under the existing rules can provide the help that many are
looking to obtain from new or different rules. As every frugal shopper
knows, before spending money on new clothes, it is always a good idea
to review what is already in the closet.
Many studies and surveys analyzing the civil litigation system have
concluded that the critical element in bridging the gap between the rules
and their application is making the district judge more accessible to the
lawyers, more involved in the details of discovery in cases that need such
involvement, and more present in the cases that require such supervision.' 8 This conclusion is consistent with the last half-century of rule
18.
See, e.g., THOMAS E. WLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., DISCOVERY AND
DISCLOSURE PRACTICE, PROBLEMS, AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE: A CASE-BASED NATIONAL
SURVEY OF COUNSEL IN CLOSED FEDERAL CIVIL CASES 44 (1997), http:llwww.fjc.gov/publicl
pdf.nsf/lookup/discovry.pdf/$File/discovry.pdf [hereinafter WILLGING ET AL., SURVEY]; Thomas E.
WiUging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal
Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 584 (1998) ("The change most likely to reduce discovery
expenses, in the view of [our sample of] attorneys, is to increase the availability of judges to resolve
discovery disputes.... The related concept of increasing court management of discovery also ranked
high as a means for reducing discovery expenses ....
");see also Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality,
Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 458 (1991) (noting that
a "study of trial judges and lawyers involved in complex cases found that both believed the system
would benefit from 'greater judicial involvement in the framing and control of discovery, including
resolution of discovery disputes."' (quoting GORDON BERMANT ET AL., PROTRACTED CIVIL TRIALS:

VIEwS FROM THE BENCH AND THE BAR 56 (1981))); Rosenberg & King, supra note 13, at 589 (noting that a 1978 Federal Judicial Center report on discovery practices found that "effective control of
discovery depends upon judicial management" (citing PAUL CONNOLLY ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATION PROCESS: DISCOVERY 77 (1978))); David S. Yoo,
Comment, Rule 33(a)'s InterrogatoryLimitation: By Party or by Side?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 911,924

n.76, 928, (2008) (noting that "studies have demonstrated a high correlation between judicial in-
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amendments. The question, then, is how to increase the use of the rules
that are already on the books, especially those that were designed to facilitate the judges' involvement where and when it is needed.
This Article suggests ways to improve the effective application of
the existing rules. Specifically, the Article suggests ways to incorporate
the optional components of Rule 16 into routine discovery and case management. Part I provides a brief history of the rules of discovery from
adoption of the rules in 1938 to the "highwater mark' of party-managed
discovery in 1970. Part H examines the trend from 1970 to 2006 toward
court-supervised discovery. Part H examines the mandatory and discretionary procedures outlined in Rule 16 and makes two suggestions for
judges to consider as part of case management.
I. A BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

OF DISCOVERY

Professors Stephen Subrin and Richard Marcus aptly describe one
'9
of the results of the 1938 Federal Rules as a "discovery revolution."'
Before 1938, American discovery opportunities were "spotty and incomplete., 20 The words "fishing expedition"-as negative a term then as it is
now-were part of the litigation vocabulary.21 When the rules became
effective in 1938, they provided broader discovery rights than any state
or federal jurisdiction.22 The rules were adopted despite the concern of
volvement and efficient litigation," and referencing a report that "summariz[ed] the results of a study
of more than 10,000 cases that determined that early judicial management of litigation significantly
reduced the duration of litigation" (citing JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND, JUST, SPEEDY, AND
INEXPENSIVE?: AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE

REFORM ACT 6, 13-15 (1996))).
The 1997 Federal Judicial Center study found:
To reduce discovery expenses, the highest percentage of attorneys would look to increased availability of judges to rule on discovery disputes and/or increased court management of discovery (63%) and controls on attorney conduct through sanctions and/or a
civility code (62%). While substantial numbers would also find certain rule changes helpful-for example, the 44% who said a uniform national rule requiring initial disclosure
would reduce expenses and the 35% who said narrowing the scope of discovery would be
helpful-changes in judge and attorney behavior clearly outweigh changes in the rules.
WILLGING ET AL., SURVEY, supra, at 45-46. The study concluded that "[w]hen pressed to select the
single most promising approach to reducing discovery problems, then, the choice that clearly outstrips others is increased judicial case management." Id. at 47.
19.
Marcus, supra note 14, at 255-56; Richard L. Marcus, Retooling American Discovery for
the Twenty-First Century: Toward a New World Order?, 7 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 153, 158-60
(1999); Subrin, supra note 1, at 734, 736.
20. Marcus, supra note 19, at 159.
21.
See id.
22. Subrin, supranote 1, at 719. Professor Subrin quotes Professor Edson R. Sunderland, who
wrote the drafts of the summary judgment and discovery sections of what became the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Professor Sunderland told the Advisory Committee that "he did not have
precedent for the combination of liberalized discovery that he had drafted." Id. He admitted that he
was "going further than any single jurisdiction's discovery provisions." Id He explained:
There is no very well settled system which will embrace the various objects that I have
sought to attain .... [O]ne Rule would be supported by experience in one State or jurisdiction, and another by experience in another State or jurisdiction. You cannot find justification for all of these anywhere. It is strictly an eclectic provision which I have brought
in here.... It was an entirely new subject matter. Now I might say that I made very little
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some members of the Advisory Committee about such liberal discovery,
including overreaching depositions.
The discovery permitted under the 1938 rules was further broadened
in 1946 by amendments that "went a long way toward completing the
discovery revolution. 23 Under those amendments, all discovery was
subject to a "scope of discovery" provision within Rule 26. The main
change was the addition of the statement that "[i]t is not ground for objection that the testimony will be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." 24 Other amendments reduced court control over interrogatories under Rule 33, broadened requests for production under Rule 34,
and made it clear that an objection to one or more specific requests for
admission was not a basis for refusing to respond to the remaining requests.25 The limits on discovery were a judicial protective order under
Rule 26 and motions to terminate or limit discovery-limits that depended on the lawyers asking for specific protection.
The 1970 amendments reached what Professor Richard Marcus
termed the "highwater mark" of party-managed discovery.2 6 Rule 34 was
amended to remove the requirement that made document discovery
available only by a motion based on a "good cause" showing. This requirement was removed, according to the Advisory Committee Notes, in
part because it was so little used.27 The 1970 amendments also removed
the necessity of seeking judicial permission to take a deposition in most
instances,28 and allowed interrogatories and requests for admission to
seek matters of opinion. 29 The 1970 amendments expressly made the
frequency of use of discovery methods unlimited unless otherwise ordered, and allowed discovery to occur in any order.3 ° Since 1970, courts
have seen a series of amendments designed to achieve what Professor
Marcus calls "discovery containment."3 These amendments moved the
line separating party-managed from court-supervised discovery.
use [sic] the Equity Rules or Federal statutes, because they have only in the very slightest
degree provided for what I tried
to do ....
Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Proceedings of Advisory
Committee on Uniform Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Court of the United States (Nov. 17,
1935), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE: COMMITTEES ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURES, 1935-1988, microformedon CIS No. C-1 13-92 (Cong. Info. Serv.)).
23.
Id. at 736.
24.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1946 amendment), reprinted in 6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL.,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26 app. 02 (3d. ed. 2009).
25.
Subrin, supra note 1, at 737-38.
26.
Marcus, supranote 13, at 748.
27.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(3) advisory committee's notes to 1970 amendment.
28. Id. 30(a) (1970 amendment), reprintedin 7 MOORE ET AL., supra note 24, § 30 app. 03.
29. Id. 33(a) (1970 amendment), reprinted in 7 MOORE ET AL., supra note 24, § 33 app. 03;
id. 36(a) advisory committee's notes to 1970 amendment.
30.
Id. 26(a) (1970 amendment), reprinted in 6 MOORE ET AL., supra note 24, § 26 app. 05;
id. 26(d) advisory committee's notes to 1970 amendment.
31.
See generallyMarcus, supranote 13.
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II. MOVING THE LINE
The first set of amendments designed to provide greater judicial
control over discovery was enacted in 1983. Rule 16 was originally entitled "Pre-Trial Procedure; Formulating Issues. ' 32 It permitted a federal
judge to require attorneys to attend a pretrial conference to consider matters such as simplifying issues, pleading amendments, admissions, limiting the number of experts, and referring issues to a master, with a pretrial
order entered to reflect the results.33 Rule 16 was significantly expanded
in 1983, and again in 1993 and 2006. The 1983 amendments were intended to "extend[] the scope of the rule to cover the entirety of the pretrial process, including discovery and motions, and provid[e] judges with
greater flexibility to tailor Rule 16 activities to the needs of a specific
case." 34 As amended, the rule authorizes pretrial conferences and lists
their objectives, requires an early scheduling order that mandates deadlines for certain items and allows them for others, and provides a lengthy
list of subjects that can be considered and acted on at any pretrial conference. 35 The rule also authorizes a final pretrial conference, addresses
pretrial orders, and authorizes sanctions for failing to obey scheduling
36
orders or participate in good faith in scheduling or pretrial conferences.
In 2006, the amendments added authority to include provisions relating
to e-discovery in a scheduling order.37
Also in 1983, Rule 26 was amended to state the criterion for tailoring the pretrial work to the needs of the particular case: proportionality.
Rule 26(b) introduced the proportionality limitations applicable to all
discovery under the Civil Rules. 31 Rule 26(b)(2)(C) now states:
On motion or on its own, the court must limit the frequency or extent
of discovery otherwise allowed by these rules or by local rule if it determines that:
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or
can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive;
(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain
the information by discovery in the action; or
32.

FED. R. Civ. P. 16 (1938 adoption), reprintedin 3 MOORE ET AL., supra note 24, § 16 app.

01.
33. Id.
34. Charles R. Richey, Rule 16 Revisited: Reflections for the Benefit and Bar, 139 F.R.D. 525,
527 (1992).
35.

FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)-(c) (1983 amendment), reprintedin 3 MOORE ET AL, supra note 24,

§ 16 app. 03; id 16(c) (1993 amendment), reprintedin 3 MOORE ET AL., supra note 24, § 16 app. 05.
36.
Id. 16(d)-(f) (1983 amendment), reprinted in 3 MOORE ET AL., supra note 24, § 16 app.
03.
Id. 16(b) (2006 amendment), reprintedin 3 MOORE Er AL., supra note 24, § 16 app. 06.
37.
38. See id. 26(b) (1983 amendment), reprinted in 6 MOORE ET AL., supra note 24, § 26 app.
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(iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its
likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake
in the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.

39

Professor Arthur Miller, the reporter who drafted this rule amend40
ment, described it as a "180-degree shift" in the approach to discovery.
The combination of discovery conferences and the direction to curtail
disproportionate discovery required judges to undertake some managerial
action in most cases and encouraged judicial involvement even when not
required. But, in 1994, commentators noted that this amendment "seems
to have created only a ripple in the caselaw, although some courts now
acknowledge that it is clearer than it was before that they should take
responsibility for the amount of discovery in cases they manage.'
What accounted for the ineffectiveness? Perhaps it is that the broad
discovery provisions embraced in the rules had been in place for fortyfive years. 42 The expectation of broad discovery and the habits of partymanagement proved resistant to the encouragement of judicial control
provided by the 1983 changes to Rule 16 and Rule 26.
In 1993, 2000, and 2006, additional amendments sought to make the
tools provided in 1983 more effective. In 1993, Rule 16 was amended to
allow judges to consider at pretrial conferences "the control and scheduling of discovery," as well as disclosures under Rule 26 and Rules 29 to
37.43 Rule 26(d) continued to allow judges to control the sequence of
discovery, and the 1993 amendments imposed a moratorium on formal
discovery until "the parties ha[d] met and conferred as required" under
Rule 26(f).44 Rule 26(f) required the parties to meet and confer to prepare
the discovery plan. 45 In 2000, a rule amendment twenty years in the making (because it was viewed as so controversial) narrowed the scope of
discovery in Rule 26(b)(1) from "relevant to the subject matter involved
in the pending action" to "relevant to the claim or defense of any party.' '46 For good cause shown, the court could order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter.47 This explicitly divided discovery into

39.
40.

Id. 26(b)(2)(C).

ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER
RESPONSIBILITY 33 (1984).
41.
8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2008.1, at 121

(2d ed. 1994).
42.
Marcus, supra note 19, at 163.
43.
FED. R. CIv. P. 16(c) (1993 amendment), reprinted in 3 MOORE ET AL., supranote 24, §
16 app. 05.
44. Id. 26(d) (1993 amendment), reprintedin 6 MOORE ET AL., supra note 24, § 26 app. 09.
45. Id. 26(f) (1993 amendment), reprintedin 6 MOORE ET AL., supra note 24, § 26 app. 09.
46. Id. 26(b)(1) (2000 amendment), reprintedin 6 MOORE ET AL., supranote 24, § 26 app. 10.
47. The full text of Rule 26(b)(1) now provides:
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two tiers: party-managed discovery regarding "any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party"; and broader
court-ordered and supervised discovery of "any matter relevant to the
subject matter involved in the action. 4 8 The same rule was amended to
clarify that only relevant information can be discovered-not all information that might lead to the discovery of admissible evidence-and to
invoke the proportionality limits. 49 Although the debate over the change
in the scope of discovery was passionate, it too was perceived as having
little effect on practice. One explanation was that any effect was
swamped by the changes that e-discovery brought.
In 2006, rule amendments to give judges additional tools to manage
the distinctive aspects of e-discovery were enacted. These amendments
further defined a discovery regime bifurcated between party-managed
disclosure and discovery, and court-supervised discovery. The amendments encourage parties to ask the court to take an earlier, more detailed,
and more frequent role in managing discovery. The amended rules require parties to include electronically stored information in initial disclosures, 50 in the mandated early discovery-planning conference of counsel, 51 and in the report to the court.52 The court is permitted, but not required, to include electronically stored information in the scheduling
order as well. 5 The amendments to Rule 16 and Rule 26(f) require the
parties to discuss general e-discovery matters at the meet-and-confer
conference and to discuss three issues in particular that, if deferred or
ignored, often produce disputes: the form of production, data preservation, and privilege waiver. 54 The amendments were designed to require
parties to discuss these issues early in the case and to seek early judicial
involvement if agreements cannot be reached. These changes were intended to get the judge involved early in the cases that need such supervision---early enough to make the involvement most helpful.

Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may
obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim
or defense-including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location
of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons who
know of any discoverable matter. For good cause, the court may order discovery of any
matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need
not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by
Rule 26(b)(2)(C).
48.
Id.
See id. 26(b)(1) (2000 amendment), reprinted in 6 MOORE ET AL., supra note 24, § 26
49.
app. 10.

50.
Id. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii).
Id.26(f).
51.
52. Id.app. form 35 (2006 amendment) (providing a form for reporting the results of the
planning meeting required by Rule 26(f), including the handling of discovery of electronically stored
information); see also id app. form 52 (replacing form 35 effective Dec. 1, 2010).
53. Id.16(b)(3)(B)(iii).
26(f)(2), (f)(3)(C)-(D).
54. See id.
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Another part of the e-discovery amendment package, Rule
26(b)(2)(B), clarified the obligation of a responding party to produce
electronically stored information that is not reasonably accessible because of undue costs and burden.55 The amendment to Rule 26(b)(2)(B)
applied the two-tier structure between party-managed and courtsupervised discovery. A party must provide discovery of the first tierrelevant, reasonably accessible, electronically stored informationwithout a court order. Information identified as "not reasonably accessible" is in the second tier, subject to discovery if the requesting party can
show good cause for a court to order production. If a party seeks production of electronically stored information that has been identified as not
reasonably accessible, and the parties cannot agree on a solution, the
issue is to be brought to the court by a motion to compel or motion for
protective order. If good cause is shown, the court may order discovery
and may impose terms and conditions. In deciding whether to compel
production, and what terms or conditions should apply, the court is to
consider the proportionality limits of Rule 26(b)(2), including whether
the cost of the discovery is worth the likely benefits. The terms and conditions may include requiring the requesting party to absorb some or all
of the costs of production, making explicit a judicial tool for controlling
and limiting discovery in order to encourage its use.
Another set of amendments to Rule 16 and Rule 26(b) addressed
privilege waiver in an attempt to offer relief from the costs and burdens
of reviewing discovery materials for privilege. The Rule 26 amendment
requires the parties to discuss at their meet-and-confer conference
whether they can agree on procedures for asserting privilege claims after
production without risk of waiver and, if so, to request the court to include the agreement in a court order.56 The Rule 16 amendment permits
the court to "include [in the scheduling order] any agreements the parties
reach for asserting claims of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation
material after information is produced. 57 The amendments also set out in
Rule 26(b)(5)(B) a procedure to apply if the parties cannot agree on
postproduction privilege assertion, allowing the parties to seek court involvement and preserve the status quo until the court can decide the disputed privilege or work-product questions.5 8

55. Rule 26(b)(2)(B) provides:
A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that
the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. On motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the party from whom discovery is
sought must show that the information is not reasonably accessible because of undue
burden or cost. If that showing is made, the court may nonetheless order discovery from
such sources if the requesting party shows good cause, considering the limitations of Rule
26(b)(2)(C). The court may specify conditions for the discovery.
56. Id. 26(f)(3)(D).
57.
58.

Id. 16(b)(3)(B)(iv).
See id.26(b)(5)(B).
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Since the enactment of Rule 26(b)(5)(B), another rule change further encourages early judicial involvement to make discovery less burdensome and expensive. Under Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, effective September 2008, if a federal court enters an order stating
that disclosure of attorney-client privileged or work-product protected
information in discovery does not waive the privilege or protection, the
order is binding not only on the parties but also on third parties and other
courts. 59 This rule provides more predictable and reliable protection
against privilege waiver and provides an additional incentive for parties
to seek-and for courts to provide---early involvement to set the terms
and limits governing discovery.
The 2006 rule amendments continued the trends toward requiring
the parties and their lawyers to raise problems early, to try to reach
agreement, and to facilitate judicial involvement and supervision when
needed. The amendments, and more importantly, the features of electronic discovery that made the amendments necessary in the first place, highlighted the importance of judicial involvement in managing discovery.
Since 1983, the Federal Rules have provided a wealth of opportunities for judges, on their own or on a party's motion, to supervise discovery in order to control toward proportionality. The changes to Rule 16 in
particular make clear the number of tools and the extent of the authority
the rules now provide. Yet complaints of judicial disengagement persist
and abound. Such disengagement is widely viewed as resulting in disproportionate discovery, with the unjustified costs and delays that it
brings. These concerns have led many to call for more amendments to
the discovery and related rules. This Article proposes an alternative to
this approach. If the use of the existing tools can be invigorated, perhaps
the gap from the rules cup to the practice lip can be bridged, and the
pressure for frequent additional rule changes reduced.
III. RULE 16 AND THE MANAGERIAL JUDGE
Rule 16 provides, in the words of Professor Thomas Rowe, "more
managerial arrows than can fit in an ordinary quiver." 6° A rereading of
Rule 16 confirms its potential for effective judicial supervision of discovery. Rule 16 begins by identifying the purposes for "one or more pretrial conferences" in any action. The first three purposes focus on pretrial
management, and read like the wish list of many civil justice reform advocates: "expediting disposition," "establishing early and continuing
control," and "discouraging wasteful pretrial activities.",6' The court must
enter a scheduling order in every case, by a specified date, after receiving
59.
See FED. R. EviD. 502(d).
60.
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Authorized Managerialism Under the Federal Rules-And the
Extent of Convergence with Civil-Law Judging, 36 Sw. U. L. REv. 191, 196 (2007).

61.

FED. R. CIrv. P. 16(a)(1)-(3).
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the parties' Rule 26(f) report or after conferring with the lawyers and
unrepresented parties at a scheduling conference or by other means. 62
The order must contain limits on the time to add parties, amend pleadings, complete discovery, and file motions.63 The scheduling order is
capable of accomplishing much more. The order may also modify the
"extent of discovery" and provide specifically for disclosure or discovery
of electronically stored information, recognizing that e-discovery may
require more detailed planning and management than paper discovery to
handle issues such as preservation and the form of discovery.64 Rule 16
also encourages the court to "consider and take appropriate action" on
sixteen nonexclusive enumerated matters. 65 They again read like the "X"
in the frequent statement, "The Rules should be amended to allow judges
to do 'X.' The "matters for consideration" include the following:
(A) formulating and simplifying the issues, and eliminating frivolous

claims or defenses;
(B) amending the pleadings if necessary or desirable;

(C) obtaining admissions and stipulations about facts and documents
to avoid unnecessary proof, and ruling in advance on the admissibility of evidence;

(E) determining the appropriateness and timing of summary adjudica-

tion under Rule 56;
(F) controlling and scheduling discovery, including orders affecting
disclosures and discovery under Rule 26 and Rules 29 through 37;

(L) adopting special procedures for managing potentially difficult or
protracted actions that may involve complex issues, multiple parties,
difficult legal questions, or unusual proof problems;

(P) facilitating in other
ways the just, speedy, and inexpensive dispo66

sition of the action.

As amended, Rule 16 was "explicitly intended to encourage active
judicial management of the case development process and of trial in most
civil actions. 67 Judge Charles Richey, a trial judge and federal rules
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. 16(b).
Id. 16(b)(3)(A).
See id. 16(b)(3)(B).
Id. 16(c)(2).
Id.
3 MOORE ET AL., supra note 24, § 16.02.
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scholar, summarized the intended effect of the 1983 amendments to Rule
16:
[T]hese Amendments replaced the historical model of the passive
judge-the judge who acts only when compelled, and who does not
get involved in the administration of a lawsuit-with a model of a
managerial, more active judge,
who is involved with every aspect of
68
a lawsuit from start to finish.
In articles written in 1989 and 1992, Judge Richey reviewed the potential and actual applications of Rule 16's provisions and concluded that
it "is9 the most powerful tool in a trial judge's case management arsen,6
al.
Has this combination of rules designed to move toward increased
judicial supervision over controlled discovery, as opposed to party management of very broad discovery, worked? Empirical studies are underway to try and give a reliable answer to this question. Anecdotal evidence suggests that lawyers view the amount of judicial involvement as
inadequate. But the wealth of rule-based opportunities for lawyers to
invoke judicial supervision, and for judges to provide it, does not suggest
that additional rules are the only, or the best, answer. The remainder of
this Article outlines how the courts might apply an existing rule-Rule
16-to improve its effectiveness.
Rule 16 requires judges to enter an order that sets four deadlines: to
join parties, to amend pleadings, to complete discovery, and to file motions. 70 But Rule 16 allows judges to do far more. The rule quite properly
recognizes that flexibility is paramount. Judges do their work in very
different ways. Cases are different. Many cases involve little discovery.
Many cases that do involve discovery require little judicial supervision
over that discovery.7 I The rule invites lawyers and judges to use a number of tools to control cases, but does not require their use in any case.
The point of Rule 16 is for the judge, working with the lawyers and litigants, to tailor a discovery and case-management plan that works for the
68.
Richey, supra note 34, at 527.
69.
Id. at 528; see also Charles R. Richey, Rule 16: A Survey and Some Considerationsfor the
Bench and Bar, 126 F.R.D. 599, 600 (1989).
70.
FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(A).
71.
See EMERY G. LEE mI & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER NATIONAL, CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE
ADVISORY
COMMITTEE
ON
CIVIL
RULES
9,
13
(2009),

bttp://www.fjc.gov/publiclpdf.nsflookup/dissurvl.pdf/$file/dissurvl.pdf (noting that "[i]nformal
exchange of documents was reported by a majority of respondents," and that more than 20 percent of
those responding to the survey reported that a judicial officer took no action in discovery other than
holding a conference to plan discovery); WILLGING Er AL., SURVEY, supranote 18, at 13 (discussing
informal exchanges of information); cf id. at 21 ("IThe data suggest that problems in discovery
may not differ so much by which form of discovery is used as they do by the nature of the case.
Where a lot of money is at stake, where the issues involve personal injury or matters of principle,
where the relationships are contentious and the issues complex, here we see more discovery and
more problems with discovery.").
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particular case, limiting the use, timing, and extent of discovery in relation to pleading amendments and motions, to control discovery toward
proportionality. The challenge is to invigorate and encourage the appropriate use of the Rule 16 tools to provide for such tailored discovery
management, without impairing the discretion and flexibility that are
essential.
A. The Rule 16 Conference
One suggestion for invigorating the use of Rule 16 is to hold an incourt hearing (or, at a minimum, a telephone hearing) with lawyers (and
non-prisoner unrepresented parties) before entering a Rule 16 order.
Many lawyers limit the proposed discovery plans submitted to the court
to the minimum required-a list of deadlines. Many judges, asked to do
no more, have a "paper hearing" and limit the Rule 16 order to the "Required Contents"-the deadlines for adding parties, amending pleadings,
completing discovery, and filing motions-with dates for a joint pretrial
order and docket call or trial. The rule allows this minimalist approach.
But again, the rule permits much more. In a critical number of cases,
such a minimalist approach does not capture the benefits available under
Rule 16.
How can this be changed? This suggestion is not new but is perhaps
underused: If the district judge required the lawyers to be present for the
Rule 16 conferences and engaged in a genuine exchange about the case,
the judge could learn critical information about the needs of that case
and, when appropriate, craft a tailored order providing detailed management. The judge could learn whether the meet-and-confer conference
was a meaningful exchange, or merely a perfunctory discussion about
deadlines. The judge could also learn whether threshold legal issues had
to be resolved, and could put into place a discovery, motion, and briefing
schedule when appropriate. The judge could discuss with the lawyers
what arrangements they had made for preservation of electronically
stored information and management of e-discovery to focus on the key
players and the most likely sources of important information. The judge
could ask the lawyers whether they planned to submit a Rule 502 order
to protect against privilege waiver. The judge could explore whether it
was appropriate to stage discovery in relation to motions that could narrow the issues and therefore reduce the amount and expense of discovery
required. The judge could determine whether, if such information was
not then available, it was appropriate to schedule one or more later conferences to add to or modify the scheduling order.
Finally, a tailored discovery plan could be put into place, offering
greater control-and greater benefit-than the bare-bones scheduling
order that customarily results from the Rule 16 "paper hearing." Judges
usually cannot determine whether more than the bare-bones order is
needed, or what a more detailed order should say, without actually talk-
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ing to the lawyers. By making such a discussion the default practice in
cases that involve discovery-rather than the exception-judges could
better tailor the order consistent with the proportionality limits of Rule
26(b).
B. The Premotion Conference
The second suggestion also is not new; it is already used by many
courts. The suggestion is that judges follow a procedure of holding a
premotion conference in discovery disputes. Under such a procedure, the
parties would seek a premotion conference after they have conferred with
each other and before filing any motion to compel discovery, to quash
discovery, or to seek protection from discovery. The judge might ask
from each party a brief description of the issues, but would not allow the
parties to file the motions, briefs, and submissions that frequently accompany discovery disputes.
At the conference, the parties and the court could identify the issues
that could be resolved in an informal fashion, and do so. Issues that require more detailed development, including the filing of motions and
briefs, could be identified and a schedule set to address them. This procedure reduces the delays in resolving discovery disputes, delays that can
increase costs, disrupt the case, and even reduce parties' willingness to
seek judicial relief. This procedure allows the judge to supervise discovery without the time lag introduced by the motion, response, reply, and
decision process. This procedure is consistent with the rules designed to
facilitate judicial involvement in the cases that need it, and allows for
early resolution of discovery disputes.
Neither of these procedures is suggested as a rule. That would be
inconsistent with the flexibility that Rule 16 embodies. But many judges
already use these or similar procedures and have found them to be a
helpful way of using the many tools that Rule 16 provides to identify,
early in the case, opportunities for effective control of discovery.
Many have warned against embracing the model of the "managerial
judge., 72 But the procedures discussed above-and their recognition of
72.

See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, ManagerialJudging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U.

CHI. L. REv. 306, 314 (1986) (noting that opponents of managerial judging "argue that litigants are
being forced, directly or indirectly, to abandon positions on the merits," that "judges are making
discretionary procedural decisions early on that effectively close off lines of substantive inquiry
without benefit of full development and consideration of the merits of the parties' positions," and
that "the 'managerial' decisions of these judges are largely immune from appellate review"); Grace
M. Giesel, Enforcement of Settlement Contracts: The Problem of the Attorney Agent, 12 GEO. J.

LEGAL ETHics 543, 548 n.23 (1999) (noting that some commentators have "question[ed] the wisdom
of judicial involvement" in settlements (citing Stephen Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in
an Adversary System, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 58-78 (1992); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against
Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485, 491514 (1985); Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 374, 378-80 (1982); Leroy J.
Tomquist, The Active Judge in PretrialSettlement: Inherent Authority Gone Awry, 25 WILAMETE

L. Rev. 743, 752-65 (1989))); Resnik, supra, at 425-26, 430 (expressing concern that
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Rule 16's potential to control discovery toward proportionality-do not
raise the danger of an aggressive managerial judicial role such that they
distort or detract from the essential disinterestedness of the judge in our
adversarial system. To the contrary, by focusing on the district judge's
involvement in discovery when it is appropriate and useful, these procedures increase the judge's ability to decide-fairly, accurately, and efficiently-the disputed issues that the adversaries present for resolution.
These procedures also allow a judge to learn about the case before the
parties ask for a decision on dispositive motions. In short, these procedures allow judges to control discovery in order to allow the parties to try
cases, not in order to push parties to settlement. These practices would
invigorate the use of the existing Rule 16 tools and make them more effective to work toward proportionality, without adding a new rule or
amending an existing rule.
CONCLUSION: FROM CUP TO LIP

Two things are clear. The first is that the application of the rules
must be monitored to ensure that they are working well, and that the
tools they provide are both adequate and effective. The second is that the
rules themselves cannot solve all the problems. The incentives and habits
lawyers and judges developed under the regime of party-controlled, very
broad discovery, in a world of paper rather than computers, are not easily
changed. The rules have to be general enough to deal with all the different kinds of cases that come into federal courts, to accommodate the inevitable changes in technology, and to accommodate the different demands on, and styles of, individual judges. And many problems affecting
discovery, such as when the duty to preserve evidence arises and the
extent of its application, begin before cases are actually filed, which is
when the rules apply.
The rules of civil procedure are, at best, only one part of what must
be a multi-front and multi-faceted approach to controlling discovery toward proportionality. If the empirical studies show that judges are not
sufficiently involved in the cases that require supervision to control toward proportionality, the procedures suggested in this Article deserve to
"[t]ransforming the judge from adjudicator to manager substantially expands the opportunities for
judges to use---or abuse-their power"; that managerial judging "undermine[s] traditional constraints on the use of [a judge's] power," such as the need to provide written justification for decisions and the availability of appellate review; that "no explicit norms or standards guide judges in
their decisions about what to demand of litigants"; and that "[hiaving supervised case preparation
and pressed for settlement, judges can hardly be considered untainted if they are ultimately asked to
find the facts and adjudicate the merits of a dispute"); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial
ADR and the Multi-door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling
Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 297, 360 (1996) ("Without further revisiting the debate
on managerial judging, it should be sufficient to note that there are dangers of mistake, favoritism, or
lax administration of justice when judges become managers, settlement impresarios, or active participants in the dispute rather than reasonably detached umpires of adjudication.").

244

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:2

be considered as protocols or guidelines for more general application, to
help narrow the gap from the cup of the rules to the lip of practice.

REINVIGORATING PLEADINGS
REBECCA LOVE KOuRust JORDAN M. SINGER* & NATALIE
KNOWLTON*
INTRODUCTION

Pleadings are the gateway to the American civil justice system.
When properly drafted, they frame the issues to be resolved and open the
door to the procedures that make complete and effective dispute resolution possible. To fulfill their potential, however, pleadings must provide
litigants with two types of access: the ability to get into court in the first
place, and the ability to participate meaningfully in the process until a
complete judicial resolution is reached.' Getting in the courthouse door is
a necessary step, but it is not sufficient; parties must be able to afford to
stay in the system long enough to narrow their disputed issues and collect
relevant evidence for presentation to a judge or jury.2
The framers of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were seeking to
balance these two forms of access in 1938. Reacting to longstanding
concerns that meritorious claims were being dismissed on procedural
technicalities, they fashioned a system in which initial access to the
courthouse would be virtually guaranteed. Pleadings, which for centuries
had been the primary means of narrowing disputed issues, were stripped
of that function entirely. In their place, parties needed only to provide a
"short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is ent
Executive Director, Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System, University of Denver. The Institute is a national, nonpartisan organization dedicated to improving the
process and culture of the civil justice system. Additional information on the Institute's work can be
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1. On the general point about multiple dimensions of access, see Dennis A. Kaufman, The
Tipping Pointon the Scales of Civil Justice, 25 TOURO L. REV. 347, 365-66 (2009).

2.

Several commentators have noted that narrowing issues is one of the central objectives in

civil procedure. See Nat'l Comm'n Staff Paper, The Early Narrowing and Resolution of Issues, 48
ANTITRUST L.J. 1041, 1042 (1979) ("Clearly defined issues direct the efforts of counsel and guide
the court in ruling on ancillary questions such as the scope of discovery. By clarifying the areas of

agreement and disagreement the parties may be better able to assess their positions and this may in
turn promote rapid settlement or adjudication. Poorly defined issues create problems of delay and
unnecessarily diffused efforts."); see also Michael Moffitt, Pleadings in the Age of Settlement, 80
IND. L.J. 727, 757 (2005) ("Without a mechanism for narrowing the issues in dispute, a legal system
and the disputants would strain under the weight of the nearly infinite number of potential grievances and legal theories conceivably stemming from parties' interactions."); Sidney Post Simpson, A
Possible Solution of the Pleading Problem, 53 HARV. L. REV. 169, 172 (1939) (noting that early

issue-narrowing allows both the parties and the judge to channel their time and energy away from
identifying the dispute and toward resolving it).
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titled to relief."3 To compensate for the loss of issue narrowing at the
outset of a case, the framers championed discovery, judicial management, and summary judgment as credible tools to help the parties collect
information and focus their dispute for trial.
The new system was innovative, and the theory behind it reasonable. In hindsight, however, removing the issue-narrowing function from
pleadings has proven to be a serious mistake. Failing to focus issues from
the outset of litigation has encouraged parties to seek out discovery that
is both voluminous and only tangentially relevant to their dispute. In
many cases-particularly complex cases--discovery and motion practice
have become so expensive and burdensome that parties cannot afford
adequate trial preparation and instead are forced to settle cases regardless
of the merits.4 Complaints about the costs of discovery and motion practice-both in time and money-have grown louder and louder in the last
sixty years, reaching a crescendo in the past decade, when the cost of
exchanging electronically stored information ("ESI") developed the potential to exceed the entire amount in controversy in a case.5
The relationship between the two forms of access is currently far
out of balance, and both plaintiffs and defendants are poorer for it. We
need a civil justice system that encourages the filing of meritorious
claims and one that allows those claims to be honed and resolved efficiently. We need, in other words, a process that begins to narrow and
focus issues as soon as a legitimate claim is filed. The most effective way
to accomplish this goal is by reinvesting the pleading stage with the responsibility of narrowing issues, by requiring the parties to plead material facts that support their claims, counterclaims, and affirmative defenses.
As we describe below, a move to fact-based pleading need not upset
the general structure and values of the existing pretrial process. It would
simply provide more information up front than is usually available under
the current pleading regime, allowing the parties and the court to better
focus discovery and motion practice on the issues that are truly in dis3.
FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a)(2).
4.
In a recent survey of the American College of Trial Lawyers, seventy-one percent of
respondents indicated their belief that counsel use discovery as a tool to force settlement. See AM.
COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE
AM. LEGAL SYS., INTERIM REPORT & 2008 LITIGATION SURVEY OF THE FELLOWS OF THE
AMERICAN
COLLEGE
OF
TRIAL
LAWYERS
A-4
(2008),

http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/pubs/Interim%2OReport%2OFinal%20for%2Owebl .pdf [hereinafter
ACTIIIAALS, INTERIM REPORT]. There is merit to these concerns. Judge Scheindlin, for example,
noted a case in which a party admitted in an e-mail to deliberately extending litigation in the hope of
achieving a high settlement. See Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in
FederalCivil Litigation: Is Rule 34 Up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 339 n.42 (2000) (citing
Karen Donovan, E-mails Helped Microsoft in Connecticut Victory, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 2, 1999, at Al).
5.
Robert E. Altman & Benjamin Lewis, Note, Cost-Shifting in ESI Discovery Disputes: A
Five Factor Test to Promote Consistency and Set Party Expectations, 36 N. KY. L. REV. 569, 569
(2009).
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pute. Under our proposed fact-based pleading system, motions to dismiss
for failure to state a claim would be granted only if a party does not plead
any objectively reasonable fact to support an element of a claim. Motions
for a more definite statement would be the favored approach to handling
claims where facts were omitted or unclear, and amendment of claims
would still be allowed. Discovery would still be available to flesh out
evidence on disputed issues, albeit in a more focused manner. The pleading of material facts, in other words, would not be designed to restrict
access to the courts; to the contrary, it would increase access by making
participation in civil litigation economically more feasible.
To flesh out our proposal, we begin in Part I by examining two pervasive myths about the relationship between pleading and court access.
The first myth holds that issue-narrowing need not take place at the
pleading stage, because other procedural tools-in particular, discovery,
judicial management, and summary judgment---can focus the issues in
dispute as efficiently and effectively as pleadings can. In fact the opposite is true, at least in a significant number of civil cases. We describe the
problems associated with assigning the issue-narrowing task to discovery
and summary judgment, and chronicle more than sixty years of warnings
that the existing system does not meet its core objective of focusing the
parties' dispute. We then address the second myth, that fact-based pleading is simply a mechanism for keeping cases out of court. As we explain,
the requirement to plead material facts can actually increase meritorious
filings by making the overall litigation process more focused and more
affordable.
In Part II we examine a number of state court systems (and two foreign common law jurisdictions) that require fact-based pleading, and find
that such pleading is embraced both as the most efficient and effective
means for the parties to narrow their dispute, and as a mechanism that is
entirely consistent with assuring full access for meritorious claims. We
also examine state court rules governing pre-suit discovery, a tool designed to preserve initial court access in fact-based pleading jurisdictions
by allowing a putative plaintiff to seek limited discovery before the filing
of a lawsuit if she would otherwise be unable to plead sufficient facts in
her complaint.
Building upon the lessons learned from both federal and state systems, in Part Ell we set out our proposal that parties be required to plead
material facts sufficient to support each element of an asserted claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim or affirmative defense. This proposal would
replace the current language of Federal Rule 8(a)(2), but is not intended
to overhaul the current federal rules regime. The dismissal of claims
would still be the exception rather than the rule, and courts would still be
encouraged to resolve confusion or inconsistency in pleadings wherever
possible by granting motions for a more definite statement or by allowing the pleading party to amend his or her claims.
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Our proposal is designed to be a starting point for discussion. A
lasting solution will require input from many different constituencies, no
doubt representing diverse points of view. We welcome that input; we do
not claim to have all the answers. The goal of this Article is to lay the
groundwork and convey the urgency of the matter. For a wide variety of
civil cases, the system of notice pleading, broad discovery, and summary
judgment practice is economically impractical and unsustainable. Factbased pleading may be the best hope for creating a system that truly provides a "just, speedy, and inexpensive ' '6 process for resolving disputes.
I. Two MYTHS ABOUT ACCESS AND PLEADING
This Part examines two common misconceptions about access and
pleading: (1) that broad "notice" pleading is sufficient to ensure full
access to litigants because parties in every case have the ability to narrow
the issues efficiently through other procedural tools; and (2) that requiring the pleading of facts shuts out some meritorious claims. Both of these
beliefs are largely unsupported myths. With respect to the first myth, for
more than fifty years judges, lawyers and commentators have pointed out
the inability of discovery and motion practice to narrow issues effectively. Indeed, far from promoting efficient resolution of issues by the court,
discovery and motion practice have too often forced settlement because
costs and delays in the discovery process proved too burdensome for one
or more parties. Courts, too, have grown increasingly aware of the risks
that excessive and expensive discovery poses to meritorious claims and
defenses. The much-discussed recent Supreme Court cases Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly7 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal8 are only the latest manifestations of this concern.
Similarly pervasive but also devoid of any real support is the belief
that fact-based pleading will inhibit the filing of meritorious claims. Advocates of this belief point to so-called "heightened pleading" requirements that demand detailed pleadings for certain types of claims, and that
are designed mostly to prevent an influx of cases into the court system.
As we explain, however, "heightened pleading" is qualitatively different
from the fact-based pleading we propose, which is designed solely for
issue-narrowing purposes. Furthermore, in the rare case in which initial
court access might be hampered because relevant material facts are exclusively in the possession of another, we endorse procedures to help
potential plaintiffs gain access to such facts before the case is filed.
These two myths have long interposed resistance to any serious
consideration of introducing fact-based pleading to assure better court

6.
7.
8.

FED. R. CIv.P. 1.
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009).
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access for all litigants. Real world experience with existing pleading
standards, however, tells another story altogether.
A. The Difficulty of NarrowingIssues in a Notice PleadingRegime
According to the standard narrative, the Federal Rules' approach to
narrowing issues through discovery and summary judgment rather than
through pleadings was welcomed both before and after the Supreme
Court affirmed the process in the 1957 case of Conley v. Gibson.9 In fact
the story is much more complicated. From almost the very outset of the
Federal Rules regime in 1938, the removal of the issue-narrowing function from the pleading stage was met with skepticism and concern by
many in the judiciary and the bar. And far from settling the issue, the
Conley case simultaneously exacerbated confusion about what should be
expected of pleadings and generated anxiety that truly meritless cases
would wreak havoc before they could be removed from the system. For
more than half a century after Conley, judges and lawyers struggled to
develop effective ways to focus issues after the pleading stage. The Supreme Court's recent decisions in Twombly and Iqbal represent only the
latest efforts to compensate for the loss of pleadings' pre-1938 role in
narrowing issues.
Initially, lawyers seemed to be on board with the approach taken by
the Federal Rules. One practicing attorney, writing a year into the new
rules, rather idyllically announced that in contrast to detailed pleadings
that had evolved under the previous code system, 10 there was a "better
way" to get information from an opposing party: "All you need [to] do is
to send around a series of relevant questions to your opponent for him to
answer, and he is expected to answer to the extent that the answers are
not privileged."11 The Supreme Court agreed, noting in 1947 that "[t]he
various instruments of discovery now serve... to narrow and clarify the
basic issues between the parties."' 2 One much later commentator re-

9.
355 U.S. 41 (1957).
10. Code pleading was introduced in the mid-nineteenth century as a simplified and less
technical approach to the common law pleading that had been in use for centuries. Under the most
celebrated code, developed by David Dudley Field and first adopted in New York in 1848, the
plaintiff had to plead facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action "in ordinary and concise language without repetition." See 1848 N.Y. LAWS, ch. 379, §§ 120(2), 128(2), 131; see also Stephen
N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The FederalRules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 933-34 (1987). Over time, however, code pleading ossified, and the precise form of acceptable pleadings became confused. See Richard L. Marcus, The
Revival of Fact Pleading Under the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 437
(1986); Clarence Morris, Law and Fact, 55 HARv. L. REV. 1303, 1326-1334 (1942) (explaining the
technical differences between those facts that were required to be pleaded and those that were impermissible). One commentator has noted that the intent of the framers of the Federal Rules was "in
large part to restore" the original objectives of code pleading. See Fleming James, Jr., The Objective
and Function of the Complaint: Common Law-Codes-FederalRules, 14 VAND. L. REV. 899, 918
(1961).
11.
Elmo Hunter, One Year of Our FederalRules, 5 Mo. L. REV. 1, 8 (1940).
12.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947).
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marked that the new system had a "splendid simplicity"13---claims could
not be frustrated at the outset by technicalities, and the discovery and
summary judgment processes would sift out claims for which the law
was clear
and the facts undisputed, leaving only real, material disputes
14
for trial.
Despite this general optimistic tone, however, many still struggled
with the transfer of the issue-na.rrowing function from pleadings to discovery and summary judgment. Judge James Alger Fee, writing only ten
years after the rules were promulgated, was forced to conclude that:
[I]t is still not clear that the pleadings therein authorized, including
not only complaint and answer but also all motions, affidavits and
depositions, advise the court, lawyers and parties prior to trial what
questions are to be decided. If this
be true, the ultimate objective of
15
lost.
is
trial
before
proceedings
all
The former Chair of the Illinois Committee on Civil Practice and
Procedure was even less charitable, decrying in 1951 the "weasel wording" of Rule 8 and advocating that pleadings "disclose the elements of
the claim or defense in sufficient detail to inform the 'iopposing
party of
6
meet."
to
upon
called
is
he
which
case
the
of
nature
the
These voices were not alone. During the 1950s, entire courts attempted to graft tighter pleading standards onto Rule 8 in order to restore
their traditional issue-narrowing function. In 1952, the Ninth Circuit
Judicial Conference adopted a resolution suggesting that Rule 8(a)(2) be
amended to require a pleading to "contain the facts constituting a cause
of action."1 7 In doing so, the court expressed its skepticism about the
ability of discovery alone to narrow the issues effectively before trial:
Evils flowing from this uncertainty as to the issues may be briefly
summarized: ...If counsel do not know what all the issues will be,

counsel by discovery process (interrogatories, depositions, inspection
of documents, requests for admissions) cannot protect against surprise or inadequate preparation save by greatly expanding all discovery to meet all possible issues. As remarked by Judge Fee: "There is
always the peril of an undisclosed issue, which may not arise until
tria. It is true the discovery procedures help, but, unless the adver-

13.
Christopher M. Fairman, HeightenedPleading,81 TEx. L. REv. 551, 554 (2002).
14.
Id.
15.
James Alger Fee, The Lost Horizon in Pleading Under the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,48 COLuM. L. REv. 491,491 (1948).
16.
Edward W. Cleary, The Uses of Pleading,40 KY. L.J. 46, 56 & n.18 (1951).
17.
Judicial Conference of the Judges of the Ninth Circuit, Claim or Cause of Action: A
Discussion on the Need for Amendment of Rule (8)(a)(2) of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 13
F.R.D. 253,253 (1952).
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sary's case is known
at the outset, there is difficulty in discovering
• ,18
S
about what to inquire."

The same sentiment was brewing among several judges in the
Southern District of New York, who began a push to require greater specificity in antitrust complaints.1 9 Judge Archie Dawson, for example,
dismissed such an action in 1956, arguing that:
If a complaint contains nothing more than general allegations that defendants have violated various provisions of the anti-trust laws combined with a prayer for relief, such a pleading... "becomes a springboard from which the parties dive off into an almost bottomless sea
of interrogatories, depositions, and pre-trial proceedings on collateral

issues, most
of which may have little relationship to the true issue in
20

the case."

These reactions did not sit well with Charles Clark, the chief architect of the Federal Rules. In 1957, Clark-by then a judge on the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals-authored an opinion designed to put an end to
the Southern District's rebellion. In Nagler v. Admiral Corp.,2' Clark
rejected the notion of special pleading standards for antitrust cases, arguing that "the federal rules contain no special exceptions" for certain
types of cases. 22 But the Nagler decision did little to quell dissent. At a
presentation in August 1958, Judge Dawson again blasted the broad
pleading standard of Rule 8(a), asserting that the "filing of a complaint in
federal court is, in effect, a license to the plaintiff to subject the defendant to the expense and difficulties of extensive discovery proceedings. 23 Judge Dawson pointed specifically to the 1951 Prettyman Report
on complex cases, in which the Judicial Conference concluded that unnecessary delay, volume and expense in such cases were attributable in
part to the fact that "the complaint and answer cannot in most [such]
cases ...

be relied upon as a means of framing the issues with sufficient

definiteness." 24 The judge bemoaned, "at both the bar and bench, there is
considerable perplexity as to the proper
procedure for securing a defini25
tion of issues in this type of case.,

18. Id. at 255 (quoting Fee, supra note 15, at 495).
19. Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,85
YALE L.J. 914, 924 (1976).
20. Bairn & Blank, Inc. v. Warren-Connelly Co., 19 F.R.D. 108, 109-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)
(quoting New Dyckman Theatre Corp. v. Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp., 16 F.R.D. 203, 206
(S.D.N.Y. 1954)); see also United Grocers' Co. v. Sau-Sea Foods, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y.
1957); Dublin Distribs., Inc. v. Edward & John Burke, Ltd., 109 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
21.
248 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1957).
22. Id. at 323.
23. Hon. Archie 0. Dawson, The Placeof the Pleadingin a ProperDefinition of the Issues in
the "Big Case," in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEMINAR ON PROTRACTED CASES FOR UNITED STATES

JUDGES, 23 F.R.D. 319, 431 (1958).
24. Hon. Leon R. Yankwich, "Short Cuts" in Long Cases, 13 F.R.D. 41, 66 (1951).
25. Dawson, supranote 23, at 432.
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It was in the midst of this debate that the Supreme Court decided
Conley v. Gibson,26 a case that cemented broad "notice" pleading as an
acceptable approach in the federal courts for the next half-century. 7 In
Conley, African-American railway workers in Texas brought suit against
their labor union, alleging that the union had failed in its duty as their
bargaining agent to protect them against workplace discrimination.28 The
union moved to dismiss the complaint on several grounds, including lack
of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.29 The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and the
Fifth Circuit affirmed.3 ° In a short opinion, the Supreme Court reversed,
holding first that jurisdiction was proper and then turning its attention to
the sufficiency of plaintiffs' allegations. 3 The Court found the allegations sufficient under a broad reading of Rule 8, holding that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove32no set of facts in support
of his claim which would entitle him to relief.
On its face, Conley's "no set of facts" standard did not appear to require the recitation of any facts at the pleading stage; it would be enough
that plaintiff could prove some set of facts prior to summary judgment or
trial that would support his claim. 33 But such a standard creates an impossibly circular relationship between pleadings and discovery. The
scope of discovery is determined by the pleadings; parties may obtain
non-privileged material "that is relevant to any party's claim or defense.,34 "If a claimant can proceed to discovery without any legally
relevant allegations at all . . . the pleading sets no standard" whatsoever
for what constitutes relevant discovery. 35 Accordingly, under Conley, "an
opposing party and the court can ascertain the limits on what is being
sought in discovery only by ascertaining what is being sought in discovery. 36
The problems associated with mere "notice" pleading are not confined to the plaintiffs submissions. Unfortunately, answers and counterclaims are equally unhelpful at narrowing disputed issues. In two recent
26. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
27. Id. at 47-48.
28. Id. at 42-43.
29. Id. at 43.
30. Id. at 43-44.
31.
Id. at 44.
32.
Id. at 45-46.
33. Put another way, dismissal under Rules 12(b)(6) would be proper only if discovery would
be moot from the outset, because no conceivable set of facts obtained through discovery could create
a viable claim. Id. at 47. One commentator has referred to this standard as a "loosey-goosey rule."
Charles B. Campbell, A "Plausible" Showing After Bell Atd. Corp. v. Twombly, 9 NEV.L.J. 1, 1
(2008).
34. FaD. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
35.

(1998).
36.

Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEx. L. REV. 1665, 1685

Id.
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surveys of litigators, only about one-fifth of respondents agreed with the
assertion, "In notice pleading, the answer to a complaint shapes and narrows the issues. 37 In a third survey conducted by the Federal Judicial
Center, less than fifteen percent of plaintiffs' lawyers and less than ten
percent of defense lawyers indicated their belief that by the time the answer was filed, "disputed issues central to the case were adequately narrowed and framed for resolution. 38
With issues remaining unfocused after the submission of pleadings
by both plaintiffs and defendants, the impact on cost and delay in the
pretrial process has been manifest. With the potential scope of discovery
so wide open, neither discovery nor summary judgment has proven capable of handling the issue-narrowing task efficiently and the costs effectively in every case. Instead, discovery today can be a brutally expensive
enterprise, exacerbated by advances in technology and transportation. In
the 1930s, the sum total of discovery in a federal case might have
amounted to a few interrogatory responses, a file folder (or perhaps a
bankers' box) of documents, and one or two local depositions. There
were no word processors, cell phones, e-mail accounts, voice messages,
or computers. 39 Even if they had wanted to, parties could not have sought
out much information; there simply was not that much available, and it
was difficult to track down. By contrast, today ninety-nine percent of
information generated is electronic, 4° and most of it is stored in a way
that makes it accessible to those who truly demand it. Law firms have
grown to a national scale, 41 and depositions are taken anywhere in the
world. For many lawyers and potential parties, an astonishing amount of
information is technically available, but the cost of completing discovery
and moving to summary judgment or trial is simply prohibitive. Far from
actually narrowing issues, the discovery process may prevent parties
from ever getting to the facts that lie at the heart of their dispute.42
37.
ACTIJlAALS, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 4, at A-3 (noting that only twenty-one percent of respondents were in agreement); AM. BAR ASS'N, ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION MEMBER
SURVEY

ON

CIVIL

PRACTICE:

FULL

REPORT

http://www.abanet.org/litigationlsurvey/docs/report-aba-report.pdf
precent of respondents in agreement).
38.
CENTER

50

&

tbl.4.1

(2009)

(finding less than twenty-two

EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL JUDICIAL
NATIONAL,
CASE-BASED
CIVIL
RULES
SURVEY
47
fig.22
(2009),

http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurvl .pdf/$file/dissurvI .pdf.
39. Richard Marcus provides a good litany of technological advances that are taken for
granted today but were unimaginable in the 1930s-including perhaps most importantly the photocopier. See Richard Marcus, Only Yesterday: Reflections on Rulemaking Responses to E-Discovery,
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 4 (2004).
40.
INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL Sys., ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: A
VIEW FROM THE FRONT LINES 5 (2008), http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/pubs/EDiscovery-

FrontLines.pdf.
41.
See Robert G. Bone, Twombly, PleadingRules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94
IOWA L. REv. 873, 896-97 (2009).
42.

See ACTIJIAALS, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 4, at A-l, A-6 (noting that in a survey of

over 1,500 experienced plaintiff and defense counsel, eighty-one percent reported that their firms
turn away cases when it is not cost-effective to handle them).
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And this is when the discovery rules are followed. Abuses of the
discovery process are well-documented, at least anecdotally. Excessive
requests, 43 refusal to respond to legitimate requests, 44 overproduction of
irrelevant documents,' unnecessary depositions,46 "Rambo" tactics,47
and the like have all been identified as factors that may contribute to
additional cost and delay in the pretrial process.48 As one court pithily
noted, "The federal rules envision that discovery will be conducted by
skilled gentlemen of the bar, without wrangling and without the intervention of the court. The vision is an unreal dream. 4 9 The consequence is
that much time, money and energy is expended in many cases without
adequate narrowing of issues.
Since the mid-1970s, rulemakers have focused on runaway discovery, but usually without explicitly acknowledging its connection to loose
pleading standards.50 A frenzy of discovery rules were promulgated between 1980 and 2000, each designed to address the problems of expense
and abuse: over two decades, lawyers and judges were introduced to
mandatory pretrial conferences, 5 1 proportionality limitations, 52 presumptive limits on interrogatories 53 and depositions,5 4 sanctions, 55 and initial
disclosures.5 6 Yet complaints about the discovery process are as perva43.
See, e.g., Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 358 (D. Md. 2008)
(explaining that "one of the most prevalent of all discovery abuses [is] kneejerk discovery requests
served without consideration of cost or burden to the responding party").
44.
See, e.g., Exact Software N. Am., Inc. v. Infocon, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 2d 702, 703 (N.D.
Ohio 2006).
45.
W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and ProfessionalResponsibility, 75 NoTRE DAME L.
REV. 1, 61 (1999).
46.
David Bamhizer, Princes of Darkness and Angels of Light: The Soul of the American
Lawyer, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 371,407 (2000).
47.
Eugene A. Cook et al., A Guide to the Texas Lawyer's Creed: A Mandatefor Professionalism, 10 REv. LITIG. 673, 675 (1991) (describing "Rambo" litigators as those who practice "unprofessional courtroom conduct" that "drive[s] the price of competent legal assistance beyond the
means of middle America").
48.
E.g., Lisa J. Trembly, MandatoryDisclosure: A HistoricalReview of the Adoption of Rule
26 and an Examination of the Events that Have TranspiredSince Its Adoption, 21 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 425, 430 (1997) ("Discovery is sometimes used as a weapon against the opposing party to
discourage the adversary from pursuing his claim, to exhaust him financially, or to force him into a
settlement.").
49.
Harlem River Consumers Coop., Inc. v. Associated Grocers of Harlem, Inc., 54 F.R.D.
551, 553 (SD.N.Y. 1972).
50.
One notable exception is the rule governing the scope of discovery. Several prominent
attorneys' groups pushed rulemakers to narrow discovery's scope to that which is relevant to the
claims or issues presented by the pleadings. See Section of Litig. Am. Bar Ass'n, Second Report of
the Special Committee For the Study of Discovery Abuse, 92 F.R.D. 137, app. at 158 (1980); Jeffrey
W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV.
529, 557-58 (2001) (discussing a proposal by the American College of Trial Lawyers). Twentythree years after the ABA's initial proposal in 1977, rulemakers changed the scope to allow discovery "that is relevant to any party's claim or defense." FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1).
51.
FED. R. Crv. P. 16(a), 26(0.
52.
Id.
26(b)(2)(C)(iii).
53. Id. 33(a)(1).
54.
Id. 30.
55.
Id. 37(b).
56. Id. 26(a)(1).
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sive as ever.57 Discovery is simply not equipped to narrow issues efficiently in many cases, especially when the pleadings fail to provide a
meaningful foundation to frame the issues in dispute.
Summary judgment, too, was originally extolled by the rule framers
as an efficient tool for narrowing claims prior to trial. Judge Clark expressed his view that the summary judgment procedure was "an important and necessary part of the series of devices designed for the swift
uncovering of the merits and either their effective immediate disposition
or their advancement toward prompt resolution by trial '' 58 In twenty-first
century litigation, however, summary judgment is not a particularly efficient or cost-effective way to separate the strong claims from the weak.5 9
First, as noted above, the process of collecting sufficient information through discovery to ascertain the strength of a claim can be very
expensive-sometimes prohibitively so. The additional cost (in time and
money) of preparing a summary judgment motion may also factor into a
party's calculations about how far to extend litigation. Furthermore, even
if the relevant information could be gathered, sorted, and presented to the
judge without transaction costs, there is no guarantee that a6 judge's ruling will sufficiently narrow and clarify the remaining issues. 0
Summary judgment also comes too late in the pretrial process to be
an effective mechanism to narrow issues in many cases. In a recent study
of nearly 7,700 federal civil cases in eight federal courts, the mean time
to rule on a summary judgment motion after it was filed was more than
five months. 61 For complex cases-the cases most in need of issuenarrowing-the mean time to rule on summary judgment was even longer: 273 days in antitrust cases, 234 days in environmental cases, 222 days
in securities cases, and 206 days in trademark cases.62 When the three to
six months that typically elapse before the start of discovery and the six
to nine months of actual discovery are tacked onto this time, an ordinary
litigant in a complex case faces eighteen to twenty-four months in litigation before summary judgment is decided. This reality hardly comports
57.
See, e.g., ACTLJIAALS, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 4, at A-4 (finding that less than
forty-four percent of respondents thought current discovery mechanisms work well, and only thirtyfour percent of respondents thought that the cumulative effect of changes to the discovery rules since
1976 has significantly reduced discovery abuse).
58.
Charles E. Clark, The Summary Judgment, 36 MINN. L. REv. 567, 579 (1952).
59.
See E. Donald Elliott, ManagerialJudging and the Evolution of Procedure,53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 306, 320 (1986) (noting that "in general the combination of discovery and summary judgment
has proved inadequate to narrow the issues in litigation prior to trial."); Jonathan T. Molot, How
Changes in the Legal Profession Reflect Changes in Civil Procedure,84 VA. L. REv. 955, 992
(1998).
60.
Indeed, there is not even the guarantee that all judges will apply the "reasonable jury"
standard for dismissal of claims on summary judgment in the same manner. Suja A. Thomas, The
Fallacyof DispositiveProcedure,50 B.C. L. REV. 759, 760 (2009).
61.

INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., CIVIL CASE PROCESSING IN THE

FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS:
A 21ST CENTURY ANALYSIS
http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/pubs/PACER%20FINAL%201-21-09.pdf.
62.
Id. at app. D.

51

tbl. 11

(2009),
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with the "swift uncovering of. . . merits" and immediate disposition or
advancement
that Judge Clark had hoped summary judgment would pro3
vide.

6

As it became increasingly clear that discovery and summary judgment could not perform the issue-narrowing function that the framers of
the Federal Rules had intended-at least, not without significant transaction costs-judicial pretrial management emerged as the strongest alternative. The original version of Rule 16 allowed the court to hold a more
or less informal conference at the close of pleadings in order to set out a
pretrial memorandum to govern the future course of action. 64 With the
1983 amendments to Rules 16 and 26, however, judges were given expanded discretion to restrict discovery and otherwise curtail lines of inquiry previously open to the parties.65 But case management has also
been critiqued as a suboptimal means of cutting away matters not central
to the dispute. Unlike motions to dismiss and motions for summary
judgment, whose results (and concomitant effect on narrowing the issues
on the case) ostensibly are tied to the merits of the claims, judicial man66
agement is by definition discretionary and effectively unappealable.
Moreover, even the most well-meaning judge faces a host of obstacles
when exercising his or her discretion, including imperfect information,
cognitive bias resulting from the use of heuristics to quickly process
complex information, and the judge's
own (often unintended) role as a
67
litigation.
the
in
player
strategic
We do not mean to suggest that discovery, summary judgment, and
judicial management are not worthwhile pretrial tools; quite the opposite.
As compared to pleadings, however, they are simply overmatched in the
task of focusing the issues in dispute. Discovery is a costly way to extract
information, even when it works as intended. Summary judgment relies
on efficient discovery to itself be efficient, and judicial management is
most effective if the judge has a firm grasp of the salient issues in the
case from the outset. Fact-based pleading would not supplant these tools,
but would augment their collective capacity to move cases toward resolution more efficiently.
The tension between broad notice pleading on the one hand and the
inability of discovery, summary judgment, and judicial management
alone to narrow issues adequately on the other has been evident in a
63. Clark, supra note 58, at 579.
64.
FED. R. CIv. P. 16 (1938 adoption), reprinted in 3 JAMES WM. MOORE Er AL., MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 16 app. 01 (3d ed. 2009); Simpson, supra note 2, at 193.
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a), 26(b)(2)(C); ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE AUGUST
1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE
MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 34-36 (1984).

66. See Elliott, supra note 59, at 317.
67. See Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1986-2002 (2007).
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number of lower court cases issued in the five decades following the
Conley decision. The tone of each case is very similar: We recognize
what the Court said in Conley about "no set offacts," but .... This was
most clearly demonstrated in the Seventh Circuit's 1984 decision in Car
Carriers,Inc. v. FordMotor Co. 68 The plaintiffs in Car Carriersalleged,
among other things, that Ford violated section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act by conspiring to deny plaintiffs adequate published tariff rates for
their services, thereby making plaintiffs' businesses unprofitable. 69 Nowhere in the complaint, however, did plaintiffs allege-directly or inferentially-the requisite element of anticompetitive effect.7 ° In upholding
the district court's dismissal of the claim, the Seventh Circuit expressly
acknowledged the "no set of facts" standard, but went on to conclude
that "Conley has never been interpreted literally. In practice, 'a complaint
... must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the
material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal
theory.' ' 7 1 The Court then expounded upon its concern that timeconsuming and expensive discovery should not be granted in cases that
were hopeless from the start: "When the requisite elements are lacking,
the costs of modern federal antitrust litigation and the increasing caseload of the federal courts counsel against sending the parties into discovery when there is no reasonable likelihood that the plaintiffs
can con72
struct a claim from the events related in the complaint."
The primary message of Car Carrierswas clear: discovery cannot
possibly serve an issue-narrowing function if the parties cannot state,
even very broadly, what the factual and legal issues are at the pleading
stage. Other circuits wrestling with Conley reached the same conclusion.
73 the First Circuit upheld the district court's
In O'Brien v. DiGrazia,
dismissal of a civil rights suit brought by police officers who refused to
supply their personal financial information to their employer, alleging
that the request violated their "right to privacy. 74a Seeing no allegations
that the plaintiffs' financial affairs would be broadcast to the public, or
even to other government agencies, the court concluded that Conley does
not impose "a duty on the courts to conjure up unpleaded facts that might
turn a frivolous claim of unconstitutional official action into a substantial
one." 75 Similarly, and based in part on the reasoning in O'Brien, the
Sixth Circuit upheld the dismissal of a CERCLA claim in which plain-

68.
69.
70.
71.
Cos., 727
72.
73.
74.
75.

745 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1104-05.
See id. at 1109-10.
Id. at 1106 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan
F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984)).
Id.
544 F.2d 543 (st Cir. 1976).
Id. at 545-47.
Id. at 546 n.3.
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tiffs had failed to allege in their complaints that they incurred "response
costs" as required by the statute.76
Even the Supreme Court appeared conflicted about how far it really
meant to go in Conley. On more than one occasion, the Court acknowledged that the pleading of some specific facts would indeed be warranted
in some cases, particularly where the parties and the court otherwise anticipated unfettered and cumbersome discovery. In Associated General
Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters,77 for example, the Court held that "a district court must retain the
power to insist upon some specificity in pleading before allowing a potentially massive factual controversy to proceed. 78 The clear tension in
the Court's pleadings jurisprudence did not escape the attention of lower
courts; the Ninth Circuit has referred to the Supreme Court's subsequent
steps away from Conley as "unfortunately... conflicting guideposts. 79
This tension finally found (some) resolution in 2007, when the Supreme Court directly addressed the ramifications of the Conley rule in
Twombly, another antitrust action. 80 The plaintiffs in Twombly brought a
putative consumer class action against regional phone monopoliesknown as "Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers" ("ILECs"), or more
colloquially, the "Baby Bells"-alleging a conspiracy in violation of the
Sherman Act to prevent upstart competitors from entering local telephone and Internet service markets and to avoid competing with each
other in their respective markets. 8 1 Specifically, the complaint alleged
that: (1) the ILECs "engaged in parallel conduct in their respective service areas to inhibit the growth of [new competitors]"; and (2) the ILECs
refrained from competing with each other in their respective markets
despite "attractive business opportunities" to do so. 82 Ultimately, the
complaint alleged that:
In the absence of any meaningful competition between the [ILECs] in
one another's markets, and in light of the parallel course of conduct
that each engaged in to prevent competition ... within their respective local telephone and/or high speed internet services markets and
the other facts and market circumstances alleged above, Plaintiffs allege upon information and belief that [the ILECs] have entered into a
76.
McGregor v. Indus. Excess Landfill, Inc., 856 F.2d 39, 43 (6th Cir. 1988).
77.
459 U.S. 519 (1983).
78.
Id. at 528 n.17; see also, e.g., Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)
("We concede that ordinary pleading rules are not meant to impose a great burden upon a plaintiff.
But it should not prove burdensome for a plaintiff who has suffered an economic loss to provide a
defendant with some indication of the loss and the causal connection that the plaintiff has in mind.
At the same time, allowing a plaintiff to forgo giving any indication of the economic loss and proximate cause that the plaintiff has in mind would bring about harm of the very sort the statutes seek to
avoid." (citation omitted)).
79. Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1155 (9th Cir. 1989).
80. Bell Atd. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
81.
Id. at 550.
82. Id. at 550-51 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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contract, combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry in
their respective local telephone and/or high speed internet services
markets and have agreed not to compete with one another
and other83
wise allocated customers and markets to one another.
The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the allegations at most revealed knowing parallel business conduct, which did
not in itself violate section 1 of the Sherman Act. 84 The district court
explained that "conscious parallelism" was not enough to form a conspiracy; read alone, the pleaded facts could be explained equally well as
"independent self-interested conduct." 85 Relying in part on Conley, the
Second Circuit reversed, holding that "to rule that allegations of parallel
anti-competitive conduct fail to support a plausible conspiracy claim, a
court would have to conclude that there is no set of facts that would permit a plaintiff to demonstrate that the particular 8parallelism
asserted was
6
the product of collusion rather than coincidence.
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, holding that pleading a section 1 claim "requires a complaint with enough factual matter
(taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made." 87 In so holding,
the Court noted the growing criticism and confusion over Conley's "no
set of facts" standard, and concluded that "after puzzling the profession
for 50 years, this famous observation has earned its retirement. 8 8 The
Court further explained that "[a]sking for plausible grounds to infer an
agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading
stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation
that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement." 89
The reversal of Conley' s "no set of facts" standard did not occur in
a vacuum. Rather, Twombly demonstrated the Court's familiarity with
other courts' struggles to apply Conley in the antitrust context, and acknowledged that it was troubled by the potential cost to litigate a case in
which the issues were undetermined and perhaps undeterminable. 90 Noting the "costs of modem federal antitrust litigation, " 9 1 the Court explicitly rejected both "careful case management" and "careful scrutiny of evidence at the summary judgment stage" as stand-alone methods to prevent
83. Id. at 551 (first and third alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
84. Id. at 544-45.
85.
Id. at 552.
86.
Id. at 553 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Twombly v. Bell At. Corp., 425
F.3d 99, 114 (2005)).
87.
Id. at 556.
88. Id. at 562-63.
89.
Id. at 556.
90. See Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal
Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1231
(2008) (calling "the problem of costly discovery" the "first and most patent policy justification" for
the Court's approach in Twombly).
91.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v.
Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)).
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cost-conscious defendants from settling "even anemic cases" before
reaching the dispositive motion stage. 92 The majority concluded that only
narrowing the issues at the pleading stage could prevent extraordinary
costs or settlement of non-meritorious suits:
Probably, then, it is only by taking care to require allegations that
reach the level suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the
potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases with "no reasonably founded hope that the [discovery]
process will reveal relevant
93
evidence" to support a § 1 claim.
The "plausibility" standard set forth in Twombly was reiterated in
the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. IqbaP4 two years later.
While the context was very different, once again the Court seemed motivated in large part by issue-narrowing considerations. The plaintiff in
Iqbal was a Pakistani Muslim who had been arrested on criminal charges
and detained by federal officials in the wake of the September 11, 2001
attacks. 95 Iqbal filed a complaint against more than 50 known and unknown federal officials and corrections officers, alleging unconstitutional
treatment while he was detained in a maximum security facility.96
Among the named defendants were then-Attorney General John Ashcroft
and then-FBI Director Robert Mueller, whom the plaintiff alleged approved a policy of holding post-September 11 detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confinement until they were cleared by the FBI.9 7 The
complaint further alleged that "knew of, condoned, and willfully and
maliciously agreed to subject" Iqbal to allegedly harsh conditions "as a
matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national
origin and for no legitimate penological interest."98
Ashcroft and Mueller moved to dismiss for failure to state sufficient
allegations to show their involvement in clearly established unconstitutional conduct. 99 The district court denied the motion, and that decision
was upheld by the Second Circuit on interlocutory appeal. 1°° The Supreme Court disagreed, relying explicitly on its holding in Twombly (and
thereby putting to rest any belief that Twombly might be limited to its
facts).'0 ° Once again, the majority expressly rejected the notion that
"careful case management" would be a sufficient prophylactic to protect

92.
93.
(2005)).
94.
95.
96.

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 559.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1940 (2009).
Id. at 1942.
Id. at 1943-44.
Id. at 1944.
Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
See id.
See id.at 1950-51, 1953.
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the named defendants from the temporal and monetary costs of discovery:
We have held, however, that the question presented by a motion to
dismiss a complaint for insufficient pleadings does not turn on the
controls placed upon the discovery process.
Our rejection of the careful-case-management approach is especially important in suits where Government-official defendants are
entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity. The basic thrust
of the qualified-immunity doctrine is to free officials from the concerns of litigation, including "avoidance of disruptive discovery."...
Litigation, though necessary to ensure that officials comply with the
law, exacts heavy costs in terms of efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and resources that might otherwise be directed to the
proper execution of the work of Government....
It is no answer to these concerns to say that discovery for petitioners can be deferred while pretrial proceedings continue for other defendants. It is quite likely that, when discovery as to the other parties
proceeds, it would prove necessary for petitioners and their counsel
to participate in the process to ensure the case does not develop in a
misleading or slanted way that causes prejudice to their position.
Even if petitioners are not yet themselves subject to discovery orders,
then, they would not be free from the burdens of discovery. 102
In Twombly the motivating concern was the potential expense of
discovery in antitrust cases (echoing the admonitions of the Prettyman
report, Judge Dawson, and the Seventh Circuit in Car Carriers),0 3 while
in Iqbal the concern was the potential drain on human resources within
the federal government. 1°4 In both cases, however, the underlying apprehension was the same: discovery and judicial case management could not
meaningfully and efficiently focus the claims suggested by the complaint. 10 5 Nothing, in other words, could adequately perform the issuenarrowing function.
The holdings of Twombly and Iqbal have caused a sensation among
some members of the bar and the academy. Some see them as setting
forth an uncertain, confusing, or radical change in the pleading standard. 1°6 Others have argued that Twombly and Iqbal represent only a
102.
Id. at 1953 (citations omitted).
103.
See supra notes 24, 72, 90 and accompanying text.
104.
See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953.
105.
See generally Robert G. Bone, PlausibilityPleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment
on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1467799.
106.
See, e.g., Edward D. Cavanagh, Twombly, The FederalRules of Civil Procedure and the
Courts, 82 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 877, 889 (2008) (noting the "uncertainty of the Twombly holding");
A. Benjamin Spencer, UnderstandingPleadingDoctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2009) (discussing
the "broad and confusing pronouncements of Twombly"); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REv. 431, 432 (2008) (describing Twombly as "a remarkable departure from estab-
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modest tweak of the pleading standard, a mere clarification that is entirely consistent with previous understandings of Rule 8.107 From our perspective, the degree of departure from prior caselaw-and even whether
the "plausibility" standard is the right one-is less important than the
unmistakable message of both cases that the issue-narrowing function of
current pretrial procedure is broken. The Court's announcement of a
"plausibility" standard for pleadings was an overt admission that the
long-held assumption that discovery could compensate for the loss of
issue-narrowing at the pleadings stage is simply not true for at least some
types of cases. Requiring some degree of fact-based pleading in support
of a party's claim or defense is merely a nod to the reality-anticipated
by several lower courts and at least twice by the Supreme Court itselfl 8 -that allowing discovery to proceed without a reasonable sense of
direction is simply irresponsible.
B. CourthouseAccess and the Pleadingof Facts
The second myth about pleading and access suggests that requiring
parties to plead material facts slams the door of the courthouse to meritorious claims. Such pleading requirements, the argument goes, effectively
create a heightened standard designed to prevent cases-particularly
cases alleging civil rights violations by government officials-from
going forward. But while access to the court for all meritorious claims is
a critical consideration, there is no reason to believe that merely requiring the recitation of material facts at the pleading stage will prevent valid
cases from being filed or will lead to greater rates of dismissals. Indeed,
there is a competing argument that allowing issues to be narrowed earlier
in the litigation would streamline the litigation process, reduce cost, and
thereby allow a greater number of meritorious claims to be filed.
There is no particular inconsistency between the pleading of facts
and initial access to the courts. In fact, the framers of Rule 8 anticipated
that the parties would include salient facts in their pleadings. George
Donworth, an original Advisory Committee member, stressed that "the
requirement as to what a pleading shall contain does not by any means
imply that the facts are not to be stated."10 9 Charles Clark, too, observed
that "you would have to have at least some allegations of fact" in a
pleading under Rule 8.110 Indeed, the decision not to include the word
lished doctrine"); Andrde Sophia Blumstein, Twombly Gets Iqbal-ed, TENN. B.J., July 2009, at 23,
23.
107.
See, e.g., Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal but Could Be Better:
The Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in a Digital Age, 58 DUKE L.J. 889, 932 n.185
(2009) (arguing that Twombly is likely not "a major change to general standards of dismissal motions"); Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 49-51), available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1442786.
108. See supra text accompanying note 68.
109.
Campbell, supra note 33, at 14.
110. Id.
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"facts" in Rule 8 seems to have been a matter of expediency rather than
rigorous opposition to a fact-based pleading regime. 1"
Subsequent amendments to the Federal Rules strengthen the notion
that in most cases, the material facts necessary to support claims are
known or knowable before a claim is ever filed. Rule 11 (b) requires a
party to have factual and legal support for the allegations in his or her
pleadings,' 12 and Rule 26(a)(1) authorizes initial disclosures in part because the parties are expected to have available
baseline facts necessary
13
to narrow issues from the outset of litigation."
Those who oppose fact-based pleading tend to respond that requiring the parties to recite facts at the pleading stage will provide judges
looking for an easy way to shrink their dockets with an excuse to dismiss
cases. They point in particular to "heightened pleading" standards that
impose additional constraints on plaintiffs alleging employment discrimination or other civil rights violations. 1 4 In the past, some lower courts
have indeed justified such "heightened pleading" standards as necessary
to limit "frivolous" cases, 115 but the Supreme Court has made clear that
such standards are impermissible. In Leatherman v. TarrantCounty Narcotics Intelligence & CoordinationUnit,"t6 for example, the Court struck
down a Fifth Circuit requirement that in civil rights claims against government officials involving the likely defense of immunity," 7 the plaintiff s complaint must state "with factual detail and particularity the basis
for the claim which necessarily includes why the defendant-official can-

111.
Edson R. Sunderland, The New FederalRules, 45 W. VA. L.Q. 5,12 (1938).
112.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (b).
113.
See Steven S. Gensler, Some Thoughts on the Lawyer's E-volving Duties in Discovery, 36
N. KY. L. REV. 521, 530-31 (2009).
114.
See, e.g., Nancy J. Bladich, The Revitalization of Notice Pleading in Civil Rights Cases,
45 MERCER L. REV. 839, 851 (1994); Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45
ARIZ. L. REv. 987, 988 (2003); Fairman, supra note 13, at 551-52; Paul J. McArdle, A Short and
Plain Statement: The Significance ofLeatherman v. Tarrant County, 72 U. DET. MERCY L.REv. 19,
33-34 (1994).
115.
The courts have been candid that docket control was the primary motivation for heightened pleading standards in civil rights cases. See, e.g., Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d
920, 922 (3d Cir. 1976) ("In recent years there has been an increasingly large volume of cases
brought under the Civil Rights Acts. A substantial number of these cases are frivolous or should be
litigated in the State courts; they all cause defendants[,] public officials, policemen and citizens
alike, considerable expense, vexation and perhaps unfounded notoriety. It is an important public
policy to weed out the frivolous and insubstantial cases at an early stage in the litigation, and still
keep the doors of the federal courts open to legitimate claims." (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Valley v. Maule, 297 F. Supp. 958, 960-61 (D. Conn 1968))); Fairman, supra note 13, at
577-82 (collecting similar cases). The same motivation was at least partially behind the passage of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Michael A. Perino, Did the PrivateSecurities
Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 913, 914 (2003) ("The Reform Act was designed
to address a number of perceived abuses in these cases. In large part, its solution was to create a
series of procedural hurdles that make it more difficult for plaintiffs' attorneys to bring and maintain
nonmeritorious securities fraud class actions.").
116.
507 U.S. 163 (1993).
117.
See id. at 168-69.
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not successfully maintain the defense of immunity."1' 18 In so holding, the
Court noted that it was "impossible to square" the Fifth Circuit's rule
with "the liberal system of 'notice pleading' set up by the Federal
Rules."1 9 More recently, in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 12 ° the Court
rejected the Second Circuit's imposition of a heightened pleading standard for employment discrimination cases brought under Title VII and
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). 1 21 Again the
Court reiterated that a heightened pleading requirement
conflicted with
122
the "simplified pleading standard" of Rule 8(a).
It would be a mistake, however, to conflate "heightened pleading"
designed to remove certain types of cases from court dockets with factbased pleading designed explicitly to deliver earlier narrowing of issues
for both parties. The former is motivated by a desire for gatekeeping; it is
designed to limit access to the civil justice system from the outset.
"Heightened pleading" also potentially hinders access by sometimes requiring very particular facts to be pled in order to overcome an anticipated affirmative defense (such as the immunity defense in Leatherman). 123 General fact-based pleading, by contrast, is not about docket
control. It views access to the courts as a question that extends throughout the life of the case, from the initial filing of the complaint to the final
disposition of the matter. The claimant's true access to the court system
requires that valid claims be permitted at the outset, and also requires
that the claimant be able to follow the claim through until disposition on
the merits. In other words, fact-based pleading is premised on the belief
that the civil justice system should preserve economic access for meritorious claims at all phases of the case: filing, scrutiny of initial pleadings,
discovery, summary judgment, and trial. 124
Opponents of fact-based pleading also argue that it shuts out meritorious claims in cases-such as employment discrimination or Bivens
actions-in which the potential defendant has exclusive possession of
some or all of the key facts. 125 But procedural mechanisms already exist
to secure access to relevant facts for such claims. 126 In a number of states
118.
Id. at 167 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472,
1473 (1985)).
119.
Id.at 168.
120. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
121.
Id. at509,515.
122.
Seeid. at513.
123.
See, e.g., Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.
124.
See AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY & INST. FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT
OF
THE
AM.
LEGAL
SYS.,
FINAL
REPORT
5-7
(2009),

http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/pubs/ACTL-IAALS%2OFinal%2OReport%2ORevised%204-1509.pdf.
125.
Cavanagh, supra note 106, at 892; see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971).
126.
For an extensive discussion of various state approaches, see generally Lonny Sheinkopf
Hoffman, Access to Information, Access to Justice: The Role of PresuitInvestigatory Discovery, 40
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 217 (2007).
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(including Pennsylvania and Connecticut, which we discuss in more detail in Part I), the courts may allow a putative plaintiff to seek limited
discovery on a matter before a case is formally initiated. 127 As long as
parties have meaningful ways to identify or confirm otherwise hidden
facts, a fact-based pleading standard should not inhibit initial access to
the courts.
In summary, opponents of fact-based pleading rely on two myths
about pleading and access that are simply not true. The most basic form
of access-merely getting into court and staying there past the pleading
stage-is not necessarily hindered by the requirement to plead material
facts supportive of a party's claims or defenses. By contrast, the more
extensive form of access-the ability to afford to see a case through to a
judicial resolution-is plainly hindered by a system in which issues are
not narrowed and focused at the pleading stage.
These lessons are evident from a review of the federal system. A
comparison to state and foreign jurisdictions, however, makes the point
even more powerfully. In Part II, we show how fact-based pleading has
evolved into a workable standard that supports both access and issuenarrowing at the state level.
II. FACT-BASED PLEADING OUTSIDE OF THE FEDERAL RULES
Outside of the federal system, the benefits of fact-based pleading
have long been understood and are continually reaffirmed. A number of
state court systems in the United States have retained their longstanding
fact-based pleading requirements to motivate the early narrowing of is28
sues, even as they adopted other aspects of federal procedure. 1 Similarly, many other common law countries have recently reaffirmed that the
pleading of facts from the outset of a case is indeed the fastest and most
cost-effective way to establish and focus the issues in dispute. A review
of these jurisdictions-both domestic and foreign-suggests that factbased pleading is beneficial, sensitive to and compatible with the need to
maintain full access to the court for meritorious claims.
We focus in this Part on state and international common law jurisdictions129 in which fact-based pleading is considered to be consistent
127.
See e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 3102(c) (McKinney 2009); OHiO REV. CODE ANN. §
2317.48 (West 2009); PA. R. Cr. P. 4003.8.
128.
John B. Oakley and Arthur F. Coon's seminal review of state court rules of civil procedure identified 17 states that employ "some higher standard of factual specificity in pleading" than
the notice pleading standard of the Federal Rules-Arkansas, Delaware, South Carolina, Florida,
Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, California, Connecticut,
Illinois, Louisiana, Nebraska and New York. John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The FederalRules
in State Courts:A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure,61 WASH. L. REv. 1367, 1378

(1986). But see L.B. 876, 97th Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2002) (overturning Nebraska's fact-pleading
standard in favor of the Federal Rules' notice pleading).
129.
For the purposes of a more meaningful comparison, only common law jurisdictions will
be discussed; however, a number of civil law countries have been involved in civil justice review
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with-and often essential to-meaningful court access. We look first to
the many courts that have emphasized fact-based pleading's ability to
narrow issues efficiently. We then examine states in which special procedural tools have been developed in order to assure that the requirement
to plead facts does not inhibit the filing of meritorious lawsuits.
A. Appreciating the Role of Pleadingsin Narrowing Issues
Several state and foreign courts have made abundantly clear that
pleadings play a central role in narrowing issues, and that this role cannot
be abdicated. As these courts have explained, fact-based pleading inures
to the benefit not only of judges and lawyers, but the parties themselves.
1. Oregon
The Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure require that pleadings contain
a "plain and concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting a claim
for relief without unnecessary repetition., 30 The Oregon Supreme Court
has repeatedly reaffirmed the state's commitment to fact pleading. 131 In
Adams v. Oregon State Police,132 the Court addressed the sufficiency of
pleading notice under Oregon Statute 30.275 and noted that the "purpose
of requiring an exchange of pleadings is not to produce perfection in the
statement of the issue but only to bring forth into the light the points that
are in dispute."' 133 According to the Court, the pleadings have served this
function "[w]hen those points are sufficiently revealed so that the opponent is apprised of what he must meet and the trial judge is given sufficient information so that he can rule advisedly during the progress of the
trial. 134 The Court reaffirmed the role of pleadings several years later in

and reform. In the last decade, substantial reviews have been undertaken in Spain, Germany, France
and the Netherlands. Furthermore, in these and most other civil law jurisdictions, parties are required
to comport with pleading standards far more strict than those characteristic of common law jurisdictions; often requiring parties to plead facts and the proof on which the parties intend to rely to support these facts. PETER L. MURRAY & RoLF STRONER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE 158 (2004) (citing
Zivilprozeoordnung [ZPO] [civil procedure statute] Jan. 30, 1877, § 139(2)). Amendment of the
pleadings in many civil law jurisdictions is also strict. In Spain, for example, once the respondent
files a response to a claim or counterclaim, the pleadings cannot be amended or modified. Ifigo
Quintana et al., Spain, in INTERNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 677, 682 (Shelby R. Grubbs ed., 2003).
130. OR. R. Ctv. P. 18(A).
131.
Throughout this Part I, we refer to "fact-based pleading" to designate the general concept
of introducing facts at the pleading stage in order to narrow and focus disputed issues. Most states
with such requirements, however, refer to the process as "fact pleading" in deference to the form of
pleading that originated with the 1848 Field Code and has been carried over to this day. Out of
respect for the traditional language, we use "fact pleading" when referring to specific state statutes
and rules.
132.
611 P.2d 1153 (1980).
133.
Id. at 1157 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 383
P.2d 107, 113 (1963)).
134.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Perkins, 383 P.2d at 113).
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Davis v. Tyee Industries,Inc. 135 -a case that some commentators
believe
136
reached the Oregon Supreme Court solely for this purpose.
The benefits of fact pleading have also been affirmed by those who
practice in Oregon courts every day. In a recent survey undertaken by the
Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System, members
of the Oregon State Bar endorsed fact-based pleading by large margins.
Among the findings:
* Fifty percent of respondents said fact pleading increased the efficiency of the litigation
process; only seventeen percent said it de37
creased efficiency. 1
Fifty-five percent of respondents said that fact pleading increased
counsel's ability to prepare for trial; only seven percent said it decreased that ability. 138
0

* Thirty-nine percent of respondents said that fact pleading increased the fairness of the litigation process; only thirteen percent
said it decreased fairness. 139
* Sixty-four percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with
the statement,
"Fact pleading helps narrow the issues early in the
, 140
case."
Many comments to the open-ended sections of the survey also extolled the virtues of fact-based pleading. One respondent indicated a preference for Oregon state court over federal court because pleadings "actually mean something" in state court.'14 As one respondent noted, "Fact
pleading.., cleans up ' the
process and makes the parties focus on what
142
the case is really about."
2. New Jersey
New Jersey courts have long recognized that, although the technical
and formal requirements for pleadings have been abandoned, the requirement that parties plead facts and the primary role of pleadings in
narrowing issues have not. The Supreme Court of New Jersey has held
that:

135.
668 P.2d 1186 (1983).
136.
See Maurice J. Holland, Some Contributionsof Justice Petersonto Oregon's Civil Procedure, 73 OR. L. REV. 785, 811 (1994).
137.
INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., SURVEY OF THE OREGON BENCH
AND BAR ON THE OREGON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE fig. 11 (2010).

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id. fig.13.
Id. fig.8.
Id. at 24.
Id.
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[T]he objective of reaching an issue of law or of fact in two or at the
most three simple pleadings has been attained, but not at the sacrifice
of stating the elements of a claim or of a defense. They remain the
same as at common
law as a matter of substantive law as well as of
43
good pleading. 1
And while New Jersey's fact pleading standard-which requires "a
statement of the facts on which the claim is based"4-is to be liberally
construed, the New Jersey Superior Court has held that "a party's pleadings must nonetheless fairly apprise an adverse party of the claims and
issues to be raised at trial. 1 45 While New Jersey courts understand that
amendment of the pleadings to conform to new evidence should be liberally permitted, this liberal practice
does not justify the pleading of mere conclusions without facts, followed by reliance upon subsequent discovery (without a frame of
reference) to justify a lawsuit.
It is just inexcusable to plead merely a conclusion and thereafter
attempt to justify this action by an attempt to resort to the discovery
practice permitted by our rules. Such discovery is intended as an aid
to every litigant to avoid surprise and make a lawsuit an inquiry into
truth and justice. It is not (and was not intended) to be a substitute for
good pleading, a shield for the lazy pleader or a means of avoiding
the requirements of pleading legally sufficient facts.... Our discovery practice is no more a cure to legally deficient pleadings than aspirin is to cancer. 146
3. Florida
The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure require "a short and plain
statement of the ultimate facts showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." 147 Florida courts have held that this pleading rule "forces counsel to
recognize the elements of their cause of action and determine whether
they have or can develop the facts necessary to support it, which avoids a
great deal of wasted expense to the litigants and unnecessary judicial
effort."' 148 In Continental Banking Co. v. Vincent,149 the Fifth District
Court of Appeal found "cause for concern" where the lower court's ruling on a motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment took into
consideration federal district court rulings that were made prior to the

143.
Grobart v. Soc'y for Establishing Useful Mfrs., 65 A.2d 833, 839 (N.J. 1949); see also
Gruccio v. Baxter, 343 A.2d 145, 147 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975) (discussing Grobart).
144.
N.J. CT. R. 4:5-2.
145.
Miltz v. Borroughs-Shelving, a Div. of Lear Siegler, Inc., 497 A.2d 516, 519 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1985).
146.
Grobart,65 A.2d at 835.
147.
148.
149.

FLA. R. CiV. P. 1.110(b).
Cont'l Banking Co. v. Vincent, 634 So. 2d 242,244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
Id.
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federal court's remand of the case to state court. 150 The Court noted that
the
quality of pleading that is acceptable in federal court and which will
routinely survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted will commonly not approach the minimum pleading threshold required in our state courts.... The fact that

a pleading of a state law claim in a diversity case in federal court has
survived a motion to dismiss says nothing about whether
15 1 the claim
courts.
state
our
in
required
standard
pleading
the
meets
The practical distinction, therefore, between the fact pleading requirement in Florida state courts and notice pleading in federal court is
more than illusory. In Vincent, had the record not indicated that the motions were considered on their merits, it appears that the Fifth District
Court of Appeals would have reconsidered the lower court's ruling. 152
Furthermore, while Florida courts permit parties to amend the
pleadings to incorporate evidence that supports new causes of action,
parties are precluded from recovering under claims where they do not
plead a cause of action with sufficient particularity to narrow the issues
in dispute-or attempt to later prove a cause of action not pleaded or
insufficiently supported in the pleadings. To this effect, the Florida Supreme Court has held that "litigants at the outset of a suit must be compelled to state their pleadings with sufficient particularly for a defense to
be prepared. Our growing, complex society and diminishing resources
all claims to the extent
mandate the requirement that litigants present
' 53
possible, at one time, and one time only."'
4. Maryland
Despite a move in 1984 to rules that more closely resemble those of
their federal counterparts, Maryland state courts also remain loyal to fact
pleading.154 According to Modern Maryland Civil Procedure,the "retention of the trappings of code or fact pleading... quite probably indicates
an intention that the pleadings play a broader role in defining the issues
Id.
150.
151.
Id.
152. See id.
153. Arky, Freed, Steams, Watson, Greer, Weaver & Harris, P.A. v. Bowmar Instrument
Corp., 537 So. 2d 561, 563 (Fla. 1988); see also Horowitz v. Laske, 855 So. 2d 169, 172-73 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (reciting the language in Arky and Cont'l Banking Co. in reversing the trial
court's denial of the motion to dismiss on the basis that the third-party complaint did not state a
cause of action).
154. The 1984 revisions to the Maryland Rules were substantial. One of the major changes was
the merger of law and equity that eliminated many of the technical requirements of common-law
pleadings. Overall, the changes to the Maryland pleading rules resulted in a pleading system that
"embodies the spirit of federal pleading" but retained the requirement that parties plead facts. 1-2
Md. Rules Commentary (MB) § 300 (2009); see also MD. RULE 2-303 (2009) (requiring in pleadings "only such statements of fact as may be necessary to show the pleader's entitlement to relief or
ground of defense").
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•.. than in federal practice." 155 The Maryland Court of Appeals has held
as much, recognizing that notice to the parties as to the nature of the
claim or defense is the paramount role of pleadings, but nonetheless
pointing to three additional roles of pleadings: (1) to state the facts upon
which the claim or defense allegedly exists; (2) to define the boundaries
of litigation; and (3) to provide for the speedy resolution of frivolous
claims and defenses. 156 Further-as is the case in New Jersey, Oregon,
and Florida-in Maryland pleading facts provides not only notice to the
parties as to the nature of the claim or defense, it also provides notice as
to the precise facts that support the claim or defense, allowing parties to
focus their efforts when going forward with discovery.
5. The Recent Reaffirmation of Fact-Based Pleading in Other
Common Law Countries
Generally speaking, the world of pleadings outside the United
States is a world of fact-based pleading. Civil law jurisdictions are characterized by their strict pleading standards, often requiring parties to
plead facts and the proof on which the parties intend to rely to support
those facts. 157 Amendment of the pleadings in many civil law jurisdictions is often not allowed.15 8 Common law jurisdictions outside of the
United States, while employing a considerably more relaxed pleading
standard than59 their civil law counterparts, nevertheless require parties to
plead facts.'

In the last fifteen years, several common law countries-among
them England, Canada, Australia and Hong Kong-have undertaken
comprehensive reviews of their civil justice systems, driven by concerns
about growing cost and delay, and a corresponding decrease in access to
the court system. 16 As part of their review, each of these jurisdictions
has taken a fresh look at the value of fact-based pleadings, and each has
reaffirmed the importance of pleading facts to narrow the issues in dispute. We offer here illustrations from two common law systems most
similar to that of the United States: Canada and England.
a. Canada
A number of Canadian provinces-each having the authority to
promulgate its own rules of civil procedure-have been active in civil
155.
1-6 Modem Md. Civil Procedure (MB) § 6.1 (2009).
156.
Scott v. Jenkins, 690 A.2d 1000, 1003 (Md. 1997).
157. See, e.g., MURRAY & STRONER, supra note 129, at 158.
158.
In Spain, for example, once the respondent files a response to a claim or counterclaim, the
pleadings cannot be amended or modified. Quintana et al., supra note 129, at 682.
159.
See, e.g., FED. CT. R. 11.2 (Austl.); ALTA. R. CT. 104 (Can. Alta.); ONT. R. Civ. P.
25.06(l) (Can. Ont.); CPR 16.4(l)(a) (U.K.).
160.
For the purposes of a more meaningful comparison, only common law jurisdictions will
be discussed; however, a number of civil law countries have been involved in civil justice review
and reform. In the last decade, substantial reviews have been undertaken in Spain, Germany, France
and the Netherlands.
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justice reform. The Alberta Rules of Court Project commenced in 2001,
with the goals of making the rules of civil procedure more clear, userfriendly, and efficient. Pleadings were one of the major topics of review
16
'
and under consideration was whether Alberta's fact pleading standard
should be retained or replaced by62a standard similar to that in the U.S.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The majority view that emerged from consultations with the Alberta
legal community163 was that detailed pleadings-the purpose of which is
to "define precisely the matters in dispute in an action"'---were valuable enough to outweigh the initial costs associated with preparing, filing,
and exchanging them.' 65 The pleadings were thought to keep the parties
on track, and respondents voiced concern that relaxing formal pleading
requirements might increase the costs and delay associated with defining
the facts and issues in a case.1 66 Some respondents suggested that issues
should be more clearly defined in pleadings, 67 while others noted that
the filing of more detailed particulars (details specifying the nature of
certain alleged facts) would increase the efficiency of disclosure and
discovery.168 Respondents commenting on particulars also suggested
including an automatic right to receive better particulars or the ability to
serve a request on the169opposing party for better particulars without the
need for a court order.
The Rules of Court Project ultimately rejected the proposition that
Alberta move to notice pleading,17 0 with the Project's General Rewrite
Committee concluding that a move to notice pleading would be "a move
in the wrong direction."'' 71 The Proposed Rules of Court, published in
October 2008 but yet to be approved by the legislature, require that
pleadings state "the facts on which a party relies," "a matter that defeats,

ALBERTA LAW REFORM INSTITUTE, ALBERTA RULES OF COURT PROJECT: PLEADINGS,
161.
CONSULTATION MEMORANDUM No. 12.8, at 1 (2003), http://www.law.ualberta.ca/alri/docs/cml28.pdf [hereinafter ALRI] (referencing that the pleading standard in Alberta at the time the Project
commenced required a "statement in summary form of the material facts on which the party pleading
relies for his claim or defence").
162.
Id. at 1-6.
See ALBERTA LAW REFORM INSTITUTE, ISSUES PAPER FOR THE LEGAL COMMUNITY:
163.
ALBERTA RULES OF COURT PROJECT 1 (2001), http://www.law.ualberta.ca/alri/docs/arcissue.pdf.

The Alberta Rules of Court Project circulated a short issues paper, inviting feedback on, among
other issues, the following two pleadings questions: "Do the cost and delay associated with formal
pleadings outweigh their value?" and "Should pleadings be abolished and replaced by a less formal
narrative of fact and law provided by each party?" Id. at 6.
Id. at5.
164.
165.
Id.
ALBERTA LAW REFORM INSTITUTE, ALBERTA RULES OF COURT PROJECT: REPORT ON
166.
LEGAL COMMUNITY CONSULTATION 7 (2002), http://www.law.ualberta.ca/alri/docs/db-report.pdf.

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Id.
Id.
ALRI, supra note 161, at 6.
Id.
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or raises a defence72to, a claim or the claim of another party," and "the
remedy claimed." 1
b. England
In the mid-1990s, a substantial review of the civil justice system in
England and Wales resulted in new rules that, while simplified, still require the pleading of facts. The English review, commissioned by the
Lord Chancellor and undertaken by one of England's most senior judges,
the Right Honorable Lord Woolf, identified a number of problems with
the English system of pleadings. The pleadings failed to set out the facts
and therefore impeded the identification of issues, were often longwinded, and concentrated too much on causes of action and defenses. 173
In short, Lord Woolf concluded that "the basic function of pleadings-to
state succinctly the facts relied on-has been lost sight of."' 174 Accordingly, Lord Woolf s suggestions for reforming the pleading system were
centered on the need "to ensure that175the basic function of pleadings-to
state facts-is restored to primacy."'
In formulating his recommendations for reform, Lord Woolf engaged in an extensive review of rules and procedures in several foreign
common law jurisdictions by seeking in-person consultations with practi176
tioners and judges in these jurisdictions, including the United States.
Given the uniqueness of notice pleading to the U.S. system, Lord Woolf
was exposed to this alternative but nevertheless opted to retain fact-based
pleading, envisioning that the role of pleadings under the new rules
would enable the court and the parties to identify and define the issues in
dispute. 77 He recommended that a "claim"-synonymous with a complaint in the U.S. civil justice system-should "set out a short description
of the claim and a succinct statement of the facts relied on.' ' 178 And a
defense should contain indications as to which parts the defendant admits, denies, doubts to be true or neither admits nor denies, insofar as
they differ from the version set forth by the claimant. 179 In large part,

172.

app.

ALBERTA LAW REFORM INSTITUTE, RULES OF COURT PROJECT: FINAL REPORT NO. 95

H

(2008),

http://www.law.ualberta.ca/alri/docs/1 .%20Appendix%20H%20-

%20Proposed%2ORules%20of%20Court.pdf.
173.
RIGHT HONOURABLE LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: INTERIM REPORT TO THE LORD
CHANCELLOR ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES ch. 20, para. 4 (1995),

http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/interim/chap20.htm.
174.
Id. (citation omitted).
175.
Id. at ch. 20, para. 8.
176.
See RIGHT HONOURABLE LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FINAL REPORT TO THE
LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES annex H (1996),
http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/final/annex1 &2.htm.
177.
See id. at sec. II, ch. 9, para. 5.

178.

Id. at ch. 12, para. 11.

179.

Id. at para. 16.
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implemented into Part 16 of the 1998 Civil
these recommendations were
80
Procedure Rules ("CPR").1
Although Lord Woolf s proposals, as implemented in the CPR, radically simplified the way in which parties commence an action,' 8' the
"Woolf Reforms" added certain procedural requirements that actually
increased the amount of factual information parties are required to set
forth in the period before discovery. A series of pre-action protocols instituted procedural requirements with which parties must comply prior to
filing a claim in court. Included in these requirements is the exchange of
pleading-like documents called Letters of Claim that must set forth facts
on which the potential claim is based. 82 The specialized pre-action pro1 83
tocols identify particular facts and documents that must be exchanged;
claims not covered by a specialized protocol are subject to the Practice
Direction, which requires among other things that the Letter of Claim
contain "a clear summary of the facts on which the claim is based."' '84
B. Balancing Fact-BasedPleadingsand Initial CourtAccess
State and international jurisdictions have not only affirmed their
commitment to fact-based pleading as a valuable tool for narrowing disputed issues, but have also developed procedural mechanisms to ensure
that the pleading standard does not adversely impact initial access to the
courts. While these mechanisms vary, their purpose is the same: to address those situations in which the facts necessary to meet the pleading
standard are in the hands of the opposing party. These mechanisms ensure access to the courts without sacrificing the requirements-and there180.
Under Part 16.2(1)(a), the parties are required to file a claim form that contains "a concise
statement of the nature of the claim." CPR 16.2(l)(a) (U.K.). Under Part 16.4(l)(a), the claimant
must also provide the opposing party with the particulars of the claim, including "a concise statement of the facts on which the claimant relies." Id. 16.4(i)(a). The Practice Direction supplement for
Part 16 directs that the particulars of claim can be included with the claim form, served alongside the
claim form, or served at a later date. Id. 16 PD paras. 3.1-.3. The Practice Direction further lists
additional particulars that parties must include, tailored to certain claim types. See id. paras. 4.1, 5.1,
6.1.
181.
The complications in the English system of pleadings prior to the Woolf reforms arose
from the highly technical requirements of commencing a claim. For example, in the High Court
alone there were four methods of starting proceedings-writ, originating summons, originating
motion and petition in the High Court. A similar situation existed in the country courts, where proceedings could be commenced by summons, originating application, petition and notice of appeal.
Further complication existed in the varying forms of each method-for example, there were three
types of forms of originating summons. As each method of commencing proceedings had different
consequences, determining how to commence an action became very complicated. WOOLF, supra
note 176, at sec. MI,ch. 12, par. 1, http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/final/sec3b.htm#cl2.
182.
See e.g., CPR Pre-action Protocol for Housing Disrepair Cases para. 3.3(a) (U.K.); id. Prepara. 6.2; id. Pre-action Protocol for Judicial Review para.
action Protocol for Disease and Illness
10; id. Pre-action Protocol for the Resolution of Clinical Disputes para. 3.16.
183.
See, e.g., id. Pre-Action Protocol for Housing Disrepair Cases paras. 3.2-5; id. PreAction Protocol for Disease and Illness Claims paras. 4.1-5; id. Pre-Action Protocol for Resolution
of Clinical Disputes paras. 3.14-19; id. Pre-Action Protocol for Personal Injury Claims paras. 3.2.20.

184.

Id. Pre-action Conduct PD sec. IV, annex A, para. 2.1(3).
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fore the benefits-of a fact-based pleading standard. We briefly describe
how these processes work in three state courts.
1. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania's pleading standard requires that parties plead the
"material facts on which a cause of action or defense is based... in a
concise and summary form."' 185 In numerous opinions Pennsylvania
courts have further established the importance of the pleadings in narrowing the issues. In Smith v. Wagner, 86 the Superior Court held that a
sufficient complaint "must do more than give the defendant fair notice of
what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. 1It
87
should formulate the issues by fully summarizing the material facts."'
In Miketic v. Baron, 88 the Superior Court held that "the pleader must
define the issues; every act189or performance essential to that end must be
set forth in the complaint.'
Pennsylvania courts have been firm in their commitment to factbased pleading, and the Superior Court has held that parties cannot escape their duties under this standard "by a general averment that the facts
are in the possession of the defendant."' 90 However, Pennsylvania civil
procedure recognizes that in limited situations the facts necessary to craft
a complaint may be exclusively in the hands of the defendant and, where
this is the case, a requirement that parties plead facts may prohibit plaintiffs from being able to bring a claim. 19' To protect a plaintiff's ability to
access the court in such situations, the Pennsylvania rules allow depositions or interrogatories "for preparation of pleadings" under certain circumstances. 192 "Pre-complaint discovery" is available to prospective
plaintiffs "where the information sought is material and necessary to the
filing of the complaint."1 93 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held
that "because of the need for specificity in pleading," the pre-complaint
discovery mechanism "play[s]
a critically important role in Pennsylva194
nia's pleading scheme."'
Where a plaintiff is not in possession of the facts needed to craft a
complaint, he or she may commence the action by filing a writ of summons-in lieu of a complaint-and then seek pre-complaint discovery to
185. PA. R. Civ. P. 1019(a).
186. 588 A.2d 1308 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
187. Id. at 1310 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Baker v. Rangos, 324 A.2d 498,
505-06 (Pa. Super Ct. 1974)) (referencing Conley and the federal notice pleading standard).
188.
675 A.2d 324 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
189. Id. at 330 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Santiago v. Pa. Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins.
Co., 613 A.2d 1235, 1238 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)).
190.
Krajsa v. Keypunch, Inc., 622 A.2d 355, 358 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Burnside v. Abbott Labs., 505 A.2d 973, 980 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)).
191.
See PA. R. CIv. P. 4001 (c).
192.
See id.
193.
PA. R. CrY. P. 4003.8(a).
194. McNeil v. Jordan, 894 A.2d 1260, 1269 (Pa. 2006).
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obtain facts sufficient to support the complaint. 195 Trial courts have discretion as to whether to allow this form of early discovery, and they take
into consideration whether it will "cause unreasonable annoyance, em1 96
barrassment, oppression, burden or expense to any person or party."
Where opposed by the party from whom it is sought, the court may require the plaintiff "to state with particularity how the discovery will materially advance the preparation of the complaint" and "shall weigh the
importance of the discovery request against the burdens imposed on any
person or party from whom the discovery is sought."' 97 In McNeil v. Jordan,198 the definitive case governing pre-complaint discovery, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court provided trial courts with the following guidance when considering a plaintiffs request to obtain pre-complaint discovery:
[A] litigant should be required to demonstrate his good faith as well
as probable cause that the information sought is both material and
necessary to the filing of a complaint in a pending action. A plaintiff
should describe with reasonable detail the materials sought, and state
with particularity probable cause for believing the information will
materially advance his pleading, as well as averring that, but for the
discovery request, he will be unable to formulate a legally sufficient
pleading. Under no circumstance should a plaintiff be allowed to embark upon a "fishing expedition," or otherwise rely on an amorphous
discovery process to detect a cause of action he lacks probable cause
to anticipate prior to the pre-complaint discovery process under this
standard. 99
The standard that a plaintiff must meet to obtain pre-complaint discovery is a relatively strict one. 200 In McNeil, the Court recognized that
the emergent consensus in Pennsylvania trial courts at the time of its
ruling was that "pre-complaint discovery should be restrictively allowed,
narrowly drafted, and permitted only when a complaint capable of surviving preliminary objections cannot be filed without aid of the requested
discovery. '20 1 However, this standard is not impossible to meet where a
195.
See PA. R. Civ. P. 1007.
196.
Id. 4003.8(a).
197.
Id. 4003.8(b).
198.
894 A.2d 1260.
199.
Id. at 1278.
200. See e.g., Potts v. Consol. Rail Corp., 37 Pa. D. & C.4th 196, 199-200 (1998) (detailing
Judge Stanton Wettick's typical experience on Fridays where he generally received at least one
order, in response to a plaintiffs request for pre-complaint discovery, seeking a stay of discovery
"until the pleadings are closed." Judge Wettick generally granted these orders on the basis that the
"discovery rules should be applied in a manner consistent with these pleadings rules that are based
on the premise that discovery will be narrowed if the contours of the dispute are initially defined
through fact pleading"); see also Speicher v. Toshok, 63 Pa. D. & C.4th 435, 438 (2003) ("[A]
plaintiff seeking to depose parties or witnesses before filing a complaint is usually faced with a
motion for a protective order requesting that such discovery be barred until the filing of the complaint. In most instances, the motion is granted.").
201.
McNeil, 894 A.2d at 1274.
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plaintiff has a valid cause of action, but lacks a necessary fact to support
a complaint under the Pennsylvania fact pleading standard.2 °2 Moreover,
evidence suggests that a more lax standard may invite numerous problems, and may be subject to abuse without careful focusing and supervision by a judge.2 °3
2. Connecticut
Like Pennsylvania, Connecticut employs pleadings for the purpose
of developing the material facts at the beginning of litigation. 204 According to a state law treatise, "The Federal practitioner relies on discovery to
develop the material facts in respect of the cause of action, whereas the
Connecticut lawyer expects to find these facts in the pleading and may
compel the pleading of material facts. 20 5 As a fact pleading jurisdiction,
"[i]n Connecticut issue is joined on the pleadings, with important consequences for discovery and issues of relevancy at trial. 20 6 Therefore, interrogatories and requests for production "are not intended to serve as
devices for discovery of those
material facts which a Connecticut pleader
20 7
must allege at the outset."
Connecticut allows a similar process for pre-suit discovery under
which parties are authorized to file a bill of discovery, defined by Connecticut courts as "an independent action in equity for discovery ... designed to obtain evidence for use in an action other than the one in which
discovery is sought., 20 8 The requesting party "must demonstrate that
what he seeks to discover is material and necessary for proof of, or is
needed to aid in proof of or in defense of, another action already brought
or about to be brought.'' 209 A party can, therefore, file a bill of discovery
to obtain discovery for evidence to use in a subsequent action.
Like Pennsylvania, Connecticut uses a probable cause standard under which parties attempting to obtain discovery must demonstrate good
faith and "by detailed facts" that probable cause exists to bring a potential cause of action. 210 In this context, "[p]robable cause is the knowledge
of facts sufficient to justify a reasonable man in the belief that he has

202. See, e.g., Potts, 37 Pa. D & C.4th at 199 (noting that pre-complaint discovery may be
granted when a plaintiff seeks a copy of the "written employment agreement with the defendant" or
requests "medical records [from] a medical provider").
203.
See Hoffman, supra note 126, at 242-44 (discussing the impact of TEX. R. CIv. P. 737
(repealed 1998)).
204.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-91 (West 2009) (requiring "a statement of the facts constituting the cause of action").
205.
1-10 Dupont on Conn. Civil Practice (MB) § 10-1.2 (2009).
206.
1-13 id. § 13-2.1.
207.
Id.
208.
Berger v. Cuomo, 644 A.2d 333, 337 (Conn. 1994).
209.
Id. (emphasis added).
210.
Id.
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reasonable grounds for presenting an action.",21' The facts provided by
the plaintiff must "fairly indicate that he has some potential cause of action, ,,212 The party must also show that the information sought is both
material and necessary and must further be able to describe the material
"with such details as may be reasonably available. 2 t3 Connecticut courts
have expressly stated that a plaintiff "should not be allowed to indulge a
hope that a thorough ransacking of any information and material which
the defendant
may possess would turn up evidence helpful to [his]
214
case."
3. Missouri
Missouri's pleading rule requires that pleadings contain "a short and
plain statement of the facts showing that the pleader is entitled to relief., 21 5 A proposal was made in 1943 that would have adopted the noticing pleading standard of the Federal Rules; however, the fact pleading
standard survived and occupies a primary role in the state's courts. According to the Missouri Supreme Court, "The goal of fact pleading is the
quick, efficient, and fair resolution of disputes" by identifying, narrowing, and defining the issues "so that the trial court and the parties know
what issues are to be tried, what discovery is necessary, and what evidence may be admitted at trial. 21 6 In ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v.
Mid-America Marine Supply Corp.,217 the court clearly distinguished the
role of pleadings in the Missouri state system from that in the Federal
Rules, stating:
Where the federal courts now use discovery to identify the triable issues, such has always been the role of the pleadings in Missouri.
Where the federal courts now use discovery to identify the facts upon
which the plaintiff's claim
rests, such has always been the role of
218
pleadings in Missouri.
The Missouri Supreme Court has taken a slightly different approach
in situations where a party does not have access to the information necessary to frame the pleadings, pointing out that the rules allow parties to
plead on "the best of the [party's] knowledge, information, and belief,
formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances.,, 2 9 Further211.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cosgrove Dev. Co. v. Cafferty, 427 A.2d
841, 842 (Conn. 1980)).
212. Id.
213.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pottetti v. Clifford, 150 A.2d 207, 213
(Conn. 1959)).
214. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pottetti,150 A.2d at

213).
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Mo. R. Civ. P. 55.05.
State ex rel. Harvey v. Wells, 955 S.W.2d 546, 547 (Mo. 1997).
854 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1993).
Id. at 380 (citations omitted).
Mo. R. Civ. P. 55.03(c); see also Wells, 955 S.W.2d at 548.
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more, a Rule 55.27(d) motion for more definite statement allows the trial
court, in its discretion, to allow a party whose pleading has been challenged more time to discover facts that will enable the party to support
the claims in the pleading. The Missouri Supreme Court has held, however, that in exercising this discretion trial courts are directed to be "sensitive to the reasons that Missouri remains a fact pleading state" and to
ensure that "[u]nnecessary expense should be eliminated by requiring
parties, as early
as possible, to abandon claims or defenses that have no
22 0
basis in fact.
Fact-based pleading has met with considerable satisfaction in many
states, due in part to the ability of such pleadings to narrow issues and
focus claims early. Given the apparently successful method of assuring
both initial court access and long-term access in the civil justice system,
further exploration of a fact-based pleading approach at the federal level
is warranted.
III. TOWARD

A NEW APPROACH

A. A ProposedNew Pleading Standard
The time is right to consider narrowing the issues at the pleading
stage in federal court. In Iqbal and Twombly, the Supreme Court clearly
fretted over a system that leaves issue narrowing to the discovery phase
or later. 221 Attorneys mostly agree with this sentiment. In a 2008 survey
of the Fellows of the American College of Trial Lawyers, over sixty-four
percent of respondents indicated that fact pleading can narrow the scope
of discovery. 2 Similarly, in a 2009 survey of the American Bar Association Section of Litigation, just under sixty-five percent of respondents
who self-identified as representing both plaintiffs and defendants indicated the same belief.22 3 And in a 2009 case-based survey of attorneys
conducted by the Federal Judicial Center, a plurality of respondents who
self-identified as representing roughly equal numbers of plaintiffs and
defendants agreed that disputed issues would be identified earlier with
fact pleading. 224 It is time to discard the old structure of waiting to focus
issues until the discovery phase of litigation, and install in its place a new
system in which meaningful access to the courts is guaranteed both at the
outset of a case and throughout its lifetime.
Pleadings that require the recitation of facts directly bearing on the
elements of a claim or affirmative defense will better address current
problems of pervasive cost and delay by commencing the issuenarrowing process at the start of the case. It bears repeating that embrac220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Wells, 955 S.W.2d at 548.
See supra Part I.A.
ACTIIAALS, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 4, at A-3.
AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 37, at 52 & tbl.4.3.
LEE & WILLGING, supra note 38, at 49 fig.24.
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ing fact-based pleading does not mean a return to code or common law
pleading, or a rejection of the basic structure of the Federal Rules. Discovery, judicial management, and summary judgment would still be
available to further focus the parties as the case moved along. Indeed, far
from replacing these tools, development of facts at the pleading stage
would enhance their use and allow cases to move toward meaningful
resolution more effectively.
1. Improvements for Discovery
Discovery is most effective when the parties are able to think comprehensively about the evidence necessary to prove their claims or defenses from a very early stage in the litigation. Early identification of the
specific issues in dispute allows a party to craft a discovery plan to uncover specific, relevant evidence in the most efficient manner possible.
Early issue-narrowing through fact-based pleading also makes discovery
gamesmanship less likely. Under a notice pleading regime, it is more
difficult to ascertain whether a disproportionate discovery request was
motivated by an innocent effort to collect all the relevant facts or a more
sinister desire to drive up the costs of responding and force a settlement.
This blurred line renders impotent most rules that would otherwise control abusive discovery. Rule 37 and Rule 26(g) sanctions are rarely issued, in part because determining malicious intent is so difficult. 225 Rule
26(b) proportionality determinations are necessarily ad hoc and difficult
to predict because judges must navigate and balance a thicket of mostly
unquantifiable factors 226 -- and because even the most earnest judges
know less about the facts of the case than do the parties.227 A requirement
to plead facts from the outset would remove many of the "innocent"
excuses associated with excessive discovery, and would make truly malicious efforts to overuse discovery easier to spot and sanction.
2. Improvements for Judicial Management
Effective judicial management of a case depends on the judge having sufficient understanding of the relevant facts and issues. While the
judge cannot be expected to know everything that the parties and their
counsel know, neither can the judge afford to be ignorant of case specifics. The introduction of facts at the pleading stage will help the judge
identify the specific issues in dispute, which in turn will increase the
judge's ability to make comprehensive and informed decisions about the
scope of discovery and pretrial practice.

225.
See Seymour Moskowitz, Rediscovering Discovery: State ProceduralRules and the Level
Playing Field,54 RUTGERS L. REV. 595, 645 n.404 (2002).
226.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (basing proportionality determinations on a consideration of "the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of
the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues").
227.
See Bone, supra note 67, at 1990.
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3. Improvements for Summary Judgment
The well-known standard for a grant of summary judgment is that
"the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any
affidavits [must] show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
' 28
fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Too often, however, summary judgment motions become an exercise in
competing affidavits and lengthy document appendices. Fact-based
pleading can help streamline the summary judgment process in two
ways. First, by focusing discovery and making the process leading up to
summary judgment faster and more cost effective, fact-based pleading
makes the actual filing of a summary judgment motion more economically palatable. Second, where facts are pled and admitted, the parties and
the court can simply rely on the pleadings to establish the presence of a
fact, obviating the need for affidavits or documentary proof. The result
should be faster and more streamlined summary judgment rulings.
4. The New Standard
After more than seventy years, is it hard to remember that pleadings
were once the primary vehicle for narrowing disputed issues in federal
civil actions. The move to notice pleading in the federal system in 1938
was a break from this centuries-old tradition-a noble experiment that
unfortunately has proven to have too many negative side effects. Discovery, judicial management, and summary judgment may well be useful
tools for narrowing issues, but in too many civil cases they cannot
achieve that goal on their own. Narrowing issues through the pleading of
material facts is the traditional, effective, and all-too-often overlooked
solution.
Accordingly, we propose the following new standard:
9 A party must plead material facts sufficient to support each element of an asserted claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or affirmative defense. A material fact would be defined as a fact that is essential to the
claim or defense and without which it could not be supported.
e In answering a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim, any statement
of fact that is not specifically denied would be deemed admitted. General
denials would not be permitted, and any denials based on lack of information of knowledge would have to be so pleaded.
* If a responding party determines that a claim or affirmative defense lacks sufficient facts to support each element, the preferred response would be a motion for a more definite statement. The court would
be instructed to grant liberally the ability to amend a claim or defense to
insert sufficient material facts to support each claim.
228.

FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
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9 If a claiming party could not provide at least one material fact for
every element of the claim, dismissal of the claim would be proper.

* The claiming party would be free to plead more than one material
fact for a claim element if such facts were known. Unlike the more rigid
pleading requirements of the common law or the codes, there would be
no punishment for incidental pleadings of evidentiary facts or conclusions of law-although conclusions of law would of course be ignored
for purposes of determining whether the claim or defense satisfied the
pleading standard. Similarly, a "fact" that was objectively fanciful could
not serve to support a claim on a motion to dismiss.
This proposed pleading standard would also narrow the scope of
discovery, consistent with the reintroduction of the issue-narrowing role
to the pleading stage. Rather than deeming discoverable "any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense," 229 as the
rule currently allows, we propose limiting discovery to non-privileged
matter that is directly relevant to developing, proving, or disproving disputed material facts as established by the pleadings. Accordingly, if a
material fact is admitted in the pleadings (either directly or by failure to
set forth a specific denial), discovery related to that fact would be unnecessary and therefore precluded. For those material facts that are in dispute, however, discovery would still be permitted both with respect to
the material facts actually asserted, and the so-called "evidentiary facts"
that help establish material facts. In other words, the proposed scope of
discovery standard is designed to focus discovery on those issues that are
especially germane to the facts and issues still in dispute, but maintain
parties' ability to explore those facts with a certain degree of latitude.
Our proposed fact-based pleading regime would also include an outlet for pre-suit discovery to collect relevant material facts that lie exclusively in the possession of another. It would be recommended to courts
to permit such discovery-after notice and an opportunity to be heard by
a potential opposing party-upon a showing by the petitioning party that:
(1) the petitioner cannot prepare a legally sufficient complaint without
the information sought; (2) the petitioner has probable cause to believe
that the information sought will enable preparation of a legally sufficient
complaint; (3) the petitioner has probable cause to believe that the information sought is in the possession of the person or entity from whom it is
sought; (4) the proposed discovery is narrowly tailored to minimize expense and inconvenience; and (5) the petitioner's need for the discovery
outweighs the burden and expense to other persons and entities.230
229. Id. 26(b)(1).
230. This proposed approach to pre-suit discovery has been codified in pilot rules developed by
the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System and the American College of Trial
Lawyers Task Force on Discovery and Civil Justice. See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM.
LEGAL SYS. & AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND CIVIL JUSTICE,
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This pre-suit discovery rule is designed to balance the need for
access to the discovery process with the acknowledged burdens that discovery imposes. The party from whom pre-suit discovery is sought
would have the opportunity to be heard before any ruling was issued,23'
and the court would have the power to impose limitations and conditions
on the scope of pre-suit discovery consistent with the petitioner's demonstrated needs.
B. The ProposedStandard in Practice:An Example
To better illustrate how the proposed new standard would work in
connection with the existing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we examine a typical claim for patent infringement. We choose a patent case
simply because it provides a relatively clean and concise illustration. The
same principles would apply to a wide range of civil cases, both
straightforward and complex.
The elements of an infringement claim are clearly established in
Title 35 of the U.S. Code: "Except as otherwise provided in this title,
whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United
States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent. 2 32 Civil Form 18 sets out the minimally sufficient
patent infringement complaint under the current system, which requires
only four paragraphs after the jurisdictional statement: (1) a statement
that the plaintiff owns the patent; (2) a statement that defendant has been
infringing the patent "by making, selling, and using" the device embodying the patent; (3) a statement that the plaintiff has given the defendant
notice of its infringement; and (4) a demand for an injunction and damages. 233
The most notable thing about Form 18 is how little must actually be
stated in the complaint. Parties tend to take advantage of the loose requirement. As one court has pointed out, "[c]omplaints and counterclaims in most patent cases are worded in a bare-bones fashion. 23 4 But
the ultimate success or failure of a claim for patent infringement must
turn on specific facts-facts that require time, energy, and money to uncover during the discovery phase. Some facts are indeed complex and
more appropriate for discovery. But many other facts are simply stated
and fundamental to the case-facts such as the identities of the paten21ST CENTURY CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A ROADMAP FOR REFORM-PILOT PROJECT RULES, at PPR
3.1 (2009).
231.
For a discussion of the importance of an express notice requirement for pre-suit discovery,
see Hoffman, supra note 126, at 270.
232.
35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006).
233.
See FED. R. Civ. P. Form 18; see also McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354,
1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
234.
N.D. ILL. LOCAL PATENT R. preamble.
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tee(s) and assignee(s); patent number; dates of application and issue;
efforts to mark products or processes covered by the patent; the specific
products allegedly made, sold or used in violation of the patent; and the
patent claims that are allegedly infringed. Stating such facts at the pleading stage either takes them off the table for discovery (because they are
admitted) or focuses the discovery on information relevant to the remaining disputed facts and issues.
Facts such as these should be readily available to a party asserting
patent infringement. Indeed, the local patent rules of several federal district courts presume that such information has been collected and considered before a case ever commences. The new Local Patent Rules of the
Northern District of Illinois, for example, require a plaintiff alleging infringement to disclose within fourteen days after an answer is filed all
documents pertaining to the disclosure, sale, transfer or embodiment of
the claimed invention; the conception and development of the claimed
invention; communications with the Patent and Trademark Office concerning each patent in suit; and ownership of patent rights by the asserting party.235 Similarly, the Northern District of California requires disclosure of asserted claims and infringement contentions within ten days
after an initial case management conference. 6
We do not suggest that infringement contentions and claim charts
be included in the initial pleadings. Because the background investigation has presumably taken place by the time of filing, however, surely a
claimant could recite facts in the complaint concerning the claims of the
patent that are allegedly infringed, as well as identify all known allegedly
infringing products. Likewise, a party alleging patent invalidity as an
affirmative defense should be expected to identify in the initial pleadings
the factual basis for the alleged invalidity. A defendant alleging obviousness, 237 for example, would be expected to provide material facts to show
that the asserted invention was a combination of known elements that
would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the relevant
art 238-including identification of the known prior art upon which defendant will rely for its defense.
Even this brief example suggests that bringing facts to light at the
pleading stage is feasible and can promote cost-effective litigation. Information that is essential to the narrowing and resolution of the infringement dispute would be presented at an early stage, obviating the
need for additional discovery requests, costly depositions, or even a separate round of automatic disclosures. To the extent there is ensuing dis235.

See id. 2.1(a).

236.

N.D. CAL. PATENT LOCAL R. 3-1.

237. To receive a valid patent, a claimed invention must not have been obvious to a person
having ordinary skill in the relevant art. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
238. See Princeton Biochemicals, Inc. v. Beckman Coulter, Inc., 411 F.3d 1332, 1337-38 (Fed.
Cir. 2005).
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covery, motion practice, or judicial involvement in managing the case,
these tools would already be informed by a better understanding of the
issues in play.
CONCLUSION

Charles Clark's vision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was
driven by two fundamental principles: that all cases should be decided on
their merits rather than on procedural maneuverings, and that "a basic
goal in litigation should be economy of time and resources. '2 39 Sadly,
after more than seventy years of experience under the Federal Rules, we
appear to be further away from achieving those principles than ever before. The potential cost of discovery and motion practice may force
plaintiffs with meritorious claims to settle because they cannot afford to
vindicate their rights, and likewise may force defendants who are not at
fault to settle because doing so is less expensive than slogging through
the broad discovery and motion practice process.
The Federal Rules are littered with efforts to compensate for the
loss of efficiency and cost effectiveness that are so ably handled by the
introduction of facts at the pleading stage. The controversial sanctions
permitted by Rules 11 and 37, the judicial management provisions of
Rule 16, the labyrinthine proportionality provisions of Rule 26, the presumptive discovery limits of Rules 30 and 33, the electronically stored
information provisions of Rules 26, 34 and 45, and the summary judgment procedures of Rule 56 all represent attempts to focus parties on the
real issues in dispute. Many of these rules would still be beneficial in a
system in which fact-based pleading focused the issues from the outset.
If anything, they would be more effective, the equivalent of chisels to
hone already focused issues rather than sledgehammers trying to give
even basic shape to the controversy.
Opposition to fact-based pleading appears to stem primarily from
two concerns: fears that meritorious claims will not get into court, and
worries that the burden of marshaling facts at the outset of the case will
outweigh the issue-narrowing benefits. 240 As we have tried to demonstrate, neither concern is insurmountable. Properly used, fact-based
pleading should open the courthouse door to meritorious claims, because
claimants will be able to see their rights through to vindication and increase the chances for full compensation of damages through a formal
239.
Jay S.Goodman, On the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
What Did the Drafters Intend?, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 351, 357 (1987).
240.
See LEE & WILLGING, supra note 38, at 50 fig.25 (finding that sixty percent of selfidentified plaintiff attorneys responding to the survey indicated agreement or strong agreement with
the statement, "Even if raising the pleading standards would help to identify and frame disputed
issues at an earlier stage in litigation, the added burdens for plaintiffs would outweigh any benefits,"
and about fifty-eight percent of self-represented defendant attorneys disagreed or strongly disagreed
with the statement).
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judicial process. And from an objective viewpoint, the cost of a pre-filing
investigation to pull together salient facts should be far less than the alternative costs of discovery and motion practice under the current Federal Rules.
There is work to be done in this area. Nearly all attorneys practicing
in the United States District Courts today have known only notice pleading, and most have spent the entirety of their professional lives in a post1970 system where discovery is the dominant aspect of civil litigation.24'
Resistance to change is therefore understandable, even as large percentages of the active bar grumble about costs to their clients, discovery
abuse, and diminishing trial rates. But there is too much dissatisfaction
with the current system-both from within and from outside the legal
profession-to be complacent. Changes to the rules, and to attitudes
about what the rules should be designed to accomplish, have become
necessary. Restoring the issue-narrowing function to the pleading stage
would be a good start.

241.
According to a 2000 census of lawyers practicing in the United States, the most recent
available, seventy-five percent of then-practicing attorneys were born after 1946, meaning they
likely did not enter practice until at least 1970. See Am. Bar Ass'n, Lawyer Demographics (2009),
http://new.abanet.org/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/LawyerDemographics.pdf. In the ensuing
ten years, the number of still-practicing lawyers whose experience predates either the Federal Rules
or the 1970 discovery amendments has only become smaller.

IMPROVING RULE 1: A MASTER RULE FOR THE FEDERAL
RULES
ROBERT

G. BONEt

INTRODUCTION

Over the past three decades, many courts and commentators have
expressed concern about federal civil litigation. One hears frequent complaints about the high costs of discovery, strategic abuse of the litigation
process, huge case backlogs, litigation delays, and frivolous suits. The
Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System and the
American College of Trial Lawyers recently conducted a survey that
revealed broad agreement in the practicing bar that key features of the
current system are not working well.' Many lawyers and commentators
believe that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be reformed, but
there is little agreement as to what exactly should be done.2
This issue of the Denver University Law Review addresses the question of what to do. Other contributions analyze a number of Federal
Rules at the core of current reform efforts, including Rule 8(a) (the
pleading rule),3 Rule 23 (the class action rule),4 and Rule 26 (the basic

discovery rule). 5 My Essay takes a different approach. It focuses on Rule
1, and in particular on a single sentence in Rule 1: "[The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure] should be construed and administered to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.",6 This sentence, which "sets forth the basic philosophical principle
for the construction of the rules," is critical to the operation of the Feder-

t
G. Rollie White Professor of Law, The University of Texas School of Law. I am grateful
to Christy Renworth and Sara Brown for their helpful research assistance.
1. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT
PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND
INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 1-3 (2009),

http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/pubs/ACTL-IAALS%2Final%2Report%2ORevised%204-1509.pdf. The survey was given to ACTL Fellows, many of whom are highly distinguished trial lawyers.
2. Indeed, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has been extremely active since 1980
proposing amendments to the Federal Rules in an effort to address these litigation problems. Many
of those amendments have gone into effect, but there is considerable disagreement about how effective they have been.
3.
FED. R. CtV. P. 8(a).
4. Id. 23.
5. Id. 26.
6. Id. 1. The current version of Rule I states in its entirety: "These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts, except as stated in Rule
81. They should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." Id.

288

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:2

al Rules as a whole. The reason is simple. The Federal Rules are purposefully designed to delegate broad discretion to trial judges, and Rule 1
is meant to guide that discretion in socially-productive ways. Thus, Rule
1 is a master rule: it affects how all the other Rules are interpreted and
applied.
Although Rule l's principle of rule construction was a vital component of the original Federal Rule scheme-indeed, as I explain below, it
was a cornerstone of early twentieth century procedural reform-I argue
that it is misleading and counterproductive today. It embodies three related assumptions that make little sense for modem litigation and stand
in the way of effective procedural design. The first assumption is that
procedure can and should be tailored to the unique needs of individual
cases. The second assumption is that procedural tailoring is best achieved
with general, transsubstantive rules that rely heavily on trial judge discretion to construct "just, speedy, and inexpensive" procedures for each
case. The third assumption is that the three values embodied in the
phrase "just, speedy, and inexpensive" can be applied without tradeoffs
or conflicts and without sacrificing substantive justice for speedier resolution or lower costs.
Part I of this Essay summarizes the history of Rule 1. It describes
what the "just, speedy, and inexpensive" phrase meant to the original
rule drafters in 1938, what it means today in light of current understandings of procedure, and how judges have applied it over the decades in
between. In addition, Part I explains why the phrase made sense to the
original rule drafters and why it offers little guidance today. Part II proposes an amendment to Rule 1 that better frames what the purpose of the
Federal Rules should be. My hope is that this amendment will encourage
explicit and careful deliberation about procedural design choices and
guide the exercise of judicial discretion in more productive directions.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY
From a modem perspective, Rule I's admonition to "secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive" determination of every lawsuit seems at best
hopelessly vague and at worst downright misleading. It is vague because
it says nothing about what makes a determination "just" or what to do
when a just determination requires procedures that reduce speed or increase expense. It is misleading insofar as it suggests that all three goals
can be achieved at the same time without making value choices or difficult tradeoffs.

7.

4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 1011, at 60 (3d ed. 2002); see also In re Paris Air Crash of Mar. 3, 1974, 69 F.R.D. 310, 318 (C.D.
Cal. 1975) ("The most important rule of all is the last sentence of F.R.Civ.P. I .... It is this command that gives all the other rules life and meaning and timbre in the realist world of the trial
court.").
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For example, is the "justness" of an outcome a function of its accuracy alone, or does it also depend on symbolic effects, educative value,
or even the fairness of the participation opportunities that parties receive?
What is one to do when, as is quite common, achieving a just determination is in conflict with reducing delay and expense? Indeed, what is one
to do when the values of speed and expense reduction themselves conflict-for example, when a judge purposefully delays the litigation to
pressure settlement and thereby reduce litigation costs?
Despite its extreme vagueness from today's perspective, Rule l's
principle of construction made sense to the original Federal Rule drafters. Section A below briefly describes the beliefs about procedure that
made sense of Rule 1 in 1938. Section B then recounts major changes in
those beliefs over the past forty years and explains why the phrase "just,
speedy, and inexpensive" is inadequate today.
A. Rule 1from 1938 to 1970
When adopted in 1938, Rule 1 read as follows:
Rule 1. Scope of Rules. These rules govern the procedure in the district courts of the United States in all suits of a civil nature whether
cognizable as cases at law or in equity, with the exceptions stated in
Rule 81. They shall be construed to secure
the just, speedy, and inex8
pensive determination of every action.
This Essay focuses on the second sentence of Rule 1. This sentence
was based on analogous provisions in many state codes. 9 Its purpose was
to make clear that the Federal Rules should be construed liberally, that
procedural decisions based on technicalities should be avoided, and that
trial judges should exercise the broad discretion given them by the Federal Rules "to the end that controversies may be speedily and finally determined according to the substantive rights of the parties."' 0 To explain
these points more clearly, it is useful to begin with some background on
the early twentieth century procedural reform movement.

8.
FED. R. CIv. P. 1 (1938 adoption), reprintedin 1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 1 app. 01 (3d. ed. 2009). Rule 1 has been amended four times since 1938. Two
of these amendments affected the second sentence, which is the focus of this Essay. A 1993 amendment added the phrase "and administered," so the second sentence then read: "They shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
See infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text. In 2007, the Rule was edited as part of the restyling
project, which is supposed to leave the meaning of the Rules intact. For a list of all the amendments
to Rule 1, see MOORE ET AL., supra, at § 1 app. 02-05.
9.
See 1 JAMES WM. MOORE & JOSEPH FRIEDMAN, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 1.13, at
67 (1st ed. 1938).
10.
Id. § 1.13, at 68 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §
132 (1935)).

290

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:2

1. The Rule Drafters' Beliefs
The adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938
marked the culmination of a more than thirty-year campaign for procedural reform. The beginning of this campaign is usually traced to Roscoe
Pound's famous 1906 address to the American Bar Association
("ABA"), The Causes of PopularDissatisfactionwith the Administration
of Justice.11 In his speech, Pound criticized, among other things, the excessive technicality and formality of the common law and code systems.
His critique inspired a multi-decade lobbying effort in Congress spearheaded by the ABA, as well as numerous reform campaigns at the state
level. 12 The federal efforts eventually produced the Rules Enabling Act
in 1934 and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.13
Three sets of beliefs animated the early twentieth century reform
movement and influenced the text of Rule 1. First, the reformers were
confident that they understood the cause of the problems with the litigation system and what to do about them. The primary cause was the hyper-technicality of code and common law procedure. According to the
critics, lawyers had become too enamored with the manipulation of technical rules and trial judges too insistent on strict compliance when nothing of substantive importance turned on it. 14 The solution was also clear:
eliminate wasteful decisions based on technicalities and require trial
judges to apply procedural rules with the sole aim of deciding cases on
the substantive merits according to the facts and the evidence. Streamlining procedure in this way would produce just results (i.e., results based
on the merits) and would do so more quickly and less
expensively by
15
decisions.
technical
pointless
and
wasteful
eliminating
The second set of beliefs had to do with the philosophical predisposition of the reformers. Many of them-and especially Charles Clark, the
chief architect of the Federal Rules-were pragmatists and moderate
legal realists. 16 As realists, they cared more about how the law actually
11.
See generally Roscoe Pound, The Causes of PopularDissatisfactionwith the Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906), reprintedin 35 F.R.D. 241 (1964).
12. For an account of the procedural reform movement in Massachusetts, see generally Robert
G. Bone, ProceduralReform in a Local Context: The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and the
Federal Rule Model, in THE HISTORY OF THE LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS: THE SUPREME JUDICIAL

COURT 1692-1992, at 393 (Russell K. Osgood ed., 1992).
13. The most extensive account of this history is still Professor Stephen Burbank's article.
Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules EnablingAct of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015, 1043-98 (1982).
14.
Roscoe Pound famously referred to this technical preoccupation as "the sporting theory of
justice." See Pound, supra note 11, at 404.
15.
See, e.g., Address of Chief Justice Hughes to the American Law Institute, in 21 A.B.A. J.
340, 341 (1935) ("It is manifest that the goal we seek is a simplified practice which will strip procedure of unnecessary forms, technicalities and distinctions, and permit the advance of causes to the
decision of their merits with a minimum of procedural encumbrances.").
16. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal
Lawsuit Structurefrom the Field Code to the FederalRules, 89 COLuM. L. REv. 1, 78-89 (1989)
(explaining the pragmatic roots of the procedural reform movement and describing how Clark's
realist and pragmatic beliefs affected his procedural choices).
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worked in practice than how it cohered in theory. As pragmatists, they
evaluated procedural rules by their practical consequences, and in particular, equated sound procedure with rules that worked well and commanded respect over time.' 7 Code and common law procedure had failed
this test. Technical preoccupation made no functional sense, and users of8
the court system complained sharply about the resulting cost and delay.'
However, the reformers still believed in the core elements of the adversary system. Those elements-individual participation, party control, the
examination and cross-examination of witnesses, and so on-met the
pragmatic test for sound procedure by working reasonably well, commanding broad acceptance, and surviving over time.
The third set of beliefs had to do with the nature of procedure itself.
Early twentieth-century reformers believed that procedure and substance
were separate domains subject to different kinds of value. The only proper function of procedure was to serve as a means to the end of enforcing
the substantive law. 19 For reformers, this meant that procedure was governed by instrumental values of good system design, such as simplicity,
flexibility, and litigation efficiency (in the sense of eliminating obvious
waste rather than minimizing social costs). These values were different
than the values that informed the substantive law. 20 Indeed, it was common at the time to refer to procedure as a "machine" or a "tool," and to
procedural design as an engineering task suitable for technical experts.2i
The goal of the reformers was to make a procedural machine that produced good substantive outcomes "without undue waste or friction or
consumption of fuel. 22
It is important to understand these points clearly. I do not mean that
reformers ignored the obvious causal link between procedure and substance. They recognized that choice of procedure influenced outcome.
That is, after all, why they cared so much about reforming the procedural
system. What I mean is that the reformers believed in a normative dis17.
For pragmatists, evaluation and description-"ought" and "is"-tend to merge. What is
good is what works well, and what works well is determined by observing how an institution or
system actually operates in practice. See id. at 86 n.288 (explaining, briefly, the pragmatic theory of
truth).
18.
See Bone, supra note 12, at 405-06 (noting concerns about criticism from the lay community in Massachusetts).
19.
This was a commonly repeated refrain during the period. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark, The
Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 297-304 (1938). According to the critics, judges insisted on strict compliance with technicalities even when noncompliance could have absolutely no
impact on substantive outcomes.
20. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark, The Code Cause of Action, 33 YALE L.J. 817, 836-37 (1924)
(noting that "convenience" is the main goal of procedure, whereas "policy" is the goal of the substantive law).
21.
For a list of sources, see Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, DemocraticLegitimacy, and ProceduralEfficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 895 n.35 (1999).
22. Roscoe Pound, Some Principles of Procedural Reform, 4 ILL. L. REv. 388, 394 (1910).
Thus, just as engineers apply value-neutral scientific and engineering principles to design efficient
machines, so procedural experts were supposed to apply substance-neutral process values to design
efficient procedures.
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tinction between procedure and substance. They believed that procedural
rules were properlyjustified by values distinctive to procedure itself.
The assumption of a normative separation between procedure and
substance underlies two other important goals for the Federal Rules.
First, the rules were supposed to apply generally to all types of cases no
matter what the substantive stakes. Today we refer to such a system as
"transsubstantive." 2 3 Transsubstantivity made sense because of the belief
that procedural design was independent of substantive value. Second, the
Federal Rules were designed as general rules that delegated broad discretion to trial judges. Delegating discretion made sense because of the assumption that trial judges, as skilled procedure technicians, could tailor
procedures to the specific needs of each individual case.
2. The Impact on Rule 1
All these beliefs are packed into Rule l's principle of construction.
First, notice that the critical sentence in Rule 1 is styled as a statement of
interpretive method rather than general purpose. To be sure, it implies a
purpose-"to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action"-but it does so in the context of declaring how the Rules
should be construed. This is consistent with-and indeed signals-the
idea that the Rules rely heavily on trial judge discretion and make wide
room for interpretation.
It is also noteworthy that Rule l's principle of construction is
framed exclusively in terms of purpose. It says nothing about text, Advisory Committee intent, or Committee Notes as interpretive guides. 24 This
choice reflects the fact that many Federal Rules were designed as openended standards. Rather than constrain trial judges, the original Federal
Rules mostly operated to expand litigation opportunities and trial judge
management options. For example, technical impediments to litigation
were removed, pleading-stage dismissals cut back, discovery options
expanded, and novel management tools, such as the pretrial conference,
given to trial judges.
It made sense too that the drafters would frame Rule l's principle in
terms of securing "just, speedy, and inexpensive" determinations. As
discussed above, reformers at the time believed there was a right answer
23.
See Robert M. Covert, For James Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the
Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 718 (1975).
24.
In recent years, some judges have made a point of emphasizing the importance of giving
priority to a Rule's text and have cautioned against using Rule 1 as an interpretive guide when the
text is clear on its face (even if the text is restrictive in a way that arguably offends the "just, speedy,
and inexpensive" principle). See, e.g.,Varhol v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 909 F.2d 1557, 1574
(7th Cir. 1990) (Manion, J., concurring) (stating that Rule 1 should not be used "as a warrant to bend
the other rules
any time an arguably harsh result may offend our sense of 'justice"'); cf.Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 822 F.2d 335, 342-43 (3d Cir. 1987) (approving the district judge's argument
that Rule I cannot be used to include case management concerns in Rule 26(c)'s "good cause"
requirement for a protective order when Rule 26(c) already makes the policy decision).
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to the question of optimal procedural design, and they also believed that
the right answer would emerge as trial judges used their expertise and
experience to think pragmatically about what to do in particular cases.
According to this view, judges did not engage in a controversial balancing of conflicting values. Instead they applied pragmatic reasoning to
identify the optimal procedures for a case, and those optimal procedures
secured "just, speedy, and inexpensive" determinations by definition.
That the drafters had a pretty good idea what optimal procedure
looked like made the task considerably easier. An optimal system was
constructed around the core elements of adversarial process freed from
code and common law technicalities and designed to ferret out facts and
evidence and manage litigation toward just decisions on the merits. 25
Because technicalities were wasteful, eliminating them necessarily reduced both delay and cost without adversely affecting the justness of
outcomes. Indeed, promoting decisions on the substantive merits improved outcome quality by eliminating technical traps for the unwary. To
be sure, the new Rules might have added some expense and delay, but
these marginal effects were not likely to be large-or so the rule drafters
must have assumed-and were in any event the inevitable result of a
properly functioning procedural system and therefore well justified.26
During the decades following adoption of the Federal Rules, judges
employed Rule 1 in a manner consistent with this account. They used the
Rule to excuse technical defects and facilitate substantive decisions.2 7
For example, the United States Supreme Court invoked Rule 1 to avoid
piecemeal appeals in one case 28 and to disapprove a narrow and overly
technical interpretation of issues on appeal in another case.29 Lower
courts used Rule 1 to support liberal interpretations of the discovery
rules 30 and to excuse strict compliance with the Federal Rules when there
25. For example, in the first edition of his well-known treatise on federal procedure, James
William Moore equated Rule l's interpretive principle with Rule 61's harmless error principle. 1
MOORE & FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, § 1.13, at 68-69. Rule 61 in its original form provided: "The
court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which
does not affect the substantial rights of the parties." Id. § 1.13, at 69.
26. For example, broader discovery under the Federal Rules might delay litigation and increase expense. However, the drafters did not envision the extremely broad discovery associated
with complex litigation today. Moreover, they may well have assumed that expanding discovery
would reduce cost and delay indirectly by facilitating settlement.
27. See 1 MOORE & FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, § 1.13, at 34-35 (Supp. 1947) (collecting case
decisions citing and relying on Rule 1).
28. City of Morgantown v. Royal Ins. Co., 337 U.S. 254, 257-58 (1949).
29. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181-82 (1962). I was only able to find three Supreme
Court opinions between 1938 and 1978 that relied on the language of Rule 1. Besides City of Morgantown and Foman, the Court decided Ettelson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 317 U.S. 188 (1942), which
rejected an argument against appealability based on Rule 1. Id. at 190-91. Ettelson, however, appears to have been substantially undermined, if not overruled, by the later decision in City of Morgantown.
30. See, e.g., S. Ry. Co. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 131 (5th Cir. 1968) (relying on Rule l's
directive in ordering production of work product where doing so materially advanced the "just,
speedy, and inexpensive" determination of the action); Tighe v. Shandel, 46 F.R.D. 622, 624 (W.D.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:2

was no significant prejudice to any party's substantive right.3' And they
invoked Rule 1 to justify construing pleadings liberally in the face of
motions to dismiss.32
Moreover, in all the opinions I have read, judges tended to apply
"just, speedy, and inexpensive" as a unitary norm equivalent to something like simple and liberal procedure. They exhibited little, if any,
awareness that the three values in the phrase might conflict. It was only
when reform moved beyond eliminating wasteful technicality-or when
what was once thought wasteful was reconceived as having some benefit-that the latent value conflicts embedded in the critical phrase became manifest.
B. Rule 1from 1970 to the Present
Over the past four decades, Rule 1 has lost much of its original
guiding force. Moreover, it is used much more frequently today than in
the past to justify restrictive interpretations of the Federal Rules. To understand these changes, one must first understand how the litigation environment and beliefs about procedure have changed since 1938.13
1. Contemporary Beliefs in a Changed Litigation World
Since the mid-1960s, the volume and scale of litigation have increased markedly. Many factors are responsible for this trend, including
the proliferation of new statutory, common law, and constitutional
Pa. 1968) (using Rule I to support liberal construction of the scope of discovery); Franks v. Nat'l
Dairy Prods. Corp., 41 F.R.D. 234, 235-36 (W.D. Tex. 1966) (citing Rule 1 as support for principle
that Rule 34 should be interpreted "to give the broadest sweep for production, inspection and copying of documents or objects in the possession or control of another party"); Hawaiian Airlines, Ltd.
v. Trans-Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 8 F.R.D. 449, 451 (D. Haw. 1948) (arguing that Rule 1 supports a
liberal interpretation of the discovery rules); McCrate v. Morgan Packing Co., 26 F. Supp. 812, 813
(N.D. Ohio 1939) (using Rule 1 to justify rejecting a narrow interpretation of Rule 36 that would
have limited it to admissions related only to documents, and permitting requests directed to factual
propositions unrelated to documents); cf Nat'l Bondholders Corp. v. McClintic, 99 F.2d 595, 599
(4th Cir. 1938) (relying on Rule I to support liberal interpretation and application of the discovery
rules).
31.
See, e.g., Sporia v. Pa. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 143 F.2d 105, 106-07 (3d Cir. 1944) (dismissing what the court considers "highly technical reasons" opposed to severing and rearranging
parties to a lawsuit); Ala. Great S. R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 140 F.2d 968, 972 (5th Cir. 1944) (condemning the trial judge's overly-technical approach to a challenge of a jury charge); Sofarelli Bros. v.
Elgin, 129 F.2d 785, 787 (4th Cir. 1942) (excusing technical noncompliance with requirements for
requesting jury trial). But see Orange Theatre Corp. v. Rayherstz Amusement Corp., 130 F.2d 185,
187 (3d Cir. 1942) (holding that a stipulation to extend time to file a response to a venue motion is
not effective without court approval as required by a reasonable interpretation of Rule 6, and noting
that requiring court approval serves Rule I 's goals by preventing parties from unilaterally prolonging the time for trial to serve their own private interests).
32. See, e.g., Knox v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp., 158 F.2d 973, 975 (5th Cir. 1947) ("Formerly, pleadings were construed strictly against the pleader, but now they are construed so as to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.").
33.
1have reviewed these developments elsewhere and will only summarize them here. For
citations supporting the points in the text, see Bone, supra note 21, at 900-07. See also Robert G.
Bone, Twombly, PleadingRules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 895-97
(2009).
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claims; an increase in the number of cases involving complex factual
issues; and the expanded use of aggregation devices such as the class
action. More complex facts require more discovery and more time for
trial. Larger suits produce larger stakes, and larger stakes encourage
more intense strategic maneuvering and therefore create higher costs.
The structure of the legal profession has changed as well. In 1938,
many lawyers were local practitioners with a strong interest in maintaining a good reputation with local judges and fellow lawyers. 34 Today there
are many more large law firms with national and international practices.
Without strong reputation stakes in local communities, these large firms
are not as constrained by reputation-related incentives from engaging in
costly strategic maneuvering.
Beliefs about procedure have also changed, partly in response to
these changing litigation conditions. During the 1960s and 1970s, a combination of factors undermined the belief in a sharp normative divide
between procedure and substance.35 The new civil rights, environmental,
and consumer protection movements relied extensively on litigation, and
this highlighted the close connection between procedure and substantive
policy. 36 For example, liberal standing rules, more expansive class action
doctrines, and the flexible use of special masters were all justified on the
ground that they were needed to enable remedies that effectively promoted the substantive values at stake in public law litigation.37
In addition, faith in technical expertise as the key to sound procedural design weakened substantially.3 8 Critics even attacked the very
possibility of value-neutral, scientifically-objective decisions.n°39 They
argued that procedure was political, just like the substantive law.
All of these developments worked together to alter beliefs about
how procedure should be made. With the demise of technical expertise
and the growing awareness that substance and procedure were intimately
linked, procedural rulemaking gradually came to be viewed in political
terms. If choice of procedure affects the distribution of power in society
by advantaging some at the expense of others, the critics argued, procedural lawmaking ought to be transparent and democratically accountable.4' Congress responded by amending the Rules Enabling Act in 1988
to increase the transparency of the process and enhance public participa-

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Bone, supra note 33, at 895-96.
Bone, supra note 21, at 902.
Id. at 900.
See id. at 900-01.
Id. at 902.
See id. at 900-01.
Id. at 889.
See id. at 902.
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tion.42 Today many rule amendments attract the attention of interest
groups, and the Advisory Committee must often
deal with intense disa43
greement and sharp conflict over rule proposals.
Starting in the late 1970s, the changed litigation environment also
prompted concerns about high litigation costs, long delays, and large
backlogs in the federal courts.4a By the 1980s, these concerns had ripened into cries of a litigation "crisis., 45 All aspects of the litigation system came under scrutiny, even the core elements of the adversarial
process. 46 The resulting critique gave birth to the alternative dispute resolution movement, which grew during the 1980s to become a prominent
feature of the contemporary litigation landscape.47 Moreover, many federal judges became actively involved in the settlement process, nudging
(some would say coercing) parties to settle.4 8
The result of all these developments is a very different view of federal civil procedure today as compared to the view held by the rule drafters and procedure reformers in 1938. Every aspect of civil procedure is
open to criticism. Nothing is off limits or taken for granted, not evenand for ADR advocates, especially not-the basic features of the adversary system. All procedures bear a burden of justification, and justifications based on technical expertise and substance-neutral process values
no longer carry much, if any, weight. Procedural choice necessarily involves controversial value choices and difficult tradeoffs among competing goals.
Consider the example of notice pleading, one of the major innovations of the original Federal Rules. The rule drafters defended liberal
pleading on the ground that it saved the wasted cost of technical demurrers, avoided unjust dismissals of meritorious suits, and facilitated decisions on the substantive merits.49 Similar arguments are used to defend
liberal notice pleading today. 50 But many courts and commentators also
focus on the negatives. By making it easy to sue, notice pleading invites
frivolous suits, which in turn increase litigation costs, add to system delays, and produce unjustified settlements. 51 The optimal pleading rule
therefore must balance benefits against harms and costs.

42.
Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 401, 102 Stat.
4642, 4649 (1988) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2073(c) (2006)).
43.
See Bone, supra note 21, at 903.
44.
Id. at 901.
45.
See Bone, supra note 33, at 896-97.
46.
See Bone, supra note 21, at 900-01.
47.
Congress adopted the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act in 1998, which requires each
federal district court to offer at least one court-annexed ADR option. 28 U.S.C. § 65 1(b) (2006).
48.
See generally Robert G. Bone, Settlement in American Civil Adjudication: The Role of
Procedural Law and the Courts, 36 COMP. L. REV. 1 (2003).
49.
Bone, supra note 33, at 895.
50.
See id. at 901-04, 908.
51.
Id. at 897, 901.
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To take another example, consider discovery. The absence of meaningful discovery in code and common law procedure made no sense to
the rule drafters.52 They viewed broad discovery as necessary to facilitate
53
good substantive decisions based on the factual and evidentiary merits
and, secondarily, to improve settlement prospects.54 Today, however,
critics of broad discovery worry about high costs and the risk of strategic
abuse, and many of them advocate stricter discovery limits. 55 But limits
can interfere with the ability of meritorious plaintiffs to obtain useful
information, which in turn can produce suboptimal trial and settlement
outcomes. Thus, limiting discovery reduces litigation expense and might
discourage frivolous suits, but at the price of unjust outcomes in meritorious suits. Both the critics and the defenders of broad discovery must
figure out how to balance these benefits against the harms and costs.
2. The Impact on Rule 1 Today
This is the challenge of modern procedure: how to determine what
is optimal given controversial value choices and difficult cost-benefit
tradeoffs. It is a challenge for the committees that make the Federal
Rules and for the judges who must apply those Rules. In the face of this
challenge, Rule l's admonition that the Rules should be construed and
administered to effect "just, speedy, and inexpensive" determinations
seems vacuous. Without the beliefs that originally supported the Ruleincluding the substance-procedure divide, the assumption of an objectively ideal procedure, and pragmatic faith in technical expertise-Rule 1
provides little meaningful guidance. It can be used to justify strict or
liberal interpretations depending on how a judge balances competing
values.
In fact, there has been a noticeable shift over the past thirty years
toward use of Rule 1 to support stricter interpretations of the Federal
Rules. The United States Supreme Court was an early leader of this
trend. In Herbertv. Lando,56 the Court took note of "mushrooming litigation costs" and "concern about undue and uncontrolled discovery. 57
Recognizing the tendency to construe discovery rules broadly, the Court
cautioned restraint, citing Rule 1: "[T]he discovery provisions, like all of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, are subject to the injunction of
Rule 1 that they 'be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action. 58 The Court concluded by reminding
district judges of discovery's limits: "[T]he requirement of Rule 26(b)(1)
that the material sought in discovery be 'relevant' should be firmly ap52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See Bone, supra note 16, at 101 n.345.
See Bone, supra note 33, at 895.
See id. at 896.
See id. at 889.
441 U.S. 153 (1979).
Id. at 176.
Id. at 177.
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plied, and the district courts should not neglect their power to restrict
discovery. . .."59
In 1993, moreover, Rule 1 was amended to highlight the importance
of reducing cost and delay and to emphasize the value of active case
management. 60 The words "and administered" were inserted after "construed" so the amended sentence read: "They shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action." The Advisory Committee Note explained that "[t]he purpose of this revision.., is to recognize the affirmative duty of the court
to exercise the authority conferred by these rules to ensure that civil litigation is resolved not only fairly, but also without undue cost or delay.",6'
This 1993 amendment was part of a package of amendments aimed
at strengthening judicial case management and controlling litigation
costs. In addition to Rule 1, Rule 16 was amended to strengthen the district judge's power to facilitate settlement,62 and the discovery rules were
amended to add initial disclosure, 63 limit depositions and interrogatories, 64 and require active judicial involvement in discovery planning.6 5 In
this broader context, the amendment to Rule 1 must have sent a clear
message to trial judges that they should focus more attention on the
"speedy" and "inexpensive" parts of Rule l's principle and actively use
their discretionary case management powers to reduce cost and delay.
66
Federal judges appear to have heard the message and acted accordingly.
The pattern of lower court decisions since 1980 is consistent with a
trend toward stricter application of Rule 1. To be sure, the Rule is still
invoked occasionally to support excusing technical noncompliance and
controlling strategic abuse. Since 1980, however, judges have used
59.
Id.; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (citing Rule I to emphasize the importance of strengthening summary judgment as a tool to screen frivolous suits).
60.
FED. R. Civ. P. I advisory committee's notes to 1993 amendment.
61.
Id.
62.
Id. 16 advisory committee's notes to 1993 amendment.
63.
Id. 26 advisory committee's notes to 1993 amendment,
64.
Id. 30 advisory committee's notes to 1993 amendment; id. 33 advisory committee's notes
to 1993 amendment.
65.
Id. 26 advisory committee's notes to 1993 amendment.
66.
See, e.g., Simon v. Philip Morris Inc., 200 F.R.D. 21, 26 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting Rule 1
with emphasis on "inexpensive" and citing the 1993 amendment as support for active case management to control costs); Active Prods. Corp. v. A.H. Choitz & Co., 163 F.R.D. 274, 278 (N.D. Ind.
1995) (citing 1993 Rule I amendment to support a restrictive case management order designed to
make sure that the complex case did not dominate the court's docket and result in longer delays for
other cases); Mareno v. Jet Aviation of Am., Inc., 155 F.R.D. 74, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (interpreting
the 1993 amendment to Rule 1 as directing judges to use their management powers to prevent abuse,
and observing that the amendment is "a counterweight to the downgrading of Rule 11 [in 1993] as a
major weapon against litigation abuse").
67. See, e.g., Mareno, 155 F.R.D. at 76 (applying Rule 1 to address an abusive motion for
fees); Chambers v. Capital Cities/ABC, 851 F. Supp. 543, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (using Rule 1 to
support dismissal of claims against non-corporate defendants joined only to gain a tactical advantage). It is possible, however, that federal judges are more willing today than they were in 1938 to
characterize as abusive any conduct that adds to litigation cost and delay, although it is difficult to
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Rule 1 to justify restricting discovery, screening frivolous suits more
aggressively, promoting settlement more strongly, and managing cases
more actively.68 Sometimes these judges emphasize Rule l's reference to

"speedy" and "inexpensive," but sometimes they focus on achieving
"just" determinations, arguing that a party's fear of excessive cost and
delay can impede court access and produce unjust outcomes.

9

Elizabeth Cabraser's recent survey of cases relying on Rule 1 shows
renewed interest in the Rule in the past few decades. 70 Her search of
LEXIS and WESTLAW databases through August 1, 2009, reveals a

sharp increase in citations to Rule 1 starting in the 1980s-from a total of
15 citations between 1938 and 1980, to 61 citations between 1980 and
1990, to 138 citations between 1990 and 2000, and finally to 251 citations between 2000 and August 1, 2009.71 She concludes that "Rule 1 is

either enjoying a distinct revival, or has finally been discovered as a
working component of the Federal Rules, rather than a mere precatory or
aspirational preface to the 'real' Rules. 7 2
My search of all Rule 1 citations in the LEXIS database confirms
the spike Cabraser found around 1980. 73 I hasten to add, however, that
tell. See Frederick v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 180 F.R.D. 384, 385-86 (D. Mont. 1998) (objecting to the
degree of control exercised by defendant's in-house counsel over local counsel when defendant's
published litigation guide, in the court's view, adopted an excessively adversarial approach to litigation strategy at odds with Rule 1).
It is also worth noting that some judges advocate giving priority to
the text of the Rules as written, even when doing so produces a result at odds with Rule I 's values.
See cases cited supra note 24. This textualism is at least in tension with a broad and flexible approach to trial judge discretion-although without more research, it is not possible to tell how widespread and how new the textualist approach really is.
68. See, e.g., Res. Assocs. Grant Writing & Evaluation Servs., LLC v. Maberry, No. CIV 080552 JB/LAM, 2009 WL 1312951, at *4 (D.N.M. Feb. 5, 2009) (citing Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S.
153, 177 (1979), and Rule I to support discovery restrictions); Avnet, Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co., No. CV05-1953-PHX-LOA, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2377, at *3 n.2 (D. Ariz. Jan. 23, 2006) (noting cost and
delay and emphasizing that discovery is subject to Rule l's standard); Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
814 F. Supp. 414, 423-24 (D.N.J. 1993) (denying plaintiffs counsel's motion to withdraw based on
difficulty of financing litigation against tobacco companies' "war of attrition" and noting how this
result is contrary to Rule I and how it might be limited with judicial discovery controls); see also
Hungate v. United States, 626 F.2d 60, 62 (8th Cir. 1980) ("While the federal courts should remain
sensitive to the liberal federal rules of pleading, they should remain equally sensitive to the mandate
of Rule I to 'secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.' Meritless
claims should be disposed of at the first appropriate opportunity."); cf Cash Energy, Inc. v. Weiner,
768 F. Supp. 892, 897 (D. Mass. 1991) (interpreting Rule 8(f)'s directive to construe pleadings to do
"substantial justice" to support stricter pleading to protect defendants from frivolous suits).
69. See, e.g., Scheetz v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 152 F.R.D. 628, 630 n.2 (D. Mont. 1993)
(noting the gap between "the promise" of Rule I and the reality of a litigation system too costly for
many to use); Haines, 814 F. Supp. at 423-24 (noting that Rule I might be offended by abusive
discovery practices that impose high costs in order to force capitulation); Foxley Cattle Co. v. Grain
Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 142 F.R.D. 677, 681 (S.D. Iowa 1992) (relying on Rule 1 to support the
importance of avoiding prohibitive costs that impede court access).
70. Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Uncovering Discovery, 60 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 3-5, on file with author).
71.
Id. at 3.
72. Id. at 5.
73.
I searched the LEXIS "Federal Court Cases, Combined" database using the search "'Rule
1' and 'just, speedy, and inexpensive."' I also searched different time periods. The results confirm a
huge spike after 1980. From 1/1/1938 to 1/1/1980, there are a total of 313 cases meeting the search
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one should be careful about inferring too much from gross citation statistics. Not all of these citations are to cases that use Rule 1 restrictively.74
Still, it seems reasonable to assume that many of the post-1980 cases
involve restrictive applications. Liberal interpretation and application
was mainstream practice before 1980 and would not have warranted special justification or a citation to Rule 1. It is likely that a judge would
have felt moved to offer a justification citing the Rule only when he or
she did something out of the ordinary; that is, interpret or apply a Federal
Rule restrictively.
One thing is clear: As an interpretive standard, the phrase "just,
speedy, and inexpensive" is seriously deficient. As the history of Rule 1
illustrates, a district judge with broad discretion can use the Rule to justify expansive and liberal interpretations of the Federal Rules, as was
common between 1938 and 1980, or to support narrow and more restrictive interpretations, as has become more common since 1980. It all depends on the judge's values, beliefs about procedure, and perceptions of
the nature and severity of litigation problems. A principle that is so malleable offers little guidance. We need a new principle, one that more
clearly expresses the goals of procedure and the value tradeoffs that
sound procedural design entails.
II. IMPROVING RULE 1

Stated simply, I propose that Rule l's key sentence be revised to
read: "They shall be construed and administered to distribute the risk of
outcome error fairly and efficiently with due regard for party participation appropriate to the case, due process and other constitutional constraints, and practical limitations on a judge's ability to predict consequences accurately and assess system-wide effects." I also propose that
the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 1 include explanations of each
component as well as more specific guiding principles.
Before elaborating on this proposal, it is important to address one
possible objection at the outset. Some might argue that there is no need
for a standard to guide discretion; that trial judges can manage cases and
make perfectly good decisions about procedure without the help of a
guiding principle.
I have two responses to this objection. First, trial judges should not
be left to make the critical normative choices on their own. Instead, those
choices should be made, insofar as possible, by the committees involved
requirements. From 1/1/1980 to 10/22/2009, there are a total of 754 cases. Put differently, the average number of cases from 1/1/1938 to 1/1/1980 is about 7.5 per year. From 1/1/1980 to 10/22/2009,
the same average more than triples, climbing to about 26 per year.
74.
Also, there are more cases in general and more published decisions today than there were
in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, so one would expect more cases citing Rule 1 even if the citation
rate remained constant. However, the overall increase in case volume alone cannot explain the sharp
spike in citations around 1980.
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in the formal rulemaking process. A properly crafted Rule 1 advances
this end by outlining the normative framework for rule interpretation in
general.
Focusing on the rulemaking process has distinct advantages in view
of contemporary beliefs about procedure. As discussed above, it is no
longer tenable to claim that procedural design is a merely technical, value-neutral, and objective exercise. Procedure necessarily involves controversial value choices. Without guidance or constraint, one trial judge,
for example, might be more willing than another to limit discovery because she believes the benefit of litigation cost savings outweighs the
burden of less accurate decisions, given the substantive interests at stake.
Or one judge might be more willing than another to aggregate cases because she assigns less weight to an individual litigant's right to a personal "day in court." This degree of trial judge subjectivity and decisional
variance is highly undesirable. The formal rulemaking process is the
proper vehicle for making normative judgments of this sort both because
of its superior access to information and its greater public accountability. 75 Thus, the rulemaking committees should do what they can to address fundamental value tradeoffs and provide guidance to trial judges on
how to balance competing values in specific cases.
My second response is that the objection incorrectly assumes that
trial judges are able to tailor procedures to the needs of specific cases in
an optimal way. Although the rule drafters believed as much, there are
good reasons today to doubt that the assumption holds true, especially in
the contemporary world of complex cases and intense strategic maneuvering. As I have explained elsewhere, bounded rationality, information
access problems, and strategic interaction effects all limit the ability of
trial judges to design case-specific procedures well.76 Given these limitations, it is important that the Advisory Committee build principles into
the Federal Rules that supply guidance and constraint.
For these reasons, we need a better standard than "just, speedy, and
inexpensive." My proposal guides and constrains not by dictating precise
results-that would be impractical and inadvisable given the inevitability
and desirability of some case-specific discretion-but by orienting the
thought process of trial judges, framing the type of analysis they should
conduct, and identifying the factors that should be taken into account.
The interpretive standard I propose, like the "just, speedy, and inexpensive" standard it replaces, is expressed in terms of purpose: the FedSee Bone, supra note 21, at 918-50.
75.
76.
See Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28
CARDOzO L. REv. 1961 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. lqbal, 129 S. Ct 1937, 1953 (2009) (referring to
"[olur rejection [in Twombly] of the careful-case-management approach"); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (expressing doubts about the ability of district judges to control discovery costs effectively through case management).
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eral Rules should be construed and administered to further the purposes
of civil procedure. My statement includes four components: (1) "to distribute the risk of outcome error fairly and efficiently;" (2) "with due
regard for party participation appropriate to the case;" (3) "due process
and other constitutional constraints;" and (4) "practical limitations on a
judge's ability to predict consequences accurately and assess systemwide effects." The first component states the central purpose of procedure and the three other components qualify that general purpose. The
following discussion addresses each in turn.
A. The Central Purpose of Procedure: "Distributethe risk of outcome
errorfairly and efficiently"
The first component of my standard assumes a relatively uncontroversial proposition, that whatever else of value civil adjudication creates,
its primary goal is to produce outcomes that accurately reflect the parties' substantive entitlements. 7 By an "outcome," I mean all outcomes of
adjudication, including decisions of legal issues, dismissals and summary
judgments, final judgments after trial, and settlements. As I have explained elsewhere, there are good reasons to count settlements along with
more formal products of the adjudicative process when evaluating outcome quality.7 8
Since perfect accuracy is impossible, the only sensible goal is to
achieve optimal accuracy, or more precisely, an optimal risk of outcome
error. Moreover, it cannot be optimal in a world of scarce resources to
minimize error risk as much as is humanly possible. If this were the goal,
most, if not all, social resources would be committed to procedure with
little, if any, left for other public goods such as education, safe roadways,
and public health.79
If zero error risk is impossible and minimally feasible error risk undesirable, it is not clear how optimality can be defined in absolute error
risk terms. Moreover, defining it as a "reasonable" risk merely begs the
question of what is reasonable. These observations suggest that the most
sensible goal for procedure is distributional. On this view, an optimal
error risk for a given case is that which results from distributing error
risk optimally across different cases and litigants.
With this much of the analysis in place, it should be evident that adjudication is about much more than reaching an outcome acceptable to
the parties (or their lawyers). Private dispute resolution is not the primary
77.
My use of the accuracy metric does not mean that I am committed to the proposition that
there is only one right answer in a case. All it requires is that there be at least one wrong answer.
78.
Bone, supra note 76, at 1981-85.
79.
For example, it is always possible, in theory at least, to reduce the error risk by litigating
the case one more time and awarding the average or modal outcome over all the repeated litigations.
This result is a consequence of Condorcet's Theorem.

20101

IMPROVING RULE 1

goal of procedure under any sensible account of American civil adjudication. Adjudication has a public purpose. It is meant to enforce the substantive law, and the substantive law is meant to further public goals such
as deterring socially undesirable behavior and providing morally justified
compensation. As a result, outcome error should be measured in terms of
how well litigation outcomes further these public goals, not in terms of
how well they satisfy the preferences of parties to a suit. 80
An optimal error risk distribution is not necessarily an equal distribution. Substantive interests matter and substantive interests vary in importance. It makes no sense, for example, to provide the same procedures
for lawsuits involving minor property damage as for lawsuits involving
important constitutional rights, especially as our legal system does not
treat these two substantive interests identically. Furthermore, in some
cases the risk of error is distributed unequally across the party line because of the substantive interests at stake. For example, plaintiffs sometimes bear the pleading burden even when they have difficulty accessing
the necessary information. 8' Moreover, the clear and convincing standard
in civil cases allocates more risk to the plaintiff than the defendant. Accordingly, an optimal distribution of error risk-and thus of scarce
process resources-should reflect the relative importance
of the substan82
tive interests at stake in different types of suits.
An optimal distribution should also take account of the costs of procedure. Those costs include the expense of additional motions, hearings,
and deliberations required to implement a procedural rule, as well as the
lost opportunity cost of being unable to reduce the risk of error in other
cases due to limited resources. In addition, a novel procedure frequently
reduces one type of error only to increase another, so the costs of the
procedure should include the new error costs that it creates. For example,
stricter pleading standards screen frivolous suits thereby reducing false
positive errors (i.e., frivolous suits that get past the pleading stage), but
stricter standards also screen meritorious suits thereby increasing false
negative errors (i.e., meritorious suits that are dismissed at the pleading

80. As I explain elsewhere, this is true even for compensation justified on moral grounds. To
be sure, parties with a right to compensation can consent to less than their substantive entitlement.
However, consent is problematic when procedures are deficient. The legitimacy of consent as a basis
for approving an outcome depends on the alternatives available to the consenting party. See Bone,
supra note 76, at 1983-84.
81.
See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (placing the burden on the
plaintiff in a case where the defendant has a First Amendment interest, even though the plaintiff was
much less likely to have the necessary information).
82. I am not suggesting that all substantive interests differ in importance or that the distinctions among them can be graded in a refined way. The differences operate on a more general level,
leaving most substantive interests with the same weight. In addition to the substantive right, the
nature of the injury and the remedy can make a difference to the importance of the substantive interest at stake in a case. For example, it is fair to say that the law in general treats serious personal
injury with more solicitude than it does property damage, and the choice reflects a judgment that it is
more important to provide relief for the former than for the latter.
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stage or not filed at all because of the fear of dismissal). 83 Similarly, expanding discovery opportunities reduces false negative errors by giving
plaintiffs with valid suits access to the information necessary to properly
vindicate their claims, 84 but it also increases false positive errors when
plaintiffs with frivolous suits leverage the threat of broad discovery to
pressure unjustified settlements.
The task of identifying an optimal error risk distribution is further
complicated by the fact that there are two different metrics and no easy
way to resolve conflicts between them. One metric is efficiency-based
(or, more generally, utilitarian) and the other is rights-based (or concerned with fairness in some other way). This is not the place to explore
these two metrics with care; I have discussed them in other writing.85
Roughly, an efficiency metric aims to minimize total social costs aggregated over all cases. Those costs include expected false positive error
costs, expected false negative error costs, and expected administrative (or
process) costs. 86 By contrast, a rights-based metric focuses on protecting
the rights of individual litigants rather than minimizing social costs in the
aggregate. For example, if the substantive law protects moral rights, the
procedures offered to adjudicate lawsuits involving those rights should
take account of their moral weight. This can justify more robust procedures that achieve greater error risk reduction in these cases than in those
not involving moral rights. 87 Thus, efficiency and rights-based metrics
can conflict,
and there is no obvious meta-principle to resolve the con88
flict.
It should be plain from this brief account that distributing the risk of
error fairly and efficiently is an extremely difficult task. It requires a
global perspective capable of predicting and evaluating the effects of
procedural choice on the risk of error in all cases. Moreover, it requires a
normative analysis capable of accommodating the demands of efficiency
and fairness when they conflict.
A reader might object at this point that no judge-or anyone else for
that matter--could possibly perform such a complex analysis perfectly.
This is certainly true. But it is not a good reason to avoid the task altogether. A judge must do the best she can. There is no other way to make
83.
See Bone, supra note 33, at 910-30.
84.
Likewise, expanding discovery opportunities gives defendants access to the information
necessary to vindicate valid defenses.
85. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 33, at 910-15.
86.
"Expected" cost is the particular cost discounted by the probability that it will materialize.
For example, expected false positive error cost is the cost of a false positive error discounted by the
probability a false positive error will materialize.
87. This point raises a very complex set of issues, however, and this is not the place to consider them with care.
88.
For example, efficiency might support a very high error risk in certain low stakes cases,
but imposing a high error risk greatly out of proportion to what other litigants receive might be
considered unfair. Thus fairness limits what can be done in the name of efficiency.
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good procedure. If I am correct that the goal is to distribute the risk of
error fairly and efficiently, then a judge has no other choice than to aim
for this goal whenever she exercises case-specific discretion.
However, this does not mean that judges must always undertake a
complex analysis or that the difficulty of the task is irrelevant to what a
judge should do. Some procedural choices are so routine and so unlikely
to have substantial negative effects that it makes sense to apply rules of
thumb. Moreover, in harder cases, the difficulty of the task should counsel restraint. For example, I have argued elsewhere that the complexity of
normative analysis in procedure implies that the judge should have only
a very limited role in settlement promotion. 89 More generally, when a
judge has grave doubts about her ability to evaluate distributional effects,
even approximately, she should seriously consider sticking with established practice-or at least not deviating too far from it-and leaving
innovation to the formal rulemaking process or to Congress.
One thing is clear from this discussion: judges should not aim to get
the right result in each individual case. Instead they should aim to balance the risk of error system-wide. For example, sometimes a procedure
that marginally reduces the error risk in one case can interfere with the
ability to achieve a reasonable result in other cases. 9° In a situation like
this, it can be tempting to adopt the procedure for the case it benefits, but
this should be done only if the system-wide effects are not too severe.
B. First Qualification: "With due regardfor party participationappropriate to the case"
The previous section set out the central purpose of procedure-to
distribute the risk of outcome error fairly and efficiently-and it explained why achieving this goal requires a global perspective, reliable
empirical information, and serious deliberation about value tradeoffs. Yet
the pursuit if this goal is subject to three important qualifications: the
requirements of party participation, the demands of due process and other constitutional constraints, and the practical limitations on a judge's
ability to predict consequences and assess system-wide effects. This section discusses the first qualification, and sections C and D below discuss
the second and third.

89. Bone, supra note 76, at 2011-15. Judicial involvement in settlement promotion can end
up pressuring suboptimal settlements relative to the parties' substantive entitlements and the goals of
the substantive law. If this becomes a systematic practice, it will increase the risk of outcome error
and affect the error risk distribution. These effects should be taken into account when a judge considers whether to intervene, and the difficulty of predicting and evaluating the effects is likely to
increase with the degree of intervention.
90. To illustrate, consider discovery. Allowing additional discovery is likely to prolong a
lawsuit. If this is done for all similar cases of a particular type (as a fair distribution of the error risk
would demand), the result will produce externalities for other cases, increase delay costs, and perhaps pressure suboptimal settlements.
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The first qualification to the general goal instructs judges to temper
their quest for an optimal error risk distribution with "due regard for party participation appropriate to the case." 91 It is important to recognize
that fairly strong party participation is already embedded in the general
goal. Because parties have strong incentives to investigate the law and
the facts and to make compelling legal arguments, allowing broad party
participation
promotes accurate outcomes--or so the adversary system
92
assumes.
I add participation as a qualifier in order to take account of nonoutcome-based participation values. Our procedural system appears to
value a party's personal participation for reasons of dignity and legitimacy in addition to outcome quality. 93 Sometimes the participation required
by non-outcome-based dignity and legitimacy values will conflict with
optimal participation justified on outcome-based grounds. To illustrate,
consider a large aggregation of cases. When the social costs of tolerating
individual suits are very high, as is true for mass torts, achieving a fair
and efficient error risk distribution can call for highly truncated participation opportunities falling significantly short of what a robust conception
of non-outcome-based values would require.9 4
In these situations, a judge must balance outcome-based and nonoutcome-based values. Like balancing fairness and efficiency to achieve
an optimal error risk distribution, balancing non-outcome-based and outcome-based values is a difficult undertaking, especially as there is no
obvious meta-principle to resolve conflicts. Nevertheless, judges must do
the best they can. In fact, judges are actually doing this now, except not
as transparently as they should and not with the kind of deliberation and
publicly-articulated reasoning that the decision deserves. For example,
when trial judges use their discretion to permit plaintiffs to sue multiple
defendants by denying a motion to separate, they in effect compel those
defendants to share the litigation stage and in so doing limit the amount
of control each defendant can exercise. Also, when related cases are consolidated in multidistrict litigation and the MDL judge denies motions to
91.
Some readers might object to my making this a qualifier rather than part of the general
goal. They might argue, for example, that participation is essential to the legitimacy of adjudication
in a liberal democracy and therefore procedure cannot distribute the risk of outcome error "fairly"
without guaranteeing each party a meaningful opportunity to participate (entirely apart from effects
on outcome quality). See generally Lawrence B. Solum, ProceduralJustice, 78 S.CAL. L. REV. 181,
275-89 (2004). I disagree with this argument, which is why I make non-outcome-based participation
a qualifier. See Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the "Day in Court" Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 264-85 (1992). But the rulemaking committees might choose instead to make
participation part of the main goal rather than a qualifier.
92. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 382-84
(1978).
93.
See Bone, supra note 91, at 264-85.
94. See Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of
Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV. 561, 628-50 (1993). Moreover, allowing more robust participation for non-outcome-based reasons can increase the risk of outcome error for cases filed later in the
litigation queue and subject to the effects of delay.
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remand in order to force collective settlement, participation is plainly
sacrificed without meaningful party consent.95 In making decisions like
these, judges today are implicitly balancing outcome-based and nonoutcome-based values. They should do so more openly and with more
careful deliberation.
My call for greater transparency and deliberation is not driven by a
belief that non-outcome-based participation is especially valuable in adjudication. In fact, I have argued elsewhere that the so-called right to a
personal "day in court," which is said to protect robust individual control
over litigation, is neither applied consistently by judges nor obviously
justified in its broad form by a sensible account of American civil adjudication. 96 I favor transparency and deliberation instead as a way to develop a clearer shared understanding of the appropriate role of nonoutcome-based values. My hope is that including the participation qualifier in Rule 1 will prompt judges to examine the issues more carefully
and justify their decisions publicly. The result should be greater consistency and coherence across the litigation system and a better justified
account of individual participation and its limits.
C. Second Qualification: "[With due regardfor] due process and
other constitutionalconstraints"
The second qualification to the general distributional goal speaks
for itself. Obviously judges are bound by constitutional constraints, as
are Congress and the committees involved in the formal rulemaking
process. Even so, constitutional provisions like the Due Process Clause
require interpretation, and constitutional interpretation depends in significant measure on the purposes procedure is supposed to serve. It follows
that a procedure justified as furthering the goal of a fair and efficient
error risk distribution subject to participation and practical constraintsand thus compatible with my proposed Rule 1-should not run afoul of
the Constitution very often.97
D. Third Qualification: "[With due regardfor] practicallimitations
on a judge's ability to predict consequences accurately and assess system-wide effects"
The third qualification focuses on practical limitations. Its inclusion
serves as an important reminder that discretionary case management and
case-specific procedural design are not always (or perhaps even often)
desirable as a policy matter. I have discussed the problems with a discre95. See Delaventura v. Columbia Acorn Trust, 417 F. Supp. 2d 147, 150-55 (D. Mass. 2006)
(criticizing this practice).
96. See Bone, supra note 91, at 265-66, 286-88; see also Robert G. Bone, Making Effective
Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 319, 337-40 (2008).
97.
The Seventh Amendment right to jury trial might be an exception because of its constitutionally-mandated historical test. However, policy concerns are involved in that analysis as well.
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tionary case-specific approach elsewhere98 and will not repeat the details
of that analysis here. Those problems include bounded rationality constraints, limitations on judicial access to information, and strategic interaction effects. In short, judges use many of the same decision heuristics
most people use and those heuristics can lead to systematically biased
results. Moreover, judges often make decisions about procedure early in
a case-especially case management and settlement promotion decisions-when they lack access to critical case-specific information. Finally, the information access problem is exacerbated by the highly strategic
environment of litigation. Parties have incentives to conceal information
so the case appears different than it actually is. The judge might try to
deter this strategy, but parties will anticipate the judge's attempt and do
what they can to counter it.
The existence of these problems means that trial judges should exercise restraint when construing and administering the Federal Rules.
They should not depart too far from established practice unless they are
confident that the departure is clearly justified in the circumstances of the
case. More radical procedural reforms should go through the formal
rulemaking or legislative process before trial judges apply them to individual cases.99 Both the rulemaking process and Congress have built-in
mechanisms to gather and process empirical information, consider global
effects, and provide opportunities for public input where appropriate.
CONCLUSION

Rule 1 might seem an odd choice for an article about Federal Rule
reform. But Rule 1 is critically important. It sets out a principle that is
supposed to guide interpretation and application of all the Federal Rules.
Since many of these Rules are purposefully written in vague language,
interpretation is the key to their application. And Rule 1 is the key to
their interpretation.
Rule 1, therefore, is a master rule for the Federal Rules. As such, it
is crucially important that it state a meaningful and sensible interpretive
principle. The original, and still current, statement-"to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination" of actions-made sense in 1938
98.
Bone, supra note 76, at 1986-2001.
99. I have suggested a number of possible Federal Rule reforms in other writing. Examples
include imposing mandatory (rather than the current presumptive) limits on discovery and specifying
different limits for different categories of cases, adopting rules that match ADR and settlement
promotion methods to different case types, and perhaps implementing stricter pleading standards
selectively but with limited access to pre-dismissal discovery. See id at 2003-15; Bone, supra
note33, at 930-35. All these reforms should be accomplished through the formal rulemaking process
and implemented as Federal Rules. This requires abandoning a commitment to transsubstantivity.
But that is a good idea anyway since the principle of transsubstantivity makes no sense today and
merely frustrates sensible procedural design. See Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Article on Adjusting the "One Size Fits All" Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L.
REV.377 (2010).
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given the beliefs and goals of the early twentieth century procedural
reform movement. However, it makes little sense today.
It is imperative that we amend Rule 1 to conform to our best understandings of what a procedural system is and what it should accomplish.
I have defended one such proposal in this Essay. There are other possibilities. The important thing is to debate the alternatives so that we can
settle on a statement of purpose that restores coherence and direction to
the vital project of designing sensible procedures for civil adjudication.

SITUATING INHERENT POWER WITHIN A RULES REGIME
SAMUEL P. JORDANt
INTRODUCTION

Federal civil procedure is dominated by rules. This is not particularly surprising. The introduction of a set of federal rules in 1938 was a
landmark achievement, one which fundamentally altered the procedural
landscape and which has shaped our discussion of procedural issues ever
since. We are now conditioned to think of procedural requirements primarily in terms of the rules, and-as the question posed by this Issue of
the Denver University Law Review suggests-we also think of procedural reform in terms of amendments to those rules.
But important though they are, the rules do not tell the whole federal procedural story. There are other sources of procedural requirements
that may be imposed in any given federal case, and that may displace or
supplement those imposed by the federal rules. For example, federal statutes may-and in recent years increasingly do--contain procedural requirements that differ from those found in the generally applicable federal rules l So it is, for example, that the pleading standards for a securities
action are different from those imposed in Rule 8(a)(2). 2 This Essay focuses on yet another source of authority for procedural requirements that
may be imposed in a federal civil case: inherent power. More specifically, my focus is on the use of inherent power to create and enforce procedural requirements in the context of a given case, or what Professor Burbank has referred to as "inherent power in the weak sense. 3 When inherent power is added to the mix, the menu of sources for procedural authority is expanded even further, such that a litigant may be sanctioned in
t Assistant Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. I am grateful to Chad Handers, Andy Hessick, Marcia McCormick, Karen Petroski, and Howard Wasserman for helpful conversations on this topic. Thanks also to Griffin O'Hanlon for excellent research assistance. I dedicate
this Essay to the memory of my father, Samuel P. Jordan, Jr., who was a proud member of the Denver Law Class of 1971. He would have been thrilled to see his name finally appear within these
pages.
1. See David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-substantivity in Federal Civil
Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 40-47), available at
http:llpapers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1428992 (discussing legislative intervention in
the domain of federal procedure).
2. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (2006); Tellabs,
Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 320-24 (2007) (interpreting the pleading standards under the PLSRA).
3.
Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure,Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1677, 1686 (2004). This is to be contrasted with a strong notion of inherent power,
which might be used to justify a court's right to fashion a prospective set of rules that could displace
competing legislative rules. See id. (arguing that federal courts do not possess strong inherent authority).
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the context of discovery by reference to a rule (Rule 37), a statute (28
U.S.C. § 1927), or inherent power.4
The use of inherent power in the procedural sphere has a long history, and its use has continued unabated in the seventy years since our embrace of a rules-based regime. Unfortunately, regular use has not translated to clarity about the precise nature of inherent power and its relationship to formal procedural authority.5 Courts routinely acknowledge
that the presence of rules and statutes has implications for the use of inherent power, but are frustratingly vague when it comes to articulating
the contours of those implications. To make matters worse, judicial practice-as opposed to judicial rhetoric-related to inherent power demonstrates that the presence of the rules act as only a very weak restriction on
the ability of courts to resort to inherent power.
My goal in this short Essay is to describe the way that inherent
power is understood and applied within our procedural framework, and
to suggest the need for a more robust account of the contemporary relationship between inherent power and formal procedural rules. Part I describes two roles-one legitimate and one not-that inherent power can
play vis-A-vis the rules. Part II examines how those roles are often confused or manipulated, with the result that inherent power remains available to justify judicial action in an undesirably large class of cases. Finally, Part II explores ways to clarify the relationship between rules and
inherent power. Although this clarification could be accomplished
through a shift in judicial practice, a preferable approach would be to
seek an amendment to the rules themselves that would better articulate
4. See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing
rules and inherent power to justify the imposition of discovery sanctions).
5.
This is not to say that courts have not made any efforts to consider the question of inherent power carefully; clearly some have. For example, the Third Circuit discussed the issue at length,
and developed an analytical framework for assessing questions relating to the use of inherent power.
See Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 560-64 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc). But the Supreme
Court explicitly rejected that framework in Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 47 n.12 (1991),
and has never seemed inclined to develop a clear theory of inherent power.
Academic commentators have gamely attempted to supply what the courts have left undefined, and
articles explaining theories of inherent power are plentiful, if inconsistent. See generally Sara Sun
Beale, ReconsideringSupervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on
the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CoLUM. L. REV. 1433 (1984); David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic
Limits of Congress'PowerRegarding the JudicialBranch, 1999 BYU L. REV. 75; A. Leo Levin &
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control over JudicialRulemaking: A Problem in Constitutional
Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1958); Linda S. Mullenix, UnconstitutionalRulemaking: The Civil
Justice Reform Act and Separationof Powers, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1283 (1993); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.,
The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735
(2001); William F. Ryan, Rush to Judgment: A ConstitutionalAnalysis of Time Limits on Judicial
Decisions, 77 B.U. L. REV. 761 (1997); William W. Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining IncidentalPowers of the Presidentand of the FederalCourts: A Comment on the Horizontal
Effect of the Sweeping Clause, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1976, at 102. These articles are
primarily focused on the constitutional relationship between inherent power and rules, but they
generally stop short of taking a functional view at the relationship between inherent power and
formal rules. My goal in this Essay is to be mindful of constitutional considerations, but to approach
the question primarily from a functional standpoint.
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their intended scope. Such an amendment would make it easier for lawyers to predict the procedural requirements that may actually be imposed
in a given case, and would ultimately further civil justice reform by making the rules-and thus the rulemaking process-more meaningful.
I. TWO ROLES OF INHERENT POWER

Although inherent power may be applied in a wide range of contexts, it is generally invoked to perform the role of gap-filler or escapevalve. This section describes both roles, and concludes that the first is
defensible but largely unnecessary, while the second is constitutionally
and functionally problematic.
A. Inherent Power as a Gap-Filler
By virtue of being constituted as a court and invested with judicial
power, courts have long found that they have authority to impose procedural requirements in the context of deciding cases. As far back as 1812,
the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that "[c]ertain implied powers must
necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution. ' 6 Thus, even when a formalized and prospective set of procedural
rules does not exist, courts may fulfill their judicial function by developing and enforcing case-specific procedural requirements.7 It requires only
a modest extension of that logic to conclude that these powers also permit courts to use their inherent power to fill gaps left by an existing but
incomplete procedural framework. 8
Many of the early cases drawing on inherent power to justify the
imposition of procedural requirements can be described as gap-filler cases. Under the conformity regimes that governed federal procedural practice until 1934, federal courts were directed to apply the procedural rules
of the states in which they sat. 9 But state procedural rules were not exhaustive, and situations unavoidably arose that fell outside their coverage. In those situations, federal courts often created and enforced proce-

6. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812). These powers are "governed not by rule
or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve
the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases." Link v. Wabash R.R. Co. 370 U.S. 626, 630-31
(1962).
7. A thornier question is whether courts could create a generally enforceable set of rules in
the absence of legislative action. For an argument that they could do so, at least "as a matter of
common law development," see Martin H. Redish, FederalJudicialIndependence: Constitutional
and PoliticalPerspectives,46 MERCER L. REv. 697, 727-28 (1995).
8.
Not all commentators have been willing to accept that extension, however modest. For a
prominent criticism of the use of inherent power to fill gaps-however genuine-in a legislatively
created set of procedural rules, see Van Alstyne, supra note 5.
9. The statute in force immediately prior to passage of the Rules Enabling Act was the Act of
June 1, 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5-6, 17 Stat. 196, 197. Earlier variations on the conformity regime had
been in place since 1789. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules EnablingAct of 1934, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1015, 1037 (1982).
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dural requirements that were justified by a reference to inherent power,
and those requirements were routinely upheld.10
The invocation of inherent power as a gap-filler has persisted even
after the conformity regime was displaced by the federal rules. Courts
properly understand the rules not as an attempt to describe the universe
of permissible procedures, but instead as an effort to formalize and unify
the procedures that are to be applied in specific situations." Thus, procedural gaps are still inevitable, and courts continue to rely on inherent
power to create case-specific procedures to fill those gaps. 12 But while
the continuing use of inherent power to address genuine gaps in the rules
may be consistent with historical practice, it is also unnecessary in most
cases because the rules themselves provide formal authority for that sort
of judicial action. Specifically, Rule 83(b)-which permits judges to
"regulate practice in any manner consistent with federal law, rules
adopted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072 and 2075, and the district's local
rules"' 3 -supports the imposition of case-specific requirements when
other sources of procedural authority are silent. 14 The use of inherent

10.
For example, the Supreme Court in In re Petersonapproved the appointment of an auditor
to review factual issues in a federal case filed in New York, despite the fact that no such practice was
specifically authorized either by the procedural code of that state or by a federal statute. 253 U.S.
300, 312-14 (1920). New York permitted the appointment of a referee in cases on long accounts, but
Peterson was not such a case. Id at 308--09. The absence of a federal statute was relevant because
the Court had previously recognized that Congress could legislatively override the 1872 Conformity
Act. See Exparte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713, 721 (1885) ("[l]f congress has legislated on this subject and
prescribed a definite role for the government of its own courts, it is to that extent exclusive of any
legislation of the states in the same matter."). Given that the alternative sources of procedural authority were silent on the matter, Justice Brandeis had no hesitation finding the appointment within the
inherent power of courts "to provide themselves with appropriate instruments required for the performance of their duties." Peterson,253 U.S. at 312. But in describing the scope of this power, it is
notable that Justice Brandeis included in quotations the caveat that the power exists "at least in the
absence of legislation to the contrary." Id. For other examples of conformity-era invocations of
inherent power, see Enelow v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379, 381-82 (1935); Bowen v. Chase, 94
U.S. 812, 824 (1876). But these cases can be misleading when it comes to the nature and scope of
inherent power. In many instances, courts invoked the rhetoric of inherent power but simultaneously
found that the power to create the requirements in question had been expressly conferred by statute.
Burbank, supra note 3, at 1687 n.33.
11.
Ryan, supra note 5, at 775-79 (discussing the non-exhaustive nature of the federal rules).
12.
Of course, case-specific procedures issued pursuant to inherent authority are not the only
way that procedural gaps may be filled. Local rules and standing orders created under the authority
of Rule 83 also serve the same function, although they do so in a more formal and prospective way.
See Ryan, supranote 5, at 777 n.66 (characterizing local rulemaking as a legislatively approved "gap
filling function").
13.
FED. R. Civ. P. 83(b). Rule 83(b) is most commonly relied on as the source for a judge's
power to develop general standing orders. See generally Myron J. Bromberg & Jonathan M. Kom,
IndividualJudges' Practices:An InadvertentSubversion of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,68
ST. JoHN's L. REv. 1 (1994).
14.
Rule 83(b) may not completely exhaust the need to employ inherent authority to address
procedural gaps, however. Inherent authority may be necessary to justify some actions-say, for the
court to examine its own jurisdiction-that do not qualify as "regulat[ing] practice." See FED. R.
Civ. P. 83(b).
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power to deal with procedural gaps is therefore gratuitous under the current framework, 5 and indeed may occasionally be problematic.16
B. Inherent Power as an Escape Valve
Inherent power acts as an escape valve when it is used as an alternative source of authority in situations where a more formal procedure also
applies. Suppose a rule directs that courts must wait twenty days before
taking a particular action. If a court cites inherent power to take that
same action after only ten days, then the power is being used not to address an unanticipated or unaddressed procedural question, but instead to
circumvent the answer provided by a competing source of authority. 17
This is a much more contestable use of inherent power. Indeed, with
very limited exceptions, the use of inherent power in this manner has
been properly criticized as inconsistent with basic principles of constitutional structure. Perhaps it would be enough to stop there, but in this section I also want to suggest that this use of inherent authority is problematic in two additional respects: first, that it frustrates the reasonable
expectations of litigants and may even conflict with due process principles in some cases, and second, that it compromises the rulemaking
process and undermines procedural reform efforts.
1. Constitutional Structure
Escape valve cases involve a direct inter-branch conflict.' 8 This is
not true of gap-filler cases, where by definition no applicable rule or statute-and thus no source of authority traceable to the legislative
branch-is present. The only question in those cases is whether the judicial branch has the power to act without specific authorization. But the
use of a judicially-sourced inherent power to bypass a legislativelysourced rule is different, and raises a question of constitutional dimension. Now the question is whether the courts can disregard or override
legislative action, and the answer to that turns on who is charged with the
ultimate authority to define the procedural rules in the federal system.
15.
This is not to say that inherent power is being used in gap-filling cases to go beyond Rule
83. To the contrary, in most cases, inherent power and Rule 83(b) provide alternative paths to the
same procedural result. But in my view, it is worth being attentive and careful about the source of
power, even where it will not affect the result in a formal sense.
16.
The use of inherent power would be problematic if, for example, a district court attempted
to introduce and enforce a procedural requirement without providing actual notice to the litigant in
advance. Rule 83 limits the ability to regulate practice by imposing a notice requirement before
procedures not found in a formal rule or statute are enforced. Enforcing a procedural requirement

without actual notice would therefore conflict with Rule 83, and employing inherent authority to that
end would properly be viewed as an example of inherent authority as an escape valve.
17.
This is by design a very clear example, but I readily acknowledge that not all instances of
inherent power as escape valve are so clear. See infra Part H1.
18.
There is a potential for intra-branch conflict, too, particularly where the competing source
of procedural authority derives from a higher court's use of supervisory power. For a thoughtful
discussion of supervisory power, see Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme
Court, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 324 (2006).
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Since the introduction of the federal rules regime, much has been
written about the proper constitutional relationship between legislative
and judicial rulemaking. 19 Although extreme positions have been staked
2°
out,
theProfessor
dominantBurbank:
view seems to be very close to that recently articulated by
If Congress chooses to exercise its power, it has the last word on matters of procedure, subject only to the specific limitations of the Constitution (i.e., in the Bill of Rights) and to a limitation that, although
difficult to phrase precisely, prevents Congress, as a matter of separation of powers, from depriving the federal courts of powers that are
necessary for them to act as such-to function as courts exercising
judicial power under Article III-when deciding cases.21
Federal rules, of course, are not statutes, but they derive from congressional action22 and are treated as statutory equivalents.23 Because it
reflects a congressional decision to exercise its power, the existence of an
applicable rule must therefore be treated as "the last word," unless the
court can articulate a constitutional reason for why the rule extends
beyond the limits of congressional rulemaking authority. While the precise scope of those limits remains unclear, 24 the fundamental principle
that the presence of rules can constrain judicial authority that otherwise
might be implied in their absence is well settled. Indeed, courts themselves routinely acknowledge that principle,
even though they do not
25
basis.
constitutional
its
articulate
always
19. See sources cited supra note 5.
20. Compare Wigmore's assertion that only courts had rulemaking power, John H. Wigmore,
All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure are Void Constitutionally, 23 U. ILL. L. REV. 276
(1928), with Clark's contention that legislative supremacy in the realm of procedure was essentially
limitless, Charles E. Clark, The Proper Function of the Supreme Court's FederalRules Committee,
28 A.B.A. J. 521 (1942).
21.
Burbank, supranote 3, at 1688.
22. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2075 (2006).
23. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 255 (1988) (noting that the Federal
Rules are "as binding as any statute duly enacted by Congress, and federal courts have no more
discretion to disregard the Rule[s'] mandate than they do to disregard constitutional or statutory
provisions").
24. There is a vast academic literature concerning the existence and definition of "essential"
or "irreducible" judicial power. For a sampling, see Ryan, supra note 5, at 785-87, and Pushaw,
supra note 5, at 741-44. Within the sphere of essential judicial power, courts arguably have the
constitutional authority to disregard any legislative attempt to control their behavior. Nothing in my
argument turns on which conception of essential judicial power is correct, and so I take no view on
that question here. It is enough to say that if a court concludes that a particular rule falls within the
sphere of essential judicial power, however defined, it should say so explicitly. Absent any such
claim, or some other claim of constitutional infirmity, a legislatively-sourced rule should be enforced.
25.
See, e.g., In re Atlantic Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 135, 143 (1st Cir. 2002) ("[1]nherent powers
cannot be exercised in a manner that contradicts an applicable statute or rule."); G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he district court... may not
exercise its inherent authority in a manner inconsistent with rule or statute."). But courts have not
always interpreted this constraint to mean that when a rule is on point, the rule, rather than inherent
power, must be the source of judicial action. Thus, even after acknowledging this principle in Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 47 (1991), the Supreme Court concluded that inherent power
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2. Fairness
One of the advantages of rules is that they are easy to discover and
knowable in advance. Before litigation begins, parties and lawyers can
consult the rules and form a reasonable understanding of the procedural
requirements that will govern their dispute. The existence of a uniform
and stable set of rules thus reduces surprise and promotes fairness by
allowing actors in the system to structure their behavior in ways that conform to procedural expectations. 266 Supplementation of the formal rules
from a source that is undefined and unknowable in advance is destabilizing, and leads to results that are less uniform and less predictable.27
As with constitutional structure, escape valve cases differ from gapfiller cases when it comes to fairness considerations. When parties and
litigants look to formal sources of authority and find nothing, they should
not presume that there is simply no answer to the question. But when a
rule speaks to an issue, those who encounter it are much more likely to
conclude that what is contained there constitutes a complete and accurate
description of the procedural requirements that may be imposed in the
case with respect to that issue.28
Of course, at some level reasonable expectations are structured by
what courts say about what is reasonable. That is, if courts routinely
staked out the position that rules are subject to supplementation by inherent power, then at some point it would become unreasonable for those
affected by the rules to assume otherwise. But this is not what courts
say, 29 and thus even very attentive participants in litigation are likely to
be misled when they encounter a rule that appears to address a particular
issue. At some level, then, the fairness concern here is rooted not in some
existed even in the face of a rule addressed to the same issue. Id. at 49 ("The Court's prior cases
have indicated that the inherent power of a court can be invoked even if procedural rules exist which
sanction the same conduct."). In other words, courts may conclude that the exercise of inherent
power is unconstrained either by finding that the rule simply does not address the issue, or that it
addresses it in a way that does not displace the availability of inherent power as an alternative. See
infra Part I.
26.
See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 68 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ('These definite standards give
litigants notice of proscribed conduct and make possible meaningful review for misuse of discretion-review which focuses on the misapplication of legal standards."). Of course, this does not
mean that the rules alone put litigants in a position to predict procedural requirements perfectly.
After all, the rules themselves may be ambiguous, which makes them subject to interpretation, or
they may confer discretion, which may be exercised in an unpredictable manner. See Robert G.
Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at ProceduralDiscretion, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 1961, 1970
(2007) (discussing interpretation and discretion as ways that judges influence the content of rules).
27.
In part due to concerns about predictability, notice, and transparency, the Third Circuit, in
Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., expressed a preference for the use of local rules rather than inherent
power to deal with gaps in the rules. 757 F.2d 557, 568-70 (3d Cir. 1985).
28.
To some extent, these concerns may be mitigated by a requirement that parties be given
notice of a procedural requirement justified by inherent power before that requirement may be enforced. But while courts often impose a notice requirement, they do not always do so. See, e.g., link
v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 632 (1962) (enforcing a sua sponte dismissal based on inherent
authority despite the absence of notice).
29.
See cases cited supranote 25.
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unavoidable problem with the use of inherent authority to supplement
written rules, but in the disconnect that presently exists between judicial
rhetoric and judicial practice.30
3. Rulemaking
Finally, the use of inherent authority to bypass the requirements reflected in formal rules has the potential to affect rulemaking. Rules reflect choices, and those choices are the product of a statutorily-created
process that is designed to involve input from a variety of sources. Invoking inherent power to avoid constraints imposed by rules is tantamount to permitting judges to substitute their individual choices for those
reached through the formal rulemaking process.31
This substitution is troublesome because it exacerbates procedural
disuniformity in the federal system. The shift from conformity to a regime of federal rules was motivated in large part by a desire to promote
uniform procedural standards. 32 Uniformity in turn was expected to contribute to reduced barriers to national legal practice and increased equality in the outcomes reached across the federal system.3 3 Allowing courts
to invoke inherent authority to escape the uniform requirements imposed
by the federal rules undermines those goals.34
A second cause for concern is that the excessive use of inherent
power decreases the significance of the rulemaking process. If rules are
truly binding, then the choices embedded in those rules have a great deal
of importance. Judges have a role in the rulemaking process, 35 and the
30. See infra Part I.
31.
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 737 (1980) (rejecting the use of supervisory power
when it "amounts to a substitution of individual judgment for the controlling decisions of this
Court"); see also Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 255 (1988) ("The balance
struck by the Rule between societal costs and the rights of the accused may not casually be overlooked 'because a court has elected to analyze the question under the supervisory power."' (quoting
Payner,447 U.S. at 736)).
32. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 9, at 1043. This is not inconsistent with an acknowledgement that the rules do not fully describe the procedural universe. See supra Part I.A. Rather, the rules
reflect a desire to impose uniform standards in certain procedural contexts, namely, those contexts to
which a promulgated rule is directed.
33. See William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure,23 CARDOzO L.
REv. 1865, 1893-97 (2002); David L. Shapiro, FederalRule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice
of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1969, 1974 (1989).
34. See G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 666 (7th Cir. 1989)
(Ripple, J., dissenting) ("Today's decision is indeed hard to reconcile with the underlying Congressional concern for uniformity of practice in the federal courts. Indeed, the majority encourages the
individual district court to march to its own drummer."); see also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501
U.S. 32, 69 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
35. Only members of the Supreme Court and those selected for service on rulemaking committees have a direct role. But other judges may participate meaningfully if indirectly in a variety of
ways, such as communicating with rulemaking committees or writing opinions that agitate for procedural modification. It is perhaps worth noting that judicial involvement in the process is not the
result of entitlement, but of legislative design. See generally Martin H. Redish and Uma M.
Amuluru, The Supreme Court, the Rules Enabling Act, and the Politicizationof the Federal Rules:
Constitutional and Statutory Implications, 90 MiNN. L. REv. 1303 (2006) (discussing the
implications of the Rules Enabling Act).

SITUATING INHERENT POWER

2010]

prospect that they will be meaningfully constrained provides them with
an incentive to ensure that the choices made are optimal by participating
fully in the rulemaking process. But if the rules are merely one source of
authority among many, and are subject to supplementation or evasion by
reference to inherent power, then the initial choices made through the
rulemaking process are less significant, and the judicial incentives to
invest in that process are reduced. 36 This is the problem that strikes closest to the heart of the question being considered by this law review issue.
Reform through rulemaking is meaningful only if the rules themselves
are meaningful. At the extreme, a broad understanding of inherent power
makes the rules less meaningful, and makes changes to those rules less
effective.
11. RULE INTERPRETATION AND ROLE CONFUSION

Inherent power may be used legitimately (if unnecessarily) to fill
gaps in formal procedural rules or illegitimately to avoid constraints imposed by those rules. As a conceptual matter, the distinction between
these two roles is straightforward. But the distinction is much harder in
practice because it depends on a determination of whether formal rules
address a particular situation and whether the exercise of inherent power
is consistent with those rules. Put differently, the distinction turns on a
judicial interpretation of the scope and effect of the federal rules.
Through this interpretive act, courts have the flexibility to refashion potential escape valves as gap-fillers, and thus to sustain the exercise of
inherent power as legitimate.
To see this interpretive flexibility at work, consider G. Heileman
Brewing v. Joseph Oat Corp.37 In Heileman, the en banc Seventh Circuit
addressed the question of whether a district judge could compel the attendance of a corporate representative at a pre-trial settlement conference. 38 Rule 16(a)(5) provided authority to compel the attendance of
attorneys and unrepresented parties, but the order in question fell outside
the scope of that formal authority because the corporation was
represented. 39 Thus, the question was whether the order could instead be
sustained by reference to inherent power. Rule 16(a)(5) might sensibly
be read to delineate the permissible range of parties who may be com36. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 67 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Disregard of applicable Rules
also circumvents the rulemaking procedures in 28 U.S.C. 2071 et seq., which Congress designed to
assure that procedural innovations like those announced today 'shall be introduced only after mature
consideration of informed opinion from all relevant quarters, with all the opportunities for comprehensive and integrated treatment which such consideration affords."' (quoting Miner v. Atlass, 363
U.S. 641, 650 (1960))); Strandell v. Jackson County, Ill., 838 F.2d 884, 886-87 (7th Cir. 1988)
("[fln those areas of trial practice where the Supreme Court and the Congress, acting together, have
addressed the appropriate balance between the needs for judicial efficiency and the rights of the
individual litigant, innovation by the individual judicial officer must conform to that balance.").
37.

871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc).

38.
39.

Id. at 652.
Id. at 651.
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pelled to attend a conference, and indeed that interpretation was urged by
several judges in dissent.4n Viewed this way, any attempt to compel a
party not listed in the rule-like the represented party at issue in the
case-would constitute an exercise of inherent power as an escape valve.
To avoid that result, the majority instead interpreted the scope of Rule
16(a)(5) narrowly: it provided specific authority to compel certain attendees, and nothing more. 41 As to those not mentioned, the rule was silent.42 Thus, the question at issue fell into a43procedural gap, and inherent
power could properly be employed to fill it.
Many cases involving questions of inherent power are similar to
Heileman in the sense that they are capable of classification as either a
gap-filler or an escape valve. 44 And as in Heileman, courts seem willing
to use the process of interpretation to sustain the exercise of inherent
power by viewing the scope of a potentially applicable rule narrowly.
This approach formally respects the principle that inherent power cannot
act as an escape valve.45 But it simultaneously minimizes the impact of
that principle by limiting escape valve cases to those "where the rules
directly mandate a specific procedure to the exclusion of others."46 In all
other cases, courts remain free to interpret formal rules either as inap-

40. See id.
at 658 (Coffey, J., dissenting); id. at 666-67 (Manion, J., dissenting).
41.
Id. at 654 (majority opinion).
42. Id.at 653 (concluding that represented parties were "not proscribed or specifically addressed" by Rule 16(a)(5)).
43.
Id.at 656.
44. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. Energy Gathering, Inc., 2 F.3d 1397 (5th Cir.
1993), is another example. The question at issue there concerned the ability of a district court to
compel production of tax returns from a non-party during post-judgment discovery. Rule 69 permits
discovery "in the aid of the judgment ... in the manner provided in these rules or in the manner
provided by the practice of the state in which the district court is held." FED. R. Civ. P. 69(a). The
Fifth Circuit considered Texas practice, but concluded that it did not fully authorize the district
court's action. Natural Gas, 2 F.3d at 1406. As for the federal rules, Rules 34 and 45 authorize
discovery from non-parties. But those rules likewise did not authorize the district court's action
because no subpoena was issued, and because any subpoena issued by the district court would not
have been issued by "the court for the district in which the production or inspection is to be made."
FED. R. CIv. P. 45(A)(2). Despite this, the Fifth Circuit found that the district court had inherent
authority to act, although it found some fault with the specific action taken. Natural Gas, 2 F.3d at
1411. At first blush, the existence of a rule clearly addressed to the question of when post-judgment
discovery may be ordered makes Natural Gas Pipelinelook like a clear example of inherent power
being used as an escape valve. But as in Heileman, the court took pains to avoid that
characterization, instead focusing on the permissive language contained in the rules and concluding
that "Rule 69(a) and Rule 34(c) do not purport to define the sole means of obtaining post-judgment
document discovery or production from a non-party." Id. at 1408.
45.
In Heileman, as in most cases involving inherent power, the court paid lip service to the
idea that inherent power may not conflict with formal procedural authority. Heileman, 871 F.2d at
652 ("Obviously, the district court, in devising means to control cases before it, may not exercise its
inherent authority in a manner inconsistent with rule or statute.").
46. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Landau & Cleary, Ltd. v. Hribar Trucking,
Inc., 867 F.2d 996, 1002 (7th Cir. 1989)). The Supreme Court has followed suit. See Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 47 (1991) ("'[W]e do not lightly assume that Congress has intended to
depart from established principles' such as the scope of a court's inherent power." (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982))).
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plicable, or as applicable but nevertheless consistent with the supplementary use of inherent power.47
There is a similarity in all of this to the interpretive contortions that
may be observed in the judicial application of the Erie doctrine.48 Since
Hanna v. Plumer,49 federal courts have been instructed to determine
whether there is a federal directive on point. To do so, courts must define
the scope of the rule, and the results have been frustratingly unclear and
inconsistent. 50 In the Erie context, observers have long suspected that at
least some of the confusion stems from a judicial resistance to conclude
that a directive is on point in cases where that conclusion would
necessitate a subsequent finding that the federal directive is
constitutionally defective. To avoid that result, courts instead interpret
the rule narrowly, even if that narrow interpretation is cramped and
unnatural.
A similar phenomenon may be at play in the context of inherent
power. Suppose that courts are interested in protecting the broad exercise
of inherent power. Interpreting the rule narrowly serves that goal by
permitting the exercise to be characterized as a gap-filler. A broader interpretation would require the courts either to limit the domain of inherent authority, or to conclude that the rule in question is constitutionally
suspect because it infringes on the "essential judicial power.",5 1 Thus, the
tendency toward narrow interpretation may reflect a simultaneous desire
to preserve judicial power and avoid a constitutional showdown. Whatever the reason, there seems to be some resistance to finding a conflict
between a formal rule and inherent power, and that resistance has given
rise to something resembling a clear statement regime: absent an explicit
and unambiguous statement to the contrary, formal rules should be interpreted to permit the exercise of inherent power.52
Alternatively, courts sometimes find that the use of inherent power is not in conflict with
47.
the rule, even if not technically consistent with it, because it is compatible with the spirit of the rule.
Heileman itself is an example. See Heileman, 871 F.2d at 652 (noting that "[the] spirit, intent, and
purpose [of Rule 16] is .. .broadly remedial" (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting In re Baker, 744 F.2d 1438, 1440 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc))). Another example is
Chambers. 501 U.S. at 50-51. Not surprisingly, the response to these efforts is to emphasize the
at 69 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("We are bound, however, by the Rules
relevance of language. See id.
themselves, not their 'aim' .... ); see also Heileman, 871 F.2d at 666 (Manion, J., dissenting)
(rejecting reliance on a rule's 'broadly remedial' 'spirit,"' and noting that the broad goal of Rule 16
"is not an excuse for us to ignore the words the drafters used to pursue that goal").
See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,78 (1938).
48.
49.
380 U.S. 460 (1965).
50.
For a sampling of the extensive litany of complaints directed at this inconsistency, see
Donald L. Doemberg, The Unseen Track of Erie Railroad: Why History and Jurisprudence Suggest
a More Straightforward Form of Erie Analysis, 109 W. VA. L. REv. 611 (2007), and Joseph P.
Bauer, The Erie Doctrine Revisited: How a Conflicts Perspective Can Aid the Analysis, 74 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1235, 1244 (1999).

51.
See infra Part I.B. 1.
52.
For a general discussion of clear statement rules, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Quasi-constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND.
L. REv. 593, 595-98 (1992). This general approach has received some academic support, even if not
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Ill. CLARIFYING THE RELATIONSHIP

When discussing the relationship between inherent power and the
rules, courts routinely recognize the power of the latter to act as a constraint on the exercise of the former. But a finding that such a constraint
is actually present is much less common. The explanation for this result
is that courts implicitly or explicitly employ a norm of construction that
views rules narrowly. Unless an existing rule contains a clear and affirmative statement that creates an unavoidable conflict, inherent power is
deemed to be available as an alternative source of judicial power to justify the imposition of procedural requirements in a given case. This results
in a role for inherent power that is both unpredictable and excessively
broad. This section explores a number of ways that the relationship between inherent power and the rules might be clarified and improved.
As a starting point, courts might simply adopt a norm of construction that is more respectful of the status of the rules. More specifically,
courts should abandon the requirement of a clear statement before finding that a rule restricts the availability of inherent power. Indeed, the
presumption should run the other way, such that the presence of a rule is
suggestive of intent to substitute a formal rule-based procedural framework in place of inherent power. The adoption of a federal rules regime
was rooted in legislative desire for a formal set of uniform rules applicable throughout the federal system. If the rulemaking process produces a
rule that addresses a certain issue, courts should approach the task of
interpretation with that preference for uniformity in mind and refrain
from disrupting the balance struck by the rule. To be sure, even a strong
presumption in favor of rule supremacy does not completely solve the
problem of determining scope and coverage. But the practical effect of a
shift in interpretive norms would be to increase the frequency of escape
valve cases, strengthen the effect of formal rules, and decrease the availability of inherent power.
Of course, courts are self-interested, and may resist an interpretive
norm that has the practical effect of reducing their autonomy to fashion
procedural requirements. For that reason, it may be preferable to work
within the clear statement framework by inserting a definition of intended scope on a rule-by-rule basis. If a clear statement of intent to constrain the exercise of inherent power is desired, then the rules could be
systematically amended to provide those statements. For example, Rule

phrased precisely in terms of a clear statement rule. For example, Professor Meador has noted with
approval that "[p]re-existing inherent authority can remain available to supplement the rules if the
rules are interpreted. . . not to prohibit the particular exercise of inherent authority." Daniel J.
Meador, Inherent JudicialAuthority in the Conduct of Civil Litigation, 73 TEx. L. REV. 1805, 1817
(1995) (emphasis added). This suggestion not only recognizes the role of interpretation in defining
the status of a given case, but also embodies an eagerness to exploit that role to permit the broad
exercise of inherent power wherever possible.
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37 might be amended to specify that it delineates the scope of judicial
authority to impose sanctions in the context of discovery.53
Alternatively, of course, the rules might be amended to make clear
that inherent power still remains available to supplement the requirements described in a particular rule. So Rule 37 might instead be
amended to state clearly that it is merely one possible source of sanctioning power, and that it is not intended to limit the availability of sanctions
based on other sources of authority. Judges would thus be authorized to
invoke inherent power as an escape valve from the rule, and would not
be forced to use a strained interpretation to characterize the case as a
gap-filler. My own view is that the former option is preferable to the
latter, at least in the context of Rule 37 if not as a general matter. But
either would be an improvement. A clear specification of the relationship
between the written rules and inherent power would have the salutary
effect of requiring rule-makers to consider the nature of that relationship
explicitly, and would provide much clearer guidance to those affected by
the rules.
But a rule-by-rule approach would render the rules even more unwieldy than they already are. A more elegant solution would be to add a
rule that establishes the general status of the rules and provides interpretive guidance. Indeed, we already have such a rule: Rule 1 instructs
judges to interpret the rules "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding, 54 and courts routinely
cite to that rule as an interpretive aid. 55 Rule 1 might easily be amended
to specify that where rules are present, they are intended to define the
permissible scope of behavior by litigants and judges, and are subject to
supplementation only where explicitly provided for.56 Such a statement
would act much like an express preemption of inherent power, and while
it would not avoid all issues related to coverage, it would strengthen the
status of the rules and helpfully structure the interpretive enterprise.
CONCLUSION

Discussions about procedural reform often start from the premise
that amendments to the rules will produce meaningful change in the procedural requirements that are enforced on the ground. That is undoubted53.
A caveat would be necessary to account for other statutory sources of sanctioning power,
which could not be overridden by a rule.
54.
FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
55.
See, e.g., Wood v. GCC Bend, LLC, 422 F.3d 873, 882-83 (9th Cir. 2005) (denying a

Rule 54(b) certification request in light of Rule l's mandate); In re Beverly Hills Bancorp, 752 F.2d
1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that to permit amendment of pleadings after losing appeal would

not further Rule l's directive).
56.
In the face of such a statement, judges may still be able to resort to inherent power. But to
do so, they would need to make an explicit finding that the power that they are exerting is part of the
"essential judicial power" that as a constitutional matter is not subject to interference by legislative
action.
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ly true to some extent; rules do matter, and their influence on procedure
is significant. But the impact of rules may not be as great as we sometimes assume. Other sources of authority compete with formal rules, and
an excessively broad understanding of those other sources weakens the
practical force of the rulemaking process. In my view, the understanding
of when inherent authority may be exercised in the face of the rules is
excessively broad, at least as it is reflected in judicial practice. Accordingly, a careful reconsideration of how the rules affect and interact with
inherent power is in order.

NATIONWIDE PERSONAL JURISDICTION FOR OUR FEDERAL
COURTS
A. BENJAMIN SPENCERt
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure limits the territorial
jurisdiction of federal district courts to that of the courts of their host
states. This limitation is a voluntary rather than obligatory restriction,
given district courts' status as courts of the national sovereign. Although there are sound policy reasons for limiting the jurisdictional
reach of our federal courts in this manner, the limitation delivers little
benefit from a judicial administration or even a fairness perspective,
and ultimately costs more to implement than is gained in return. The
rule should be amended to provide that district courts have personal
jurisdiction over all defendants who have constitutionally sufficient
contacts with the United States, leaving a refined venue doctrine to
attend to matters relating to the convenience and propriety of litigating a matter in one particular district versus another.

"We ...see no reason why the extent of a Federal District Court's

personal jurisdiction should depend
upon the existence or nonexis1
tence of a state 'long-arm' statute."
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, all first-year law students study personal jurisdiction
as part of the basic civil procedure course. Many initial meetings of that
class begin with discussions of Pennoyer v. Neff,2 followed by an exploration of InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington3 and its progeny. This rite
of passage is occasioned by the fact that federal district courts are ordinarily subject to the same constraints on their ability to assert personal jurisdiction as the courts of the states in which they are located, a limitation
that derives from Rule 4(k)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.4
Although sloughing through these cases has great value as a means
of introducing law students to case law analysis and inculcating them
t Associate Professor of Law (with tenure), Washington & Lee University School of Law. I
would like to thank Washington & Lee for generous grant assistance that enabled this research. I
would also like to thank those who were able to give helpful comments on the piece.
1. Statement of Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas, 374 U.S. 865, 869 (1963).
2.
95 U.S. 714 (1877).
3.
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
4.
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A) ("Serving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes
personal jurisdiction over a defendant: (A) who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general
jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located ....
").

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:2

with critical legal thinking skills, many wonder whether all of the time
and attention devoted to the subject is warranted. Given its current relevance to personal jurisdiction in federal courts, it is indeed essential that
law students gain an understanding of how to determine whether a party
is subject to jurisdiction in any given state. But whether the jurisdictional
reach of state courts should be the measuring rod for the jurisdictional
reach of federal courts is another matter. Eliminating this linkage would
certainly free up time in the first-year procedure course for other more
pertinent topics. Of course, that consequence alone cannot justify what
would seem to be a major innovation to the rules as they currently stand.
Are there more serious grounds for dispensing with the requirement that
federal district courts limit their jurisdictional reach to that of their host
states? I believe so. My thinking on that prospect follows.
I. THE CURRENT RULE
Members of the founding generation were concerned that a national
court system would subject citizens to suit in distant locales at great inconvenience and in violation of a perceived entitlement to localized justice. 5 Responding to this concern, the First Congress, via the Judiciary
Act of 1789, limited effective service to that issued by the district in
which the defendant resided or the district in which the defendant was
actually present when served.6 This was the federal practice until the
enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. 7 Rule 4(f)
carried the torch from there, permitting service of process to be effective
anywhere within the state in which the issuing district court was located,
or beyond the state's borders if otherwise permitted by federal statute.8 In
1963, the rules were amended to permit a district court's service of
process to be effective beyond the host state's borders whenever permitted by the statutes or rules of court of the state in which the district court
5.
Jamelle C. Sharpe, Beyond Borders: Disassembling the State-Based Model of Federal
Forum Fairness, 30 CARDOZO L. REv. 2897, 2903 (2009) ("Those members of the First Congress
who set out to create the federal court system were keenly aware that their constituents were 'accustomed to receive justice at their own doors in a simple form,' and repeatedly were warned of the
dangers that could attend a geographically expansive national judiciary." (quoting 4 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 28 (Maeva Marcus & James R. Perry eds., 1992))).
6. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79 ("[N]o civil suit shall be brought before
either of [circuit or district] courts against an inhabitant of the United States, by any original process
in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found at the time of
serving the writ .... ").
7.
Robertson v. R.R. Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 623 (1925) ("Under the general provisions of
law, a United States District Court cannot issue process beyond the limits of the district. And a
defendant in a civil suit can be subjected to its jurisdiction in personam only by service within the
district. Such was the general rule established by Judiciary Act Sept. 24, 1789 .... And such has
been the general rule ever since." (citations omitted)).
8.
Rule 4(f) originally read, "Territorial Limits of Effective Service. All process other than a
subpoena may be served anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in which the district court
is held and, when a statute of the United States so provides, beyond the territorial limits of that
state." FED. R, Crv. P. 4(f) (1938 adoption), reprinted in I JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL.., MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE

§ 4 app. 01 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2009).

20101

NATIONWIDE PERSONAL JURISDICTION

was located. 9 The current incarnation of the rule linking the scope of
effective service in a federal district court to the jurisdictional reach of
their respective host states is found in Rule 4(k), which reads, "Serving a
summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction
over a defendant: (A) who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located .... "'o
Linking federal and state court jurisdiction in this manner makes
federal jurisdiction dependent upon both the scope of the host state's
jurisdictional statutes and the constitutional scope of a state's jurisdictional reach under InternationalShoe and its progeny. Several problems
attend this model.
First, incorporating state jurisdictional limits means that there will
be some lack of uniformity among the federal courts respecting their own
jurisdictional reach. Although most states assert personal jurisdiction to
the constitutional limit," federal courts located in states that do not reach
so far will be correspondingly constrained. 12 As courts of a common sovereign, it makes little sense for the courts of our national government to
have varying jurisdictional reach, and even less sense for the variation to
be by virtue of the will of states' legislatures or courts. The linkage is
particularly ill-fitting when federal question cases are concerned; in such
cases there can be 13no claim that the federal court is merely acting as a
court of the forum.
The second shortcoming of the current approach is that by forsaking
the full constitutional reach of federal courts' territorial authority, the
district courts are deprived of an important aspect of their distinctiveness
in the ordinary civil case. The federal courts are not only meant to provide a neutral forum in which outsiders can expect a hearing that is at
least theoretically less tainted with localized biases. 14 They are more
9.
Rule 4(e) was amended to read, "Whenever a statute or rule of court of the state in which
the district court is held provides... for service of a summons... upon a party not an inhabitant of
or found within the state ....

service may ...

be made under the circumstances and in the manner

prescribed in the statute or rule." Id. 4(e) (1963 amendment), reprinted in 1 MOORE ET AL., supra
note 8, at § 4 app. 03. Rule 4(f) was amended to indicate that extraterritorial service was effective
"when authorized by a statute of the United States or by these rules." Id. 4(f) (1963 amendment),
reprintedin 1 MOORE ET AL., supra note 8, at § 4 app. 03.
10. Id.4(k)(l).
11.
Douglas D. McFarland, Dictum Run Wild: How Long-Arm Statutes Extended to the Limits
of Due Process, 84 B.U. L. REv. 491, 496-97 (2004) (discussing the long-arm statutes across the
states and indicating that 32 states have statutes that expressly or by judicial interpretation confer
jurisdiction to the constitutional limit).
12.
New York is a notable example of such a state. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney 2009).
13.
Cf Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945) ("[A] federal court adjudicating a state-created right solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties is for that
purpose, in effect, only another court of the State .... ").
14.
Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61, 87 (1809) (Marshall, C.J.) ("However, true the fact
may be, that the tribunals of the states will administer justice as impartially as those of the nation, to
parties of every description, it is not less true that the constitution itself either entertains apprehensions on this subject, or views with such indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors,
that it has established national tribunals for the decision of controversies between aliens and a citi-
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generally seen as fora in which litigants can seek justice under circumstances in which state courts-for whatever reason-are unable or unwilling to provide it. The service of the federal courts in the South during
the civil rights era comes to mind. Thus, if there are instances where the
forum state cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over an individual, but a
federal court within that state nonetheless would be a proper forum under
applicable venue rules, the federal court's doors should be open to the
dispute so long as exercising jurisdiction over the defendant would be
constitutional with respect to the national sovereign. Rule 4(k) recognizes this principle, although to a much more limited extent, when it permits
district courts to exercise jurisdiction to the constitutional limit in federal
question cases when all states-not just the forum state-are unable to
exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant.' 5
Third, the reliance on the InternationalShoe doctrine vis-a-vis state
boundaries that is a consequence of Rule 4(k)(1)(A) imports all of the
shortcomings of that analysis into the federal court context. The constitutional law of personal jurisdiction doctrine is notoriously confusing and
imprecise.16 Thus, in close or difficult cases, raising and resolving personal jurisdiction challenges consumes an inordinate amount of parties'
time and the courts' limited resources. Such satellite litigation contributes to the overall inefficiency of the judicial process and the inability
of courts to reduce their burgeoning caseloads. Further, the imprecision
of the InternationalShoe analysis and its incorporation of reasonableness
considerations renders the outcome of the analysis unpredictable in difficult cases. As a result, litigants have less certainty regarding where a
defendant may or may not be subject to jurisdiction, meaning parties end
up litigating the jurisdictional question in the plaintiff's chosen forum.
Doing so, of course, robs the defendant of some portion of the protection
that the jurisdictional linkage rule was designed to deliver.
Finally, connecting federal jurisdictional reach to that of forum
states duplicates, in many respects, the considerations comprising the
federal venue analysis-making the double regime of personal jurisdiczen, or between citizens of different states."). Judge Friendly explores and questions this rationale in
Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARv. L. REV. 483, 492-93
(1928).
15.
Rule 4(k)(2) reads as follows: "For a claim that arises under federal law, serving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant if: (A) the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state's courts of general jurisdiction; and (B) exercising
jurisdiction is consistent with the United States Constitution and laws." FED. R. Civ.P. 4(k)(2).
16.
I have specified my views to that effect in a previous writing. A. Benjamin Spencer,
Jurisdictionto Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 617, 618 (2006) ("With each
decision, the Court has convulsed away from the simple notion in International Shoe that state
sovereignty and due process permit jurisdiction over nonresidents who are minimally connected with
the forum, to a confused defendant-centric doctrine obsessed with defendants' intentions, expectations, and experiences of inconvenience."); see also James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law
Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction:Implicationsfor Modem Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REv. 169, 171 & n.5
(2004) (describing personal jurisdiction doctrine under InternationalShoe and its progeny as "deeply
confused" and collecting critical commentary).
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tion and venue somewhat of a belt-and-suspenders approach. Federal
venue law is focused on siting an action in states where the defendants
reside, or within the districts in which property concerned in the action is
located or actions or omissions giving rise to the action occurred.1 7 As
such, in most instances venue analysis is likely to identify federal districts to hear the action that will not present constitutionally undue burdens on defendants. Granted, venue analysis is not coterminous with
personal jurisdiction analysis at the state level, as the latter requires the
identification of purposeful forum state contacts on the part of each defendant.18 But the minimum contacts concern is rooted in a need to give a
defendant notice that they are within the sovereign authority of a particular state, not in a need to attend to the right of defendants to participate in
the proceedings without undue burden. 9 The former concern is not one
that properly pertains to the federal district courts as arms of the national
sovereign. The latter concern is addressed by the reasonableness wing of
the InternationalShoe analysis, which consists of factors that are addressed to some extent in a federal venue analysis. 20 Venue restrictions,
then, can be said to do much (but not all) of the relevant service to the
participation interests of defendants, with personal jurisdiction limitations failing to deliver any cognizable additional benefits without the
additional attendant costs described above.
I. A PROPOSED REVISION

My proposal is to delink federal- and state-court personal jurisdiction by amending Rule 4(k) as follows:
(k) Territorial Limits of Effective Service. Serving a summons or
filing a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant: (A) who is ubject to the jurisdictien of a court of general ju
risdiction in the state where the dist ct eou tis lecated when exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United States Constitution. [delete the remainder of current Rule 4(k).]
This change would have the effect of authorizing nationwide service
of process in all civil cases in the federal district courts, which the Supreme Court has recognized as constitutionally permissible. 21 To obtain
17.

28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2006).

18.

See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).

19.

See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) ("By requiring that indi-

viduals have 'fair warning that a particular activity may subject [them] to the jurisdiction of a foreign
sovereign,' the Due Process Clause 'gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows
potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where
that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit."' (alteration in original) (citation omitted)
(quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980))).
20.
Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
21.
Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. 300, 328 (1838) ("Whatever may be the extent of their jurisdiction over the subject matter of suits, in respect to persons and property; it can only be exercised
within the limits of the [federal judicial] district. Congress might have authorized civil process from
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personal jurisdiction under this revised rule, a plaintiff would simply
need to show that the defendant had minimum contacts with the United
States, the current approach taken when Rule 4(k)(2) is applied to establish jurisdiction. 22 Note that if the rule were amended in this way, there
would be no need for the remaining components of Rule 4(k); because
those provisions reflect circumstances falling within the constitutional
scope of federal court territorial jurisdiction, they would become duplicative of the jurisdictional grant of revised Rule 4(k).23
In the absence of any linkage between personal jurisdiction in the
federal district courts and the scope of such jurisdiction in their respective hosts' state courts, the determination of which among the several
district courts would hear a case would be based on an application of the
federal statutes governing venue. 24 In the ordinary case, that would limit
a plaintiffs choice to (1) a defendant's district within the state in which
all defendants reside, (2) a district in which a significant portion of the
events or omissions giving rise to the action occurred, (3) the district in
which property involved in the action is located, or (4) districts in which
defendants could be subjected to personal jurisdiction if none of the other
possibilities are available.25 Ultimately, then, the district chosen would
be one that had some connection to the situs of the actions giving rise to
the dispute, if not to the location of one or more of the defendants.
any circuit court, to have run into any state of the Union. It has not done so."); see also Miss. Publ'g
Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946); Robertson v. R.R. Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622
(1925).
22. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) advisory committee notes to 1993 amendment (explaining that
the Fifth Amendment, the basis of jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2), "requires that any defendant have
affiliating contacts with the United States sufficient to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over that party").
23. This includes the so-called 100-mile Bulge Rule of Rule 4(k)(1)(B), which currently
permits personal jurisdiction over Rule 14 and Rule 19 parties served in a judicial district within 100
miles of the summoning courthouse. Under the proposed rule, parties so served would be constitutionally subject to jurisdiction in the United States based on having been served with process within
the country's borders. See Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Marin, 495 U.S. 604, 628
(1990) (upholding the constitutionality of personal jurisdiction based on in-state service of process).
That said, it is open to question whether jurisdiction over corporations would be constitutional solely
based on service within the United States since Burnham left open the question of whether the instate service rule applied to corporations. 4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1102 (3d ed. 2002 & Supp. 2009) ("Service made upon a
corporation, partnership, or other unincorporated association simply by delivering process to a
corporate or comparable officer who happens to reside or be physically present in the state at the
time the documents are served will not be effective to establish in personam jurisdiction, unless that
entity also is doing business so as to be amenable to service of process and the assertion of jurisdiction in the forum state."). But the same uncertainty could be said to exist under the current rule,
which purports to authorize service over any Rule 14 or Rule 19 party served within 100 miles of the
issuing courthouse, including corporations so served. See, e.g., Turbana Corp. v. M/V "Summer
Meadows", No. 03 Civ.2099(HB), 2003 WL 22852742, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2003) (using the
bulge rule to authorize jurisdiction over a corporation in New York whose agent was served in
Bridgeport, Connecticut).
24.
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391, 1404, 1406 (2006). In addition to the general venue statute,
there are several other special venue statutes as well as venue provisions within the body of various
substantive federal statutes. See, e.g., id 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (employment discrimination
claims); id.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (ERISA claims).
25.
Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
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In the event that the plaintiff selects a venue not connected to the
defendants' location, dissatisfied defendants may avail themselves of the
change of venue statute: 28 U.S.C. § 1404. Section 1404 permits litigants
to seek a transfer to a preferred district 26 provided the district is one that
would satisfy the venue requirements had the action been filed there
originally, 27 and assuming convenience considerations and the interests
of justice warrant the transfer.2 8 Indeed, once the statute is invoked,
courts have occasion to consider a list of convenience and justice factors
that closely mirror the list of factors the Supreme Court has identified for
consideration for the reasonableness prong of a constitutional personal
jurisdiction analysis. 29 In short, plaintiffs may only transfer to districts
bearing some connection with the defendants or the dispute, and defendants are given an opportunity to move the case to a preferred alternate
qualifying district by invoking many of the same considerations that
would have undergirded a constitutional personal jurisdiction analysis.
What are the shortcomings of this proposed approach? Different jurisdictional standards mean that distinctions between federal and state
courts within the same state will inevitably arise in terms of defendants'
amenability to suit. As a result, plaintiffs with claims that entitle them to
bring suit in the federal courts will have an advantage over plaintiffs
whose claims must be brought in state court; defendants in the latter category of suits will evade jurisdiction in some state courts when diverse
plaintiffs might be able to bring similar suits against those same defendants in federal courts in those states. This might strike some as an unfair
distinction, indeed a distinction that the Supreme Court has, in other con26.
Id. § 1404(a) ("For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a
district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been
brought."). Section 1406 similarly provides for a change of venue, though it presupposes an initial
filing in an improper venue. Id. § 1406(a).
27.
Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 344 (1960) ("If when a suit is commenced, plaintiff has
a right to sue in that district, independently of the wishes of defendant, it is a district where [the
action] might have been brought." (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Blaski v. Hoffman, 260 F.2d 317, 321 (7th Cir. 1958))).
28.
§ 1404(a).
29.
The factors that courts consider when evaluating a venue transfer request typically include
the following:
(1) the plaintiffs choice of forum, (2) the convenience of witnesses, (3) the location of
relevant documents and relative ease of access to sources of proof, (4) the convenience of
the parties, (5) the locus of operative facts, (6) the availability of process to compel the
attendance of unwilling witnesses, [and] (7) the relative means of the parties.
Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Fox Entm't Group, Inc., 522 F.3d 271, 275 (2d Cir. 2008) (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95,
106-07 (2d Cir. 2006)). Compare these factors with the factors the Court set forth in Asahi Metal
Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, Solano County:
A court must consider the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and
the plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief. It must also weigh in its determination "the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive
social policies."
480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292
(1980)).
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texts, suggested was to be avoided.3 ° Of course, this concern is not pertinent to federal question cases, since all prospective plaintiffs would have
equal access to the preferable jurisdictional reach of federal courts for
such claims. But even in the diversity jurisdiction context, where the
disparity would be unavoidable, I do not share the stated concern. I view
federal courts as distinctive, and I do not view federal diversity jurisdiction as mere mimicry of state courts.
Another potential defect of the proposed reform is that governing
choice-of-law rules would undoubtedly be altered in cases now able to be
brought in federal courts in states that could not themselves exercise personal jurisdiction. That is, because federal courts sitting in diversity must
apply the conflicts rules of the forum state, 31 diversity cases brought in
states not having personal jurisdiction over the defendant will be governed by conflicts rules that would have been inaccessible under the
current version of Rule 4(k). This result would allow plaintiffs to shop
32
around for a forum state with the most favorable choice of law rules.
But the ability to forum shop would be constrained by the federal venue
statute, which provides a narrower menu of options for bringing a suit,
meaning that plaintiffs would not simply have the run of all federal districts (except perhaps in the case of claims against aliens). 33 An additional safeguard against this concern might be the fact that many states do
not differ wildly in the substance of their choice of law rules,34 meaning
that less still would be at stake in a plaintiff's decision about where to
bring a suit.
Finally, there is the Founders' concern about being subjected to suit
in distant locales. The absence of a forum state personal jurisdiction requirement may sweep defendants into federal court in states with which
they have little or no contacts. For example, suppose a vendor in Virginia
sells a faulty product to a visiting Californian. If the product subsequently causes harm to the Californian in California, the Virginia vendor could
30. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (indicating that "avoidance of inequitable
administration of the laws" between federal and state court was one of the "twin aims" of the Erie
doctrine); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (holding that the conflict
of laws rules to be applied by federal courts sitting in diversity are to be those of the forum state
because "[o]therwise the accident of diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb equal administration of justice in coordinate state and federal courts sitting side by side").
31.
Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496.
32.
Linda J. Silberman, Reflections on Burnham v. Superior Court: Toward Presumptive
Rules of Jurisdictionand Implications for Choice of Law, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 569, 587 (1991) ("[A]
nationwide service rule would exacerbate forum shopping since a litigant would search for the forum
with the most favorable choice-of-law rules.").
33.
The general venue statute includes a provision that permits venue in actions against aliens
to be brought in any federal district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (2006).
34.
See generally Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2008:
Twenty-second Annual Survey, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 269 (2009) (describing the various approaches to
choice of law questions taken in the states and indicating that a preponderance tend to follow the
Restatement (Second) or some variant of an interest analysis approach, or a traditional lex loci delicti
approach).
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be sued in California federal court consistent with the federal venue statute.35 This possibility might lead the vendor to be unwilling to sell products to persons from distant states, an outcome that would be discriminatory and harmful to interstate commerce. This is a serious concern, although a court in such a situation would have the power to transfer the
case to a Virginia federal court for the convenience of the parties and
witnesses and in the interests of justice. 36 Under the current statutes concerning change of venue, such a transfer would not be guaranteed. However, this concern does not suggest that linkage with forum state territorial jurisdiction limitations is necessary. Rather, it indicates that in some
instances federal venue law is inadequate to identify the most appropriate
district within the federal judicial system for hearing a case. Thus, were
de-linkage achieved, the federal venue statute might need to become
more robust, tightening the connection between defendants and districts
needed to lay venue.
The following amendment to the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. §
1391, would appear to address this concern:
§ 1391. Venue generally
(a) A civil action... may... be brought only in

(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events actions
or omissions of the defendant giving rise to the claim occurred .... 37
If the venue statute read as proposed, our Virginia vendor could not
be sued in California federal court for the Virginia sale of a defective
product to a Californian. Proper venue in suits against defendants such as
our vendor would exist only in those districts in which the defendant's
wrongdoing could be located, not in districts in which only the effects of
that wrongdoing were felt.
Although the proposed change to the general venue statute would
bring venue law more in line with the constraints that are currently imposed via personal jurisdiction doctrine, I am not certain that changing
the venue statute in this manner is advisable. There may be instances
when it is perfectly reasonable for a case to be heard in the place of the
harm, notwithstanding the defendant's lack of contacts with that district.
The proposed venue statute change would preclude proper venue in such
districts, which is likely too restrictive. I am more comfortable permitting
venue to be determined under the statute as it is currently written and
35.
occurred
36.
37.

This is so because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the action would have
in the relevant federal district in which the plaintiff was harmed.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006).
A conforming change would have to be made to subsection (b) of the statute as well.
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allowing disgruntled defendants to challenge that selection under the
terms of the change of venue statutes that permit the court to consider the
equities of the matter on a case-by-case basis.
CONCLUSION

Delinking the jurisdictional reach of federal courts from that of their
host states seems to be an innovation that would simplify the identification of a proper court for civil actions without raising any constitutional
or sovereignty-related concerns. The participation interests of defendants
would not be forsaken but would still have a voice in venue doctrine and
in the considerations embedded in the change of venue analysis. There
are likely considerations and implications pertaining to this proposal that
have not been considered in this Essay. But all in all, my view is that the
benefits of revising Rule 4(k) in the manner proposed outweigh the costs
that I am able to discern.

REFOCUSING AWAY FROM RULES REFORM AND DEVOTING
MORE ATTENTION TO THE DECIDERS
JEFFREY W. STEMPEL t
INTRODUCTION

The premise of this issue of the Denver University Law Review is to
permit the contributors to address the question of which procedural rule
he or she would change if so empowered. Notwithstanding the attractiveness of the assignment, I find myself straining the boundaries of the
assigned topic to address an important related issue-the quality of the
judges and the adjudication system applying the rules. During the past
quarter-century, the legal system has devoted an inordinate amount of
time and energy revising litigation rules relative to the time spent on the
more pressing problems of adjudication weakness related to the quality,
temperament, neutrality, and support of the system's judges and the resources devoted to the system.
The issue of judicial competence and integrity is particularly troubling in the wake of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,' where the U.S.
Supreme Court vacated a state supreme court decision in which a justice-who had received at least $3 million in campaign support from a
litigant-cast the deciding vote to relieve the litigant of a liability award
of $50 million ($82 million with interest).2 The Court reached this result,

t
Doris S. & Theodore B. Lee Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada Las Vegas. Thanks to Janette Bloom, Bill Boyd, George Kuhlman, Doris Lee, Ted Lee,
Steve Subrin, Bill Maupin, Ann McGinley, Jim Rogers, Tuan Samahon, John White, and the members of Nevada's Judicial Code Commission for ideas and continuing support (but not necessarily
agreement with the suggestions in this article). Thanks also to David McClure, Jeanne Price, Shannon Rowe, Jennifer Gross, and Chad Schatzle for valuable research assistance.
1. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
2. See infra note 8 and accompanying text (reviewing the facts of Caperton). Technically,
the campaign contributor was not a formal party to the litigation. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
He was, however, the CEO of litigant A.T. Massey Coal Company as well as the personification of
the company. See id. Many observers put the amount of campaign support received by the challenged justice at $3.5 million. Editorial, Clouded State Supreme Court, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Apr.
7, 2008, at 4A, available at http://www.wvgazette.con/Opinion/Editorials/200804060029 ("Massey
Energy's CEO spent an astounding $3.5 million to defeat Benjamin's Democratic opponent."). With
interest, the amount at stake exceeded $75 million. See id. In the aftermath of the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in June 2009, the West Virginia Supreme Court (without the tainted justice) reheard
the case, holding in a 4-1 vote that the underlying decision was a nullity due to a forum selection
clause requiring that all disputes related to a coal delivery contract between a Caperton-related
company and a Massey-related company be tried in Buchanan County, Virginia. See Caperton v.
A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 33350, 2009 WL 3806071 (W. Va. Nov. 12, 2009). Discussion of the
decision on remand is beyond the scope of this article but represents a very broad and in my view
problematic construction of the forum selection clause. Nonetheless, it has the decided advantage of
being rendered without the participation of a justice so financially linked to the winning litigant.
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one I view as compelled by common sense,3 through a 5-4 vote.4 The
dissenters, led by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia, minimized the
danger of biased judging presented by the situation 5 and questioned the
practical feasibility of the Court's approach, as well as the wisdom of
expanding review of state court judicial disqualification pursuant to the
Due Process Clause. 6 If nothing else, the state justice's clearly erroneous
failure to recuse (the constitutional question may have been fairly debatable but the basic disqualification question was not) wasted vast amounts
of money and time by expanding the litigation and necessitating multiple

3.
See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Completing Caperton and Clarifying Common Sense Through
Using the Right Standardfor ConstitutionalJudicialRecusal, 29 REV. LrTIG. 1 (forthcoming 2010)
(manuscript
at
29),
available
at
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1001 &context=jeffrey-stempel.
4.
Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2256-57, 2267 (forming the majority, Kennedy, J., joined by
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., voted to vacate the West Virginia Supreme Court decision
where a state court justice casting the deciding vote had received $3 million in campaign aid from
the CEO of defendant Massey; and Roberts, C.J., joined by Scalia, Thomas & Alito, JJ., voting to let
the decision stand in spite of key participation by the challenged state court justice); see also id. at
2274-75 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for extending due process review to cases of
judicial recusal based on campaign activity).
5. See id. at 2273 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("And why is the Court so convinced that this is
an extreme case? It is true that Don Blankenship spent a large amount of money in connection with
this election. But this point cannot be emphasized strongly enough: Other than a $1,000 direct contribution from Blankenship, [disqualified West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals] Justice [Brent]
Benjamin and his campaign had no control over how this money was spent."); see also id. ("Moreover, Blankenship's [$3 million in] independent expenditures do not appear 'grossly disproportionate'
compared to other such expenditures in this very election."); id. at 2275 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The
Court today continues its quixotic quest to right all wrongs and repair all imperfections through the
Constitution. Alas, the quest cannot succeed-which is why some wrongs and imperfections have
been called nonjusticiable.").
6. See id. at 2267-72 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (contending that the "end result [of the
majority's decision favoring disqualification] will do far more to erode public confidence in judicial
impartiality than an isolated failure to recuse in a particular case" and raising a list of specific questions regarding application of the majority's standards for judicial impartiality satisfying constitutional due process); see also id. at 2275 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In the best of all possible worlds,
should judges sometimes recuse even where the clear commands of our prior due process law do not
require it? Undoubtedly. The relevant question, however, is whether we do more good than harm by
seeking to correct this imperfection through expansion of our constitutional mandate in a manner
ungoverned by any discemable rule. The answer is obvious.").
More precisely, the Roberts dissent posed 40 questions in defense of its view that the
majority's invocation of the Due Process Clause to require judicial disqualification due to receipt of
enormous campaign contributions was not a sustainably practical approach to policing the judicial
integrity of state courts. See id. at 2267, 2269-72 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Forty enumerated
questions, that is, with many containing subparts or follow-up questions. Id. at 2269-72. If one
calculates the total number of questions in the Roberts dissent as one would in reviewing litigation
interrogatories, the total number of questions actually totals 80 queries. See id. Although to some the
Roberts dissent makes useful points about line-drawing and application of the constitutional norm in
the context of recusal, most of the questions are easily answered or serve more as nitpicking efforts
to undermine the majority opinion and largely serve to underscore the dissenters' disagreement with
the majority view that a judge should not sit on cases involving $3 million benefactors. See Jeffrey
W. Stempel, Playing Forty Questions: Responding to Justice Roberts' Concerns in Caperton and
Some Tentative Answers About OperationalizingJudicialRecusal and Due Process, 38 Sw. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 6, 51-52, on file with author).
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motions, a trip to the Supreme Court, and yet another oral argument on
the merits of the case.
To be sure, Capertonrepresents a high-water mark judicial error requiring Supreme Court intervention, and a low point of judicial performance. 8 One commentator described the Court's relatively limited exten7. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Impeach Brent Benjamin Now!?: Giving Adequate Attention to
Failings of Judicial Impartiality, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 6, 1011),
available
at
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=jeffrey-stempel (reviewing the
history of the Caperton case and assessing the error of the justice's failure to recuse pursuant to
Canon 3(E) of the West Virginia Judicial Code as well as the Due Process Clause).
8.
The Caperton v. Massey drama began when Hugh Caperton purchased the Harman Mine
in southwestern Virginia in 1993. See John Gibeaut, Caperton's Coal: The Battle over an Appalachian Mine Exposes a Nasty Vein in Bench Politics, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2009, at 52, 52, available at
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/capertons-Coal. The mine contained "high-grade metallurgical
coal, a hot-burning and especially pure variety that steel mills crave to fuel the blast furnaces used to
make coke needed in their production process." Id. A.T. Massey Coal Company, led by CEO Don L.
Blankenship, wanted to acquire the Harman Mine and its high-grade coal, but Caperton was unwilling to sell. Id. Through a series of commercial and legal initiatives, which Caperton viewed as
fraudulent and predatory, but Massey characterized as merely aggressive business, Massey eventually drove the Harman Mining Corporation and other Caperton corporate entities into bankruptcy. See
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 232-33 (W. Va. 2008) (providing extensive
background of the case in an opinion written by three state court justices who ruled for Massey).
"Through a series of complex, almost Byzantine transactions, including the acquisition of Harman's
prime customer and the land surrounding the competing mine, Massey both landlocked Harman with
no road or rail access and left Caperton without a market for his coal even if he could ship it." Gibeaut, supra, at 52; see also Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 230-33. In 1998, Caperton agreed to sell the
Harman Mine to Massey but the deal collapsed down the home stretch as Massey insisted on
changes that Caperton contended reflected bad faith and an attempt to ruin the Caperton interests.
See Gibeaut, supra, at 52.
Caperton's companies (Harman Mining Corporation, Harman Development Corporation
and Sovereign Coal Sales, Inc.), filed for Chapter I I bankruptcy in 1998 facing $25 million in
claims. See Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 230, 233; Gibeaut, supra, at 52. Caperton, who had personally
guaranteed $1.9 million of his companies' debt, sued Massey in West Virginia, alleging fraud and
tortuous interference with contract. He obtained a $50 million jury verdict in 2002 that survived
vigorous post-trial attack by Massey. See Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 233. The trial court rejected
Massey's new trial and remittitur motions in June 2004, and in March 2005 denied Massey's motion
for judgment as a matter of law. Id.
Elections for the West Virginia Supreme Court were slated for November 2004, with
Justice Warren McGraw seeking re-election. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct.
2252, 2254 (2009). Massey CEO Blankenship threw his support to challenger Brent Benjamin. See
Elliot G. Hicks, Editorial, Merit Selection, Not Elections, Must Be How We Choose Justices,
CHARLESTON GAZETrE, Dec. 14, 2004, at 5A, available at 2004 WLNR 14039840; Millions Spent

to Defeat Warren McGraw, CHARLESTON GAZETrE, Dec. 4, 2004, at 3A, available at 2004 WLNR
13311082; Cecil E. Roberts, Editorial, Blankenship's Hollow Rhetoric, His Money Defeated
McGraw, Now He Must Help Miners, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Dec. 13, 2004, at 5A, available at
2004 WLNR 14039766. Blankenship contributed the statutory maximum of $1,000 to the Benjamin
campaign committee and also donated nearly $2.5 million to a political organization named "And for
the Sake of the Kids," which opposed Justice McGraw and advocated Justice Benjamin's election.
Paul J. Nyden, Reports Show Benjamin, Blakenship Connections, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Feb. 15,
2009, at IA, availableat http://www.wvgazette.comlNews/200902140483 (noting that "And for the
Sake of the Kids" group specialized in running negative advertisements targeting Justice McGraw);
see also Marcia Coyle, Amici Urge Recusals in Cases of Substantial Election Contributions,TEX.
LAW.,
Jan.
12,
2009,
at
5,
5,
available
at
http://www.law.comjsp/tx/PubArticleTX.jsp?id=120242731901&slretum=l &hbxlogin=l
(noting
that "And for the Sake of the Kids" group worked to defeat Justice McGraw). In addition, Blankenship spent more than $500,000 independently on television and newspaper advertisements favoring
Justice Benjamin, as well as for fundraising on behalf of Justice Benjamin. See, e.g., DEBORAH
GOLDBERG ET AL., JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2004,
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sion of due process-based review of state judge disqualification decisions
as a "cold day in hell" standard of intervention 9-and he is probably correct. The Supreme Court has neither the time nor the stomach for regularly policing lower court breaches of disqualification standards. Unfortunately, neither do most appellate courts and state high courts. Indeed,
where recusal l° is concerned, the federal and state high courts are arguably as much a part of the problem as part of the solution. Although U.S.
Supreme Court corrections of judicial recusal error are rare, judicial recusal failures are surprisingly frequent. 1
Worse yet, judicial failure to recuse is but a part of a larger problem: a lot of judging is simply not very good, and the judiciary views
itself with the inaccurate presumption that judges are highly resistant to
the cognitive and emotional limits and distortions that afflict all human
beings. 2 In addition, both the electoral and appointive methods of selectat
4-5
(Jesse
Rutledge
ed.,
2004),
http://www.gavelgrab.org/wpcontent/resources/NewPoliticsReport2004.pdf (showing an advertisement opposing McGraw accused him of letting a child rapist out of prison and allowing him to work as a high school janitor).
Justice Benjamin won with slightly more than 53 percent of the more than 700,000 votes cast and
subsequently cast the deciding vote on the merits of Massey's appeal to the West Virginia Supreme
Court. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257 ("Benjamin won. He received 382,036 votes (53.3%) and
McGraw received 334,301 votes (46.7%).").
In June 2009, the Court by a 5-4 majority sided with Caperton and vacated the decision
reversing his $50 million judgment. Id. at 2267. The Court observed:
[T]here is serious risk of actual bias-based on objective and reasonable perceptionswhen a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge's
election campaign when the case was pending or imminent. The inquiry centers on the
contribution's relative size in comparison to the total amount of money contributed to the
campaign, the total amount spent in the election, and the apparent effect such contribution had on the outcome of the election.
Applying this principle, we conclude that Blankenship's campaign efforts had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing Justice Benjamin on the case.
Id. at 2263-64.
9. Caperton Ruling May Spur States to Enhance Their Process for Judge's Recusal, 25 LAW.
MANUAL ON PROF. CONDUCT 335, 337 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting law
professor Charles G. Geyh, reporter for the ABA Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model Rules of
Judicial Conduct).
10. This article treats the words "disqualification" and "recusal" as synonyms. Some courts
and commentators have historically distinguished the terms, suggesting that disqualification is a
judge's mandatory obligation to avoid participation in a case while recusal is a more voluntary,
discretionary act informed by a judge's own preferences as well as prevailing law. See JAMES J.
ALFtNI ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 4.04 (4th ed. 2007) (tending to use disqualification
as a preferred term, but using recusal as an acceptable synonym); RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL
DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES § 20.8 (2d ed. 2007) (noting the

traditional distinction, but using the terms interchangeably throughout the treatise); Debra Lyn
Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Appellate Courts, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1213, 1223
(2002) (using the terms interchangeably); Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEx. L. REV. 431, 460
(2004) (outlining the traditional distinction between the terms).
11.
See infra sources cited note 13 and accompanying text (discussing other instances of bad
judicial disqualification practice); see also FLAMM, supra note 10 (citing cases where trial judges
refused to disqualify and were reversed); Miller, supra note 10, at 460.
12. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 110 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). The Introduction, in particular, offers a brief but very good overview of the type of cognitive biases affecting human judgment as well as addressing the problem of
constructed preferences that may not be fully rational. Id. at 1-5. Among the biases summarized are
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ing judges are proving problematic, injecting big money and electioneering in judicial selection along with an arguably politicized, less-skilled
judiciary. Whatever the strengths or shortcomings of individual judges,
they work in a system that provides inadequate support regarding pay,
staffing, caseload, and working conditions.
Part I briefly states my case for this perhaps overly provocative thesis (and one sure to continue to keep me off judicial continuing legal
education programs) that much judicial performance is mediocre to poor
and that increased, systemic efforts toward improving judicial performance should be given higher priority than rules reform. Part II addresses the "anachronistic" cult of undue deference to and insufficient
realism about judges, in particular the system's insufficient grappling
with problems of cognitive error and excessive judicial self-confidence.
Part III offers some suggestions for improving judging and the environment in which judges work, which should in turn improve adjudication
as much or more than any package of rule reforms.
I. RULES ARE ONLY AS GOOD AS THOSE APPLYING THEM (AND THE
INFRASTRUCTURE OF ADJUDICATION)

As much as I would like to sound the clarion call of crisis rhetoric,
the system is not in danger of imminent collapse because of judicial error. But there are nonetheless far too many errors for a system that prides
itself on accuracy, predictability, dependability, consistency, and rationality. To continue further with the example of recusal, there are far too
many instances where judges preside over cases in spite of being disqualified under the applicable rules of the game. 13 Theoretically, courts
self-serving bias, extremeness aversion, hindsight bias, optimistic bias, and status quo bias. Id. at 34, 8. Heuristics that streamline decision-making but may mislead include the availability of heuristic
and anchoring as well as case-based decisions. Id. at 5. In addition, cognitive factors affecting valuation include loss aversion, mental accounting, and the difficulty of translating normative judgments
into monetary amounts, particularly where there is not an established market for the loss or damage
in question. Id. at 5-7; see also Chris Guthrie & Tracey E. George, The Futility of Appeal: Disciplinary Insights into the "Affirmance Effect" on the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 357, 377-80, 382-85 (2004) (discussing status quo bias, omission bias, the recognition heuristic, one-reason heuristics, and imitation); Guthrie & George, supra, at 381 (citing Daniel G.
Goldstein & Gerd Gigerenzer, The Recognition Heuristic: How Ignorance Makes Us Smart, in
SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART 37 (Gerd Gigerenzer et al eds., 1999); Bernhard Borges
et al., Can Ignorance Beat the Stock Market?, in SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART, supra,
at 59) (discussing "ignorance-based" heuristics, which according to some are not all bad); Robert A.
Prentice & Jonathan J. Koehler, A Normality Bias in Legal Decision Making, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
583, 598-99 (2003) (addressing status quo bias under rubric of normality bias). See generally
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982);
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185
SCIENCE 1124, 1124 (1974).
13.
See Miller, supra note 10, at 436-62 (listing an array of judicial misconduct resulting in
sanctions over the course of more than 200 footnotes; sanctions for disqualification error consumed
only three footnotes); Stempel, supra note 7, at 5-6 (arguing that errs in failing to recuse are not
treated with sufficient seriousness). The U.S. Supreme Court has performed particularly poorly
concerning disqualification of the Justices, each of whom makes a final, unreviewable determination
regarding his or her participation in a case. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH,
UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 227-33 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing Justice Rehnquist's improper

340

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:2

should almost never err in this regard because the presumption is one of
disqualification if the case is uncertain or close. 14 Substitute judges of
equivalent talent and integrity are nearly always available to replace a
judge about whom impartiality concerns exist.
Similarly, judges regularly err in deciding Rule 12 dismissal motions,15 summary judgment motions,' 6 motions for judgment as a matter
failure to recuse in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972), and concluding that Rehnquist also committed
perjury when addressing the situation in confirmation hearings); Monroe H. Freedman, Judicial
Impartiality in the Supreme Court-The Troubling Case of Justice Stephen Breyer, 30 OKLA. CITY
U. L. REV. 513 passim (2005) (addressing disqualification lapses by Justice Breyer); Monroe H.
Freedman, Duck-Blind Justice: Justice Scalia'sMemorandum in the Cheney Case, 18 GEo. J. LEG.
ETHICS 229 (2004) (addressing Justice Scalia's failure to recuse in the case involving his friend,
Vice President Dick Cheney, and their duck-hunting trip during the pendency of the case, focusing
on the Justice's arguably tendentious memorandum defending his decision not to recuse); Caprice L.
Roberts, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse?: Recusal and the Procedural Void in the Court of Last
Resort, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 107, 112-14 (2004) (noting that Justices make unilateral, unreviewable
decisions as to their eligibility to participate in cases, criticizing, and proposing change); Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Chief William's Ghost: The ProblematicPersistence of the Duty to Sit, 57 BUFF. L. REV.
813, 851-63, 899-918 (2009) [hereinafter Stempel, Chief William's Ghost] (criticizing, similarly,
Laird v. Tatum episode and discussing other improper recusal behavior by justices as well as lower
courts continuing to laud the concept of "duty to sit" after it was abolished while citing the Rehnquist nonrecusal with apparent ignorance of controversy that surrounded it); Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589, 590 (1987) (noting that Justices make
unilateral, unreviewable decisions as to their eligibility to participate in cases, criticizing practice,
and proposing change).
Disturbingly, Justice Rehnquist's papers on file with the Hoover Institution reflect his
brethren (and it was all brethren at the time) supporting his decision and minimizing the concerns of
his critics. See Stempel, Chief William's Ghost, supra, at 858 n. 126. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, and Powell all praised his analysis and at least implicitly endorsed the Rehnquist
decision, even though the closer examination of academic commentators reveals great error by
Justice Rehnquist in sitting on the case. See id. at 854-61; see also id at 813-14 (showing a letter
from Justice Potter Stewart approving of Rehnquist's draft memorandum and assessment); id. at 858
n.126 (noting Justice Powell's lack of praise for Justice Rehnquist's "splendid memorandum"). With
informal gate-keeping like this by the Justices themselves, there is little de facto check on the selfinterested recusal decisions of the justices.
Twenty years earlier, the Court, in similar fashion, barely (by a 5-4 vote) disapproved of a
federal district judge who was a trustee of Loyola University (New Orleans) presiding over a bench
trial and rendering favorable findings to a litigant looking to pay Loyola $7 million for land that he
would need if he prevailed in the litigation. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486
U.S. 847, 850 (1988); STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND

ETHics 592-602 (8th ed. 2009) (reproducing edited version of opinion and noting that Judge Collins,
the subject of the recusal motion, whose conduct was not deemed recusal-worthy by four justices,
was subsequently "convicted of bribery, conspiracy, and obstruction of justice in connection with his
judicial duties. He was sentenced to nearly seven years in prison, but for a while he remained a
federal judge, and continued to draw his salary while in prison. In 1993, to avoid impeachment, he
resigned his judgeship. He was disbarred in November 1994").
14.
Stempel, Chief.William's Ghost, supranote 13, at 895.
15.
See FED. R. CIv. P. 12. Under Rule 12 and its state analogs, a defendant may seek dismissal based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, deficient process, deficient service of process, failure to join an essential party, or failure to state a claim
under which relief may be granted even if the facts as stated in the complaint, counter, or cross-claim
are true. Id
Defendants routinely make Rule 12 motions. Consequently, appellate reversal of trial
court outcomes favorable to plaintiffs, if based on the lack of a right to relief under the substantive
law, indicates likely error by the trial court in previously having denied a defendant's Rule 12(b)(6)
motion arguing failure to state a claim. Similarly, an appellate reversal based on lack of subject
matter jurisdiction (Rule 12(b)(l)), personal jurisdiction (Rule 12(b)(2)), or improper venue (Rule
12(b)(3)) suggests trial court error since these motions are routinely made if the defendant has a
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basis for the motion. See THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 2001
SUPPLEMENTAL SURVEY OF CIVIL APPEALS: APPEALS FROM GENERAL CIVIL TRIALS IN 46 LARGE
COUNTIES, 2001-2005, at 5 tbl.7 (2006), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/agctlcO5.pdf (finding
fifty percent of trial outcomes reversed on appeal; forty-five percent where plaintiff prevailed at trial,
and 65 percent where defendant prevailed at trial); Stanton Wheeler et al., Do the "Haves" Come
Out Ahead? Winning and Losing in State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970, 21 LAW & SoC'y REV. 403,
406-07 (1987) (finding reversal rates ranging from roughly thirty-five percent to almost sixty-five
percent in sample of 6,000 cases spanning 1870-1970 time period); Note, Courting Reversal: The
Supervisory Role of State Supreme Courts, 87 YALE L.J. 1191, 1194-97 (1978) (noting reversal rate
of nearly forty percent overall in 1870-1970 sample); see also Arthur R. Miller, The PretrialRush to
Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion," "Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Clichas Eroding Our
Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1133-34 (2003) (criticizing
perceived excessive use of pretrial disposition devices).
16. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (permitting the court to enter judgment as a matter of law without
further proceedings where there exists no genuine dispute of material fact, and movant is entitled to
legal relief). Regarding judicial error in application of Rule 56, see Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse
of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71, 102-119 (1999)
(listing examples of judges granting summary judgment to Title VII defendants in spite of substantial, sometimes shocking evidence in record of race or gender discrimination); Catherine J. Lanctot,
The Defendant Lies and the PlaintiffLoses: The Fallacy of the "Pretext-Plus"Rule in Employment
Discrimination Cases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 57, 140-41 (1991) (discussing how courts often wrongly
accept defendant's claim of non-discrimination as conclusive without testing defendant assertions);
Ann C. McGinley & Jeffrey W. Stempel, Condescending Contradictions:Richard Posner's Pragmatism and Pregnancy Discrimination,46 FLA. L. REV. 193, 211-18 (1994) (examining Title VII
case, and concluding that well-regarded Seventh Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner and a colleague
(panel decision was 2-I) erred in affirming grant of summary judgment); Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and
ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 228-42 (1993) (same); Paul W. Mollica, Federal Summary
Judgment at High Tide, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 141, 180-81, 218 (2000) (reviewing cases and finding
summary judgment often granted erroneously, particularly in civil rights and discrimination cases).
See also Jeffrey W. Stempel, A DistortedMirror: The Supreme Court'sShimmering View
of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process,49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 107-09
(1988) (questioning the correctness of much of the U.S. Supreme Court's important summary judgment trilogy of Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)). But
see Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153-54 (2000) (reversing the summary judgment in age discrimination case where appellate court had ruled evidence of derogatory
remarks about plaintiff insufficient to create triable issue of fact); Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S.
440, 456 (2000) (reversing appellate court error in granting summary judgment in product liability
claim); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999) (reversing summary judgment in voting rights
case); Mollica, supra, at 205-209 (discussing Reeves, Hunt, and Weisgram). While cases like
Reeves, Hunt, and Weisgram reflect the Supreme Court properly applying Rule 56, they of course
also show that federal appeals courts erred quite dramatically. For example, Reeves, Hunt, and
Weisgram were all unanimously decided cases.
In nearly ten percent of appeals, it appears that a grant or denial of summary judgment is
alleged to be erroneous. COHEN, supra note 15, at 11 app. A. Further, the number of summary judgment motions made and granted appears to be increasing. See Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials
and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL. LEGAL. STUD. 591, 591 (2004) (finding case termination by summary judgment was
approximately two percent in 1960 and moved to nearly eight percent by 2000); Joe S. Cecil et al., A
Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 861, 896 (2007) (finding summary judgment motions made in approximately twelve
percent of cases in 1975 and moved to twenty-one percent of cases by 2000); see also Kevin M.
Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919 (2009); Theodore Eisenberg &
Michael Heise, Plaintiphobiain State Courts? An Empirical Study of State Court Trials on Appeal,
38 J. LEGAL STUD. 121 (2009).
nonfrivolous
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of law,' 7 and discovery disputes. 18 With all too much frequency, they
give credence to incredibly weak legal arguments and factual assertions. 19

17. See FED R. Civ. P. 50. Prior to 1991, Rule 50 motions were "directed verdict" motions if
made prior to jury deliberation and motions for "judgment notwithstanding the verdict" if made after
the jury had spoken. In each case, as with the current judgment-as-a-matter-of-law nomenclature, the
motion is made after the claimant's evidence has been presented and argues that, as a matter of law,
there is insufficient evidence to satisfy the claimant's burden of proof to establish a legal right of
recovery. See DAVID F. HERR, ROGER S. HAYDOCK & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, MOTION PRACTICE §§
21.02, 22.03 (5th ed. 2009); FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF,

CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.21 (5th ed. 2001). The change in nomenclature was made in part as a response
to U.S. Supreme Court's 1986 summary judgment trilogy, see cases cited supra note 16, which more
expressly equated the standards for Rule 50 and Rule 56 motions. Prior to the trilogy, the prevailing
view was that the grant of summary judgment required no genuine factual disputes, while a Rule 50
motion could be granted even if there was conflicting but unpersuasive evidence supporting the
nonmovant. See Stempel, supra note 16, at 129-158.
Like summary judgment, judgment as a matter of law is a frequent basis for appeal and
reversal. COHEN, supra note 15, at 1Iapp. A; Note, supra note 15, at 1199-1202.
18.
See generally ROGER S. HAYDOCK & DAVID F. HERR, DISCOVERY PRACTICE §§ 31.04,
32.02 (5th ed. 2009) (courts err with some frequency in deciding discovery motions and have wide
discretion on many discovery issues). Of course, in a manner akin to the old adage about doctors
being able to "bury their mistakes," erroneous trial judge discovery rulings seldom become the
subject of appeal because a discovery ruling is normally not a final, appealable order and normally
does not become the object of successful interlocutory review. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 17, §§
5.14, 12.4 (discussing that review of discovery ruling is ordinarily not appealable until after final
judgment). Similarly, the trial court's evidence rulings are often effectively insulated from appellate
review because the vast bulk of civil litigation settles, leaving no final judgment subject to appeal.
See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339-40 (1994) (noting that although various measures may differ
slightly, it is universally acknowledged that 90 percent or more of civil cases settle).
19.
See McGinley, supra note 16, at 206, 255-56 (finding that both trial and appellate courts
frequently err in granting or affirming summary judgment in discrimination cases); sources cited
supra note 16; see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Sanctions, Symmetry, and Safe Harbors: Limited Misapplicationof Rule 11 by HarmonizingIt with Pre-verdict DismissalDevices, 60 FORDHAM L. REV.
257, 276-79 (1991) (discussing that, in reversal of sorts from problem of excessive grants of summary judgment, some courts have erroneously ruled that a legal claim for which summary judgment
was denied prior to trial can later be characterized as legally unsupported and subject to Rule 11
sanction).
See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153-54, cited in
supra note 15; Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.
163, 168 (1993) (reversing the Fifth Circuit and trial court for applying heightened pleading standard
to civil rights claim arising out of policy abuse even though Federal Civil Rules 8 and 9 provide no
basis for such a heightened pleading requirement); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,
496-97 (1985) (reversing the Second Circuit for imposing heightened pleading requirements for
RICO claim despite lack of any basis for requirement in statute or civil rules). But see Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009) (holding, in an opinion inconsistent with Leatherman, that the
plaintiffs' 270-paragraph complaint was insufficient to establish potential claim); see also Vandenberg v. Superior Court, 982 P.2d 229, 246 (Cal. 1999) (reversing lower courts for holding that commercial general liability insurance applies only to tort claims and not to contract claims resulting in
property damage despite evidence of any such textual limitation in insurance policy); Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Reason and Pollution: Correctly Construing the "Absolute" Exclusion in Context and in
Accord With Its Purpose and Party Expectations, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 1, 4-5 (1998) (collecting
cases taking irreconcilable views as to meaning and application of standard form commercial liability insurance language, and concluding that courts construing pollution exclusion so broadly as to
negate coverage for common torts err and improperly strip policyholders of coverage). I realize that
not everyone will agree with me about the proper construction of the pollution exclusion. But at a
minimum, the stark split amongst the courts interpreting the very same language suggests that roughly half the courts have erred in some sense, even controlling for factual distinctions in the cases.
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At least as measured by their track record on appellate review, the
performance of trial judges is merely okay and hardly great. Although
trial courts are affirmed roughly sixty percent of the time,2 ° this is hardly
a statistic that should encourage complacency. While that's a great winning percentage (batting average, if you will) for sports, it seems far too
low for a legal system that prides itself on accuracy, predictability, dependability, consistency, and rationality. Put another way, trial judges are
deemed wrong on appeal almost half the time. If commercial airlines had
a similar track record, airports would be empty. Yet as a society we continue to participate in a legal system that has a relatively high error rate,
even if one regards the problem as sufficiently solved through the quality
control of appeal. But further consideration bursts even this small bubble.
Appellate courts are, to paraphrase Justice Jackson's memorable
phrase, final22 but hardly infallible. 21 As demonstrated regularly
legal
periodicals, rehearing motions, and conflicting caselaw, 23 manyinappel20. COHEN, supra note 15, at 1; Wheeler et al., supra note 15, at 406; Note, supra note 15, at
1199-00. But see Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobiain the Appellate Courts:
Civil Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 971 (2002)
(noting relatively high affirmance rates for less politicized commercial claims as contrasted to more
controversial civil rights or job discrimination claims); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg,
Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 119, 150 (2002) (suggesting strong "affirmance effect" in
practice); Chris Guthrie & Tracey E. George, The Futility of Appeal: DisciplinaryInsights Into the
"Affirmance Effect" on the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 357, 358 (2005)
(suggesting that at least for federal appeals court review of trial decisions, affirmance rate is much
higher, perhaps ninety percent). Because the bulk of litigation in America is state court litigation, I
tend to regard the state court data, such as that in the Wheeler and Cohen sources, as more important
and indicative of the degree to which error pervades the system. In addition, I question whether the
Guthrie-George reading of the data, which is based on the Annual Reports of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, overstates affirmance, although that is a topic for another day.
21.
See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("We are not final
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.").
22. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text; see also Charles Nesson, Agent Orange
Meets the Blue Bus: Factfinding at the Frontierof Knowledge, 66 B.U. L. REV. 521 (1986) (criticizing, persuasively, grant of summary judgment by highly regarded judge (Jack B. Weinstein
(E.D.N.Y)) against opt-out plaintiff in Agent Orange litigation). This theme of judicial error runs
through many articles in legal periodicals, including many of mine. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Class Actions and Limited Vision: Opportunities for Improvement Through a More Functional
Approach to Class Treatment of Disputes, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1127 (2005) (criticizing judicial decisions denying partial class action treatment despite sufficient commonality of legal and factual
claims); Jeffrey W. Stempel, An Inconsistently Sensitive Mind: Richard Posner's Cerebration of
Insurance Law and Continuing Blind Spots of Econominalism, 7 CONN. INS. L.J. 7 (2000) (praising
prominent judge's insurance-related opinions but finding some wrongly decided); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Domtar Baby: Misplaced Notions of Equitable Apportionment Create a Thicket of Potential
Unfairnessfor Insurance Policyholders, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 769 (1999) (criticizing Minnesota Supreme Court decision permitting insurers to avoid full payment of policy limits for triggered
claims that extend over several years by prorating responsibility into years when policyholder's
insurance was exhausted or unavailable); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrappingand Slouching Toward
Gomorrah:Arbitral Infatuationand the Decline of Consent, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1381 (1996) (criticizing broad construction of arbitration clauses and naive judicial attitude that arbitration is invariably faster and cheaper than litigation with no potential loss of adjudicator expertise or neutrality (a
view supported in G. Richard Shell, FairPlay, Consent and Securities Arbitration: A Comment on
Speidel, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1365 (1996); Richard E. Speidel, Contract Theory and Securities Arbitration: Whither Consent?, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1335 (1996))); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reassessing the
"Sophisticated" Policyholder Defense in Insurance Coverage Litigation, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 807
(1993) (criticizing decisions, including one by revered Fifth Circuit Judge John Minor Wisdom,
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late decisions are arguably wrong-perhaps even obviously wrong-to
everyone but the two or three jurists on the panel who supported the result. 24 Although this ironically suggests that in many instances of reversal
it was the trial judge who was correct, the net effect is to underscore that
adjudication results hardly represent cosmic truth.
None of this is news to anyone alive since the time of the legal realist movement. 25 In an adversary system, particularly one mixing lay input
(the jury, witnesses, public opinion, economic power, election of judges)
with imperfect legal actors (bad judges, harried judges, emotional judges,
politicized judges, self-interested judges-and staff suffering similar
erroneously concluding that normal rules of contract construction do not apply when policyholder is
a "sophisticated" business entity (a position supported in Hazel Glenn Beh, Reassessing the Sophisticated Insured Exception, 39 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 85 (2004))).
Indeed, one could flip through the pages of almost any law review and find several examples of professors, practitioners, and student authors doing a pretty good job of demonstrating that at
least some judicial decisions are quite wrongly decided, poorly reasoned, insufficiently considered,
and the like. Although at one level this demonstrates that other lawyers and near-lawyers can be
nearly as cocksure as judges, there is more than mere legal realist difference of opinion at work.
Judges may read these works and reasonably conclude that their critics (including or especially me)
are wrong. Fair enough, but it is doubtful that the critics are wrong one hundred percent of the time.
And, if the critics are even half right, this suggests enough judicial error to merit concern.
23. Conflicts among the federal circuit courts of appeals are a leading ground for U.S. Supreme Court review. See Arthur D. Heliman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996
SUP. CT. REv. 403, 432-33 (1997) (finding that one reason to grant review is when a United States
court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of another United States court of
appeals); see also Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 129 S. Ct. 788, 793 (2009) (certiorari
granted because of circuit split); Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 22 (1986) (same).
Different state courts frequently reach inconsistent or even diametrically opposed decisions. For example, different state supreme courts may be construing exactly the same insurance
policy language and according the terms different meanings-perhaps one court claims the language
is unambiguous while another finds it fraught with ambiguity. Compare Hazen Paper Co. v. U.S.
Fid. & Guar. Co., 555 N.E.2d 576, 580-82 (Mass. 1990) (holding that government agency's "potentially responsible party" letter regarding Superfund liability is "suit" under liability insurance policy
triggering insurer's duty to defend policyholder in agency enforcement action), with Foster-Gardner,
Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 959 P.2d 265, 280 (Cal. 1998) (holding that agency enforcement
letter and action are not "suits"). Obviously, both of these decisions cannot be correct, but they are
both nonetheless controlling law in their respective jurisdictions. Thus, even decisions that will
never formally be deemed incorrect caution judges to appreciate that other reasonable jurists may
view an issue or dispute from the opposite perspective. See EMERIC FISCHER, PETER NASH SWISHER
& JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW § 11.06 (rev. 3d ed. 2006) (juxtaposing
inconsistent cases interpreting the same insurance policy language).
24. Most federal appellate decisions are the product of a three-judge panel, as are state intermediate appellate court decisions, with many state supreme courts also sitting in panels to decide
cases deemed insufficiently important for en banc review. As a practical matter, appellate decisions
are thus not an industry-wide declaration of the legal community but the product of the preferences
of two or more jurists. See Note, supra note 15, at 1212 (finding that roughly half of state supreme
court cases reversing trial courts have one or more dissenting justices).
In addition, U.S. Supreme Court decisions and those of en banc lower courts often feature
several dissenting votes. Although this is to a large extent an inevitable aspect of the indeterminacy
of law, it suggests that the system is quite a long way from rendering results that enjoy universal or
unquestioned support.
25. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, The DistortingSlant in QuantitativeStudies of Judging, 50 B.C
L. REV. 685, 695 (2009) ("'[T]o say that no political prejudices have swayed the court,' noted Coles
with consummate realism, 'is to maintain that its members have been exempt from the known weaknesses of human nature, and above those influences which operate most powerfully in determining
the opinions of other men."' (alteration in original) (quoting Walter D. Coles, Politics and the Supreme Court of the United States, 27 AM. L. REV. 182, 182 (1893))).
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shortcomings), adjudicatory outcomes will often fall short of perfection.
But many items of judicial business do not involve thorny legal issues or
implicate the value choices that divide humans in a post-modem world.
Many judicial decisions involve relatively straightforward applications of
rather simple legal precepts, such as that a judge should recuse where
impartiality might be reasonably questioned or that summary judgment
should not be granted if there are disputed material facts that would divide reasonable persons as to their meaning (in which case a jury is required for most such claims). But even for these types of claims, error26is
relatively frequent, and may occur at both the trial and appellate levels.
For too many years, the legal system has accepted a lower order of
performance by figuratively shrugging and contending that the system's
goal is not to be correct so much as to provide resolution.27 Even those
seeing courts as norm articulators have not been sufficiently concerned
about systemic reform even though they are quick to decry decisions that
displease them.28 We have accepted too much mediocrity in both the
application of law and in legal outcomes. In particular, we have been
willing to suffer too many jurists who fail to recognize situations in
which their impartiality is suspect or who misapply the law to the cases
before them. At the same time, we have saddled the good ones with too
much weight from elections, fundraising, insufficient staff and logistical
support, and insufficient moral support, such as failing to defend judges
from attacks against their independence and fidelity to legal safeguards
that are unpopular in the current political climate (for example, due
process rights for terrorism suspects). In addition, the clubbish culture of
civility in the fraternity of the bench makes it difficult for better judges to
candidly call out the judges of blameworthy behavior.29 This situation is

26. See sources cited supra note 13 (regarding erroneous disqualification rulings); see also,
e.g., Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming summary judgment
granted in age discrimination case in spite of clear material factual dispute with trial court improperly making credibility assessments of conflicting witnesses); Healy v. N.Y. life Ins. Co., 860 F. 2d
1209 (3d Cir. 1988) (affirming case with similar improper crediting of defense witnesses and disbelief of plaintiff's testimony in violation of summary judgment ground rules, but with a dissenting
opinion). Both cases are criticized in McGinley, supra note 16, at 237-241.
27. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 17, § 1.1 (stressing that a primary role of courts is to act as a
mechanism for resolving disputes with finality, but noting other occasionally conflicting goals of due
process and furthering of social and political values) ("[P]rocedure should yield final and lasting
adjudications so that people may enjoy repose and security in their legal relationships." (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS ch. 1 (1980))).
28.

See ROBERT M. COVER, OWEN M. Fiss & JUDITH RESNIK, PROCEDURE 225-26 (1988)

(tending to emphasize role of courts as generators of social norms and policy more than as mere
resolvers of atomized disputes); Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 161213 (1986) (same); John Leubsdorf, ConstitutionalCivil Procedure, 63 TEX. L. REv. 579, 579-80,
637 (1984) (noting due process considerations in litigation); see also Marc Galanter, Why the
"Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95,
135-39 (1974) (noting role of courts in ordering society but suggesting limited ability to effect
significant social change through litigation rather than legislation and electoral politics).
29. See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 7 (criticizing the U.S. Supreme Court, the West Virginia
state bar, and the judicial disciplinary authorities for failing to appreciate the magnitude of a state
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one of long standing, but seems particularly irksome coming at the end
of an era when there has been so much attention to revising the procedural rules applied by the judges we simultaneously over-revere and under-assess. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, have been
subject to significant substantive amendment on a rolling basis during the
past forty years, with a complete restyling taking effect in 2007.30 Further
changes are currently pending. 3 1 Although most observers appear to approve of the restyling,32 many of the substantive changes have divided
the profession and are not obvious improvements.33 Yet serial revision of
supreme court justice's failure to recuse and multiple opinions reflecting ignorance, improper application of law, or improper desire to remain on case where he ultimately was disqualified).
30.
Promulgated in 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were only modestly amended
in 1946, 1948, and 1963, followed by major amendments in 1966. Thereafter came significant
amendments in 1970, 1980, 1983, 1987, 1993, and 2000, plus a wholesale restyling that became
effective in 2007. In other words, the Rules have received major revision more than once a decade.
By contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court and many state courts continue to allow each individual justice
sole authority over their participation in cases, and few states have ceased electing judges. By comparison, however, Rules revision seems nearly perpetual as compared to the less frequent and episodic attention given to judicial selection and supervision (e.g., judicial conduct commissions, which
arrived in force during the 1970s, remain comparatively unchanged during the past 20 years). See
ALFINi ET AL., supra note 10, chs. 13-16 (surveying judicial discipline commissions and other avenues for sanctioning or removing judges); see also id. § 13.01 ("In the latter third of the twentieth
century, judicial conduct commissions emerged across the country and quickly became the primary
means by which judicial conduct is regulated and discipline imposed."); JUDITH ROSENBAUM WITH
JEFFREY M. SHAMAN & KATHERINE LEVIN, PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES OF STATE JUDICIAL

CONDUCT ORGANIZATIONS (1990); 1 AM. JUDICATURE SoC'Y, JUDICIAL CONDUCT ORGANIZATIONS
GOVERNING PROVISIONS (Kathleen Sampson & Joseph B. Cahill eds., 1982 & Supp. 1984).
31.
U.S. Courts, Federal Rulemaking, http://www.uscourts.gov/nilesindex2.html (last visited
Mar. 15, 2010) (noting the September 15, 2009 Judicial Conference of the United States' approval of
proposed amendments to appellate rules, criminal rules, civil rules, evidence rules, and bankruptcy
rules). In particular, Civil Rules 8, 26 and 56 are recommended for amendments that, if not derailed
by the U.S. Supreme Court or Congress, should take effect on December 1, 2010. Id.
32.
Certainly, this has been the sentiment expressed by civil procedure professors on the
AALS listserv based on the reaction of their students who, unlike the faculty, are unburdened by
having grown up practicing under the pre-2007 Rules language. Notwithstanding that the restyling
may have been done well, one can continue to reasonably ask whether it was an apt expenditure of
resources. The pre-December 2007 language of the Rules may have been imperfect, but it was not
indecipherable.
33.
Discovery Rules changes in 1993 and 2000 alone spurred a stream of concern and criticism. See, e.g., Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosurein Discovery-The Rush to Reform, 27
GA. L. REV. 1, 39-41 (1992); Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 53
(1997) ("Much of the hoopla about litigation costs may be traceable to those whose real complaint is
that they or their clients are exposed to liabilities that they would prefer to avoid."); Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 39 B.C. L. REV. 683, 683-84,
688-89 (1998) (questioning wisdom of the 1983 and 1993 Amendments designed to combat supposedly excessive and abusive discovery); Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray:The Pervasive
Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequencesfor Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 1393, 1396, 1443-44 (1994); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: MandatoryInformal
Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795 passim (1991) (questioning the
efficacy of the proposed disclosure system that was eventually enacted in the 1993 Amendments to
the federal civil rules); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Ulysses Tied to the Generic Whipping Post: The Continuing Odyssey of Discovery "Reform," LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring/Summer 2001, at 197,
197-200, 211 (criticizing many post-1970 changes to the federal discovery rules); Stephen N. Subrin, Teaching Civil Procedure While You Watch It Disintegrate,59 BROOK. L. REV. 1155, 1160,
1163 (1993) (finding many post-1970 changes to Rules to err too greatly in the direction of restricting claims and reducing adjudication in favor of encouraging settlement); Carl Tobias, Discovery
Reform Redux, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1433, 1433-34 (1999) (noting the seeming excessive focus on
discovery rather than other aspects of the civil rules and litigation).
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the text of the Rules ("tinkering" to those less supportive) continues, 34
without much evidence to suggest it has improved the federal adjudication process. 35 And, of course, with each new iteration of federal rule
revisions comes a subsequent round of deliberation in the states, most of
which pattern their rules on the federal rules-or at least will reconsider
idiosyncratic state rules in light of federal developments.36 This results in
a system focusing more on the text of the rules while focusing considerably less attention on the legal officers applying the rules. Some recalibration is in order.

34. See Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural
Progress,59 BROOK. L. REV. 761, 761 (1993) (relating a conversation with noted plaintiffs' security
class action attorney Edward Labaton, Esq., who stated that he viewed the establishment of a Standing Committee on Civil Rules as a mistake due to its tendency to encourage excessive Rules revision).
For example, in the current package of proposed Civil Rules amendments, Rule 8 is to be
changed so that "discharge in bankruptcy" is no longer an enumerated defense, a change that does no
harm but also does not really change the law because the discharge provisions of the federal bankruptcy statutes have always taken precedence over Rule 8. See STANDING RULES COMM., JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT TO JUDICIAL CONFERENCE: SEPTEMBER 2009 app. C-13 (2009),

http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/j c09-2009/2009-09-Appendix-C.pdf
(explaining
rationale
for
changes). In addition, Rule 56 is to be amended so that language that summary judgment "should be
granted" if the motion is meritorious will be changed to "shall be granted," restoring language that
was in the Rule from 1938 until 2007 but was altered as part of the restyling project. Id. at C-6.
Although the restyling may have accomplished some good things, the shall-to-should change, which
injected some uncertainty as to whether substantive summary judgment law had changed, was not
one of them. See id. In addition, pending changes to Rule 26 will make expert witness report drafts
and communications with counsel subject to work product protection, in effect undoing some of the
changes the Rules Committee made in the 1993 Amendments that expanded the scope of expert
witness discovery. Id. at C-2 to C-3. The Committee's assessment is quite persuasive, particularly
concerning the likely advantages of revising the expert discovery rules, which have led to considerable waste and gamesmanship. But, the change is nonetheless in large part a correction of prior
Committee mistakes and also supports an argument that the federal bench failed to sufficiently
alleviate expert discovery problems through its rulings and case management.
35.
See Gregory P. Joseph, FederalLitigation-Where Did It Go off Track?, LITIG., Summer
2008, at 5, 62 (arguing that the rule changes "have made federal civil litigation procedurally more
complex"); Miller, supra note 10, at 439-40; Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformationin ProceduralJustice, 77 MINN. L. REV. 375 passim (1992) (noting and criticizing rules changes designed
to restrict discovery and make pretrial disposition easier); Lauren K. Robel, The Politics of Crisis in
the FederalCourts,7 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSp. RESOL. 115, 115-16 (1991) (criticizing crisis rhetoric and
undue efforts of politicians to be perceived as active in rules and court reform); Carl Tobias, Civil
Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 24 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1393, 1413-27
(1992) (criticizing inconsistent court practices encouraged by 1990 congressional legislation and
proliferation of local rules and practices); see also Judith Resnik, FailingFaith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986); Symposium, Reinventing Civil Litigation: EvaluatingProposalsfor Change, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 655 (1993).
36.
The degree of state embrace of federal rules is something less than wholesale adoption but
most state civil litigation systems largely are in accord with the federal rules regarding the conduct
of litigation. See generally Thomas 0. Main, Procedural Uniformity and the ExaggeratedRole of
Rules: A survey of Intra-state Uniformity in Three States That Have Not Adopted the FederalRules
of Civil Procedure,46 VILL. L. REV. 311 (2001); John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the FederalRules
in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354 (2003); John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The FederalRules in
State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367 (1986);
Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and
Emerging ProceduralPatterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999 (1989).
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Although some rules changes have been helpful,37 many have been
inconsequential 38 or arguably counter-productive. 39 Rather than expending more energy on rule revision, the next decade or so would be better
spent attempting to improve judicial selection, performance, and discipline. Structural changes and increased financial support should be part of
this effort. A significant part of the project should be improved selection
of judges, consciousness-raising of the bench regarding common cognitive error, and a push for increased humility on the bench, particularly in
cases to which judges have a connection. If nothing else, the system
should eliminate once and for all situations like Caperton in which a
badly mistaken (or perhaps even unscrupulous) judge makes a close to

37. For example, the revision of Rule 15 in response to Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21
(1986), which construed former Rule 15 in a manner that made it more difficult to add a party and
have a claim relate back to the date of the original pleading for statute of limitations purposes, is
generally regarded as a helpful response to a problematic Court decision. See Joseph P. Bauer,
Schiavone: An Un-Fortune-ateIllustration of the Supreme Court'sRole as Interpreterof the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 720, 720, 722-23 (1988); Harold S. Lewis, Jr.,
The Excessive History of FederalRule 15(c) and Its Lesson for Civil Rules Revision, 85 MICH. L.
REV. 1507, 1514-25, 1558-59 (1987) (noting problem of relation back with amendments under
former Rule 15).
Similarly, the 1993 Amendments to Rule 11, which were designed to rectify problems
created by the 1983 Amendments to Rule 11, were well received and appear to have been largely
effective in reducing satellite Rule 11 litigation regarded by many as wasteful and excessively strategic. See GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE 21-36 (2d
ed. 1994); GEORGENE M. VAIRO, RULE 11 SANCTIONS: CASE LAW, PERSPECTIVES AND PREVENTIVE
MEASURES § 1.01 (Richard G. Johnson ed., 3d ed. 2004); see also Carl Tobias, Rule 11 Recalibrated
in Civil Rights Cases, 36 VILL. L. REV. 105, 106-16 (1991) (noting that after perceived excessive
use of Rule 11 against civil rights claims, courts appear to have adopted more a restrained approach);
Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigationand the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV.
270, 308 (1989) (noting that public law attorneys "believe that Rule 11 constitutes an ongoing threat
to their efforts"); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A CriticalAnalysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 196-97 (1988)
(criticizing aspects of the 1983 Amendment to Rule 11 and consequent upsurge in Rule 11 practice).
38. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., A Square Peg in a Round Hole? The 2000 Limitation on the
Scope of Federal Civil Discovery, 69 TENN. L. REV. 13, 14, 33 (2001) (finding the 2000 Amendments to the scope portion of Rule 26 not to have made much difference, at least initially); Jeffrey
W. Stempel & David F. Herr, Applying Amended Rule 26 (B)(1) in Litigation: The New Scope of
Discovery, 199 F.R.D. 396, 396-97, 423 (2001) (noting change but suggesting that it may not have a
dramatic impact); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors
of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 636-37 (2001) (criticizing interest group influence in connection
with scope amendments and expressing concern that narrowed scope of discovery will disadvantage
plaintiffs but conceding that impact would likely not be dramatic if the claimant's counsel are sufficiently skilled). Similarly, the creation of the disclosure requirements of Rule 26 in the 1993
Amendments caused substantial concern, but appears to have had relatively little impact in practice
because the material subject to disclosure was historically always requested in the parties' respective
first waves of discovery requests. See Rowe, supra, at 25-27.
39. Rule changes that do not effect much change could be considered counterproductive in
that they impose transaction costs without accomplishing much positive change. See Stempel, supra
note 38, at 531. Even after the recent restyling of the rules, which professors and students see as
producing clear Rules, the text on the whole can be criticized for introducing transaction costs and
occasionally creating potential litigation issues as to whether a wording change merely restates the
earlier rule or creates a slightly different rule. See STANDING RULES COMM., supra note 34, at C-6
(describing proposed changes in Rule 56 to reverse linguistic change made by 2007 restyling).
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unreviewable self-serving determination regarding his own qualifications
to participate in a dispute. n
H. PERILS OF RULE FIXATION AND THE INCREASINGLY ANACHRONISTIC
CULT OF THE JUDGE: UNDERADDRESSED PROBLEMS OF SELECTION,
SUPPORT, COGNITIVE ERROR, AND OVERCONFIDENCE

American law has been largely a cult of the judge since at least the
time of the Christopher Columbus Langdell deanship at Harvard Law
School. Dean Langdell's case method, which focused on learning law
through assimilating the writings of judges, made the judge the center of
the legal universe. 41 Although the legal realist movement changed the
terrain of the legal education and the profession, even making judges
targets of critical commentary, the judicial cult was more modified than
dethroned4 2 Even in the modem era, the study of appellate cases remains
the primary vehicle
for studying law, particularly in the formative first43
year curriculum.

If anything, judges were, and remain, at least as venerated in the
post-realist era 4 as during the height of nineteenth century formalism.
For every Chancellor Kent then, 5 there was a Learned Hand,46 Louis

Brandeis,4 7 or Benjamin Cardozo

48

during the middle third of the twen-

40.
Stempel, supra note 7, at 6 (observing that the quality of a state justice's analysis and
reasoning regarding his recusal so misapplied clearly applicable law (of which he was repeatedly
apprised) as to call into question his motives).

41.

See ROBERT STEPHENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE

1850s

TO THE 1980s, at 52 (1983) (describing the evolution of American legal education as formal law
schools replaced apprenticeships and self-taught "reading law," culminating in Harvard Law Dean
Christopher Columbus Langdell's establishment of the case method as the dominant form of legal
education during the late nineteenth century); Jeffrey W. Stempel, All Stressed Up but Not Sure
Where to Go: Pondering the Teaching of Adversarialism in Law School, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 165,

166-76 (1989) (reviewing

STEPHEN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE

AMERICAN APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION (1988)) (same).
42.
See STEPHENS, supra note 4 1, at 155-56; sources cited infra note 44.
43.
See WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
TEACHING,
SUMMARY:
EDUCATING
LAWYERS
5-6
(2007),

http://www.carnegiefoundation.org/sites/default/files/publications/elibrary-pdf -632.pdf.
44.
See BAILEY KUKLIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL PRIMER 183-85 (1994) (finding that basic tenants of
legal realist movement have been absorbed into mainstream of modem American law); Jonathan T.
Molot, Ambivalence About Formalism, 93 VA. L. REV. 1, 2, 49-50 (2007) (same); Matin Roger
Scordato, Post-realistBlues: Formalism, Instrumentalism, and the Hybrid Nature of Common Law
Jurisprudence,7 NEV. L.J. 263, 271-78 (2007); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104
HARv. L. REV. 468, 469 (1990) ("Legal realism has dominated American legal education for over
half a century."); Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 467 (1988)

(reviewing

LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE:

1927-1960 (1986)) ("All major current

schools of thought are, in significant ways, products of legal realism. To some extent, we are all
realists now.").
45. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 332 (2d ed. 1985) (noting
the influence of New York jurist Samuel Kent).
46. Learned Hand was a prominent Second Circuit judge who was widely celebrated as one of
the nation's best jurists. See generally GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE
JUDGE (1994).

47.
Louis Brandeis, also widely celebrated, was the first Jewish U.S. Supreme Court Justice
and a prominent Boston attorney prior to being appointed to the Court. The University of Louisville
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tieth century and with the last third came adulation of Earl Warren,4 9
William Brennan, 50 Henry Friendly 5' and Richard Posner. 52 Several Justices even appear on postage stamps.53 Today's law students are likely
Law School in his original hometown bears this name as does a prominent university in Boston. See
generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE
JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA
(2000); see also BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION: THE SECRET

POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF TWO SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (1982) (examining Brandeis's behindthe-scenes influence on American law, with some criticism of his hidden influence including covert
collaborations with Felix Frankfurter (who now is honored on a U.S. Postal Service stamp, see infra
note 53)).
48. Benjamin Nathan Cardozo sat on the New York Court of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme
Court and is often held out as an example of outstanding, far-sighted judging. See generally
RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION (1990); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
49. Former California Governor Earl Warren was Chief Justice from 1953 to 1969 and was
widely revered by liberals and moderates, even if disliked by many conservatives. See, e.g., JIM
NEWTON, JUSTICE FOR ALL: EARL WARREN AND THE NATION HE MADE 10-11 (2006); JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (dedicating the book to
Warren, for whom Ely clerked, with memorable phrase: "You don't need many heroes if you choose
carefully"); Jeffrey Rosen, Op-Ed., The Trial of John Roberts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2009, at WKI 8,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/13/opinion/13rosen.html ("[l]f Chief Justice Roberts
presides over a broad, ideologically divided ruling in a campaign finance case the court heard last
week, he risks being remembered instead as a conservative Earl Warren."). Liberals with long memories also note that Warren, as California Attorney General, supported the shameful internment of
Japanese-Americans that was the subject of Korematsu v. UnitedStates, 319 U.S. 432 (1943), coram
nobis granted, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984). Even if a judge is not uniformly venerated, the
judge's prominence provides ample evidence of the judicial cult in American law. For example,
although Justices Warren and Roberts are both household words, comparatively few, even in the
legal profession, know of Floyd Abrams, one of the advocates in the Supreme Court case noted by
Professor Rosen.
50. William Brennan served on the U.S. Supreme Court from 1956 to 1990 and was considered a pivotal member. Like Justice Warren, Justice Brennan was often criticized by conservatives
but lionized by liberals and enjoyed cult-like fame. See generally The Oyez Project, William J.
Brennan, Jr., http://www.oyez.org/justices/william-j brennan-jr (last visited Mar. 15, 2010);
WILLIAM J. BRENNAN JR.: AN AFFAIR WITH FREEDOM: A COLLECTION OF HIS OPINIONS AND
SPEECHES (Stephen J. Friedman ed., 1967); Jawboning Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1987, at A30,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/04/02/opinion/topics-of-the-times-jawboningjustice.html (quoting William Bradford Reynolds criticizing Brennan as a "radical egalitarian").
51.
Henry Friendly was founding partner of the firm now known as Cleary Gottlieb Steen &
Hamilton LLP and served on the Second Circuit from 1959-1974. He was famous in academic
circles as reputedly having the highest grades at Harvard Law School since Brandeis's student days
and regarded by many as the nation's best appellate judge, and one of the best judges never to be
appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court. See Michael Norman, Henry J. Friendly, FederalJudge in
Court of Appeals, is Dead at 82, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1986, at B6, available at 1986 WLNR
846371; see also HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW (1973) (well

regarded and widely scholarly book by Judge Friendly).
52. Richard A. Posner, a well-known law professor and prolific scholar, was appointed to the
Seventh Circuit in 1981. See Fed. Judicial Ctr., Biographical Directory of Federal Judges,
http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (last visited Mar. 15, 2010); see also RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed. 2007); Elena Kagan, Richard Posner, The Judge, 120 HARV.
L. REV. 1121, 1121-22 (2007). Although his fame stems in substantial part from his scholarly writings, it seems clear that his platform as a judge has enhanced his exposure and stature. A search of
"Richard Posner" in Journals and Law Reviews in Westlaw showed only 34 references to Posner
before he was appointed to the judiciary; after 1981, 9,649 references.
53. See U.S. Courts, Four Supreme Court Justices Honored in New Postage Stamps,
http://www.uscourts.gov/newsroomV2009/postageStamps.cfm (last visited Mar. 15, 2010) (noting
that on September 22, 2009 commemorative stamps of Justices Joseph Story (on Court from 18111845), Louis Brandeis (1916-1939), Felix Frankfurter (1939-1962) and William Brennan (19561990) were released).
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familiar with prominent judges but not with similarly influential practitioners, like Reginald Heber Smith-the inventor of the billable hour54Edward Bennett Williams,55 E. Barrett Prettyman,5 6 or H. Bartow Farr.5 7
Even less likely is familiarity with lawyer-legislators, such as Robert
Kastenmeier5 8 or Birch Bayh. 59 To the extent American law is a movie,
the judge always has the starring role, whether playing hero or villain.6°
Not surprisingly, with the pedestal of center stage comes some
sense of entitlement and even arrogance. Lawyers are indoctrinated to
view a judgeship as the pinnacle of professional achievement and appear

54. Reginald Heber Smith was a partner in the prestigious Boston law firm of Hale & Dorr
who is both credited and blamed for setting the modem means of attorney payment through hourly
rates. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, In Pursuit of the Public Good: Lawyers Who Care, 52 ME. L. REv. 301,
302 (2000). Prior to the spread of this custom, attorneys tended to charge flat rate amounts based on
their estimates of the work or their views as to the value of the services rendered. As late as the
1980s, some prominent New York firms continued to send bills with statements such as "For Services Rendered-$750,000" and no further breakdown of time spent, a practice that would lead to hoots
and howls today.
55. Edward Bennett Williams was a noted Washington, D.C. trial lawyer and named partner
of the prestigious Williams and Connolly law firm. He defended several prominent public figures,
including organized crime boss Frank Costello, Teamsters Union President Jimmy Hoffa, and Senator Joseph McCarthy. See Edward Bennett Williams, Trial Lawyer, Dead at 68, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
15, 1988, at DI1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1988/08/15/obituariesledward-bennettwilliams-trial-lawyer-dead-at-68.html.
56.
E. Barrett Prettyman was a partner in the Hogan & Hartson law firm specializing in advocacy before the U.S. Supreme Court. See Myron H. Bright, Jurists-in-Residence Programs, FED.
LAW. Jan. 2007, at 38, 41.
57.
H. Bartow Farr, a name partner in Farr & Taranto, specializes in Supreme Court advocacy. Like Prettyman, he has a reputation for excellence and an enviable track record of prevailing in
most of his cases before the Court. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.
89, 124-25 (1984) (striking down injunctive relief ordered by federal court in connection with deprivations of developmentally disabled residents at institution (Farr's client) notwithstanding that
federal court's inquiry and decision followed roadmap set forth by Court in prior decision in case);
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 5 (1981) (reversing lower courts on the
ground that the Patients' Bill of Rights in Developmental Disabilities Act of 1975 did not create
independent rights at law, but was only funding a statute).
Kastenmeier, a long-time Wisconsin congressman, was chair of the Judiciary Subcommit58.
tee on Federal Rules and was responsible for many litigation reform efforts. He was eventually
unseated by a television anchor. See Biographical Directory of the U.S. Cong., Kastenmeier,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scriptsbiodisplay.pl?index=kO00020 (last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
59. Birch Bayh (D.-Ind.) was a U.S. Senator credited with major revisions of the federal
statutes governing disqualification of judges. See generally John P. Frank, Disqualification of
Judges: In Support of the Bayh Bill, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43 (1970). He is the father of
current Indiana U.S. Senator Evan Bayh, who has announced he will not seek re-election.
Perhaps the best known lawyers in America are those appearing regularly as guest com60.
mentators on television or occasionally thrust into the spotlight because of a high profile televised
trial. Although many of the former are good lawyers, most can correctly be characterized as not
being in the upper echelon of the profession, at least as viewed by the profession itself. As to the
latter, for every David Boies or Barry Richard (who argued Bush v. Gore in various stages and
forums), there are lawyers like the O.J. Simpson prosecution team, who performed horribly. See
Chris Tucker, Lawyer Says O.J. Case Was Lost Early, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 15, 1998, at
IOJ, available at 1998 WLNR 7416011. But, as bad as some of the lawyering in People v. Simpson
may have been, the performance of trial judge Lance Ito is widely regarded as worse and he appeared to occupy center stage even more than the prominent defense lawyers retained by Simpson.
See, e.g., John Caher, Counsel, Media Spar over TV's Effect in Court, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 30, 2004, at 1
col. 3 (noting media criticism's effect on Ito's demeanor in court); No Media Circus, NEWSDAY,
June 4, 1997, at A42, available at 1997 WLNR 560130.
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to retain that view notwithstanding modem concerns over salary,6' caseloads, working conditions, and life restrictions attendant in becoming a
judge. Like any other human being put in a position of authority (complete with lawyers and their clients fawning to curry favor), judges may
acquire a false sense of infallibility.
But with this power frequently comes frustration. Judges commonly
complain about restrictions on their activities, unfavorable press scrutiny,
low pay (at least relative to what they received as attorneys), impoverished working conditions, and bureaucratic burdens. 62 For appellate
judges, travel obligations add to the stress no matter how much junket
value they may appear to have to outsiders. For every chance to hear
cases in San Francisco, there are judges slogging to Omaha in the dead of
winter. For elected judges, there are the added burdens of fundraising,
campaigning, and the constant fear of voter rejection. Although few
judges leave the bench voluntarily, they may develop the sense that they
are underappreciated and misunderstood-and that critics (political, social, and academic) simply do not understand the intricate realities of
judging.
As discussed above,63 one area in which some degree of judicial
trench mentality appears with some frequency is on matters of disqualification. In many of the reported cases on disqualification, judges not only
err in failing to recuse, but err badly. Caperton v. Massey serves as a
prime example of a judicial officer repeatedly making terribly bad recusal decisions. Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp.64 likewise
reflects bad judicial behavior by an apparently bad judge 65 that was rectifled by a 5-4 U.S. Supreme Court vote. 66 Aetna Life Insurance Co. v.
Lavoie67 reflects similarly suspect judicial behavior of an Alabama justice that required U.S. Supreme Court correction. And cases such as
these reaching the Court are likely just the tip of the iceberg.
The problem becomes particularly acute where the jurist's recusal
decision is not reviewable, as in the case of U.S. Supreme Court Justices
61.
See generally Stephen J. Choi et al., Are Judges Overpaid? A Skeptical Response to the
Judicial Salary Debate, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 47 (2009). Despite complaints about relatively low
pay in comparison to private practice, few judges leave the bench and judicial vacancies appear to
draw many applicants.
62.
See Lee May, Federal Judges Complain Pay Is Too Low, Seek Raises, L.A. TIMES, July
28, 1985, at MN8, available at http:/articles.latimes.com/1985-07-28/news/mn-5438_I-federaljudge.
63.
See supra Introduction.
64.
486 U.S. 847 (1988) (discussing judge who was trustee of university with multi-million
dollar interest in case outcome failed to recuse).
65.
See GILLERS, supra note 13, at 592, 602 (observing that trial judge who failed to recuse in
Liljeberg was eventually convicted of bribery, conspiracy, and obstruction of justice).
66. See Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 870 (Rehnquist, C.J., with white & Scalia, JJ., dissenting); id.
at 874 (O'Conner, J., dissenting).
67.
475 U.S. 813 (1986) (holding that Alabama Supreme Court Justice should have recused in
case presenting same legal issue involved in his similar claim against another insurance company;
failure to recuse violated insurer's due process rights).
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Rehnquist, Scalia, and Breyer, who have made shockingly bad-and
uncorrected-determinations not to recuse. 68 West Virginia Supreme
Court Justice Benjamin's refusal to disqualify, although perhaps debatable as a matter of due process, clearly failed the standard set forth in Canon 3(E) (now Rule 2.11) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. 69 He memorialized this bad decision in writing on four occasions, revealing that he
apparently did not understand the applicable legal standard and instead
erroneously measured his ability to participate according to whether he
subjectively thought he could be fair.7° Disappointingly but unsurprisingly, he concluded he could be perfectly fair in spite of having received $3
million in campaign help from the CEO of a litigant with $82 million
riding on his vote.7 '
Justice Benjamin's recusal failings, although more severe than
most, are perhaps a sign of the times as judicial elections become hotly
politicized and candidacies are heavily financed by interest groups hoping to place sympathetic judges on the bench. Today, substantial monetary support has joined the historical list of circumstances-family,
friends, law firm connections, and direct financial interest-that create
recusal questions. Although favoritism has always been a danger to impartial justice, the influx of campaign money and its cousins, such as jobs
for judicial relatives and lucrative court appointments, have increased the
problem of actual and perceived bias.7 2
Even when their assessments are not clouded by finance, family, or
friendship, judges have proven surprisingly fallible, both in controlled
experiments and in actual practice. In a variety of studies, judges have
been shown to be susceptible to cognition errors and bias, just like laypersons. 73 For example, self-serving bias-the tendency for people to
68.
See source cited supra note 13 and accompanying text.
69.
See Stephen M. Hoersting & Bradley A. Smith, The Caperton Caper and the Kennedy
Conundrum, 2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 319, 325 & n.25 (2009).
70.
See Stempel, supra note 7, at 22, 29, 52.
71.
See id. at 10-11.
72.
See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Malignant Democracy: Core Fallacies Underlying Election of
the Judiciary,4 NEV. L.J. 35, 45-49 (2003) (discussing large increase in campaign spending during
past decade); Michael J. Goodman & William C. Rempel, Juice vs. Justice: A Times Investigation
(pt.
1),
L.A.
TIMES,
June
8,
2006,
at
MNI,
available
at
http://articles.latimes.com/2006/jun/O8/nationlna-vegas8 (discussing perceived abuses and judicial
favoritism in Las Vegas); Elliot G. Hicks, Op-Ed., Merit Selection, Not Elections, Must Be How We
Choose Justices, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Dec. 14, 2004, at 5A, availableat 2004 WLNR 14039840.
73.
See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Misjudging, 7 NEV. L.J. 420, 420 (2007) (reviewing literature and
finding substantial evidence that judges are impacted by cognitive biases and reasoning errors;
arguing that judges "possess three sets of 'blinders': informational blinders, cognitive blinders, and
attitudinal blinders" which make "accurate application of governing law to the facts of the case...
difficult"); Mitu Gulati, Jeffrey J. Rachinski & Donald C. Langevoort, Fraudby Hindsight, 98 Nw.
U. L. REv. 773 (2004) (finding judges and juries vulnerable to hindsight bias in concluding fraud
took place when incorrect estimates or statements resulted only from mistake and lacked scienter);
Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the JudicialMind, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 777 (2001) (findings also suggest judges are influenced by framing, hindsight bias, representativeness, and egocentric bias as well as anchoring); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological
Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998) (observing that hindsight bias affects
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overestimate themselves, their abilities, and their success or prospects for
success-"can also influence judges, leading them to believe that they
are better decision makers than is in fact the case. 74 Summarizing this
research, one author observed that it has "shown us that judges are subject to hindsight bias, can be manipulated by anchoring, will sometimes
fall prey to the lure of inappropriate evidence[,] and suffer a number of
other 'blinders."' ' 75 Other scholars have suggested that much judicial
error results not only from cognitive failings, but also from "strong biases and prejudices" that pose "a major obstacle to the fair administration
of justice. 7 6
In addition, judges are perhaps more inconsistent about basic legal
axioms than is commonly thought. In one experiment, for example,
judges were asked to convert their concept of the variant burdens of
proof-preponderance, clear and convincing evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt-to percentages. The percentage definitions given by the
judges varied in ways that should make observers uncomfortable about
the consistency of the bench. For example, some judges thought that
proof at the eighty percent level was beyond a reasonable doubt while
others identified the standard as ninety-nine percent. 7 The percentage
judges and juries); W. Kip Viscusi, How Do Judges Think About Risk?, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 26,
29 (1999) (finding "judges exhibit a variety of biases"); Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey
J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005) (observing that judges have difficulty disregarding inadmissible evidence while making determinations when they are faced with variants of various hypothetical questions); see also Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Christina A. Studebaker, Anchoring in the
Courtroom: The Effects of Caps on Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 353, 354, 357
(1999) (finding that mock jurors's knowledge of caps on damages had effect of depressing what
would otherwise have been awarded as damages; no reason to think that judges are not similarly
affected).
74.
Guthrie, supra note 73, at 436; accord Theodore Eisenberg, Differing Perceptions of
Attorney Fees in Bankruptcy Cases, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 979, 983-84 (1994) (finding that bankruptcy
judges appear to overestimate their efficiency as compared to attorney evaluations); see also Guthrie
et al.,
supra note 73, at 813-14 (finding over half ofjudges surveyed estimated that they were in the
top quarter of the bench as measured by reversal rates).
75.
Stephan Landsman, Nobody's Perfect, 7 NEV. L.J. 468, 468 (2007) (noting that work of
Guthrie and others "is part of a historical trend that has increasingly focused on judicial fallibility,"
including prominent Kalven & Zeisel jury research of 1950s and 1960s). But see id. at 475-76
(suggesting that use of lay juries, who are often insulated from information known to judges, in
combination with judges for adjudication, may significantly reduce adverse impact of blinders);
Philip M. Pro, Mis(understanding)Judging, 7 NEV. L.J. 480, 483 (2007); Elaine W. Shoben, Evidentiary Wisdom and Blinders in Perspective: Thoughts on Misjudging, 7 NEV. L.J. 500, 509-10 (2007);
see also Stephen N. Subrin, Thoughts on Misjudging Misjudging, 7 NEV. L.J. 513, 513-20 (2007)
(taking issue with some of Guthrie's conclusions and finding them misleading in four different
dimensions, including failing to see limits of empirical research, taking overly narrow view of civil
litigation process, overestimating neutrality of arbitrators and mediators as compared to judges, and
underweighting conective impact of jury system).
76. See Rodney J. Uphoff, On Misjudging and Its Implicationsfor Criminal Defendants,
Their Lawyers and the Criminal Justice System, 7 NEV. L.J. 521, 522-23 (citing instances of bad
judicial behavior, including bias and favoritism); see also id. at 525-30 (providing examples of
judicial conduct so bad that it appears to result from bias or prejudice rather than mere susceptibility
to cognitive miscalculation).
77. See Barbara D. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion
in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE. L.J. 1299, 1311 (1997).
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ranges used to define clear and convincing evidence were similarly wideranging.78 In another experiment, judges were given a hypothetical civil
rights claim with a hypothetical summary judgment motion. They varied
substantially in whether they would grant or deny the motion79-a motion based on supposedly very clear law.8 °
These experimental results are not particularly encouraging for fans
of the imperial judiciary. At a minimum they reveal a good deal of inconsistency between judges. Consider the consequences for a criminal
defendant: Before Judge A, the defendant will be convicted if the judge
is eighty percent confident; before Judge B, the judge must be absolutely
convinced. In the summary judgment context, Judge X is ready to find
against a plaintiff as a matter of law while Judge Y believes the matter
requires jury attention-and both Judges X and Y are viewing the same
set of hypothetical cases facts. This hardly evokes the type of consistency
and predictability to which law aspires.
In real life, judges make similar decisions that appear erroneous to
many. For example, one judge concluded as a matter of law that there
was no actionable sexual harassment even though a supervisor repeatedly
rubbed an employee's thigh and attempted to kiss her despite her protests, holding that the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact that the reasonable person would find that the supervisor's actions created a hostile
work environment. 81 Another found-again as a matter of law-that
being called a "black bitch" was sufficient proof of race discrimination to
merit jury consideration of the issue. 2 In an age discrimination case, the
trial and appellate courts found an employer's claim of firing for poor
performance convincing--as a matter of law-despite five glowing performance reviews and only one stating that the manager and the employee were not "on the same 'wavelength.' ' 8 3 Another federal judge
threw a civil rights litigant out of court for failing to raise his claim in84
state court--even though the state court had refused to hear the claim.
78.
See id.
79.
See Myron H. Bright, Do Philosophy and Oral Argument Influence Decisions?-Getting
There, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1991, at 68, 69-71.
80. See FED. R. CIv. P. 56(c) ("The [motion for summary] judgment sought should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.").
81.
Saxton v. AT&T Co., 10 F.3d 526, 528, 537 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Beiner, supra note
16, at 106-08 (providing similar examples).
82. See EEOC v. Champion Int'l Corp., No. 93 C 20279, 1995 WL 488333, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 1, 1995).
83.
See McCoy v. WGN Cont'l Broad. Co., 957 F.2d 368, 370 (7th Cir. 1992).
84. See Delew v. Wagner, No. 97-CV-90 (D. Nev. Apr. 4, 1997), rev'd 143 F.3d 1219, 122123 (9th Cir. 1998) ("The state court denied the motion [for leave to amend brought by plaintiffs] and
directed the Delews to file a separate section 1983 complaint. While we question the soundness of
that decision, we have no power to correct it and must accept the unique posture the Delews' claims
appear before us.... The Nevada state court effectively split the Delews' causes of action by denying their motion to join the two actions in one proceeding. The rule concerning the claim splitting is
not applicable here.").
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When the case was reversed and remanded, a second federal judge
granted summary judgment on the ground that there were no facts creating a jury issue, even though the plaintiff had introduced substantial evidence of a police cover-up designed to prevent the family of a decedent
bicyclist from gathering
evidence against an officer's wife who had run
85
into the cyclist.
Civil rights and job discrimination cases provide some particularly
shocking examples of judges willing to accept hokey legal arguments.
Consider the "same actor" defense to job discrimination claims through
which some defendant employers have successfully argued that--as a
matter of law-an adverse employment action cannot have been the
product of invidious discrimination if the same person both hired and
fired the employee.86 Even if this argument made some sense, where the
person hiring the plaintiff is also the alleged discriminator, this is at best
only evidence tending to suggest non-discrimination. It cannot logically
be conclusive or support even a rebuttable presumption of nondiscrimination. Nonetheless, some well-educated jurists have been willing to embrace this defense to a discrimination claim and unfairly impose
upon employees the burden of overcoming a presumption of nondiscrimination, where the same superior both hires and fires an alleged
victim of discrimination.

One might be tempted to explain the disparate Delew results according to the judicial
politics of whether a judge is receptive to or hostile toward civil rights claims against a police department. However, the Ninth Circuit panel was one composed of judges generally regarded as
conservative, suggesting that the trial court error was clear under the law. The judge who wrote the
Ninth Circuit opinion, Joseph Sneed, was appointed to the bench by Richard Nixon, and is the father
of former Hewlett-Packard CEO, Carly Fiorina, a prominent John McCain supporter in 2008, and is
generally regarded as a judicial conservative. Panel member Diarmuid O'Scannlain was appointed
by Ronald Reagan and is regarded by many lawyers as the most ideologically conservative member
of the Ninth Circuit. Panel member Harlington Wood, Jr., a Seventh Circuit judge sitting by designation, was appointed by Richard Nixon and is considered conservative. For biographies on the aforementioned judges, see Fed. Judicial Ctr., supra note 52.
85. See Delew v. Las Vegas Metro. Police, No. CV-S-00-0460 RLH (LRL) (D. Nev. Dec. 17,
2002), rev'd sub nom. Delew v. Wagner, 143 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1998). The plaintiffs evidence of
record included certain officers spiriting the officer's spouse away from the scene for at least two
hours so that she could not be observed and viewed as inebriated, mishandling a simple blood test so
that its results (which tended to show significant alcohol in her bloodstream) would be inadmissible
in court, and failure to preserve evidence.
Although it was possible that the officers in question could present an innocent explanation for their conduct sufficient to satisfy a jury, it is hard to imagine a reasonable observer that did
not see these facts as at least presenting a jury question. Yet there was at least one federal trial judge
who thought that no reasonable jury could fail to render a defense verdict on these facts.
After the Ninth Circuit reversal and remand, the police department conducted a mock jury
exercise that brought in a multi-million dollar mock verdict, leading the department to settle the case
for more than a $1 million. When the views of laypersons and defense counsel differ this much from
a judge's decision, a little concern is in order, as well as a little humility for the judges.
86. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After
Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1251, 1314-16 (1998) (arguing that the same-actor defense is
"simply not how discrimination works"); Julie S. Northup, Note, The "Same Actor Inference" in
Employment Discrimination: Cheap Justice?, 73 WASH. L. REv. 193, 221 (1998) (concluding that
the defense allows valid claims to be dismissed).
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A perhaps more egregious example was presented when employers
asserted the "after-acquired evidence" defense to discrimination claims.
Under this defense, an employer who had allegedly fired an employee for
discriminatory reasons would-after the suit was filed-seek and obtain
some negative information about the plaintiff that arguably justified dismissal and then argue that the employee was dischargeable on these nondiscriminatory grounds, even though the employer as a matter of uncontested fact had not made the adverse job decision on this basis.87 The
Supreme Court, in McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing C0._88 correctly concluded that such information could not constitute an absolute
bar to a discrimination claim since the after-acquired evidence defense
by definition asks a court to hold an employer's conduct nondiscriminatory based on reasons for discharge that were concededly not actually
used by the employer in making the discharge decision.8 9
Although impaired logical reasoning skills cannot be discounted as
a reason for such opinions, they probably reflect some judges' hostility
toward such claims. Neither explanation, however, is very comforting.
Judges have also made significant errors regarding the fortuity element
of insurance, erroneously reasoning that policyholders are not covered
for injuries they commit through acting unreasonably, when the entire
point of insurance is to protect policyholders when their negligence leads
to legal liability (people who were never negligent would theoretically
never face tort liability) and also failing to note that even the most careful actor can be sued by a mistaken, bitter, or strategically acting plaintiff.90
The limited scope and space of this Article precludes any attempt at
a lengthy or detailed list of examples of judicial error, but any experienced reader of cases or observer of courtroom activity undoubtedly
has experienced a few jaw-dropping moments when faced with a deeply
incorrect judicial decision. 9 1 As noted above, the aggregate statistics suggest that reviewing courts find trial judges wrong roughly forty percent
of the time. 92 I do not mean to suggest that adjudication is a paint-bynumbers enterprise. Some amount of disagreement is inevitable in many
87.

See, e.g., Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 708 (10th Cir. 1988);

see also JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LITIGATION ROAD: THE STORY OF CAMPBELL V. STATE FARM 162-67

(2008) (discussing fired insurance agent's age and religious discrimination claims, and court barring
claims as a matter of law where after discharge employer found evidence of improper behavior). See
generally Ann C. McGinley, Reinventing Reality: The Impermissible Intrusion of After-Acquired
Evidence in Title VII Litigation, 26 CONN. L. REV. 145 (1993) (setting forth background of afteracquired evidence defense and noting cases where it worked for employers in spite of its logical
incoherence and factual inaccuracy).
88.
513 U.S. 352 (1995).
89. See id. at 362-63.
90.

See I JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS § 1.06 (3d ed. 2006 &

Supp. 2009).
91.
See, e.g., Uphoff, supra note 76, at 525-27 (relating episode of very troubling trial judge
animosity toward criminal defendant drawn from professor's practice experience).
92. See supra text accompanying note 20.
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cases. Just as there has been a tendency to accept less-than-unanimous
jury verdicts, there may be a post-modem Zeitgeist counseling a less
judgmental attitude toward reversal rates and decisions with which we
disagree. It may be the appellate panel, or simply two-thirds of the appellate panel, that is incorrect. My point is simply that judicial decisionmaking appears to fall far short of the near-universal rates of affirmance,
approval, consensus, or acceptance one would expect-at least for routine matters not implicating political divisions-if judges were as infallible as they present themselves or as our legal and education system assumes them to be.
During the nearly 25 years of the Zenith-Celotex-Liberty Lobby
summary judgment trilogy,93 it has become judicially popular to sing the
praises of summary judgment and for judges to believe they can omnisciently apply Rule 5694 without error. Appellate statistics and scholarly
commentary make it quite clear that the bench is not nearly so omniscient as it supposes.95 To some extent, one must be a bit arrogant to be a
judge facing a summary judgment motion, in that the enterprise requires
supreme judicial self-confidence-an assurance that the judge absolutely
knows the permissible range of reasonable views of the evidence. But,
many judges seem to regularly go beyond this baseline minimum and
find themselves frequently declaring a singular view of the world that is
not shared by other judges, let alone legal scholars. If the facts in summary judgment motions were really not subject to genuine dispute, and
the law is reasonably clear, the affirmation rate for summary judgment
motions would be 100 percent. Even discounting the legal realism that
many statutes and case precedents are not clearly determinative of the
correct legal outcome in a given dispute, one would expect much higher
affirmation rates, and much less scholarly commentary arguing that
courts erred in applying the straightforward "no genuine dispute of material fact" standard.
. Nonetheless, judges as a class seem astonishingly confident in their
own infallibility. I witnessed a telling example during hearings regarding
the draft amendments to the discovery rules that were eventually promulgated in 1993. During an April 1993 public hearing in Atlanta, a lawyer witness stated that the majority of his colleagues opposed the proposed system of disclosure, to which an irritated Judge Sam Pointer
(Northern District of Alabama and then-Chair of the Civil Rules Committee) replied that the Committee was not conducting a "plebiscite."

93. See Stempel, supra note 16, at 107-09 (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court's 1986 summary judgment trilogy of Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986);
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317
(1986)).
94. FED. R. Ctv. P. 56.
95.
See sources cited supranote 16.
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Perhaps, but if the Committee (or at least its Chair) was so singularly
uninterested in practitioner opinion, why was it holding hearings?
Judge Pointer's relatively insular view is matched by an institutional
trend as well. The most recently constituted Federal Civil Rules Committees have been composed almost exclusively of judges.9 7 The original
Committee that drafted the 1938 Rules included a higher portion of law
professors and attorneys from government and private practice.98 Today,
the Rules Committees (Criminal, Appellate, and Bankruptcy, as well as
Civil Rules) are ninety percent judges. 99 When the process is already

highly judge-centric, one would think that the judiciary, which determines committee membership, would consider seeking more diversity of
input and participation.
In similar fashion, it appears that the bulk of judicial education
classes are taught by judges or former judges, with comparatively few
led by practitioners and even less by legal academics. 1°° And, as was
96. The short answer to my rhetorical question is that the Committee was required to hold the
hearing pursuant to the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25. If
it had been up to Judge Pointer and the other Committee members, perhaps there would have been
no public hearings. Certainly, there appear to have been no significant revisions in the Committee's
proposal as a result of public comment.
More troubling to me is the degree to which Judge Pointer's remarks reflect a certain usversus-them trench mentality in which lawyers are the enemy, advocating for a status quo that permits them to engage in income-enhancing strategic behavior rather than concerned participants in the
justice system. To be sure, some lawyers are self-serving and venal. But most of those bothering to
show up at a Rules hearing, even if well aware of client preferences (or even if funded by clients)
appear to me to take seriously their roles as officers of the court. Fortunately, in many issues of Civil
Rules revision-for example, the 1993 changes to Rule 11, and the pending changes to Rule 26
regarding expert witness discovery-the judiciary does appear to be listening to lawyers and not
discounting their concerns as mere self-interest.
As an afterward, notwithstanding my concern that Judge Pointer was unduly hostile to
lawyers who did not like the proposed 1993 discovery reforms, they have not been the mild disaster I
predicted. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Cultural Literacy and the Adversary System: The Enduring
Problems of Distrust, Misunderstanding,and Narrow Perspective, 27 VAL. U. L. REV. 313, 314-16
(1992). And Judge Pointer was a primary force (and reputedly a prime drafter) of the 1993 Amendment to Rule 11 that corrected many problems engendered by the 1983 Rule 11 Amendment.
97.

See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, CHAIRS AND REPORTERS (2009),

http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Members List-07 -2009.pdf [hereinafter CHAIRS AND REPORTERS].
98. See Resnik, supra note 35, at 499 n.24 (noting that original Rules Committee included
"leading lawyers (active in the bar and in politics) and ... law professors").
99. See CHAIRS AND REPORTERS, supranote 97.
of
Courses,
Listing
Alphabetical
2009
Coll.,
Judicial
Nat'l
100. See
http://www.judges.org/coursesalpha_- 2010.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
For example, approximately a dozen educational programs were presented at the September 2009 Conference of the American Judges Association ("50th Anniversary Celebration"), nearly
all presented by sitting judges. The exceptions were a deputy district attorney speaking about "The
Link Between Animal Cruelty and Violence to Persons," a Harvard Medical School professor, and
Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean at the UC-Irvine Law School. One session involved "Judicial Ethics" but
the speaker had not been determined by the time the program was posted. See Am. Judges Ass'n,
(2009),
Celebration
Anniversary
50th
http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/htdocs/2009Annual/SpeakerMaterials/Briefprogram.pdf.
To be sure, Chemerinsky is the gold standard among legal academics and always worth
hearing. His topic "Supreme Court of the United States Review of Recent Decisions of Significance
to State Court Judges" appears timely and useful and includes a discussion of Caperton v. Massey,
although it is only one of fifteen cases noted in his outline (coming after cases on the Fourth
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noted more than a quarter-century ago, judges appear much more focused on case management than on substantive adjudication °1 and on
preserving maximum judicial discretion even as attorney discretion is
increasingly limited. °2
III. INITIAL STEPS TOWARD IMPROVEMENT

Widespread or systemic problems ordinarily require a systemic and
far-reaching solution. Full articulation of promising avenues for reform
with even partial explanation would consume an entire law review issue.
In a nod to attempted brevity, this Part briefly lists what I regard as the
most promising initiatives, some of which are in the nature of structural
change and the composition of the bench, others in the form of rule
changes, and others that largely depend on changes in judicial attitude
and self-perception.
A. Recusal and DisqualificationReform
First, some basic recusal reform: A jurist's decision not to recuse
should always be subject to at least one level of review. Obviously, this
problem is most pronounced in the U.S. Supreme Court and in the many
state supreme courts that operate under the same each-judge-is-the-lawunto-himself system. Recusal decisions made by an individual jurist
should be subject to review before another judge, a designated review
panel, or the full court, perhaps (in state courts) with a right of further
discretionary review vested with a state judicial discipline commission.
For trial judges, unlike for some supreme court justices, including U.S.
Supreme Court justices, the current system has reasonable checks upon
judicial recusal errors. But even here, there remains room for improvement in states that do not permit at least one peremptory challenge to a
judge and do not 0provide
for chief judge review of an individual judge's
3
refusal to recuse.'

Amendment, the Confrontation Clause, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and DNA testing for
criminal
defendants).
See Erwin
Chemerinsky,
Supreme
Court Review
(2009),
http://aja.ncsc.dnii.us/htdocs/2009AnnuallSpeakerMaterials/SupremeCourtReview.pdf
(program
materials). There is little hint in the program of education about the types of heuristics and biases
that may often lead to poor recusal practice and incorrect decision-making on matters of procedural
and substantive law, although some discussion is reflected in the power point slides of Harvard
psychology professor Ronald Schouten. See Ronald Schouten, Assessing Dangerousness: Myths and
Research
(2009),
http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/htdocs/2009Annual/SpeakerMaterials/AssessingDangerousness.ppt
(program
materials). As appears usual, much of the emphasis was on case management.
101.
See Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376-78 (1982).
102.
See Edward Brunet, The Triumph of Efficiency and Discretion over Competing Complex
Litigation Policies, 10 REv. LrrIG. 273, 276-77 (1991).
103.
See FLAMM, supra note 10, chs. 17, 26-28 (noting degree to which such devices are used
in the states); see also Deborah Goldberg et al., The Best Defense: Why Elected Judges Should Lead
Recusal Reform, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 503, 526-27 (2007) (advocating greater use of peremptory
challenges and additional review to reduce disqualification errors).
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Each federal trial judge makes the initial decision about disqualification, subject to appellate review. Unfortunately, however, the recusal
decision is not ordinarily subject to immediate review, 1°4 creating both
the problem of wasted resources if a case is vacated and remanded for
recusal error, and the potential problem of appellate courts flinching
from reversing a nonrecusal decision that will necessitate repetition of a
lengthy, expensive, or inconvenient trial. Correspondingly, one potentially useful reform is making available immediate review of a judge's refusal to disqualify, either at the district court level or through expedited
interlocutory review. The latter need not be such a baroque proceeding as
to undermine the final order rule but can be a "quick look" to ensure that
the trial judge has not obviously erred. After final adjudication, an aggrieved party could continue to press the issue although, as a practical
matter, it is less likely to prevail than if there had been no previous review of the trial judge's decision to stay on the case.
Compared to federal judges, the level of review for state court
judges is often more rigorous and includes at least some immediate review. In many states, although the challenged judge makes his own initial recusal decision, the affected party may as a matter of right receive
review by the chief justice of the trial court. Thereafter, there is appellate
review and possible state supreme court review. Where failure to recuse
goes beyond mere question as to impartiality, but rises to the level of a
probability of bias, the nonrecusal may be reversed
10 5 on constitutional
grounds under the authority of Caperton v. Massey.
State trial court recusal practice seems superior to the federal model
in another regard. In the federal system, a litigant can have a judge removed as a matter of right if he moves for recusal and files an affidavit
of bias or prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144.106 However, an attorney
considering this option must have some evidentiary ground for asserting
(under oath and in the affidavit) that the challenged judge is prejudiced
or biased. 10 7 By contrast, in many states, the parties may exercise one
peremptory challenge to remove a judge as a matter of right, provided
this is done at the outset of the case. 10 8 This system allows lawyers and
litigants the necessary freedom to seek recusal without needing to develop a convincing case of bias, and permits removal of the judge where the
attorney has doubts about the judge's ability to be impartial. 109
Of course, a recusal motion is useful only if made-and making the
motion requires that a litigant or counsel have at least some information
See JAMES ET AL., supra note 17, § 12.4 (regarding final order rule and limits on interlo104.
cutory review).
129 S.Ct. 2252, 2265 (2009).
105.
See FLAMM, supranote 10, § 23.2.
106.
See id. § 23.6.
107.
108.
See Goldberg et al., supra note 103, at 522.
109.
See id. at 526.
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to bring the judge's impartiality into question. Logically, then, a stringent
disclosure requirement is also necessary for effective recusal practice.
Although judges are already required to disclose any potential basis for
challenging their participation in a case on impartiality grounds, some
consciousness-raising might be necessary to spur judges to disclose information sooner and more often.
Improved disclosure would be particularly helpful where the concern is lack of impartiality due to campaign support. In many states,
campaign funding disclosure laws are inadequate in that they do not sufficiently mandate immediate posting of campaign contributions and
amounts. Ideally, campaign contributions should be disclosed on a website immediately upon receipt, with sufficient identifying information
about the donor, particularly for organizations with patriotic-sounding
names that may merely be the front organizations for individuals or
companies.
But as the Caperton saga shows, direct campaign contributions may
be only the tip of the iceberg. All but $1,000 of the $3 million spent on
West Virginia Justice Benjamin's electoral behalf came from so-called
independent expenditures, rather than through direct contributions to the
Benjamin campaign (the state has a $1,000 limit on direct contributions).11 ° If campaign spending disclosure is to be effective, it must apply
to advocacy organizations as well. When a group with an innocuous
name like "Citizens for Better Courts" raises money, its detailed donor
list should be publically available on the web in real time.
Although I urge less attention to rulemaking and more attention to
judging, many of my prescriptions for improved judging involve proposed new rules or systems. But, simple attitude adjustment or consciousness-raising may go a long way toward improved judicial performance. Regarding recusal, an important mental adjustment for judges
would be the simple realization that judges are relatively fungible, a fact
already recognized in jurisdictions that permit peremptory challenges to
judges. If Judge X cannot hear a case, this hardly imperils justice. Judge
Y can hear the case. If the system is working reasonably well, there
should not be a great quality gap between Judge X and Judge Y.
Unfortunately, the history of judicial recusal has been an implicit
preference for holding on to a case out of misplaced pride, and concern
that recusal will impose burdens on other judges or permit strategic judge
shopping by litigants."' Most notoriously, the traditional "duty to sit"
doctrine reflected this attitude which, during its 1950-1970 heyday,
counseled judges to disqualify only in clear cases and to lean against
110.
See supranote 8 (describing Capertonmatter).
111.
See Stempel, Chief William's Ghost, supra note 13, at 814-19 (describing background and
rationale of duty to sit and its unfortunate evolution into presumption of resistance to recusal in close
cases).
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recusal in close cases. 1 2 Although what I call this "pernicious" version
of the duty to sit was removed from the ABA Model Code in 1972 and
from federal law14 in 1974,113 it persists in case dicta and remains in force
in some states.'
B. Improved Educationfor Judges
Another simple means of improving judicial performance without
amending rules or establishing new structures is improved education for
judges regarding cognitive biases and reasoning errors commonly made
by humans. For example, the experiments discussed above 1 5 might not
have had such drastic impact in judicial perceptions of the hypothetical
cases if the judges had been given even a little training in this concept so
that they could realize the degree to which mental anchors impact human
judgment.
Currently, it appears that, despite substantial judicial education in
court management, new laws, and emerging types of cases, there is little
judicial education directed toward informing the judges of the insights of
cognitive psychology and behavioral economics. 1 6 Even a day-long
course regarding anchoring, hindsight bias, status quo bias, optimism
bias, self-serving bias, the availability heuristic, and similar traits affect112.
113.
114.
115.
note 73).
116.
education

See id. at 835-36, 849-50.
Id. at 863-68.
See id. at 882-84.
See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text (discussing findings in Guthrie et al., supra

See supra note 100 and accompanying text (regarding nature and frequency of judicial
courses).
This is not to suggest that judicial education courses are completely devoid of inquiry on
these topics or that judicial education courses draw their faculty completely from the bench. However, a review of the websites, programs, and available course materials of the National Judicial College or the American Judicature Society, or the American Judges Association, The National Center
for the Study of State Courts, Federal Judicial Center and other organizations engaging in judicial
education, confirms that primary focus appears to be on case management and substantive law, with
little or no discussion of behavioral psychology literature. When judicial education materials speak
of "bias," in almost all instances they refer to race, gender, ethnic, or religious bias rather than cognitive bias. Although the increasingly raised judicial consciousness as to these topics is encouraging, it
to me suggests substantial room for improvement. Forty years after the civil rights movement of the
1950s and 1960s, it is at least good to know the bench is getting courses on race bias. A similar time
lag may accompany the bench's eventual institutionalization of courses taking a more sophisticated
approach to cognitive decision-making and impartiality.
There are, of course, some notable exceptions to the general rule; courses that appear to be
quite sophisticated and interesting regarding judicial ethics, including disqualification, as well as
regarding race and gender bias. However, the courses typically cost roughly $1,000, perhaps more,
which may suppress attendance. But see Nat'l Judicial Coll., Ethics in the Everyday Court,
http://www.judges.org/news/newsOlO509.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2010) (describing National
Judicial College course presented by sitting judge running 76 minutes and costing $50 and planning
to cover ABA Model Judicial Code and "include a discussion about recusal as it should have been
applied in the Illinois Supreme Court case Avery v. State FarmMutual Insurance Company as well
as examples from Wisconsin and West Virginia"); Cynthia Gray, Top 10 Recent Judicial Ethics
Cases, http://aja.ncsc.dni.uslhtdocs/2009AnnuallSpeakerMaterialsrroplOEthics.pdf (2009) (program
materials) (giving first discussion of Caperton v. Massey and addressing other notable recusal cases).
Perhaps an effort at not only expanding course offerings but encouraging, subsidizing, or even
mandating attendance is in order.
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ing human cognition could go a long way toward inoculating judges
against these misleading influences, or at least reducing the -influence of
these factors on judges.1 17 Organizations like the National Judicial College, the American Judicature Society, or the American Judges Association could make a special effort to add these to the curriculum and encourage attendance. State judicial administrators, as well as the Federal
Judicial Center in its efforts to educate federal judges, could promote
this.
C. Judicial Selection Reform
But, education and consciousness-raising alone will not be enough.
A useful structural change would be to move away from elections and
toward appointment of judges. Currently, nearly eighty percent of the
states elect judges to some degree." 8 Where the elections are full-blown,
knock-down, drag-out affairs similar to executive or legislative races,
there are obvious dangers that results will not bring forth the apogee of
the legal profession. Many talented lawyers simply will not want the
economic and social inconvenience of running for judge. Many will dislike the fundraising and flesh-pressing process (although they dare not
be caught on camera expressing the latter sentiment). 19
In addition, the very notion of judges as candidates listening to
constituent groups is distasteful, at least when the groups promote their
particular agendas rather than overall court reform. Judges are supposed
to be deciding cases based on the record before them and the law. Consideration of individual voter or interest group preferences as discerned
on the campaign trail (e.g., "it's time to get tough on criminals," or "legal
liability is choking business in this state," or "you should see my workers
compensation payments") have little legitimate role in the process. Although consideration of public policy and public values is legitimate,
these should be discerned from objective sources such as legislation,
history, chronicled relevant data, or even (subject to some trepidation)
personal experience, rather than from ad hoc consideration of informal
contacts with voters and supporters. It is even more disturbing to think

117.
See Guthrie, supra note 73, at 428-29 (discussing cognitive error heuristics and biases).
118.
See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2274-75 (2009) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (noting widespread state practice of electing judges in some form); Stempel, supra note
72, at 60 n.61 (citing Am. Bar Ass'n, Fact Sheet on Judicial Selection Methods in the States,
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/facLsheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2010)) (stating that nearly
forty states have either partisan elections (seven), nonpartisan elections (fourteen) or retention elections (seventeen)); see also Am. Judicature Soc'y, Judicial Selection Methods in the States,
http://www.ajs.org/selection/sel-state-select-map.asp (last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
119.

See CHARLES H. SHELDON & LINDA S. MAULE, CHOOSING JUSTICE: THE RECRUITMENT

OF STATE AND FEDERAL JUDGES 17-19 (1997) (reviewing considerations that encourage or discourage seeking of judicial office); James J. Alfini & Jarrett Gable, The Role of the OrganizedBar in
State Judicial Selection Reform: The Year 2000 Standards, 106 DICK. L. REV. 683, 705, 708 (2002)
(reviewing similar considerations).
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that a judge's notion of public policy may derive from the views of a key
supporter such as a large contributor or a media baron.
Appointment is not without its own politicking, as potential judges
jockey for favor in the eyes of those making the selections. Warren
Burger, then a judge of the D.C. Circuit, openly "ran" for the U.S Supreme Court by making speeches mirroring President-Elect Richard Nixon's campaign rhetoric on judicial philosophy. 120 Justice Sonya Sotomayor, notwithstanding her blue chip credentials, would probably not be
on the Court
if her last name were Johnson and she had grown up in
12 1
Scarsdale.
However, these sorts of political considerations are quite different
from those that threaten judicial independence and competence in an
elective system. Burger's efforts to stand out as the sort of "strict constructionist" likely to be favored by Nixon were perhaps a bit like watching a junior associate trying to chat up the managing partner in hopes of
making a good impression, but were nonetheless based on his substantive
legal views and quite relevant to the task of judging. Ethnic, racial, social, and religious diversity are all legitimate grounds for consideration in
judicial election, making Sotomayor's Puerto Rican heritage and her
professional accomplishments surmounting the poverty of her youth
germane, particularly in a country where a Hispanic has never been on
the Court and the rich generally have more access to power than the
poor.
By contrast, in an elective system, candidates can succeed through
the coalition building of tacitly pre-committing on issues to interest
groups without any need for a coherent or correct judicial philosophy.
The cunning candidate can, in the course of a day (albeit with a wink and
a nod to satisfy the Code of Judicial Conduct), tell doctors she will find
restrictions on malpractice claims constitutional, tell businesses that she
will err on the side of finding less injury and denying some treatments in
order to lower workers compensation costs, tell other businesses that she
is concerned about reported abuses of union organizing drives, inform a
church congregation of her distaste for abortion, affirm her disinclination
to strike a ballot initiative on technical grounds, and let it be known to

120.
See BOB WOODWARD & SCOTr ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT 18-25 (1979).
121.
See Damien Cave, For Hispanics, Court Pick Sets off Pride, and Some Concerns, N.Y.

TIMES,
May
27,
2009,
at
A16,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/27/us/politics/271atino.htm (noting that Obama may have nominated Sotomayor to thank the Hispanic community for their support of his 2008 campaign); Editorial, The New Justice, N.Y. TIMES,
May 27, 2009, at A26, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/27/opinion/27wed1.htm (discussing Sotomayor's background and
nomination to the Supreme Court).
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the police union that criminal defendants are likely to lose evidence suppression motions and receive harsh sentences if convicted. 122
Although some may defend this as faithful to democratic values,
lawyers should be appalled at this conflating of the judicial and the legislative functions. Where judicial candidates are forced to act like representatives, an important checking function of the judiciary is irretrievably
lost before the first judicial decision is rendered. And limited empirical
study of electoral judicial politics appears to confirm the common sense
notion that judges vote in a manner consistent
with their electoral sup123
contributions.
campaign
port, particularly
The appointment process should also be de-politicized. Particularly
at the federal level, judicial selection has become less about merit and
more about installing jurists predictably supportive of the appointing
party's agenda, preferably at a sufficiently young age that the new judge
can render favorable opinions for decades. The Burger episode noted
above, while hardly scandalous, is an illustration. Although well regarded, Warren Burger would never have made anyone's list in a vote
for the country's most able jurists or finest legal minds. At the time, the
federal bench contained many able Republican judges while law firms
and law faculties were similarly full of people with credentials equaling
or exceeding those of Judge Burger. But, in addition to talking the right
talk for a Nixon appointment, Judge Burger had a consistently conservative voting record and had distinguished himself in conservative circles
by being in frequent opposition to his colleague, D.C. Circuit Judge David Bazelon, a noted liberal. 124 The Burger choice thus made political
sense and was not an obvious error, but it was hardly an attempt to put
the nation's best legal mind on the High Court. For the past twenty years,
White House efforts to fill federal trial and appellate posts have been
marked by an effort to place noncontroversial but politically reliable
judges on the bench. Professors Farber and Sherry have criticized this
development, while taking pains to note that they do not subscribe to the
fairy tale of judges completely removed from real world considerations:
Oliver Wendell Holmes had it almost right: The life of the law is logic and experience. If the institutional structures sharpen the logic, a
122.
This would be all in the nature of a campaign day's work for a politically conservative
judicial candidate, while politically liberal judicial candidates could of course be doing just the
opposite (e.g., hinting to trial lawyers that damages caps are unconstitutional or to criminal defense
lawyers that she will be tough on the police in suppression hearings) at just as frenetic a pace.
123.
See Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions:A Case Study of Arbitration
Law in Alabama, 15 J.L. & POL. 645, 646, 661 (1999) (noting that changes in Alabama Supreme
Court decisions regarding enforceability of arbitration clauses reflect changes in Court composition,
with judges supported by business groups more favorable to arbitration); Adam Liptak & Janet
Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrorsa High Court's Rulings, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 1, 2006, at 11, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/us/0ljudges.html.
124.
See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 120, at 21-24 (discussing Burger appointment).
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life lived in the law provides the necessary experience. In that life,
the legal culture and professional norms discourage radical, politicized, or idiosyncratic decision making. The judicial selection
process ideally should reinforce these professional norms, but today
it sadly fails to do so.

The judicial appointment process is now dominated by the assumption that a nominee's political views matter more than his or her
legal acuity or judicial temperament. It was not always this way. Until the late 1980s or so, lawyers were nominated to the federal
bench-including the Supreme Court-because they were prominent
and respected, as well as usually being stalwart members of the president's party. But party affiliation is not the same as political ideology; in the past, moderate members of the president's party were more
likely to be respected by the bench and bar-and therefore more likely to be nominated and 125
confirmed-than were those on the left or
right fringes of the party.
Farber and Sherry point to the appointment of Justice Harry Blackmun to the Court as an example of an almost bygone era of reduced partisan loyalty and ideological purity in selecting nominees. Justice Blackmun made a name for himself by quietly practicing law for sixteen years
before President Eisenhower nominated him to the Eighth Circuit. He
was a moderate Republican who had supported Democrat Hubert
Humphrey's Senate campaign. In his eleven years on the Court of Appeals, Blackmun earned a reputation as a careful, hardworking, and moderate judge. His Court of Appeals opinions are not particularly ideological, and his nomination to the Supreme Court was probably prompted as
much by his long-standing friendship
with Chief Justice Warren Burger
126
as by his obvious competence.
125.
See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS: PRINCIPLE AND
POLITICS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 113, 116 (2009).
126.
Id. at 116. Continuing with another illustration, Farber and Sherry provide:
Another example of how the nomination process used to work is a current federal
district judge, whose open and repeated downward departures from the federal sentencing
guidelines in some types of drug cases led to a congressional investigation, Republican
lambasting of soft-on-crime judges, and eventually a statute limiting judges' authority to
depart downward (which was recently overturned by the Supreme Court in United States
v. Booker [543 U.S. 220 (2005)]). How did this apparently partisan judge get to the
bench? Well, he was a respected local lawyer who managed the election campaign of a
successful congressional candidate, which led to his appointment as U.S. Attorney, which
in turn led to his nomination to the federal bench. And before you jump to any conclusions: The congressional candidate was a Republican, and the supposedly soft-on-crime
judge in question was appointed to both the U.S. Attorney position and the federal judgeship by President Ronald Reagan.
Id. at 116-17 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2004).
The judge unnamed by Farber and Sherry is James Rosenbaum (D.-Minn.), with whom I
worked on the successful 1978 U.S. Senate campaign of Rudy Boschwitz (R.-Minn) (serving in the
Senate until defeated by the late Paul Wellstone in the 1990 election). Having seen Judge Rosenbaum close-up in the campaign, and as a judge when I practiced in Minnesota, and as a law professor
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To the extent that states mix appointment with retention election,
these sorts of problems are mitigated but hardly eliminated. The incumbent appointed judge facing a retention election in Missouri Plan-like
systems has a decided advantage over the judicial challenger, but nonetheless remains vulnerable to public rejection for reasons that may have
little to do with judicial performance. In addition, the incumbent has a
record that can be distorted, while a challenger, if pulled from the ranks
of the practicing bar, may have essentially no record. Even if the challenger has represented unsavory clients, there is always the excuse that
even the despicable are entitled to an attorney. Advocacy groups can be
particularly adept at turning a legally correct vacation of an erroneously
imposed sentence, or reversal based on clear evidentiary error, into a
television advertisement asserting that the incumbent judge cares more
about criminals than victims.
In addition to appointment, states may want to consider life tenure
or long terms of office (presumably subject to reappointment rather than
retention election) , although there are obvious costs and benefits to such
an approach. On the plus side, life tenure or long terms increase judicial
independence, not only in substantive legal decision-making but also in
judicial administration. 127 On the negative side, this may encourage the
type of excessive self-confidence and even arrogance that also creates
problems. Again, Caperton v. Massey provides an example. As noted
above, Justice Benjamin badly erred in failing to recuse and conducted
himself in a manner that some observers might regard as a pretext for
favoritism or even corruption. But however excised any portion of the
West Virginia electorate may be, they must wait until 2016 to register
their displeasure at the ballot box. In states with the more common sixyear terms, Justice Benjamin would face the voters in November 2010,

occasionally reading his judicial opinions, I concur with Farber and Sherry that he is exactly the type
of high caliber professional jurist to which the system aspires. Judge Rosenbaum appears to be a true
political moderate, a trait that caused some problems during the Boschwitz Senate campaign, in that
he was not always warmly received by more conservative elements of the state Republican party
who wished he were more conservative and partisan. His overly candid comments about the harshness of the sentencing guidelines earned him more than a little grief from legislators, the public, and
other judges (who reportedly resented having the spotlight shown on what was a relatively common
practice because of the harsh and inflexible sentencing guidelines). But it hardly negates his credentials and track record as the type of non-ideological judicial centrist desired under a system committed to the rule of law tempered with justice and equity. That Judge Rosenbaum was vilified for
telling the truth about problems with the sentencing guidelines during an era of highly ideological
appointments, such as those of Justices John Roberts and Samuel Alito, makes a tellingly negative
comment on the current state of the appointment process.
127.
For anecdotal proof, just visit federal and state court trials. Federal judges generally brook
no shenanigans from counsel, clients or witnesses, and run the metaphorical "tight ship" in court. By
contrast, many state court judges, sensitive to lawyer survey results published in the local press and
unwilling to alienate potential campaign contributors, tend to grant attorneys far more leeway, resulting in stage whispers, speaking objections, and mini-editorials and closing arguments in the midst of
trial, as well as unfair innuendo in questioning witnesses. Although clever (but ethically challenged)
lawyers can do this in federal court, counsel often need not even be clever to get away with such
conduct in state court.
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while 12his
Caperton failings were still relatively fresh in the public
8
mind.
To the extent states are unwilling for political reasons to go toward
a purely appointive system, election systems can be reformed to increase
and improve the information provided to the voter and to reduce the potentially corrupting influence of money in judicial electoral conflict. In
29
addition to merit selection and Missouri Plan-style retention elections,'
public financing of campaigns appears to be capable of limiting the influence of monied interests, 130 although a judge confident of the support
of really wealthy persons or entities can evade the system by refusing
public funding and remaining free of spending limits. 3 '
D. PoliticalParty Designationfor Judges
Another promising reform is the use of political party designation
for judges, 32 although it undoubtedly cuts against the grain of the traditional view that judges should be "non-partisan." But the idea of a purely
non-partisan judge is fiction. Any person interested in law must be interested enough in public policy issues to have formed basic political views.
Judges know whether they are Democrats or Republicans (or at least the
direction they lean if independents). Similarly, most of the bar and interest group community (unless the jurisdiction is very large) also know the
judge's political leanings. When judicial candidates cannot list party affiliation, only the less sophisticated parts of the electorate (which is, unfortunately, most of the electorate) are kept in the dark.
After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 133 there is a serious
constitutional question as to whether a prohibition on party identification
can be enforced because of the First Amendment rights of the candidate
128.
See Stempel, supra note 3, at 48.
129.
See Alfini & Gable, supra note 119, at 691 (describing Missouri Plan and similar merit
selection appointment with retention elections). See generally Henry R. Glick, The Promise and the
Performance of the Missouri Plan: Judicial Selection in the Fifty States, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 509
(1978) (describing the Missouri Plan).
130.
See Michael W. Bowers, Public Financing of Judicial Campaigns: Practicesand Prospects, 4 Nev. L.J. 107, 116-17 (2003).
131.
This seems inarguable given the First Amendment doctrine related to political speech and
campaign spending set forth in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) (setting forth constitutional
limits on legislation restricting campaign contributions). Similarly, candidates for U.S. President are
offered public financing that, if accepted, requires them to observe certain spending limits. However,
if the candidate does not accept federal money, the candidate need not adhere to spending restrictions. See Peter Nicholas & Janet Hook, Campaign '08: Race for the White House: Obama Sets His
Own Terms for the Race, L.A. TIMES, June 20, 2008, at A1, available at 2008 WLNR 11647946
(observing that candidate Barack Obama rejected federal funding in order not to be bound by federal
spending limits).
132.
See David W. Adamany, The Party Variable in Judges' Voting: Conceptual Notes and a
Case Study, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 57, 72 (1969) (arguing that voters would choose candidates that
share their party preference because it "is a good forecaster of judicial conduct.").
133.
536 U.S. 765 (2002) (striking down on First Amendment grounds restriction on judicial
candidates announcing position on legal issues even if issues may be raised in matter coming before
the court).
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and the voter. Rather than fighting a rear-guard action against expanding
information available to the voter, states that elect judges should strongly
consider movement toward permitting party designation on the ballot.
Although this will be decried in some quarters as partisanship, the net
effect will be to provide voters with substantially more information cues
than are currently received.
Knowing whether a judge is willing to identify as Republican or
Democrat tells the voters quite a bit about a candidate, much more than
the average lay voter will be able to discern from the candidate's stump
speeches or a few televised debates.1 34 In addition, party designation
could inject the leavening expertise of the party endorsement process into
judicial races. A candidate with the party endorsement could be so designated on the ballot, presumably an advantage even if other candidates
indicate their political preferences. The party's official endorsement provides an additional layer of scrutiny, and a vetting party designation does
not mean that judges elected as Republicans always rule for Republican
135
litigants or vice versa.
Fair application of the rules of disqualification
136
this.
should prevent
Party designation would improve and expand voter cues by giving
the voters at least some information about the judge's likely views about
tort liability, executive power, criminal defendant rights and sentencing,
as well as civil rights and job discrimination claims. 1 But this is a rela134.
"Members of the general public simply do not have enough legal expertise to have an
informed opinion, any more than they know enough about medicine or economics to respond to
[hypothetical polls on medicine and economics]." FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 125, at 117-18
(also noting that when Chief Justice Rehnquist's death created a vacancy in that post, public opinion
polls showed Justice O'Connor as the preferred replacement, followed by former New York Mayor
Rudolph Giuliani). Although Giuliani is a prominent lawyer and politician, it is unlikely members of
the general public outside New York City (where he was U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of
New York during the 1980s) know anything about his legal acuity and judicial temperament. In the
New York legal community, Giuliani's performance as U.S. Attorney gets mixed reviews, with
substantial criticism of his purported grandstanding in making arrests. See DANIEL FISCHEL,
PAYBACK: THE CONsPIRACY To DESTROY MICHAEL MILKEN AND His FINANCIAL REVOLUTION
112-114 (1995) (noting criticism of Giuliani for televised arrests of non-dangerous white collar
criminals hauled off in handcuffs). Adding to other problems with lay selection of professional
offices is the public's fickleness. See Michael Cooper & Megan Thee, Resurgent McCain is Florida
Victor; Giuliani Far Back, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 30, 2008, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com20O8/01l/30/us/politics/30florida.htm
(reporting Giuliani's dramatically
unsuccessful race for the 2008 Republican presidential nomination).
135.
See Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 775-76 (defining impartiality as ruling without regard to identity of litigants rather than absence of views on legal issues).
136.
For example, if a litigant is the County Chair of the judge's political party, there would
appear to be reasonable question as to the judge's ability to be impartial and the case should be
assigned to another judge. A closer question is whether a judge from an opposing political party (as
contrasted with a judge identified as an "independent") is disqualified due to a fear of ruling against
a political opponent. The correct answer to the recusal question in cases like these is correspondingly
fact-dependent.
137.
To state what I regard as an obvious but not empirically well-documented truth: Republican judges are more likely to be resistant to tort liability, supportive of executive power, harsher
toward criminal defendants, and more skeptical of job discrimination or civil rights claims, while
Democratic judges will likely tend in the opposite direction. To the extent that law, precedent, and
the evidentiary record in the case are constraining, the judge's overall political orientation should in
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tively crude cue. In general, a rational voter would associate Republicans
with greater skepticism regarding tort, civil rights, and discrimination
claims and a tougher attitude toward crime and criminal defendants,
while associating Democratic candidates with largely opposite inclinations. But these broad-brush characterizations can easily become misleading caricatures. For elections to work most effectively, the public
must be comparatively well informed about candidate jurisprudential
views. Local media play a key role in determining the information that
reaches the voter-and largely has fallen down on the job.
Typical media coverage of a judicial election includes a brief profile
of the candidate and publication of the candidate's preferred 200-word
statement or a skeletal question-and-answer interview that usually does
not include probing or sophisticated analysis. Seldom have reporters had
legal training. Often, whatever print media coverage exists of judicial
races comes in the form of a "voter's guide" contained in a paper appearing shortly before the election, often containing information about other
offices on the ballot as well. Under these circumstances, the average voter is unlikely to even focus on the judicial race information let alone retain any of it. Furthermore, because most judicial races lack official Republican and Democratic candidates, there may be three or more candidates for a given 38seat, which reduces the voter's ability to focus and
choose rationally. 1
In addition, similar candidates may split the vote that would ordinarily accrue to that type of candidate, resulting in the election of a candidate who enjoys the support of only a distinct minority of the electorate.
In a hypothetical race with three assistant prosecutors and a public defender, the prosecutors may largely split the "law-and-order" vote, with
the public defender winning with the support of only a shade more than
one quarter of the electorate. Although defendant rights advocates might
applaud this result, it clearly undermines the ideal of elections reflecting
majority voter sentiment.
One need not look too far for real world examples. In 2006, five
candidates vied for a single state trial judgeship in Nevada. Elizabeth
Halverson, a former judicial clerk, ran against four men-all seemingly
more qualified according to the common norm of years of experience in
practice-and won a surprising victory generally attributed to her status

theory not affect outcomes but almost certainly does in close cases. But this undoubtedly happens
even when the judge's party preference is not on the ballot. At least under a party designation system, the voter has more information about the judge that can be used in casting a ballot based on the
voter's own preferences regarding tort liability, executive power, defendants' rights, discrimination,
and the like.
See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, StandardForm Contracts,and Unconsciona138.
bility, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1203, 1217 (2003) (observing that people typically can concentrate on only
a limited number of options in making choices).
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as the only woman in the race. 139 After taking the bench, problems developed in her relations with other judges and complaints emerged regarding her judicial performance, resulting in her suspension in 2007 and
eventual removal in 2008.14° When the story broke, reporters dug deeper
into Judge Halverson's background and found that she was subject to an
unpaid judgment in California, that her husband was an ex-convict, and
that her lifestyle was bizarre.14 1 Would even the most feminist of voters
have supported Judge Halverson had she known this about the candidate?
At the very least, this was information voters should have known, but did
not.
The local press, of course, can be forgiven for not having vetted
candidate Halverson very well. There were more than twenty judicial
offices on the ballot as well as other electoral matters to occupy the time
of the reporters. Which leads to another proposed non-rulemaking
reform: stagger judicial elections in a manner that minimizes the judicial
contests each year so that the press has more opportunity to investigate
and question candidates, and voters have more time to glean and examine
information about the candidates. Although this is hardly likely to be a
panacea, it will make for better voter choices at the margin and probably
allow avoidance of embarrassing judicial election outcomes A la Halverson. Even without formal changes of this type, the news media could on
its own motion improve the timing, duration, and depth of its coverage of
judicial races.
E. Increased Support and Review of Judges
Another change that does not involve the civil or criminal rules is
simply providing better logistical and intellectual support to the judges.
Although the usual wish list is so well established to be tattered at the
edges, there is almost no doubt that better facilities, improved technology, more staff, and more funds for staff training and enrichment would
all improve judicial performance at the margin. Once again, however,
judges can help themselves through more prudent behavior. With sometimes disturbing frequency, for example, judges often hire their law
clerks based on connections rooted in family or their former lives as
practitioners or political activists. Many times this is prescription for
hiring inferior clerks who in turn produce inferior, inadequately re139.
See Jon Ralston, Op-Ed., Jon Ralston Says Voters Can'tBe Trusted to Select Judges, LAS
VEGAS SuN, Nov. 19, 2008, at 5, available at 2008 WLNR 22090726 (stating that Halverson won
because voters often pick women in judicial races).
140.
See In re Halverson, 169 P.3d 1161, 1170-71 (Nev. 2007).
141.
See Brian Haynes, Judge's Husband Has Long Rap Sheet, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., May 26,
2007, at I B, availableat http://www.lvj.com/news/7700407.html (noting husband's criminal record
and that the county cited the couple because their front yard was filled with garbage); Jane Ann
Morrison, Judicial Commission Might Have a Say on Halverson Controversy, LAS VEGAS REV.-J,
May 31, 2007, at lB, available at http://www.lvrj.com/news/7761837.html (commenting on Halverson's $42,000 unpaid judgment from California).
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searched, poorly drafted opinions, perhaps without adequate vetting of
the precedents cited by the litigants.
Even where the judge properly determines to hire law clerks on merit rather than connection, it appears that judges seldom go beyond the
papers submitted by the applicant. In 25 years of teaching, I have had
only three judges who ever called regarding a judicial clerkship applicant
(I have written scores of letters, which I hope are paid at least some heed
by the judges or their current clerks during the screening of applicants).
Although I do not claim omniscience about which law graduates will be
better law clerks, I have a pretty good idea. A conversation provides the
opportunity for a more nuanced view of a candidate recommended by a
professor, to compare candidates from the same law school, and to provide a second or third opinion about a candidate by talking to a faculty
member who did not write a recommendation letter. Frankly, I am surprised not to get more calls (however much I might complain if inundated with calls). Hiring law clerks is one of the most important activities
of the judge. One would expect more digging prior to a hire. 142
Beyond the selection process, an obvious avenue for improvement
is more stringent review of judicial performance. The primary mode of
checking judicial error, of course, is appeal. While appellate quality control does not appear to be performing badly, room for improvement abounds. The average time for disposition of a garden-variety federal appeal is roughly eighteen months. While not horrendous, neither is it fast
enough to satisfy those who might invoke the traditional "justice delayed
is justice denied" mantra. In state systems, average appellate disposition
times can be three years or more, a disturbingly long time. In nearly a
fifth of the states, the absence of an intermediate appellate court places
this burden on state supreme courts, extending delay, resulting in more
decisions without opinion or in per curiam opinions (which probably
means more staff decision-making than is healthy).
In addition, many state supreme courts, like federal appellate courts,
sit in panels of three. In the federal system, this is unproblematic for
most cases. However, where a case is close, important, or presents particularly complex issues, en banc consideration would seem apt. But caseload and court size inhibits en banc review, perhaps too much. These
issues seem more problematic at the state court level, where many state
142.
A related problem is that some judges give substantial consideration to non-merit factors
in hiring clerks, such as personal, family, business, church, social, or law firm connections. This, of
course, is the judge's prerogative. But when judges exercise that prerogative, they risk producing
lower quality work because they are getting lower quality assistance from their clerks. At the very
least, one would expect such judges never to complain about the quality of a law school's clerks
unless they are hiring based on evaluations suggested by the law school (e.g., grades, co-curricular
activities, research papers). A clerk in the bottom quartile of the class who is the son of a family
friend will always suffer in comparison to a clerk selected from a more distant law school on the
basis of merit.
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supreme courts-even those with elected judges-sit primarily in panels
of three. Where justices are elected, disposition by panel seems a betrayal of democracy. In an elected judicial system the voters are at least in
theory making well-informed choices and are aware of the candidates'
jurisprudential and ideological preferences. If this is so, many voters may
choose Candidate A over Candidate B out of a desire to bring some ideological or jurisprudential change or balance to the Court. A centrist voter
may, for example, rationally support Candidate A, even though the candidate is a judicial-social-political-ideological conservative, out of a feeling that the Court as a whole is too judicially, socially, politically or
ideologically liberal.
But when the Court decides most cases in panels of three, the system undermines the voter's attempt to act rationally, at least along this
dimension. For example, Candidate-cum-Judge A may be routinely
paired with Judge X, another conservative, and Judge Y, a moderate,
producing opinions that are considerably more conservative than the
voter anticipated would result from his effort to cast a vote in favor of
balance on the full court. In the meantime, another panel composed of
Judges C, D, and E may be rendering opinions far more liberal than preferred by the voter. Voter preferences and expectations are thwarted
when cases are decided by less than the full state supreme court.
If courts are to be selected via election in the manner of a legislature, the entire court should function as one deliberative body in the
manner of a legislature for all cases. Panel disposition is at odds with this
principle. Defenders of panel disposition may counter that because of
law's general constraining and non-political nature, panel disposition
makes no difference. If this is so, however, the case for elections is seriously undermined. If adjudication is not significantly political, judges
should be chosen on the basis of technical expertise via appointment
14 3
rather than through the inevitably political process of the ballot box.
In addition, judicial performance should be subject to disciplinary
review. In this regard, states arguably are ahead of the federal system. If
a federal judge errs, there is little the system can do outside of appeal or
occasional removal from a case through disqualification. Federal judges
are subject to removal via impeachment, which is a rare event. By contrast, state judges are subject to judicial discipline via the respective
state's judicial discipline commission (sometimes called a judicial investigation commission). These commissions have power to investigate
complaints or initiate investigations of their own, and possess an array of
sanctions. The commissions may punish not only corruption, but also
143.
Defenders of panel decision-making on state supreme courts may also argue that courts
can grant en banc review where the case is deemed sufficiently uncertain that its outcome could vary
depending on panel composition. Although this is a fine argument in theory, it likely founders in
practice because of the inertia in favor of using panels as a case management tool.
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incompetence, unseemly behavior, and abuse of office. In most all states,
commission decisions may be challenged before the state supreme court,
making it unlikely that commission actions will unduly undermine judicial independence.'44
At perhaps a level of tinkering with the system, one might consider
changes in judicial compensation, linking pay to performance (as measured by reversal rates or some other metric), productivity (as measured
by opinions produced), or influence (as measured by citation). Although
there are obvious logistical impediments and substantive concerns, some
consideration might be given to moving at least somewhat away from the
traditional lockstep compensation of the judiciary.
Consideration should also be given to revising the traditional 9-to-5,
Monday-through-Friday orientation of the court system. For example,
one means of speeding court disposition is extending the operating hours
of the court to include evenings and weekends. Although this is perhaps
impracticable for jury trials because of the lifestyle preferences of lay
jurors, it should not preclude judges from holding oral arguments or evidentiary hearings at off hours in order to move cases along while continuing to preside over jury trials.
With speed- and efficiency-oriented reforms, of course, there lies
the danger of elevating logistical aspects of case management above legal erudition and careful adjudication. Certainly, one serious criticism of
judging during the past three decades is the shift from a culture of adjudication to one of pretrial disposition and choreographed, mildly coerced
settlement. 145
Although the line to walk is a fine one, I continue to think that efficiency-oriented reforms are compatible with high-quality adjudication.
But the focus should not be so much on getting rid of cases as on adjudicating them more thoroughly, accurately, and rapidly. The trick is in expanding judicial resources directed toward adjudication (such as motion
hearings on Saturday, more law clerks, or working late on a written opinion) rather than expending these resources for case tracking or endless
settlement conferences. For the most part, settlement should be managed
by counsel and the parties or aided through third party neutrals other than
the judge (although this creates another source of expenditures). While
this transpires, judges should be holding trials and deciding motions to
create46the shadow of law within which lawyers and litigants will bargain.

144.
See ALFINIET AL., supranote 10, ch. 13.
145.
See generally Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation to Private Justice: Legal Practice at
War with the Professionand Its Values, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 931 (1993).
146.
See Robert H. Mnookint & Lewis Komhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950 (1979) (popularizing the "shadow of the law" metaphor).
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As with much of what I'm suggesting, changes in rules, statutes,
regulations, or administrative protocols can only go so far. Much of what
is required is some attitude adjustment in the judiciary and a willingness
to weigh costs and benefits more broadly. Under the current regime,
spurred by the odes to pretrial disposition such as those set forth in the
1986 summary judgment trilogy, courts appear to operate under the premise that a grant of a Rule 12 motion or a summary judgment motion or
judgment as a matter of law is always more efficient than adjudication by
trial. But to date no one has actually counted the relative costs and benefits. Considering the immense attorney and judicial investment in assessing, deciding, and defending these motions, including appellate consideration, it would not be surprising if undue emphasis on pretrial disposition
proved more costly overall in ordinary matters, simple cases, or disputes
where trial will not consume many days. Although there are some judicial legitimacy concerns, a new regime inclined to adjudicate via trial
except when the case for pretrial disposition is clear might be more efficient overall with no discernible decrease in justice.
CONCLUSION

Obviously, my if-I-could-change-civil-litigation wish list is longer
and less developed than more targeted proposals to change rule language
or substantive legal provisions. I also acknowledge swimming substantially against the tide. But, the past twenty-five years of rule revision,
despite some accomplishment, appears not to have substantially improved case disposition, and instead has tended to decrease access to the
courts. Now seems the hour to shift from rule revision as the primary
vehicle of adjudicatory reform to a focus on the judges applying those
rules, including their selection, education, and training, and the structural
and logistical system in which they operate.

THE LIMITATIONS OF TRANSSUBSTANTIVE PROCEDURE:
AN ESSAY ON ADJUSTING THE "ONE SIZE FITS ALL"

ASSUMPTION
STEPHEN N. SUBRlN1
INTRODUCTION

I have argued for three decades that the underlying transsubstantive
philosophy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is flawed.' Early on,
such luminaries as Professors Geoffrey Hazard and Paul Carrington
(former Reporter to the Federal Rules Advisory Committee) strenuously
attacked my assault and the assault of others on the transsubstantive assumption.2 This makes it particularly heartening that in March 2009, the
Final Report of The American College of Trial Lawyers Task Force on
Discovery and The Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal
System supported our position: "The 'one size fits all' approach of the
current federal and most state rules is useful in many cases but rulemakt
Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law. My thanks to my friends Steve
Burbank and Thom Main for their helpful comments on an earlier draft. Steve Burbank and I have
been discussing many of the issues discussed in this Essay for twenty-five years. This past summer
we worked on an unpublished manuscript entitled "Litigation and Democracy," which again probes
some of the same issues. At this point we are often uncertain which idea was initially whose. It is
likely that the best points originated with Steve and more than likely that the mistakes are my own.
1. E.g., Stephen N. Subrin, Op-Ed, The Law and the Rules, N.Y. TtMEs, Nov. 10, 1979, at 23
("Applying the rules to all cases, big and small, has proved disastrous.... We need a less-expansive
process. Otherwise, ordinary disputes will continue to blossom into Federal Cases."); Stephen N.
Subrin, The Empirical Challenge to Procedure Based in Equity: How Can Equity Procedure Be
Made More Equitable, in EQUITY AND CONTEMPORARY LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS 761, 788, 792
(Stephen R. Goldstein ed., 1992) [hereinafter Subrin, Equity More Equitable]; Stephen N. Subrin,
Reflections on the Twin Dreams of Simplified Procedure and Useful Empiricism, 35 W. ST. U. L.
REv. 173, 187 (2007) [hereinafter Subrin, Simplified Procedure];Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points
and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Casefor Selective Substance-Specific Procedure,46 FLA.
L. REv. 27, 41 (1994) [hereinafter Subrin, Substance-Specific]; Stephen N. Subrin, FederalRules,
Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging ProceduralPatterns, 137 U.
PA. L. REv. 1999, 2038-43, 2048-51 (1989) [hereinafter, Subrin, FederalRules]; Stephen N. Subrin,
How Equity ConqueredCommon Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909, 985 (1987) [hereinafter Subrin, HistoricalPerspective].
The possibility of different procedures for some cases for contemporary civil litigation is not "some
newfangled idea." Subrin, Substance-Specific, supra, at 55 (citing comments by Benjamin Kaplan
when he was Reporter to the Advisory Committee suggesting consideration of different procedures
for different cases, as well as similar suggestions by others). Stephen B. Burbank has urged modification of transsubstantive procedure on several occasions. Some of them are listed in Subrin, Substance-Specific, supra, at 28 n.4. For others who have discussed transsubstantivity, pro and con, see
infra note 18. The term "trans-substantive" (many of us do not now use the hyphen) was probably
first used by Robert Cover. Robert M. Cover, For James Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 718 (1975).
2. Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An
Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-trans-substantiveRules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2067,
2068-69 (1989); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-substantive Virtues in the
FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237,2238 (1989).
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ers should have the flexibility to create different sets of rules for certain
types of 3cases so that they can be resolved more expeditiously and efficiently."
By transsubstantive, I mean two things: the notion that the same
procedural rules should be available for all civil law suits: (1) regardless
of the substantive law underlying the claims, or "case-type" transsubstantivity; and (2) regardless of the size of the litigation or the stakes involved, or "case-size" transsubstantivity. I use the term "transsubstantive" to cover both. One could have case-type transsubstantive procedure, but not have case-size transsubstantive procedure. For instance,
large cases (however defined), regardless of the underlying substantive
law, could have one set of procedures, and smaller size cases, regardless
of the underlying substantive law, could have a modified set of procedures.
A "one size fits all" underlying assumption for procedural rules carries with it the necessity to decide the type of rules for all cases. When
drafters of procedural rules decide to go the transsubstantive route, they
have in effect made one decision that forces upon them another. The first
decision is to have rules that will apply to all cases. The second is the
overall nature of those uniform rules.
In this Essay, I explain both the nineteenth and twentieth century
decisions to adopt transsubstantive procedure, borrowing from equity as
the model. I then discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the transsubstantive/equity decision, and why, on balance, I think the combined decision needs readjustment. I end with suggestions for change, including a
simpler procedural track for some cases and non-binding protocols for
discovery and other procedural incidents for some of the more expansive
and expensive case-types.
I. LAW AND EQUITY AND THE TRANSSUBSTANTIVE FIELD CODE
DECISION

There were two major occasions in the past two centuries when decisions were made about the nature of the procedures to govern civil litigation in the United States. The first was the drafting of the Field Code
in New York in the mid-nineteenth century. That code, adopted in New
York in 1848, was copied by over half of the states; those states covered
almost sixty percent of the country's population.4 The second was the
3.
AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY & INST. FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT
OF
THE
AM.
LEGAL
Sys.,
FINAL
REPORT
4
(2009),

http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/pubs/ACTL-IAALS%2OFinal%20Report%20Revised%204-1509.pdf [hereinafter ACTIJIAALS, FINAL REPORT].

4.

For the history of David Dudley Field and the Field Code, see Stephen N. Subrin, David

Dudley Field and the Field Code: A HistoricalAnalysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW &

HIST. REv. 311 (1988). The information on the number of states and people covered by the Field
Code is found in Subrin, HistoricalPerspective, supra note 1, at 939 n.170.
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drafting of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Advisory Committee that drafted the Federal Rules was appointed in 1935, and the drafting
was essentially accomplished in 1935 through 1937. The Federal Rules
became law in 1938. 5 About half the states adopted those rules in substantial degree,6 including their numbering. Most other states were influenced by them.
In both instances, the drafters chose to create a transsubstantive procedural system, in the case-type sense and the case-size sense. The New
York legislature appointed a committee that was given the task of drafting rules that merged what had previously been rules for law courts and
rules for equity courts. To understand the transsubstantive preference of
the Field Code, and later the Federal Rules, a little knowledge about historic law and equity, and their differences, is necessary.
Historically in England, there were two different procedural systems
for major civil litigation: law and equity. The common law courts (called
"law courts") required the plaintiff to confine his case to a single writ
with limited joinder of parties.7 Each writ covered what we would think
of as one cause of action. There was a complicated pleading system that
required the parties to go back and forth (declaration, answer, joinder,
surrejoinder, etc.) until the case became limited to one legal or one factual issue. If factual, a jury decided it. If legal, the issue was left to
judges. Depending on the writ chosen, there were different procedures.
By choosing a writ, one knew what allegations had to be placed in it, as
well as other matters, such as when procedural steps had to take place
and what interim remedies were permitted. Monetary damages were the
typical relief in common law cases. Procedure was so paramount to the
English common law system that the legal anthropologist Henry Maine
contended, "substantive law has at first the look of being gradually secreted in the interstices of procedure.",8 This was a non-transsubstantive
procedural system: different procedural requirements for different substantive claims.

5. See Subrin, HistoricalPerspective, supranote 1, at 973.
6. For the history of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Enabling Act that authorized the Rules, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015
(1982) and Subrin, HistoricalPerspective, supra note 1, 943-75. The information on state adoption
of the Federal Rules is found in Subrin, HistoricalPerspective, supra note 1, at 910 n.4.
7.
For the history of the common law procedural system in England, see Subrin, Historical
Perspective, supra note 1, at 914-18. A truly magnificent casebook (actually the most beautiful
casebook I have ever seen) has just been published examining and explaining in detail (with pictures) the development of the common law and Anglo-American legal institutions. JOHN H.
LANGBEIN, RENEE LETITOW LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (2009). For a description of the writ

system and common law courts, see id. at 85-125. For a description of Chancery and the "Rise of
Equity," see id. at 267-334.
8.

HENRY SUMNER MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389 (1886), cited

in Subrin, HistoricalPerspective, supra note 1, at 915 n.28.
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There was another way in which historic English procedure was
non-transsubstantive. The second court for adjudicating major civil litigation in England was the Chancery Court, called "Equity." 9 It had materially different procedure from the law courts. In Equity, the petitioner
wrote his claim in narrative form, not restricted to common law technical
pleading. The system permitted, and often required, the joinder of many
parties. There was some of what we would call "pre-trial discovery" in
Equity. There was no lay jury. 10 The Chancellor was given large discretion to decide an equity case in accordance with his understanding of
fairness and justice. The Chancellor could grant injunctive relief.ll
Each system had its benefits and burdens. Simply put, the common
law case had the benefits of definition, confinement, and predictability,
but the detriments of inflexibility and decision often based on procedural
technicality. The equity case had the benefits of multiple parties, creative
narrative pleading, some discovery, injunctive relief, and judicial discretion permitting justice based on the facts of the particular case. Not surprisingly, cases in Chancery Court were thought to be, and often were,
cumbersome, expensive, and never-ending (think Jarndyce v. Jarndyce
in Dickens' Bleakhouse). The decision of one judge, the Chancellor,
without a jury and without firm, rigorous rules, was often accused of
being arbitrary. 12
It may be that in a merged system of law and equity, drafters of procedure have to look to equity, with its more free-flowing narrative in
pleadings, rather than to individualized writs that require different allegations for different types of cases. I have previously written how the 1848
Field Code in New York ended up with some equity procedure, although
not with the latitude in pleading, joinder, and discovery inherent in the
Federal Rules. Field and the other commissioners used equity as a model.
Arphaxed Loomis, one of the original commissioners, described how he
was forced to reject common law principles and turn to equity in order to
draft a procedural code for a merged system of law and equity:
I prepared and submitted ...about 60 sections of law, based on the
Common Law System, abolishing forms of action and general issues
and requiring all pleadings to be sworn to, as to belief. I found serious difficulty in applying it to Chancery cases and in framing fixed
Common Law issues under it. I then abandoned it and drew up some
9.
For the history of the Equity procedural system in England, see Subrin, Historical Perspective, supra note 1, at 918-21.
10. See id. at 920.
11.
Seeid. at919.
12. For more detailed critiques of both law and equity, see id. at 917-18, 921, 974-75 and
Subrin, Equity More Equitable, supra note 1, in which I compare burdens and benefits of law and
equity, rule and discretion. Steve Burbank reminds me that common law pleading (because of the
need to fit within the writ) was an invitation to fictional allegations and, coupled with no or little
discovery, this led to surprise, ambush, and inefficiency at trial. This point was raised by those
arguing for reform of the common law procedural system.
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70 or 80 sections based on Chancery principles, abolishing forms of
actions, applying it to all kinds of actions .... The system approaches and assimilates more nearly with the equity forms than with those
of the common law. 13

"[F]acts constituting a cause of action" was the pleading requirement in the Field Code. 14 Lawyers argued, and courts had to decide, what
was a fact, evidence, or legal conclusion. This proved difficult and costly
because defendants were understandably drawn to motions to dismiss for
failure to meet the pleading requirement. Moreover, lawyers and judges,
schooled in the common law system, often used writs and common law
pleading as guides. The New York legislature amended the Field Code so
much between 1848 and 1897 that the initial 392 provisions ballooned to
3,441 provisions, increasing in technicality as well as size. 15 For these
and other reasons, such as the simplification of English procedure in the
Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875, there was momentum building by the
end of the nineteenth century for a new attempt to simplify American
civil procedure. This drive for simplification had particular force with
respect to procedure for the Federal District Courts.1 6 It is that history we
must turn to in order to understand how transsubstantive procedure won
the day in the twentieth century.

II. THE FEDERAL RULES TRANSSUBSTANTIVE DECISION AND THE
FURTHER TURN TO EQUITY

I have previously written in some detail about the historical background of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 17 What is most important
for this discussion is that, by the time the Advisory Committee that was
to draft the Federal Rules met in 1935, there were deeply entrenched
13.

Subrin, Historical Perspective, supra note 1, at 933 (alterations in original) (quoting

ARPHAXED LOOMIS, HISTORIC SKETCH OF THE NEW YORK SYSTEM OF LAW REFORM IN PRACTICE
AND PLEADINGS 16, 25 (1879)).

14.
1848 N.Y. Laws ch. 379, § 120(2) (71st Sess. Apr. 12, 1848). For the provision, as
amended, see 1851 N.Y. Laws ch. 479, § 142(2), reprinted in THE CODE OF PROCEDURE OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK, FROM 1848 TO 1871, at 104 (1870).

15.
For critique of the Field Code and information about the increase to 3,441 provisions (the
Throop Code), see Subrin, HistoricalPerspective, supra note 1, at 940-42. For a critique and defense of Field and the Field Code, see Subrin, supra note 4, at 338-45. For a description of the
difficulties caused by the necessity to determine what was a cause of action, fact, conclusion, ultimate fact, or evidence, see, for example, Rules of Civil Procedurefor the District Courts of the
United States: Hearing on H.R. 8892 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,75th Cong. 94 (1938)
(statement of Edgar B. Tolman, Secretary, Advisory Comm. on the Rules for Civil Procedure).
16.
On the influence of the reformed English procedure and the Judicature Acts of 1873 and
1875, see Subrin, Historical Perspective, supra note 1, at 942-43. This article also gives a detailed
description of the historical background of the Federal Rules and the lure of simplicity and equity.
See id. at 943-73; see also Janice Toran, 'Tis a Gift to Be Simple: Aesthetics and Procedural
Reform, 89 MICH. L. REv. 352 (1990).
17.
See generally Subrin, Historical Perspective, supra note 1; Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing
Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691
(1998) [hereinafter Subrin, Discovery];Stephen N. Subrin, Charles E. Clark and His Procedural
Outlook: The Disciplined Champion of Undisciplined Rules, in JUDGE CHARLES EDWARD CLARK
115 (Peninah Petruck ed., 1991) [hereinafter Subrin, Clark].
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ideas about the "ideal" procedure. First, procedure was thought to be
materially distinct from substantive law; it should merely aid in the quest
to have cases decided on the merits. 18 In the oft-quoted words of Charles
Clark, the Reporter of the Advisory Committee, procedure and pleading
should be the "handmaid rather than the mistress of justice."' 9 Second,
procedure was to be simple and flexible. The Field Code, it was argued,
had become too complicated.2 °
The simplification theme had another dimension. Since the founding of our country, there had been a series of acts that required the Federal District Courts to adhere to the procedure of the state in which the
particular court sat, unless there was contrary federal statutory law. 21
Those who wanted uniform federal rules argued that this caused great
confusion, because under the Conformity Act of 1872, the federal courts
had only to conform "as near as may be" to the state procedure "in like
causes." 22 It was asserted that many federal judges departed from state
procedure based on their own preferences, and it was difficult to know
what procedure would apply to one's case in federal court. It was also
argued that not only was the mixture of state, federal, and judge-made
procedure confusing, but the state procedure, whether based on the
common law or Field Code, was too complicated and not fit for a modem
industrial economy.2 3
At the initial behest of the American Bar Association, Congress finally passed the Rules Enabling Act in 1934 empowering the Supreme
Court to promulgate uniform federal procedural rules to apply in all federal district courts.24 If the new rules were drafted to apply to both law
and equity cases, the statute required the Court to present them to Congress, with an opportunity to veto them before they became law. Charles
18.
For a detailed, sophisticated, and recent description of the importance of the separation of
procedure and substantive law in order to support the transsubstantive nature of the Federal Rules,
see David Marcus, The Past, Present and Future of Trans-substantivityin FederalCivil Procedure,
59 DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 6 n.17), available at
http://ssm.conabstract=1428992 (Marcus provides a "nonexhaustive list of significant discussions
of trans-substantivity").
19.
Charles E. Clark, History, Systems and Functions of Pleading, 11 VA. L. REV. 517, 542
(1925) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Coles, [1907] 1 K.B. 4); see also Charles E.
Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 297 (1938); Charles E. Clark, Procedural
Fundamentals, 1 CONN. B.J. 67, 67-68 (1927); Charles E. Clark, The Code Cause of Action, 33
YALE L.J. 817, 819 (1924). A collection of Clark's essays even bears the same moniker. PROCEDURE
-THE HANDMAID OF JUSTICE: ESSAYS OF JUDGE CHARLES E. CLARK (Charles Alan Wright &
Harry M. Reasoner eds., 1965). Clark was actually citing from an English case.
20.
See Subrin, HistoricalPerspective,supra note 1, at 941.
21.
For the history of these process and conformity acts, and the critique by Enabling Act
proponents about their alleged failings, see Burbank, supra note 6, 1036-42.
22.
Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197.
23.
In addition to Burbank's description of the pro-Enabling Act position with regard to the
process and conformity acts, see Subrin, HistoricalPerspective, supra note 1, at 957-58 & n.284.
24.
Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (2006)). A reliable, thorough, and detailed history of the A.B.A.'s battle to have the
Enabling Act adopted is found in Burbank, supra note 6, at 1043-98. I explore the politics and
ideology leading to the Enabling Act in Subrin, HistoricalPerspective,supra note I, at 943-70.
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Clark, then Dean at Yale School, lobbied intensely (with the help of
James William "Bill" Moore, who was studying at Yale) to have the Supreme Court authorize the drafting of rules for both law and equity cases. 25 They argued, quite persuasively, that it was inefficient to have two
different systems, with both judges and lawyers frequently uncertain in
which court a case should be brought. Moreover, it was costly to have
the same factual situation considered, and sometimes tried, by two different courts. Clark carried the day, especially with the help of William
D. Mitchell, who became the Chairman of the Advisory Committee. The
Supreme Court appointed the Committee, with Clark as the Reporter and
head draftsman. The Court authorized the committee to draft uniform
rules for the Federal District Courts that would
26 apply to both law and
system.
merged
a
creating
thereby
cases,
equity
It was almost inevitable that the Advisory Committee would draft
transsubstantive rules, and that those rules would be equity based. Professors Stephen Burbank of the University of Pennsylvania Law School,
David Marcus of the University of Arizona Law School, and I, have read
the transcripts of the deliberations of this initial Advisory Committee.27
We have not found any debate about whether the rules would be uniform
in the sense that the same rules would apply to all cases. The Advisory
Committee talked about uniformity in the sense that the same rules
would apply in all Federal District Courts (one of the members of the
Committee, Edson Sunderland, had argued that the Enabling Act permitted or obligated each District Court to continue to apply the procedure of
the state in which it was located). 28 But they did not debate transsubstantivity;29 rather, they assumed that the rules would apply uniformly to all
cases.
Why was transsubstantive procedure virtually inevitable? First, it
took the English centuries to evolve to the different writs with their different procedural incidents. What is the likelihood that the fourteen lawyers on the Advisory Committee either had the expertise to craft different
procedures for different cases or that they could agree on which distinct
procedures should apply to which cases? Second, the whole atmosphere
in which the Enabling Act was passed was infused with talk of simplicity. Different rules for different case types, if done on a substantive law
basis, is far from simple. There are non-transsubstantive features that one
could beneficially blend with the current Federal Rule system, as I will
argue later in this Essay. However, the view of simplicity at the time the
25.
I have told this story in detail in Subrin, Clark, supra note 17, at 116-37.
26.
Id. at 138.
27.
Much of what we found is explained in detail in Burbank, supra note 6, at 1132-84;
Marcus, supra note 18, at 30-35; and Subrin, HistoricalPerspective, supra note 1, at 973-82. I have
discussed this point with both other professors.
28. Burbank, supra note 6, at 1135-36; Subrin, Clark, supra note 17, at 135-37.
29.
Subrin, HistoricalPerspective,supra note 1, at 974.
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initial Federal Rules were drafted did not seem to allow for such a possibility. Thirdly, as Professor David Marcus has recently and convincingly
shown, what made it possible to have a uniform set of procedural rules,
conceptually, was the notion that procedure and substantive law were
somewhat distinct legal categories.3 ° If different rules were to be drafted
for different types of substantive cases, then procedure and substance
look considerably less distinct; it then looks like substance and procedure
join together in sophisticated and nuanced ways to produce legal outcomes. It becomes apparent that procedure will be one major determinant
of those outcomes.
Finally, on a related point, we now know that once one starts debating which procedures are best for which types of cases, it becomes obvious that political decisions are being made. If one requires, for instance, more rigorous pleading in securities cases in order to make such
cases more difficult to bring, it is hard to say this is not a political decision with substantive results. 3 ' I do not know to what extent the initial
Advisory Committee members saw this conundrum with clarity, but they
did know that the Enabling Act specifically stated that "[s]aid rules shall
neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify any substantive rights of any litigant. ' '32 The initial Advisory Committee knew that by making the decision to merge law and equity they had triggered the Enabling Act language, which mandated that the rules be presented to Congress. They
certainly did not want to raise congressional ire by overtly stepping into
substantive areas of law-this was the province of elected officials.
Having assumed that the rules would be transsubstantive, the Committee still had to decide if the rules would look more like equity or
common law procedure. But this decision, too, was largely inevitable. As
Loomis had pointed out with respect to drafting the Field Code, it seems
impossible to craft rules for both law and equity cases that would look
like the common law system.33 The writ and single issue pleading system
forced cases into preexisting categories in a fairly rigid way. Equity invited petitioners to describe new situations requiring different types of
analysis and relief. Equity lodged a good deal of discretion in the Chancellor. Equity permitted and often required the joinder of many parties.

30. Marcus, supra note 18, at 13.
31.
See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 101, 109 Stat.
737, 746-47 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006)) (requiring a heightened pleading
standard for securities fraud actions). In 1988, at a conference on the fiftieth anniversary of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Professor Judith Resnik explored the political and non-neutral
aspects of civil rulemaking. Judith Resnik, The Domain of Courts, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2219, 222427 (1989). For a more recent exploration of the political nature of civil rulemaking, see generally
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politicsand Sociology in FederalCivil Rulemaking: Errors of Scope, 52 ALA.

L. REv. 529 (2001).
32.
Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (2006)).

33.

See supra text accompanying note 13.
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This outlook was almost 180 degrees opposite to the common law procedural system.
In order to achieve the power from Congress to have the Supreme
Court promulgate procedural rules, the proponents had asserted for decades that the common law and Field Code provisions were too complex
and too inflexible. Those like Clark could hardly now choose anything
that looked technical and rigid. And they did not want to, anyway. Clark
had complained that the Field Code did not go far enough in the direction
of equity procedure. In the areas of pleading and joinder, according to
Clark writing as early as the 1920s, a wise procedure would be as permissive and expansive as equity.34 And Edson Sunderland, another law
professor on the Committee, had for many years extolled the glory of a
plethora of discovery mechanisms.35 Where Field had wanted to tie the
hands of judges, because he abhorred judicial discretion, Clark (in the
footsteps of Roscoe Pound and William Howard Taft) wanted to broaden
the discretion of judges in order to permit them to do justice in the particular case.36 The United States Federal Equity Rules of 1912 were
commended.
Legal Realism was in full force at Yale Law School, where Clark
was Dean.3 7 An important underlying principle was that experts, if given
all of the facts, would make wise, enlightened decisions. Moreover, considering the times in which the Advisory Committee was drafting, the
Enabling Act was, in a very real sense, New Deal legislation: It was presented to Congress by Homer Cummings, President Roosevelt's Attorney General; it was passed by a largely Democratic Congress; and it was
signed by President Roosevelt. 38 The Federal Congress was passing
sweeping statutes that would require causes of action and interpretation
not hampered by common law categories or rigorous pleading requirements. No constituency with power wanted constrictive procedure. Conservatives trusted the federal judiciary to do what they considered right
and just. Liberals wanted more flexible law and more government. And
39
they now had a President they trusted who would appoint the judges.
Perhaps lawyers saw the financial advantages for themselves of a procedural system that would permit creative lawyering with new causes of
action, more parties, and extensive discovery. And they were told by

34. For Clark's views, see Subrin, HistoricalPerspective, supranote 1, at 962-65.
35. For Sunderland's views on discovery, see Subrin, Discovery, supra note 17, at 714-17.
36. Id. at 693.
37.
On the relationship of legal realism to the Federal Rules, see Subrin, Historical Perspective, supra note 1, at 965-66.
38. For this part of the history, see id. at 969-70.
39.
Clark was, in fact, appointed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the prestigious Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in 1939, one year after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became law.
Stephen N. Subrin, CharlesE. Clark, in THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICFIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW

107, 108 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009).
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Clark and others how easy it would be for them to practice under the new
flexible system.
The members of the Advisory Committee came from elite law
schools and what were then large firms. Throughout the committee deliberations, they used examples of big cases, such as admiralty, patent,
rate-setting, and strike suits against corporations and their officers. "Although there was occasional concern expressed for costs, there was no
one on the Committee who was a spokesperson for the small firm, the
small case, or the small client." 4 Law professors, particularly from the
elite schools, had argued for decades that procedure should be simple,
flexible, and like equity. And some of these law professors would soon
be government administrators and federal judges who would have more
leeway for action under a flexible system that gave great latitude to both
lawyers and judges. I am uncertain the extent to which legislators knew it
at the time the Enabling Act was enacted, but as they passed more federal
laws, they would be calling on private lawyers and private litigation to
enforce those laws in new and creative ways. 41 As I expressed it two
decades ago: "Virtually every intellectual, cultural, and political signpost
pointed to equity. 42 The Advisory Committee did not consider, so far as
I have been able to ascertain, rejecting case-size transsubstantive procedure. With their minds on the big case, and their insistence on simplicity
and flexibility, they either failed to consider, or consciously chose not to
consider, the effects of an all-equity procedural system on smaller cases.
So the transsubstantive decision brought equity in its wake. And
given the emphasis on simplicity and flexibility at the time, the drafters-and in turn the Supreme Court-went a good deal further than the
Field Code and even equity procedure in adopting the major provisions.
Their choices included what became known as "notice pleading": lenient
joinder of parties, causes of action, theories, and remedies; every type of
discovery formerly experimented with in states and then some; and ease
of amendment. 43 The Supreme Court did very little to change what the
Advisory Committee presented to them. The Rules became law by congressional inaction.
40.
Subrin, HistoricalPerspective, supra note 1, at 972. Professor Thom Main has suggested
to me that given the amount in controversy requirement for all cases in the 1930s, and the value of a
dollar at the time, there might not have been such a thing as a "small case" in federal court during
the period that the Enabling Act was drafted.
41.
Professor Stephen Burbank has brought to my attention the work of Sean Farhang, Public
Regulation and PrivateLawsuits in the American Separation of Powers System, 52 AM. J. POL. SI.
821 (2008). "[Farhang's] evidence suggests that the phenomenon [of enormous growth of statutory
litigation starting in the 1960s] may be the result of conscious congressional choices to empower
private litigation through devices such as pro-plaintiff attorney fee-shifting and multiple damage
provisions, thereby insulating congressional preferences from an ideologically distant executive (that
would be able to subvert those preferences in a system of administrative enforcement)." Stephen B.
Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American Procedure,93 JUDICATURE 109, 117
(2009).
42.
Subrin, HistoricalPerspective,supra note 1, at 957.
43.
Burbank, supra note 41, at 117, 119.
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1I. THE GOOD AND THE BAD: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
As expected, the Federal Rules and state rules patterned after them
have been able to accommodate new types of litigation and larger cases.
It is difficult to imagine current negligence, antitrust, discrimination, and
products liability law and litigation, to name a handful of areas, without
the pleading, joinder, and discovery provisions introduced by the transsubstantive Federal Rules. The class action amendments of 1966,44 permitting, if not encouraging, consumer and civil rights class actions, have
added to the Federal Rules' accommodation of the large case. If one
thinks that the advances in consumer protection, civil rights, product
safety, and other areas are salutary, then one would conclude, I think,
that the Federal Rules were a major advancement. Moreover, if one concludes that private litigation should be a major method of effectuating the
laws passed by Congress, as opposed to intensified administrative agency
activity or a more enhanced and expensive safety net (as are the norms in
other Western democracies), then the liberality, flexibility, and attorney
latitude provided by the Federal Rules seem to be crucial.
There are other advantages of the transsubstantive equity-based
procedural system. For one, it does not require learning large numbers of
different procedural rules, nor does it necessitate that lawyers and judges
decide which rules will apply to which cases. That the rules are flexible,
permit ease of pleading, broad joinder, and considerable discovery all
seem like a good thing. On the pleading front, the drafters were probably
right to conclude that more rigorous pleading rules will lead to endless
and expensive disputes over what is a fact, evidence, or legal conclusion.
The recent foray into this thicket, as evidenced by Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly4 5 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal46, unless changed quickly by Congress,
will I fear, bear out my prediction. Nobody, to my knowledge, is arguing
that the restrictive joinder provisions of the common law and the Field
Code make sense. Although discovery can become burdensome, costly,
and in fact ludicrous in some cases,47 very few attorneys or judges think

For a description of the changes brought by the 1966 amendments to the class action rule,
44.
FED. R. Ctv. P. 23, see STEPHEN N. SUBRIN & MARGARET Y. K. Woo, LITIGATING IN AMERICA:
CiVIL PROCEDURE INCONTEXT 195-98 (2006).
45.
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). These decisions, when taken together, apparently instruct Federal
46.
District Court Judges, upon considering a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, to disregard material in the
complaint that the judge deems to be conclusory, and then to decide, looking at what remains in the
complaint, whether the claim is plausible. It seems to this author, as it did to the four dissenting
Supreme Court Justices in lqbal, that this is a highly subjective test, destined to lead to unpredictable
and unfair results. See id. at 1957 (Souter, J., dissenting). Bills are already being introduced in Congress to reverse the pleading requirement articulated in these cases.
47. For a description of the negative aspects of American discovery, see SUBRIN & WOO,
supra note 44, at 143-46.
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we would be better off with no discovery in our country, particularly
given the importance of private litigation to enforce social norms.48
Moreover, to create a different procedural system for every area of
law seems impractical in the extreme. First, how would Congress have
the time or ability to fashion many different rules for many different
types of cases? And Congress would have to do it, because once one tries
to mesh particular procedures with particular areas of law, it becomes
obvious that these are political questions requiring testimony, empirical
evidence when available, and normative decisions. Second, as previously
mentioned, it would be difficult for lawyers and judges to have to learn
and operate under substantially different procedures for a large variety of
cases. Third, substantive categories overlap, and distinctions would be
debated at great length and cost. Those who cherish transsubstantive
procedure are right that we do not want to return to anything like the writ
system, even if we could.
But, it has now become obvious that these points of advantage have
not been gained without substantial cost. Many, including me, have written for years about the detriments of this wide-open procedural system,
as beneficial as that system is in many cases.49 One cost is a loss of focus
and incisiveness, which results in losses of time and money. Lawyers are
trained to try to see every possibility, and our canon of ethics requires us
to represent our clients zealously. 50 When a procedure that permits the
joinder of so many claims, issues, and parties coalesces with this lawyer
training and canon of ethics, and one also adds to the mix the widest array of discovery possibilities in litigation known to humankind,5' the
temptation to expand the litigation in terms of time, expense, and nuggets
of information can prove irresistible. This is particularly true if there are
either strategic reasons for expansion (like wearing out the other side or
its resources), or one is being paid by the hour, or both. Years ago
Wayne Brazil demonstrated the evils that can and do occur in discovery
as a result of this mixture of attorney motivations, not the least of which
is income maximization.5 2

48.

See id. at 147-48, 152. For data showing that the majority of cases has surprisingly little

discovery, see Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Giving the "Haves" A Little More: Considering the 1998

Discovery Proposals, 52 SMU L. REv. 229, 246-49 (1999). For the "outlier" position that all discovery should be eliminated, see Loren Kieve, Discovery Reform, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1991, at 79, 7981.
49.
See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1463, 14711486 (1987) (book review); Subrin, Historical Perspective, supra note 1, at 911-912, 973-975.
50.
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY canon 7 (1983) ("A Lawyer Should Represent a

Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law.").
51.
See Subrin, Discovery, supra note 17, at 718-19; Stephen N. Subrin, Discovery in Global
Perspective: Are We Nuts?, 52 DEPAuL L. REv. 299, 300 (2002).
52.
See Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal
Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787, 869-74 (1980); Wayne D. Brazil, Views
from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the System of Civil Discovery, 1980
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With these increases in time and monetary expense inherent in the
transsubstantive, all-equity Federal procedural system, comes the legitimate desire of judges and rulemakers to constrain that system. But the
cures exacerbate the disease. And thus we have seen added to the federal
system increasing numbers of mandatory steps in the process, each of
which causes attorney work and expense. These mandatory steps now
include mandatory disclosure shortly after the commencement of a case,
a discovery conference, an initial scheduling conference, disclosure of
experts and their testimony, a pretrial conference or pretrial conferences,
potential mandatory alternative dispute resolution, and pretrial documents (including witness summaries, and summaries of potential evidentiary issues). Add to these all of the multiple methods of discovery, local
rules and standing order requirements, increased use of motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim encouraged by the decisions of lower
court federal judges even before Twombly and Iqbal, 53Daubert54 hearings
challenging the use of experts, and increased use of summary judgment
motions.55 A large number of federal cases, if not most of them, have
always settled, and there is no evidence that all of the increased mandatory activity in federal court increases the number of settlements. But additional required procedural activity does increase the cost of what lawyers
are required to do in their cases; some, if not most of those cases, would
have settled without any or all of the additional up-front costs. There is a
good deal of reason to believe that it is more expensive to litigate a case
in federal court than the same case would cost for litigation in state
court.5 6

AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 217, 230-35 (1980); Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Characterof Civil
Discovery: A Critique and Proposalsfor Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1303-1305 (1978).
53. Rigorous pleading requirements were required by many Federal District Court judges
prior to Twombly and Jqbal. See Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading,45 ARIZ. L.
REv. 987, 988-89, 1002 (2003); Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 434-437, 492 (1986); Patricia W. Hatamyar,
The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1487764. This phenomenon of the Supreme Court's
following changes in procedure already accomplished by lower court judges can also be seen in
expanded managerial judging preceding the amendment to Rule 16 explicitly permitting such expansion, and increased use of summary judgment preceding the Supreme Court triology of cases in
1986. See Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in FederalCivil Cases:
Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. OF EMPIRIcAL LEGAL STUD. 591,620 (2004); David
L. Shapiro, FederalRule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1969, 1992 (1989); see also Judith Resnik, Changing Practices, Changing Rules: Judicial and
CongressionalRulemaking on Civil Juries, Civil Justice, and Civil Judging, 49 ALA. L. REV. 133,
156, 157 (1997) (noting rule change in the federal courts is frequently preceded by changes made by
federal court judges supposedly operating under the previous, contrary rules or statutes).
54.
Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
55. Burbank, supra note 53, at 617-18. ("Ihere probably is sufficient and sufficiently reliable
evidence, however, to believe that the rate of case termination as a result of summary judgment rose
substantially in federal first-instance courts as a whole in the period from 1960 to 2000, with one
plausible (and perhaps conservative) range being from approximately 1.8 percent in 1960 to approximately 7.7 percent in 2000.").
56. A 1983 Civil Litigation Project found that for all cases in which the amount of controversy was over $10,000, state court was less expensive than either federal court or arbitration. Herbert
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The expense of discovery in federal court has helped lead to the
evolution of pleading standards that will inevitably result in the dismissal
of some meritorious cases. Twombly, the precursor to the more rigorous
pleading standard made explicit in Iqbal, specifically spoke of the expensive discovery possibilities in antitrust litigation.57 These dismissals will
normally take place without discovery, discovery that is sorely needed in
some lawsuits such as discrimination cases, where intent is a necessary
element. The new "plausibility" test, to be applied after a judge strikes
allegations that he or she thinks are conclusory, is an invitation to ad hoc
decision making. Judges, like all of us, look at life's occurrences through
the lenses of personal experience. Justice Benjamin Cardozo noted this
inescapable subjectivity:
Of the power of favor or prejudice in any sordid or vulgar or evil
sense, I have found no trace, not even the faintest, among the judges
whom I have known. But every day there is borne in on me a new
conviction of the inescapable relation between the truth without us
and the truth within. The spirit of the age, as is revealed to each of us,
is too often only the spirit of the group in which accidents of birth or

education or occupation or fellowship have given us a place. No effort or revolution of mind will overthrow
58 utterly and at all times the
empire of these subconscious loyalties.

M. Kritzer & Jill K. Anderson, The Arbitration Alternative: A Comparative Analysis of Case
Processing Time, Disposition Mode, and Cost in the American Arbitration Association and the
Courts, 8 JUST. SYS. J. 6, 18 (1983) (ironically, for cases between $5,000 and $10,000, federal court
was the least expensive of the three alternatives). Litigating in federal court is more expensive than
in state court. See ClassAction FairnessAct of 2001: Hearingon H.R. 2341 Before the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 38-39 (2002) (statement of Andrew Friedman, Partner, Bonnett, Fairbourn, Friedman & Balint, P.C.). "Studies have indicated that, generally, individual plaintiffs are
likely to find state courts less expensive, more accessible, and easier to navigate." Marc E. Montgomery, Comment, Navigating the Back Channels of Salvage Law: Procedural Options for the
Small Boat Salvor, 83 TL. L. REv. 1463, 1494-95 (2009). "Litigation in federal court is also generally more expensive and time consuming than most state court actions." Gregory M. Cesarano &
Daniel R. Vega, So You Thought a Remand Was Imminent?: Post-removalLitigation and the Waiver
of the Right to Seek a Remand Grounded on Removal Defects, FLA. B.J., Feb. 2000, at 22, 22, 24.
"Removal to federal court made litigation more difficult, complex, expensive, time-consuming, and
intimidating for the individual plaintiffs." David A. Luigs, Book Note, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1700, 1702
(1994) (reviewing EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY
JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958 (1992)); see also Subrin, Simplified Procedure,
supra note 1, at 181 n.35; Michael Ena, Comment, JurisdictionalIssues in the Adjudication of Patent Law Malpractice Cases in Light of Recent Federal Circuit Decisions, 19 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 219, 256 (2008); Kevin N. Tharp, Note, Federal Court Jurisdictionover
Private TCPA Claims: Why the FederalCourts of Appeals Got It Right, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 189,
207 (1999); Gregory P. Joseph, Trial Balloon: Federal Litigation-Where Did It Go Off Track?,
LITIG., Summer 2008, at 5, 62. Judith Resnik has explained how the additional procedural steps
required in federal district courts, often promulgated as cost-saving reforms, have instead added to
the costs of litigating in federal court. Resnick, supra note 53, at 194, 209.
57.
Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
58.
BENJAMIN N. CARDOzO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 174-75 (1921). On the
inevitable bias of each of us, including judges, see Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald
Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARv. L. REv. 838 (2009), and Judith Olans Brown, Stephen N. Subrin & Phyllis Tropper
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The subjective nature of what constitutes a "conclusion" and "plausibility" insures that lower court judges, already inclined to reduce or
eliminate discovery and decrease caseloads, will be prone to dismiss at
the pleading stage the type of cases which their experience has led them
to treat with skepticism. The result will be to deny some litigants, with
cases that could be won after discovery and at trial, of their Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial-or any trial for that matter.
This is by no means the only place that discretion has been introduced into the federal civil litigation system. The transsubstantive decision inherent in the Federal Rules regime required the drafters to choose
a wide-open, flexible system that would accommodate the largest of cases. There is discretion at every turn in the open-textured Federal Rules,
from what constitutes the statement of a claim for which relief can be
granted;, to what constitutes conduct, transaction, or occurrence (as these
concepts manifest themselves in different rules); to what is impairment
as a practical matter in necessary party jurisprudence; to when discovery
has become so onerous that judicial curtailment is in order; to when a
Rule 11 sanction should be imposed; to what is a lack of sufficiency of
potential evidence for summary judgment purposes. 59 Add to this the
elasticity of major federal evidence rules, such as the Daubert standard
for expert testimony, and you have a virtual riot of discretion, much of it
rarely overturned by appellate courts. 60 Professor Burbank has pointed
out: "Many of the Federal Rules authorize essentially ad hoc decisions
and therefore are trans-substantive in only the most trivial sense." 6 1 To
put it another way, in order to meet the goal of having the same rules for
all cases, the drafters were forced to draft general rules, with a good deal
of discretion inherent in them, giving little direction to judges and in
turn, to lawyers. Consequently, similar cases and situations are apt to be
treated quite differently, depending on the judge. Since we now know
that procedural decisions can, and often do, materially influence substantive application, the rules cannot provide uniformity of result.
I am not contending that the drafters of initial Federal Rules could
or should have foreseen all of the potential for expansiveness and expense that ultimately reached fruition in the federal courts, nor that they
could have foreseen the costs of attempts through additional procedural
steps to constrain that procedure. After all, they could not have known
Baumann, Some Thoughts About Social Perception and Employment DiscriminationLaw: A Modest
Proposalfor Reopening the JudicialDialogue, 46 EMORY L. J. 1488, 1492-1508 (1997).
59.
Maurice Rosenberg concluded in 1971: "Of the eighty-six rules that comprise the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the term 'discretion' appears in ten or so. Nevertheless, appellate courts
have held that review-restraining discretion is implicitly present in thirty other provisions of the
Rules." Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22
SYRACUSE L. REv. 635, 655 (1971); see also Resnik, supra note 53, at 195 (discussing how judicial
discretion pervades the activity of the federal judiciary).
60.
See id.
61.
Burbank, supranote 49, at 1474.
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about copying machines, faxes, computers, and cell phones. They probably would be astonished that there are more than a million lawyers in our
country, 62 at the size of law firms and their litigation departments, and
that the plaintiffs' tort bar has the resources to take on even the most
well-heeled defendants and their lawyers. 63 Perhaps they did not realize
that creative lawyers, particularly imbued with the profit motive, would
be sorely tempted to seek one more question, one more document or
digital bit of information, in the hopes that it will strengthen their case.
Nor that the lawyers will usually be able to justify that search as legitimate, both to themselves and a court. The drafters would be particularly
amazed that their simple procedural system, with its liberal pleading and
broad discovery, has led to the opposite: a complex morass of mandatory
procedural steps and rigorous pleading requirements, without any discovery, as evidenced by Twombly and Iqbal.
There is data, though, that may show that the picture I have painted
is too bleak, at least with respect to discovery. Many studies have shown
that the vast majority of cases do not have an inordinate amount of discovery. 64 About a half or a third of civil lawsuits (depending on the
study) have no discovery, and the cases that utilize discovery frequently
do not have more than two or three discovery incidents, perhaps a deposition or two and a set of interrogatories. The majority of cases, both at
the state and federal level, are disposed of in less than a year or not more
than two. 65 Such data would indicate that the lawyers themselves are
doing a good job in adjusting their expenditure of time and money to the
stakes involved in cases. In other words, the lawyers under this characterization are effectively sorting cases on a case-size basis, despite the
transsubstantive, equity-like nature of the Rules.
But there are problems with the pretty picture I have just painted.
Everyone seems to agree that there are a substantial number of cases in
which the amount of discovery is overwhelming by any standard, involving dozens if not hundreds of depositions, thousands of pages of documents, and trillions of bytes of digitalized information.66 We do not know
if the so-called large cases constitute five percent, ten percent, or more of

62.
Clara N. Carson, Lawyers in Profile: A Statistical Portraitof the U.S. Legal Profession,
10 RESEARCHING L. 1, 7 (1999).
63.
See Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-financing Civil Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. 183, 183, 19899, 216 (2001); see also Herbert M. Kritzer, From Litigators of Ordinary Cases to Litigators of
ExtraordinaryCases: Stratificationof the Plaintiffs' Bar in the Twenty-first Century, 51 DEPAUL L.
REv. 219, 231-33 (2001).
64.
For data on discovery, see, for example, Thornburg, supra note 48, at 246-49; and Linda
S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the
Consequencesfor Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393 passim (1994).
65.
Subrin, Equity More Equitable, supranote 1, at 767-68.
66.
Id. at 772-76; Subrin, Substance-Specific, supra note 1, at 45 n.124 (Judge Barefoot
Sanders is quoted as saying that "relatively few cases require massive and constant intervention").
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the entire federal docket. 67 We do know that it is those cases that tend to
occupy a good deal of the attention of federal judges and the press. 68 Of
those cases, surely some do not merit as much process as the Federal
Rules permit. More importantly, many of those cases that would settle
without the multiple steps now required by the Federal Rules are made
more costly than necessary. Moreover, the threat of the costs of the Federal system and some state systems surely results in meritorious cases not
being brought because of the cost, or in settlements in which the true
value is discounted because of the reality or threat of enormous cost.
When the Federal Rules became law, about eighteen percent of civil
cases terminated in Federal Court were resolved by trial.69 When I started
practicing law in 1963, the figure was down to about twelve percent and
in 2002 it was below two percent. 70 "More startling was the sixty percent
decline in the absolute number of trials since the mid 1980s.',' To anyone who believes in the jury trial and trial in open court, this is distressing. If one believes that cases should settle in the shadow of what would
happen at trial, there is very little left to cast an intelligent shadow. Obviously, one cannot put all of this at the hands of transsubstantive allequity procedure. The huge increase in federal civil cases, especially
burgeoning in the 1980s, has not helped, and the expanse and priority of
the criminal docket have also contributed.72 But the high cost of the
transsubstantive all-equity procedure in terms of time, money, and reduced focus and predictability, which in turn precipitates or forces settlement, has surely played a part in the diminution of trials.7 3

67.
See Subrin, Substance-Specific,supra note 1, at 45; see also Mullenix, supra note 64, at
1395-1400, 1407-09 (on the press) and 1404-07 (on lawyers and judges).
68.
SUBRIN & Woo, supra note 44, at 147.
69.
Marc Galanter, A World Without Trials?, 2006 J. DiSP. RESOL. 7, 12 (2006) thereinafter
Galanter, World Without Trials]; Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and
Related Matters in Federaland State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 464 (2004) [hereinafter Galanter, Vanishing Trials].
70.
Galanter, World Without Trials, supra note 69, at 12; Galanter, Vanishing Trials, supra
note 69, at 459.
71.
Galanter, Vanishing Trials, supranote 69, at 459.
72.
For charts showing the rise in federal civil dispositions in ten year intervals from 1962
through 2002, see id. at 462-63. For the increase in criminal cases and the impact on the civil docket
of the Speedy Trial Act, see William W. Schwarzer & Russell R. Wheeler, On the Federalizationof
the Administration of Civil and Criminal Justice, 23 STETSON L. REv. 651, 680 n.89 (1994); and
Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principlesto Define the ProperLimits for Federal
Criminal Jurisdiction,46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 987-88 (1995).
73.
Maybe more positive aspects of the transsubstantive/equity procedure have led to more
settlements and fewer trials. Perhaps the discovery methods have in fact provided both sides with a
realistic view of their respective cases, and thus made a trial unnecessary not because of unpredictability, but because the lawyers know what to expect and can thus achieve informed settlement. And
perhaps the discovery, sometimes showing an insufficiency of evidence for at least one element of
the plaintiffs cause of action, and sometimes showing that an affirmative defense or a claim in its
entirety must be believed, has added to more summary judgment motions justifiably allowed; thus,
this too, diminishes the number of trials.

394

[Vol. 87:2

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

IV. MAINTAINING STRENGTHS OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE WHILE
REDUCING DETRIMENTS

There is no sensible reason why some cases cannot maintain the advantages of the Federal Rule wide-open, equity-based procedural system
while others are handled with a more contained system that has the restraint advantages historically associated with common law procedure.
To put it another way, one could have transsubstantive procedure in the
case-type sense, without necessarily having it in the case-size sense.
Many states utilize multi-track designation for different cases, some
states having two tracks and some three. 74 There is often a track called
"simple," "expedited," or "fast" in which there are restraints on permitted
delay and amounts of discovery; some of these states previously have
substantially adopted the Federal Rules as the model for their procedural
rules.7 5 Some federal courts have also adopted different case tracks.76
Charles Clark, the major draftsman of the Federal Rules, thought all
along that there were cases that did not require all of the process afforded
by the then-new Federal Rules.77 In the sections that follow, I will argue
for a simple case track for the Federal District Courts, along with two
other exceptions to the Federal Rule transsubstantivity. Let us first,
though, consider options for achieving constraint in the Federal Rule
procedural system.

74. Seymour Moskowitz, Discovery in State Civil Procedure: The National Perspective, 35
W. ST. U. L. REV. 121, 128-32 (2007).
75. See, e.g., id. at 127-35. Five states vary the amount of permitted discovery for "lowstakes, economic litigation, cases." Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in State Civil Justice: Developing a Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure Through a Collaborative Rule-Making
Process, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1222 (2005). California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, and
Texas "define these cases by amount-in-controversy.... California's amount-in-controversy cut-off
is the lowest by a margin of $25,000 to $50,000. Kentucky's Economic Litigation Docket includes
specified classes of cases regardless of amount in controversy." Id. For state variations on volume
limits on a case-differentiated bases, see id. at 1222-23. The state procedural rules of Colorado and
Kentucky have been called "Federal Rules Replicas." John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal
Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354, 356 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Some states
accomplish tracking through rules of civil procedure. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 94(a) (West
2009); KY. R. Crv. P. 33.01(3), 93.01, 93.02; TEx. R. Civ. P. 190.1-.5. Other states accomplish
tracking through court rules. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 4:5A-1 to -2 (West 2009). Some states
use court orders. E.g., MA. R. SUPER. CT. order 1-88; N.Y. NEW YORK COUNTRY COURTHOUSE
PROCEDURES procedure V. For the Bureau of Justice Assistance Fact Sheet describing methods of
Differentiated Case Management, see CAROLINE COOPER ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
DIFFERENTIATED

CASE

MANAGEMENT:

IMPLEMENTATION

MANUAL

9,

11-14

(1993),

http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/difm.pdf.
76.
See, e.g., FLA. U.S. DIST. CT. S. DIST. GENERAL RULE 16.1(a) ("Differentiated Case
Management in Civil Actions"); MN. U.S. DIST. CT. RULES 1, 4, 6, 10-11 (allowing parties to agree
to these rules, which, inter alia, restricts the amount and time for discovery, sets a certain trial date
within six months of the date of the Pretrial Conference (which is to be within 30 days of the date in
which the complaint was served), and grants each side only eight hours of trial time); MO. U.S. DIST.
CT. E. DIST, L.R. 16-5.01("Case Management Tracks"); In re Standing Order Governing Civil Case
Management Before the Honorable Frank D. Whitney, No. 3:07-MC-47 (W.D.N.C. May 14, 2007);
OH. U.S. DIST. CT. N. DIST. CIVIL RULE 16.1 ("Differentiated Case Management").
77.
Subrin, Clark, supra note 17, at 148-49.

2010]

ADJUSTING "ONE SIZE FITS ALL"

A. Weaving Substance and Procedure
There are at least four major ways in which those who craft procedural rules could try to aid restraint. First, they could try to intermesh
substance with process in the manner that the common law evolved, similar to writs weaving procedure with substance and the use of multiple
pleadings-like the single-issue pleading method-to try to define issues. There are at least three good reasons for why this will not occur.
First, the chore is by its very nature highly political because the process
will be seen to favor or disfavor certain types of cases. In a democracy,
this means a legislature will have to do the crafting. No legislature is
likely to want to craft substance and procedure rules for a large number
of types of cases; this is a complex and controversial task. Second, the
common law system was found sufficiently wanting, due to a lack of
flexibility and a tendency to dispose of cases on technicalities unrelated
to the merits. Thus, it was discarded in our country in the mid-nineteenth
century. Third, there has been no constituency in the judiciary, the legal
profession, legislature, or interest groups at large that has suggested that
such a system is a good idea for large numbers of case-types.
B. Tightening Transsubstantive Procedure
A second major way to constrain the procedural system would be to
stick with transsubstantive procedure, the same procedure for all casetypes and case-sizes, but to make that procedure considerably more restraining than the current Federal Rules. This might include some combination of (1) more rigorous pleading requirements for all cases, such as
so-called "fact pleading," as under the Field Code or whatever the new
pleading rule is under Twombly and lqbal; (2) substantially reduced discovery; (3) reduced joinder possibilities, although to the best of my
knowledge no one has seriously suggested curtailing the federal joinder
of claims or parties rules, with the exception of making it more difficult
to pursue class actions; (4) firm dates set shortly after the answer is filed
for completing discovery and commencing trial; and (5) limitations on
the duration of trial. But, as we have seen, there were good reasons for
jettisoning fact-pleading-including the difficulty of knowing what is a
fact, conclusion, or evidence. Some cases merit extensive discovery because of the stakes involved, the complexity of issues, and the hidden
nature of important facts. Similarly, some cases require copious pre-trial
time and preparation, as well as lengthy trials if the case is not disposed
of through dispositive motions or settlement.
There is another important reason for rejecting fact-pleading or other more rigorous pleading requirements, substantially reduced discovery,
or restrictive trial time on a transsubstantive basis. Our country relies
heavily on private litigation to enforce legislatively-created social norms.
We turn to private litigation, in large measure, to insure our safety, protect the environment, police untoward business conduct, and protect civil
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rights, including the right of minority groups not to suffer discrimination.
Unlike other nations, our country has chosen not to rely on a substantially enlarged bureaucratic state for enforcement of social norms. Similarly,
we have chosen to supply a smaller safety net for the injured or those in
need than many other Western countries. Congress has passed statutes
permitting multiple damage awards for winning plaintiffs by mandating
that defendants pay the legal fees of victorious plaintiffs, with the purpose of encouraging private law suits in order to effectuate national policy. 78 Many of these suits are the type in which a meritorious plaintiff
lacks extensive facts at the commencement of a case that would allow for
a rigorous pleading requirement to be met and for which extensive discovery is required. Think, for instance, of the "intent" element in employment discrimination cases. The unfairness of requiring rigorous
pleading in this and similar instances is acknowledged in Federal Rule
9(b), which permits "state of mind" issues to be averred generally, and
Rule 11, which permits a pleader to aver that a factual contention "will
likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery. 79
In short, a transsubstantive restrictive procedure does not make
sense in our country because many important lawsuits require the latitude
and flexibility incorporated in the 1938 Federal Rule regime. Dismissing
some types of lawsuits for a dearth of facts in pleading, before opportunity for discovery, flies in the face of our tradition of private law enforcement. Paul Carrington put it this way:
We should keep clearly in mind that discovery is the American alternative to the administrative state .... Every day, hundreds of American lawyers caution their clients that an unlawful course of conduct
will be accompanied by serious risk of exposure at the hands of some
hundreds of thousands of lawyers, each armed with a subpoena power by which misdeeds can be uncovered. Unless corresponding new
powers are conferred on public officers, constricting discovery would

78.
E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15 (2006) (awarding plaintiffs injured by vaccines damages and
attorney fees); see also Burbank, supra note 41, at 118.
79.
Unfortunately, the majority in lqbal seems to have forgotten the importance of Rule 9(b)
in cases involving the need to prove a defendant's state of mind, and have apparently, by judicial fiat
rather than the Enabling Act process, amended the Rule out of anything close to its prior existence.
See Burbank, supra note 41, at 115. The disproportionate impact rigorous pleading requirements and

current summary judgment practice has on plaintiffs in discrimination cases has been frequently and
amply illustrated. See, e.g., id. at 117-18; Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment
DiscriminationPlaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 103,
128 (2009); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment DiscriminationPlaintiffs
Fare in FederalCourt, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 429 (2004); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The
Dangersof Summary Judgment: Gender and FederalCivil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 709
(2007).
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diminish the disincentives 80for lawless behavior across a wide spectrum of forbidden conduct.

Geoffrey Hazard put it succinctly in explaining that civil claims are
"an integral part of law enforcement in this country .... [T]he scope of
discovery determines the scope of effective law enforcement in many
fields regulated by law. ' 1 Patrick Higginbotham, the former Chair of the
Federal Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, also emphasized the symbiotic relationship of discovery and the ability to enforce Congressional
statutes in many areas of law:
Congress has elected to use the private suit, private attorneys-general
as an enforcing mechanism for the anti-trust laws, the securities laws,
environmental laws, civil rights and more. In the main, the plaintiff in
these suits must discover his evidence from the defendant. Calibration of discovery is calibration
of the level of enforcement of the so82
cial policy set by Congress.

To try to constrain the Federal Rule transsubstantive equity-based
system by mandating, still on a transsubstantive basis, rigorous pleading
prior to discovery, severely limited discovery, or greatly limited time for
submitting evidence at trial, is too deep an assault on the historic role of
civil litigation in our country.

80.
Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 54 (1997). Given the
place in our country of private litigation to effectuate public norms, and the place of discovery in
making this effectuation possible, plus the impossibility in some cases for meritorious plaintiffs to
know in advance enough facts to comply with a rigorous pleading requirement since they have not
yet engaged in discovery, a few of the proposals in the Final Report of the American College and the
Institute that I mentioned at the beginning of this paper do not seem wise. Among them are replacing
notice pleading with "fact-based pleading" and not permitting discovery after initial disclosures and
additional limited discovery, absent agreement or a court order. ACTUIAALS, FINAL REPORT,
supra note 3, at 5, 9. How can a plaintiff in a civil rights suit rely on federal judges to permit the
needed additional discovery, when many of these same judges took a dim view of these suits and
required fact pleading before Twombly and lqbal? See, e.g., Fairman, supra note 53, at 988. Moreover, how will plaintiffs in civil rights suits have the opportunity to move the court for any discovery
in those cases dismissed at the pleadings stage? Perhaps the Final Report, by suggesting that
"[p]leadings should set forth with particularity all of the material facts that are known to the pleading
party to establish the pleading party's claims," means to protect a party that is unable to know material facts because the evidence is in the hands of the defendant, and that a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim should not be granted when this is the case. ACTL/IAALS, FINAL REPORT, at
5. And perhaps the need to move the court for additional discovery as the normal rule can be alleviated by the Final Report's acknowledgement of the need for special rules for some cases and the
suggestion for discovery protocols for "certain types of specialized cases." Id. at 11. I would, though,
need to read these clarifications before concluding that the Final Report's pleading and discovery
recommendations reflect an understanding of the unique place of United States civil litigation in
protecting societal norms established by legislatures.
81.
GEOFFREY C. HAzARD, JR., SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUND. & SOUTHERN METHODIST
UNIV. SCHOOL OF LAW, REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 3 (1995).

82.

Patrick Higginbotham, Foreword,49 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1997).
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C. IncreasingJudicialInvolvement
A third way to attempt to control mounting time and expense in civil litigation is through judicial case management. This has been the path
of Federal Rule amendments, such as the expanded scope and utilization
of pretrial conferences and scheduling orders in Rules 16 and by ad hoc
supervision of discovery in Rule 26(b)(2). No one denies that rigorous
case management is needed for large scale litigation. But this does not
seem an appropriate solution for the bulk of litigation. State courts do not
have the resources or personnel to manage each case. Even at the federal
level, case management for all cases has the flaw of requiring a good
deal of judicial time, whether by Article III Judges or by Magistrate
Judges. Ironically, it is a constant complaint of the litigation bar that despite case management, judges show little inclination to enter the fray of
discovery disputes,
and it is discovery that probably requires the most
83
constraint.
Moreover, judicial case-by-case management introduces additional
largely uncontrolled discretion that is itself the subject of major criticism. 84 When the system requires multiple conferences for most cases,
case management also adds additional preparation time and expense in
those cases that would settle without any judicial involvement. A Federal
Judicial Center 1997 Report concluded: "Increased judicial case management is the means attorneys most often recommended for alleviating
discovery problems and reducing discovery expenses, but multivariate
analyses failed to detect an association between judges'85case management approaches and.disposition times or litigation costs.
D. The "Simple Track" Alternative
A fourth way to constrain civil litigation, and make it more efficient
and fair, is one that many states and some federal courts continue to experiment with. In my mind, it is the method that makes the most sense.
This method selects some cases for a special, simplified track on a case86
size basis, thus eroding the transsubstantive principle in that respect.
83.
THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE
PRACTICE, PROBLEMS, AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE: A CASE-BASED NATIONAL SURVEY OF

COUNSEL INCLOSED FEDERAL CIVIL CASES 2 (1997). "In response to a list of thirteen changes that
might potentially reduce litigation costs, the most frequent choice by the attorneys was to increase
the availability of judges to resolve discovery disputes (54%)." Id. at 10. "About 40% of the attorneys reported unnecessary discovery expenses due to discovery problems." Id. at 5.
84.
The classical article raising concerns about judicial case management is Judith Resnik,
ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 378-80 (1982).
85.

WILLGING Err AL., supra note 83, at 2.

86.
Many others have written about simple or fast tracks, see, for example, Michael A. Friedrichs, Fast Track: A Panaceafor a Delayed and Cluttered Court System?, 1 S.D. JUST. J. 443, 443
(1993); Richard McMillan, Jr. & David B. Siegel, Creating a Fast-Track Alternative Under the
FederalRules of Civil Procedure,60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 431, 431-32 (1985); Steven Croley et
al., South Carolina's Fast Track Jury Trial: An Inventive and Inexpensive Way to Resolve Cases,
S.C. LAW., July 2009, at 14, 15; see also Edward H. Cooper, Simplified Rules of FederalProcedure?, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1794, 1798 (2002).
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Notice, however, that the simple track solution maintains transsubstantivity of the case-type variety because the simple track will include cases
based on a wide range of substantive laws. Moreover, the simple track
would maintain the vast majority of procedural rules for the cases on that
track, thus making it largely transsubstantive for most of the procedure.
The simple track method would separate out cases that do not generally
warrant the whole panoply of federal process. This method uses time
limits and discovery limits to control the costs of litigation. It also eliminates some of the pre-trial steps that involve judicial involvement and
require additional attorney time, such as multiple pre-trial conferences.
A simple track would set a trial date shortly after commencement
that is perhaps no more than six or nine months from the date the answer
is filed. A discovery cut-off date would be set at the same time. There
would be only one required conference, to set the discovery-cut-off date
and the firm trial date, and perhaps even this could be dispensed with if
presumptive time standards were established. There would be limits on
discovery for all cases on the simple track. Whether that would be two or
three depositions, each one lasting no more than three or four hours, and
ten or fifteen interrogatories, would be up to the drafters. The length of
time before trials and discovery cut-off dates should also be left to the
drafters, but it is important that once the dates and limitations are decided
upon, they be kept firm, except for very good cause shown. Putting a
sensible limit on document requests is difficult to draft because relevant
documents come in so many forms and in unpredictable numbers. The
drafters of the simple track should consider requiring more specificity for
document requests than is currently the norm, as a means of reducing the
burdens of this type of discovery.
The obvious reason for these limitations on time and discovery are
to reduce delay and expense. So far as time limits go, there is some empirical evidence that a firm trial date-set relatively early and with a
sensible amount of time until the trial is to commence, and a time limit in
which discovery must be completed-tend to reduce the costs and delays
of litigation.87 Limits on the amounts of discovery (such as the number of
interrogatories and depositions) can also reduce cost.8 8 The drafters
87. A RAND study of twenty federal district courts in the 1990s found that "[s]horter time
from setting a discovery schedule to discovery cutoff is associated with both significantly reduced
time to disposition and significantly reduced lawyer work hours." JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND,
JUST, SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE
CIVIL
JUSTICE
REFORM
ACT
16
(1996),

http://www.randorg/pubsmonographsrepots/2007/MR80O.pdf. They also found that work hours
correlate with "costs to litigants in dollar terms." Id. at 16. "Litigant data also show little difference
in satisfaction between shorter and longer time to discovery cutoff." Id Early setting of a trial date
results in an additional reduction of time, but does not significantly change lawyer work hours. Id. at
14. Further support for firm trial dates is found in Barbara J. Rouse & Stephen E. Neel, Voice of the
Judiciary:Firm, FairTrial Date Initiative-An Update, BOSTON B.J., MarJApr. 2007, at 7, 7-8.
88. A RAND study of twenty federal district courts in the 1990s found that limiting interrogatories had a significantly reduction of total lawyer work hours for hourly fee attorneys. JAMES S.
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should also consider eliminating mandatory disclosure for simple track
cases; there is some evidence that eliminating mandatory disclosures
does not reduce formal discovery, nor save time or money. 89 Not having
to prepare for and attend multiple pre-trial conferences also saves time
and money. The drafters should also consider limits on the time that each
side can have for the presentation of cases at trial. 90
What cases should be included and excluded from such a simplified
track? At the federal level, Congress has revealed a desire for energetic
enforcement of some statutes by providing for multiple damages or fee
shifting for successful plaintiffs. 9 1 In order to permit such vigorous enforcement, such cases should be excluded from the simple track. One
could then set the limit for other cases to be excluded at over some figure, such as realistic damages of over $500,000, with a provision that for
very good cause shown a party could move to be removed from the simple track. The parties should also be able to opt into the simple track by
consent, but not opt out, except through order of the court.
At the federal level, the Advisory Committee has decided in the past
not to adopt rules for a simple track.92 Congress may have to mandate a
simple track through statute. At the state level, such tracking has often
been accomplished by court rule. State legislatures can also create a simple track, excluding cases where vigorous private enforcement is the goal
and such enforcement requires more time and more discovery.
The arguments used against such a simple track for federal trial
courts, including those made when the issue has been addressed at AdviKAKALIK ET AL., RAND, DISCOVERY MANAGEMENT: FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM
ACT
EVALUATION
DATA
48-50
(1998),

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographireports/2009/MR941.pdf. "These findings support the policy
of limiting interrogatories as a means of limiting lawyer work hours because there is no statistical
evidence that interrogatory limitations hurt, and they may help for several subsets of cases." James
S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the Civil Justice Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613, 664 (1998) [hereinafter Kakalik et al., Discovery Management]. The
researchers did not have sufficient data to comment on whether reducing the number of depositions
would reduce hours spent and consequently costs, but it is logical to believe that deposition reduction would result in reduction of lawyer hours spent and a consequent reduction in costs.
89. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management, supra note 88, at 659 ("We found no strong evidence that a policy of early mandatory disclosure reduced lawyer work time on any of the subsets of
cases examined."). The Final Report of the Joint Project reported: "Only 34 percent of the respondents said that the current initial disclosure rules reduce discovery and only 28 percent said they save
the clients money. The initial-disclosure rules need to be revised." ACTIJIAALS, FINAL REPORT,
supranote 3, at 7.
90.
Judge Keeton recommended this two decades ago. Robert E. Keeton, Time Limits as
Incentives in an Adversary System, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2053, 2055-56 (1989).
91.
Professor Stephen Burbank suggested this idea to me. He was influenced by Sean Farhang. See Farhang, supra note 41, at 822, 824.
92. An initial attempt at drafting a more simplified procedure was rejected politely by the
Advisory Committee, which ended its discussion of simplified procedure, after hearing from three
Federal Judges, as follows: "The Committee expressed thanks to the panel members for their very
informative and helpful presentations." CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE
U.S.,
MINUTES:
OCTOBER
16
AND
17,
at
20-28
(2000),
http://www.uscourts.gov/ruleslMinutes/CVlO-2000-min.pdf [hereinafter ADVISORY COMM.].
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sory Committee meetings,93 do not seem persuasive to me. One advanced
at the Advisory Committee is that it takes a special legal culture to accept
such restraint, and lawyers in some districts, accustomed to a different
culture, would oppose a simple track. 94 The evidence for this proposition
was that lawyers and judges in other districts would not approve of the
so-called "rocket docket" in the Eastern District of Virginia.95 But the
bench and bar in that district have adjusted over time to this accelerated
procedure, although the Eastern District of Virginia timetable may be too
short and rigid for nationwide use. Many state bars have already adjusted
to the designation of cases to tracks, including simple ones.
Another argument is that "any change should be preceded and supported by empirical study. 96 Myself and others have urged the importance of statistical research.97 Empirical study, though, has already
shown the advantages of firm trial dates and discovery cutoffs. 98 It is
ironic to have Federal Judges at the Advisory Committee urging empirical study prior to adopting a simple track, when the Advisory Committee
has adopted the vast majority of its amendments without empirical study,
including several amendments that add to judicial power-such as tightening up Rule 11, enlarging the scope of Rule 16, and encouraging judicial ad hoc control over discovery in Rule 26.
Another argument made at the Advisory Committee was that lawyers have not taken advantage of a simple track when it was made available. 99 A major purpose of a simple track is to impose restrictions on
lawyer behavior because of the activity of some lawyers in abusing the
system. It does not tell us anything about the advantages of a simple
track that mandates restraints on lawyers that lawyers do not voluntarily
submit to such a track. The argument that federal courts already have the
power under Rule 16 to "adopt simplified procedures for cases that deserve them"' ° has the failings of ad hoc judicial case management that I
have discussed above.

93. Subrin, Simplified Procedure, supra note 1, at 186-187. The current Reporter to the
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure drafted rules for a simple draft, and
reported some of the problems he encountered and foresaw with such an enterprise. Cooper, supra
note 86, at 1800-04.
94. See ADVISORY COMM., supra note 92, at 25-26; Subrin, Simplified Procedure,supra note
1, at 187.
95. ADVISORY COMM., supra note 92, at 24.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., Subrin, Simplified Procedure,supra note 1, at 191 nn.62-63. Professor Burbank
put the importance of empiricism in order to better understand civil litigation this way: "If those with
the power of discretion are unwilling to surrender any of it, let us at least hope that they will also
seek the power of facts." Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure:
The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1963 (1989).
98. KAKALIK ET AL., supranote 87, at 26-28.
99. See ADVISORY COMM., supra note 92, at 27.
100. Id. at 22.
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Perhaps the most annoying (or disingenuous) comment against a
simple track in Advisory Committee minutes is this: "The Committee
was reminded that RAND did a study of experience under the Civil Justice Reform Act. The 'multiple tracks' approach was not recommended." 101 The reason the RAND study on the Civil Justice Reform Act
could not recommend tracks was that the district courts, including pilot
districts, did not experiment with tracking in any way that permitted
RAND to empirically study the possibility. 10 2 One researcher of judicial
activity under the Civil Justice Reform Act put the difficulty of assessment this way:
Nine out of ten pilot districts tracked few or no cases. As a result,
"almost all general civil cases to which CJRA procedural principles
might be relevant were placed in the standard track, if any track assignment was made." These cases "were managed individually." To
put it mildly, "there was little actual 'differential' tracking of general
civil cases in most districts that adopted a track model in their CJRA
plan." Pilot districts did not apply this principle in enough cases to
draw any conclusions. As a result, "[the RAND investigators] have
no basis for evaluating how the track method of [differential case
management]
affected time, cost, satisfaction, and views of fair103
ness."
The failure of Federal District Court Judges to permit empirical
study of tracking makes the argument of adopting a simple track system
only after empirical study all the more hollow.
Another objection I have heard is that there is no sound way to assign some cases to a special, simple track. But why not? States have as1°4
signed cases to special tracks, often based on the amount of damages.
Placing lawsuits in the simple track which allege $500,000 or less in
damages (or for which the value of injunctive relief is deemed to be less
than that amount) is of course arbitrary, as would be any other figure.
But we have arbitrary numbers and dates for many things in procedure,
such as the monetary amount required for diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, when an answer is due, when there must be a discovery conference, or for the number of pages for a brief. If a different monetary
101.
CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., MINuTEs: APRIL 78, at 36 (2008), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CV04-2008-min.pdf.
102.
See John Burritt McArthur, Inter-branch Politics and the Judicial Resistance to Federal
Civil Justice Reform, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 551, 582-83 (1999).
103.
Id. (quoting KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 87, at 12; KAKALIK ET AL., RAND,
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT IN PILOT AND COMPARISON DisTRicrs
29(1996), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph-reports/2007/MR801.pdf). McArthur is less polite
than RAND about the judicial reluctance to truly allow tracking to be tested: "Ever tactful, RAND
recorded complaints from judges and lawyers about the difficulty of putting cases into tracks. But it
identified the more fundamental problem when it mentioned 'judges' desire to tailor case management to the needs of the case and to their style of management.' Judges didn't want to change their
habits." Id. at 583 (quoting KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 87, at 12).
104.
Croley et a)., supra note 86, at 16.
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amount is a wiser one for the simple track, then the drafters of the track
can surely make that decision. And if over time it turns out that another
test for the simple track would work better, then it can be changed. The
placement to the simple track of cases below the cut-off amount will
probably have to be done by an assignment judge on the basis of the
complaint and a required cover sheet.
Perhaps the most serious objection is that there will be second-rate
justice for those cases on the simple track. 10 5 One thread of the objection
might be that dramatically reduced discovery will prejudice fair resolution on the merits for such cases. But there is no rational reason why
discovery in all cases should be almost totally unlimited at the whim of
lawyers. It has been amply demonstrated that such uncontrolled discovery often spins out of control in terms of time and expense, with little or
no additional benefit to the litigation process.1 °6 Lawyers, when paid, can
always come up with reasons for an additional piece of discovery or additional reasons for extra time to prepare their case. Most cases settle;
few cases reach trial under the present system. There is no such thing as
a perfect procedural system or the perfect amount of discovery. The issue
is whether overall the process is fair and perceived to be fair. So long as
both sides are treated the same, have ample opportunity to prepare their
cases, and can move for additional time or more discovery-for very
good cause shown-and so long as judges ordinarily enforce the restrictions, it is difficult to see why a simple track for some cases will reduce
fairness, or reduce the number of decisions or settlements that reflect the
merits.
A simple track does not provide second class justice. In fact, in
many cases it is better justice because the ultimate determination of the
case will not so often depend on discounting or adding to the value of the
case due to huge transaction costs. Lawyers will have to learn to focus
their attention to the most meritorious of their claims and defenses. Furthermore, some meritorious cases that have not been brought in the past,
because of expense, may now be brought. Judges, less burdened by con105.
Judge Niemeyer was sensitive to this potential critique when he introduced the simplified
procedure question to the Advisory Committee. "The purpose is not to provide a second-class procedure to claims that are deemed unimportant. Instead, the purpose is to provide a procedure that will
better enable these claims to be enforced." CiIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF
THE
U.S.,
MINUTES:
OCT.
14
AND
15,
at
39
(1999),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/l099mnCV.pdf. Thom Main has pointed out to me that I
have excluded cases in which Congress has mandated energetic enforcement and that this may well
imply that simple track cases will not receive the advantage of energetic enforcement, thus implying
second-rate justice. This is a fair point, but Ithink that "energetic enforcement" requires a balancing
of costs and benefits. The diminution of costs in the simple track, and the reduction of delay, provide
multiple benefits, as I argue; such benefits compensate for the decreased discovery and time limits.
In those statutes in which Congress has shown intent for energetic enforcement, the cost-benefit
analysis shifts, in my view, and it makes sense to have fewer restraints. In these cases, the private bar
is substituting for executive or administrative enforcement and the broad range of resources that
might have been made available for such government enforcement.
106.
See, e.g., Thornburg, supra note 48, at 248.
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ferences and huge amounts of discovery to consider at summary judgment, should have more time to preside over trials. If as a result of the
simple track, more cases will reach trial (a welcome change given the
drastic diminution of terminated cases that are now tried) and more
judges are needed to conduct additional trials, this need should be presented to Congress.
The simple track erodes transsubstantive procedure in the case-size
sense. Excluding some substantive cases from the simple track, because
of legislative intent for rigorous enforcement, is a case-type exception
and leaves those cases with the normal transsubstantive procedure. There
is already case-type erosion to transsubstantive procedure at both the
state and federal levels. For example, many states have specialized procedures for medical malpractice cases.10 7 Congress, too, has instituted
special procedural rules for securities and prisoner litigation. 10 8 In these
instances, the purpose of the case-type specific procedure was to make it
more difficult for plaintiffs and to discourage or eliminate what were
thought to be meritless or unjustified litigation.
Legislators, though, could also draft special procedures to aid litigation in certain fields they decide require more vigorous enforcement, just
as they have done in providing for multiple damages or fee-shifting.
Congress has already passed numerous restoration statutes, some including procedural provisions, when they think that the Supreme Court has
misunderstood congressional intent. 1°9 If Congress does not reverse
Twombly and Iqbal's more rigorous pleading requirement for all cases,
as I think it should, then it would make sense to restore notice pleading
in those areas of law in which Congress has already evidenced the intent
for rigorous enforcement by providing multiple damages and/or shifting
legal fees for the benefit of plaintiffs. If Congress reverses Twombly and
Iqbal's more rigorous pleading holdings, Congress could later erode
transsubstantivity by requiring more rigorous pleading in a case-specific
way for selected statutes, just as was done for securities litigation. This,
of course, would erode the transsubstantive principle. In any of the possibilities I have mentioned, though, for a modest amount of procedural
law/substantive law integration, the vast bulk of procedural rules remain
intact. This is a far cry from the complexity of the common law writ system. Transsubstantivity remains the underlying norm.
Finally, substance-specific protocols may be in order for some types
of litigation that have been excluded from the simple track.110 Such pro107.
108.

Moskowitz, supra note 74, at 124-26.
Fairman, supra note 53, at 988-89 & nn.6-7.

109.

See e.g., JEB BARNES, OVERRULED?:

LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDES, PLURALISM,

AND

CONTEMPORARY COURT-CONGRESS RELATIONS 10-11 (2004);William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding
Supreme Court Statutory InterpretationDecisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 332-36 (1991).
110.
This is a proposal I made in 1994. Subrin, Substance Specific, supra note 1, at 48-56. In a
letter dated September 22, 1997, Professors Subrin, Burbank, and Hazard made a similar proposal to
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tocols would be suggestive and not binding, until a judge chose to
mandate them or portions of them. Once it becomes obvious that a certain type of litigation, not assigned to the simple track because of the
high stakes involved, is repetitive, time-consuming, and expensive (for
example, product liability for specific products and antitrust cases), it
would be helpful to judges and lawyers to provide norms through suggested standards or protocols for future litigation in the same fields.
The Advisory Committee could appoint representatives of the judiciary, plaintiff and defendant lawyers, and perhaps clients in such cases
to discuss, negotiate, and compromise on what the normal pleadings and
discovery should include, and what the ordinary times for discovery cutoff and trial dates should be. They might even decide what should be
included in summary judgment motions and memoranda, what should
normally be required to survive summary judgment and judgment as a
matter of law, and what the ordinary length of trial should be. For those
procedural issues they cannot agree upon, as well as those for which
there is agreement, the Advisory Committee would decide on the final
protocols. Such protocols, with the recommended norms published in
advance by the Advisory Committee, would aid lawyers in advising their
clients, and aid judges, by providing suggested standards to help inform
their procedural decisions.1 1 If the Advisory Committee believes that
promulgating such substance-specific protocols, though only advisory, is
beyond the power granted to it by the Supreme Court, or beyond the
power granted by the Enabling Act, they should seek authority from the
Supreme Court, or in turn, from Congress. It is difficult to think why
such power would not be conferred.
CONCLUSION

With these three inroads to transsubstantive procedure-a simple
track, procedural-substantive law integration for selected case-types, and
procedural standards or protocols for special types of expensive, repetitive litigation-the procedural system can recapture what had been some
of the benefits of more defining and confining common law procedure.
At the same time, it can retain the benefits of the 1938 federal transsubstantive equity-based model for those cases that require such full procethe Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a letter sent to then Chairman,
the Honorable David F. Levi. On February 19, 2008, I made a proposal to the American Law Institute for a similar project on "Substance-Specific Procedural Standards." Neither the Advisory Committee nor the A.L.I. has responded to these proposals. The idea of protocols for discovery in particular subject-matter areas was mentioned at an Advisory Committee meeting in 1997: "Several bar
groups and commentators have expressed support for some effort along these lines." CIVIL RULES
ADVISORY COMM.,

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE

OF THE U.S.,

MINUTES Ocr. 6 AND 7 (1997),

http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/cvl O-97.htm.
111.
I urged such protocols (I called them "presumptive rules") in Subrin, Substance Specific,
supra note 1, at 48, 52-56. For a positive response to my proposal, see Jeffrey W. Stempel, Halting
Devolution or Bleak to the Future: Subrin's New-Old Procedure as a Possible Antidote to Dreyfuss's "Tolstoy Problem",46 FLA. L. REV. 57, 58-60 (1994).
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dural treatment. All cases, including those in the three categories I propose which depart from transsubstantivity, would continue to operate
under the vast majority of the same procedural rules.

RESOLVING CASES "ON THE MERITS"
JAY TIDMARSHt
INTRODUCTION

My task, as I understand it, is to select a single rule of procedure
and explain why (and how) it must be reformed in order to build a better
civil justice system in the twenty-first century. Let me say at the outset
that I intend to shirk this responsibility. My principal reason is the integrated nature of our rules of procedure. All the rules-or at least all the
rules worth talking about in the context of serious reform to American
civil justice-are interwoven. As with a spider's web, a tug on a single
rule can collapse the entire structure.' In considering reform, therefore, it
is more important to ask what kind of structure we ideally want to build
and what constitutional, historical, political, and economic realities constrain this ideal. The details of shaping individual rules to fit the structure
are a second-order consideration.2
I start from the premise that our civil justice system is broken. In the
weak sense of the word "broken," I doubt that this claim will generate
much controversy. The system isn't perfect. If it were, the distinguished
group of judges, lawyers, and academics who are my colleagues in this
collection of essays would have little to say. The history of AngloAmerican procedure has been an unending effort to perfect the imperfect.
Some of our efforts have made things worse, others have made them
better. We have not yet come to the endpoint of procedural reform.
But I also mean that the American system is "broken" in a stronger,
more controversial sense: our system is not sustainable in the long run.
What particularly makes the system unsustainable is the lack of a coherent theory that justifies its present structure. Our modem procedural3
system was built largely on the foundations of Roscoe Pound's vision.
That vision, which was first implemented in the Federal Equity Rules in
1912 and then even more fully embraced in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1938, had (at least in retrospect) predictable and deep flaws
that were baldly exposed after World War II as the legal market and the
t Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. I thank the participants in a workshop at
Notre Dame Law School for their thoughts on an early version of this essay.
1. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, DestabilizingSystems, 95 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 14), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1448796.
2.
In no sense do I intend to suggest that, as a second-order consideration, crafting a body of
rules is unimportant; indeed, in any practical sense, crafting rules is far more critical, and far more
difficult work than the imaginative task of design. But if we do not start with some sense of what we
want to build and what our real-world constraints are, a system of rules is likely to be jerry-built.
3.
See Jay Tidmarsh, Pound's Century, and Ours, 81 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 513 (2006).
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nature of American law evolved.4 Most of the efforts at procedural
reform in the past thirty years have been attempts to walk away from, or
tamp down the consequences of, Pound's belief in a simple, uniform,
discretionary, "decide each case on its merits" approach to legal procedure. 5 Although these efforts can loosely be associated with a law-andeconomics perspective (in the sense that they are all attempts to rein in
perceived excess costs in the present litigation system), it is fair to say
that, while we are in the process of rejecting Pound's paradigm, we have
yet to come up with a paradigm to replace it.
The fundamental reason for the endurance of Pound's paradigm is
its elegant simplicity: it promises to resolve each claim and each issue on
its factual and legal merit, without letting procedural technicalities or
traps derail the decision. No other vision for instance, "decide claims
by the most efficient means"-captures this most basic aspiration of an
ideal civil justice system. Like any aspiration, resolving cases "on the
merits" is never perfectly achievable.6 Nevertheless, this paradigm has
continued to battle all other policy objectives-such as achieving efficiency, fostering settlements, preventing jury confusion, and balancing
party control against active judicial management-in debates over the
architecture of our procedural rules.
This essay critically examines the meaning of the "on the merits"
ideal, how the principle has permeated our procedural theory and architecture, and why, despite its allure and its centrality to our procedural
system, we should replace the "on the merits" principle with a "fair out-

4.
See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Authority in the Dock, 69 B.U. L. REV. 469, 470-71 (1989);
Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The FederalRules of Civil Procedurein
HistoricalPerspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909,910-14 (1987).
5.
The modem dissatisfaction with Pound's vision was evident by the time of a conference in
1976 intended to consider the future of civil justice and, ironically, named for Pound. See Charles S.
House et al., Introduction to the Conference, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON

JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 17, 17-21 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1976). At the federal
level, the most visible procedural manifestations of this dissatisfaction include the 1983 amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which invigorated Rules 11 and 16, added the initial iteration of the proportionality requirement now found in Rule 26(b)(2)(C), and created Rule 26(g) as the
Rule 11 equivalent for discovery; the 1993 and 2000 amendments that created the mandatorydisclosure provisions of Rule 26(a) and further strengthened the judge's case-management authority
under Rule 16; and the 2006 e-discovery amendments of Rule 26(b)(2)(B). In terms of judicial
decisions, the Supreme Court's imprimatur on the more vigorous use of summary judgment, which
dates to 1986, as well as its efforts in 2007 and 2009 to toughen notice-pleading requirements, also
can be seen as expressions of its dissatisfaction with the consequences of the animating vision of the
Federal Rules. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) ("Summary judgment
procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part
of the Federal Rules as a whole ....); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) (pleading);
Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007)
(summary judgment); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)
(summary judgment); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary judgment).
6. As Professor Elliott put it, "Nourishing the fiction that justice is a pearl beyond price has
its own price." E. Donald Elliott, ManagerialJudging and the Evolution of Procedure,53 U. CHI.L.
REV. 306,321 (1986).
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come" principle that avoids the significant costs that the "on the merits"
principle generates.
I. THE MEANING OF "ON THE MERITS"
A simplistic definition of "on the merits" is "accurately": a case is
resolved "on the merits" when it is resolved accurately, on the basis of
the law and the facts. This definition is simplistic in the sense that it posits a correct answer for each factual and legal issue, even though a single correct answer to either factual or legal questions, or in the application of the latter to the former, is elusive.7 A somewhat less simplistic
meaning is to define "on the merits" to require a resolution that can be
justified by the exercise of reason.
But this definition is not precisely what Pound had in mind when he
called for reform of the American procedural system. For Pound, a principal cause of dissatisfaction with the American civil justice system was
the strict and unyielding operation of procedural technicalities that
thwarted the determination of a case "finally and upon its merits."8 Thus,
resolving cases on the merits meant removing procedural barriers that
stood in the way of the resolution demanded by "substantive law and
justice." 9 According to Pound, procedural rules should serve only two
purposes: either "to provide for the orderly dispatch of business, saving
of public time, and maintenance of the dignity of tribunals" or "to secure
to all parties a fair opportunity to meet the case against them and a full

7. Any "accuracy" theory poses certain difficulties. One is the metaphysical commitment
that underlies the concept of "accuracy." In the usual sense of the word in legal procedure, an outcome of a lawsuit is "accurate" when the legal conclusions are correct and the factual findings are
true. Leaving aside the issue of how to measure whether a legal proposition can be regarded as
correct, the concept that a fact determined in adjudication is "true" usually means that the fact as
determined by the decision-maker (judge or jury) corresponds to the fact as it actually happened (or
will happen without legal intervention). Such a correspondence theory is one possible understanding
of the meaning of truth, but competing philosophical approaches also exist-including the coherence
theory that better justifies the alternative definition that an accurate definition is one that can be
justified by the exercise of reason. See generally Michael Glanzberg, Truth, in STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHILOSOPHY
(Edward N.
Zalta
ed.,
2009), available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth (discussing correspondence, coherence, and other theories of
truth, as well as the metaphysical and epistemological suppositions that underlie them); Dan M.
Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive
Illiberalism, 122 HARv. L. REv. 837 (2009) (discussing the way in which a person's background can
influence the legal and factual interpretation of events on a videotape). A second reason is that, to
some extent, the procedures used to determine the facts influence the determination, see infra notes
17-19, so that it is impossible to talk about an "accurate" outcome independent of the procedural
rules that determine the outcome. An "accuracy" definition, however, presupposes that the "right"
answer exists independently of the process by which the answer is determined. Finally, the idea of
"accuracy" is not itself clearly defined. For instance, it can be divided into concepts of "case accuracy" (getting the law, the facts, and the remedies right in a specific case) and "systemic accuracy"
(adopting procedures that, ex ante, tend to get the law, the facts, and the remedies right). See Lawrence B. Solum, ProceduralJustice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 247-48 (2004).
8.
Roscoe Pound, The Causes of PopularDissatisfactionwith the Administration of Justice,
29 A.B.A. REP. 395, 405 (1906), reprintedin 35 F.R.D. 241 (1964).
9. Id. at 406.
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opportunity to present their own case."10 To prevent the adversaries from
manipulating these rules in order to obtain private advantages unrelated
to these purposes, the judge was to have the discretion to enforce procedural rules to give effect to these purposes and to no others. 1 Thus, for
Pound, resolving cases "on the merits" meant arriving at a decision
through the use of procedural rules that are "capable of a reasonable individualization of application' '1 2 and that are designed and implemented
for any purpose
to "mak[e] it unprofitable to raise questions of procedure
'3
except to develop the merits of the cause to the full."'
These two meanings-deciding cases accurately (or at least rationally) and deciding cases under procedures that give the parties the full
opportunity to present evidence and arguments in their cases-aren't
precisely the same thing. Perfectly realized, the latter approach might
generally yield outcomes that comport with the first approach, but the
latter approach does not demand perfect realization. The qualifier "generally" in the last sentence is necessary to account for the internal dynamic of Pound's approach alluded to above. According to Pound, procedural rules can legitimately exist not only for the purpose of deciding
cases on their substantive merit, but also for the purpose of ensuring the
"orderly dispatch of business, with conse uent saving of public time and
maintenance of the dignity of tribunals."' Presumably, if a plaintiff with
a meritorious claim missed a deadline for filing a response to a dispositive motion, a court could enforce the deadline to uphold the integrity of
the judicial process--even if the meritorious claim was tossed out as a
result.' 5 The same result might occur if a court was convinced that the
judicial costs of proceeding with a case outweighed the likelihood that
the case had merit.16 Except to the extent that Pound's system gave
judges the discretion to tailor all procedural rules to the circumstances of

Roscoe Pound, Some Principles of Procedural Reform, 4 ILL. L. REV. 388, 402 (1910)
10.
(emphasis omitted).
Id. (stating that "[ilt should be for the court, in its discretion, not the parties, to vindicate
11.
rules of procedure" involving the first purpose and that "nothing should depend on or be obtainable
through [rules meeting the second purpose] except the securing of such opportunity" (emphasis
omitted)).
12.
ld. at400.
13. Id. Pound did not justify the move he made from requiring that procedural rules not act as
a barrier to achieving the outcome required by the substantive law and justice, to requiring that
procedural rules not act as a barrier to the full and fair participation of the parties. These formulations are not the same; we can imagine an excellent inquisitorial judge who reaches the substantively
just result without allowing participation from the parties. Pound apparently believed that the parties'
full and fair participation would lead to substantively just results, although that connection is not
logically required.
14.
d.;see sources cited supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
15.
Cf.Nat'l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976) (upholding the dismissal of a case as a sanction for the violation of discovery orders).
Cf.Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (affirming the dismissal of an
16.

antitrust case on the pleadings; mentioning the significant costs of discovery as a relevant consideration in the decision).
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a case, Pound never attempted to reconcile the tension generated by the
dual purposes that he believed procedural rules should serve.
Both the "accuracy" definition of "on the merits" and Pound's related but distinct definition neglect an important aspect of procedural
rules: the rules themselves, to some extent, determine the merits. A
process that seeks to resolve disputes through, let's say, the scientific
method of falsifiable hypotheses is likely to yield different results than a
process that relies on adversarial presentation. 17 Some of the ways in
which procedural rules affect outcomes are well-described in the literature. 18 In theory, we might talk about a "right" or "accurate" or "rational"
answer on the substantive merits that is independent of the process used;
in the real world, however, substance and procedure are inextricably intertwined and cannot be disaggregated. t9 Because they are interrelated,
procedural rules are also inevitably political, in the sense that a given set
of rules is likely to favor the interests of some over those of others.
Taking account of this fact, let me suggest a definition of "on the
merits" that accounts for some of the criticisms of the "accuracy" and
"rationality" definitions as well as Pound's alternative. This definition
tracks fairly closely, I believe, the meaning that American proceduralists
give the phrase:
17.
See Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv.
1031, 1036 (1975) ("[O]thers searching after facts-in history, geography, medicine, whatever-do
not emulate our adversary system."); see also THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF
GOVERNMENT 185 (1935) ("Bitter partisanship in opposite directions is supposed to bring out the
truth. Of course no rational human being would apply such a theory to his own affairs or to other
departments of the government.").
18.
For a sampling of the literature, see Irwin A. Horwitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, The Consolidation of Plaintiffs: The Effects of Number of Plaintiffs on Jurors' Liability Decisions, Damage
Awards, and Cognitive Processing of Evidence, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 909, 910-13 (2000) (reporting data showing that the likelihood of plaintiffs' recovery increases as more plaintiffs are
joined, but that the average award decreases when more than four plaintiffs are joined); Irwin A.
Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, An Experimental Investigation of ProceduralIssues in Complex
Tort Trials, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 269, 281-85 (1990) (reporting changed effects on liability and
damages outcomes in bifurcated trials); Irwin A. Horwitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, The Effects of
Outlier Presence, PlaintiffPopulation Size, and Aggregation of Plaintiffs on Simulated Civil Jury
Decisions, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 209, 225-28 (1988) (describing how the number of joined
plaintiffs affects the likelihood of recovery and value of joined cases); Samuel Issacharoff & George
Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 74 (1990) (discussing
changes in expected litigation outcomes as a result of varying summary-judgment standards); Hans
Zeisel & Thomas Callahan, Split Trials and Time Saving: A Statistical Analysis, 76 HARv. L. REV.
1606, 1612 (1963) (finding rise in defense verdicts when issue of liability was bifurcated and tried
before damages); compare Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464-65 (1965) (holding that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are "rules of... procedure" within the meaning of the Rules Enabling Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006), as long as their effects on substantive rights are merely "incidental" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Miss. Publ'g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445-46
(1946))).
19.
As John Dingell pithily remarked, "I'll let you write the substance ... and you let me
write the procedure, and I'll screw you every time." Regulatory Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 2327
Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
98th Cong. 312 (1983) (statement of Rep. John Dingell, Chairman, H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce); see also Solum, supra note 7, at 225 (demonstrating "the ineliminable and inherent entanglement of substance and procedure").
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A resolution "on the merits" occurs when a lawsuit is decided
according to procedural rules that (1) are designed, interpreted,
and implemented to give the parties a full opportunity to participate in presenting the proofs and reasoned arguments on which
a court can decide a case, and (2) do not systematically affect
the outcomes of cases due to the intended operation of a principle other than the principle of allowing the parties a full opportunity to participate.
This definition hews more closely to the approach developed by
Pound 20 because it defines "on the merits" in more procedural than substantive terms-it seeks to remove decision-making rules that act as barriers to rational resolution rather than requiring a rational resolution directly. But it also differs from Pound's approach in significant ways.
First, rules designed to uphold the "dignity of the tribunal" are excluded
from the definition because they are designed to serve a purpose other
than assuring the parties a full opportunity to participate in the case.21
Furthermore, the second half of the definition has no direct link to
Pound's work; it is rather a reflection of the inevitably substantive effects
of procedural rules. A system of rules that meets the first condition of the
definition will be costly. 22 These costs might discourage some putative
litigants--especially those with fairly small amounts at stake-from
commencing or defending suits. Thus, rules intended to assure a full opportunity to litigate can have the opposite effect, and can prevent some
putative litigants from pursuing this opportunity. Moreover, for plaintiffs
who can afford to enter the system, such a system of rules is likely, in the
main, to have a pro-plaintiff effect. The second clause eliminates consideration of these economic or political effects: a rule whose intended purpose is to give the parties a full opportunity to participate does not become illegitimate simply because, in its operation, it has an opposite or
unintended effect in some situations.23
20.
Close readers will notice that I borrowed the phrase "proofs and reasoned arguments"
from Lon Fuller, who argued that participation through proofs and reasoned arguments was essential
to the adjudicatory form. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV.
353, 363 (1978). Professor Fuller's argument is often taken as a defense of the necessity of an adversarial system. See id. at 382-85. In using "proofs and reasoned arguments," I am not incorporating
all of Professor Fuller's argument, but I am consciously using a phrase associated with the adversarial tradition to highlight the fact that, insofar as the phrase "on the merits" refers to a principle
adopted to shape American procedural rules, the underlying form of the American legal system is
adversarial.
21.
This fact does not mean that the enforcement of sanctions against those who violate the
rules is necessarily precluded. The "on the merits" principle guarantees the opportunity to participate, not the right of actual participation.Parties can forfeit their opportunity. Implementing the
sanctions provided in a rule against a violator does not offend the "on the merits" principle unless
the court, in enforcing the rule, considers matters other than the nature of, and reasons for, a party's
forfeiture of that opportunity (such as the need to clear dockets). In this sense, the "on the merits"
principle does not prevent courts from upholding their dignity against violators.
22.
For further discussion of this point, see infra notes 49-62.
23.
The second clause also allows for procedural rules that establish deadlines or practices
that the "on the merits" principle underdetermines. For instance, drafters of procedural rules must
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The critical word in the definition is "full." Virtually any system of
procedural rules-including ones designed to enhance efficiency, to foster settlements, or to advance the interests of certain classes of litigantsgives the parties some opportunity to participate in shaping the litigation.
It is the guarantee of a full opportunity-unfettered by concerns for expense, delay, or advancing certain political interests-that defines the
"on the merits" principle. What this definition excludes are decisions
made in accordance with rules designed, interpreted, or implemented to
advance other purposes-for instance, rules designed to enhance the efficiency of litigation, to foster settlements, or to favor business interests.
To be clear, I am not contending that the "on the merits" principle is
the best, or even a necessary, principle around which to design a system
of procedural rules. Nor am I contending that procedural rules intended
to enhance efficiency in litigation, to foster settlements, or to advance
other social objectives are illegitimate; or that these other principles must
be subordinated to the "on the merits" principle when designing and implementing a system of procedural rules. For now, my only point is to fix
the meaning of the phrase "resolving a case on the merits," in order that I
might explore the influence of this idea on our present procedural rules
and to consider whether this principle is in fact an appropriate, or even a
necessary, element in the design and implementation of a procedural
system.
II. THE INFLUENCE OF THE "ON THE MERITS" PRINCIPLE
It is a true but unremarkable observation that the principle of resolving cases on their merits is deeply ingrained in modern American procedure. The first level of engagement is doctrinal. Major aspects of the
American procedural system flow directly from the idea that parties deserve a full opportunity to participate in shaping decisions about their
claims and defenses. For instance, three of the central and most controversial features in American procedure-notice pleading, discovery, and
joinder-were originally designed to enable "on the merits" resolutions. 24 Notice pleading sought to eliminate the technical rigor of common-law and code pleading-a rigor that was thought to thwart the par-

decide how many days a defendant has to respond to a complaint. The "on the merits" principle
specified in the first clause requires that the period be long enough to allow the defendant a full
opportunity to participate (so a response deadline of ten minutes would be inadequate). But, assuming that twenty days is adequate to ensure this opportunity, the "on the merits" principle cannot
determine whether the number of days should be twenty or twenty-one. The drafters are justified in
choosing either deadline, and in using other principles (such as efficiency or simplicity) to make the
choice, because the choice does not systematically affect the outcome in a way intended to thwart
the parties' opportunity to participate.
24.
See Subrin, supra note 4, at 922, 945-47, 962-64, 973-74 (noting that modem notice
pleading, discovery, and joinder have their origins in the system of equity, and that the desire to have
cases determined on their substantive merits underlay the efforts of reformers such as Roscoe Pound
and Charles Clark to use equity's procedural approach).
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ties' ability to obtain a decision based on substantive law.25 Generous
discovery rules reversed the common-law and code-pleading practices, in
which discovery was either unavailable or significantly circumscribed.26
The principal argument for discovery was that it was necessary to ensure
that both sides would have a full opportunity to present their own cases
and to meet the cases of their opponents.27 And the breadth of modem
joinder devices borrowed from and expanded on the devices available in
equity, which had permitted broad joinder in order to do complete justice
among all interested parties. 28
Of course, like all legal rules, these doctrines can also be justified
on grounds other than the "on the merits" principle. Charles Clark argued
(with apparent sincerity) that notice pleading, when combined with good
case management, was more efficient than a demanding pleading standard.29 Edson Sunderland argued that full discovery fostered settlements
30
because the parties could know the strength of the cases on both sides.
The joinder rules are usually construed to permit as much joinder "as is
compatible with efficiency and due process. 31
When rules are designed to serve multiple purposes, the dominant
purpose becomes evident when, on a given set of facts, a court chooses
one interpretation or implementation of the rule that better fulfills the
dominant purpose, but other interpretations or implementations would
have better fulfilled other purposes. Traditionally, the "on the merits"
principle won out at the levels of interpretation and implementation. But
in recent years that dominance has been threatened. The point is well
illustrated in the tension between Conley v. Gibson,32 whose "no set of
25. CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 56-58 (2d ed. 1947);
Charles E. Clark, Special Pleading in the "Big Case," 21 F.R.D. 45, 47 (1957) [hereinafter Clark,
Big Case].
26. See Subrin, supra note 4, at 936-37 (discussing limitations on discovery in code pleading); Edson R. Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863, 865-66,
869-71 (1933) (discussing the general unavailability of discovery at common law, the limitations on
using equity to aid in obtaining discovery in common-law actions, and the vagaries of discovery in
American jurisdictions before enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
27. See Sunderland, supra note 26, at 869. Professor Sunderland advocated for and spearheaded the drafting of the Federal Rules' discovery provisions. See Charles E. Clark, Edson Sunderland and the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 58 MICH. L. REV. 6, 11 (1959) (noting that "[tihe
system thus envisaged by Sunderland had no counterpart at the time he proposed it").
28. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Broadening the Second Stage of Interpleader, 56 HARV. L.
REV. 541, 548 (1943); Subrin, supranote 4, at 923.
29. Clark, Big Case, supra note 25, at 53 ("You will get there more expeditiously if instead of
pausing to beautify the pleadings you turn to pre-trial and the . . . saving of actual trial it
represents.").
30. Sunderland, supra note 26, at 865 ("Many a case would be settled ... if the true situation
could be disclosed before the trial begins.").
31.
Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (interpreting Rule 24); see also
Mosley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1332 (8th Cir. 1974) (interpreting Rule 20 permissive
joinder "to promote trial convenience and expedite the final determination of disputes, thereby
preventing multiple lawsuits"); cf United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966)
("Under the Rules, the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged.").
32. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
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facts" interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2) proscribed nearly all dismissals of
pleadings for reasons unrelated to the merits, and Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly,33 whose "plausibility" interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2) overruled
Conley, in part because of fears that Conley's "on the merits" approach
was too costly. Bills presently pending in Congress would reject Twombly and restore Conley's approach to pleading.3 4 A principal argument
justifying the bills
is to restore litigants' ability to have cases determined
35
merits.
their
on
The fight over the proper orientation of pleading rules demonstrates
the continuing vitality of, but also the controversy beneath, the "on the
merits" principle. The reason that notice pleading, discovery, and joinder
excite controversy and generate calls for reform36 is not their tendency to
foster efficient outcomes or settlements. 37 On the contrary, they are con33.
550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1947 (2009) (affirming
Twombly's approach).
34.
As of this writing, bills have been introduced in both the Senate and the House to overturn
Twombly and Iqbal, and hearings have been scheduled. Notice Pleading Resolution Act of 2009, S.
1504, 111 th Cong. (2009); Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111 th Cong. (2009). The
groups supporting these bills include civil-rights and pro-plaintiff organizations-a fact that shows
that the "on the merits" principle, whatever its theoretical merit, is not perceived as politically neutral in its effect.
35.
The House bill is titled the "Open Access to Courts Act of 2009." H.R. 4115, 11 1th Cong.
(2009). The sponsor of the Senate bill, Senator Arlen Specter, stated that the effect of Twombly was
to "deny many plaintiffs with meritorious claims access to the Federal courts and, with it, any legal
redress for their injuries." 155 CONG. REc. S7891 (daily ed. July 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. Specter). His bill was intended to ensure that plaintiffs "had access to relevant information in the defendant's possession," and that they could "normally offer evidence to support the complaint's allegations" before a decision was rendered. Id. at S7890.
36.
For one reform proposal advocating stricter pleading rules and limiting discovery, see
INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL Sys. & AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK
FORCE ON DISCOVERY & CIVIL JUSTICE, 21ST CENTURY CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A ROADMAP FOR

REFORM PILOT PROJECT RULES 1 (2009), http://www.actl.com/AMlTemplate.cfm?Section=Home&
Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=4509.
37.
A comparable debate over the role of the "on the merits" principle has existed for some
time in the area of discovery. The 1983 amendments to Federal Rule 26(b) to require that discovery
be proportional to the needs of the case (a requirement strengthened in subsequent amendments), the
2000 amendments to Federal Rule 26(b)(1) to eliminate subject-matter discovery except on a showing of good cause, and the 2006 amendments that established a presumption of non-disclosure for
electronically stored information that was not readily accessible, all sought to constrain the perceived
excess costs of full "on the merits" discovery. Efforts to constrain the "on the merits" orientation in
the area of joinder have thus far been less evident. Except arguably in the context of class actions,
the law of joinder has remained relatively stable in recent years, and the justifications for class
actions are for the most part shaped by considerations other than the "on the merits" principle. See
Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEx. L. REV. 1137, 1145-51 (2009).
Indeed, in some areas, the use ofjoinder and consolidation devices is expanding. See ADMIN. OFFICE
OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2008 ANNUAL REPORT

OF THE DIRECTOR 71 tbl.S-20 (2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2008/JudicialBusinespdf
version.pdf (showing 75,663 cases consolidated in multidistrict proceedings in 2006 and 102,448
cases consolidated in multidistrict proceedings in 2008). Because the law of joinder and consolidation has long had an orientation toward efficiency, see supra note 31 and accompanying text, the
stability in the area of joinder is not inconsistent with my general point of the ascendancy of efficiency concerns, rather than the "on the merits" principle, in modern American litigation. Nonetheless, liberal joinder often causes requests for broad and costly discovery, such that debates over the
sustainability of full "on the merits" discovery are often indirectly debates over the breadth of modem joinder and consolidation.
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troversial only because, in fulfilling the goal of merits-based resolutions
and thus extending to the parties (often plaintiffs) a full opportunity to
litigate, they are perceived to generate inefficiencies or to have a bias
against the interests of certain litigants (often defendants).
The second level at which the "on the merits" principle influences
the architecture of our procedural rules is more structural in nature.
When Pound first propounded his procedural vision, he recognized the
tendency of any system of rules to ossify, 38 thus eventually frustrating
the goal of resolving cases on their merits. 39 His antidote was judicial
discretion. 4° This vision of a highly discretionary system of procedural
rules manifested itself in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and remains intact today. 4'
At the same time, the purposes for which this discretion should be
exercised have become more contested. For Pound, the point of judicial
discretion was to tailor the generalities of substantive law to the facts of
individual cases-in other words, to provide a structural mechanism by
which rules designed to resolve cases on the merits could meet that
goal.42 Today, however, judicial discretion is often exercised for other
purposes, especially for ensuring the efficient resolution of litigation.43
Therefore, both at the doctrinal level and at the structural level of
the appropriate judicial role, the "on the merits" principle is engaged in a
struggle for continued relevance. As long as the struggle continues
against the backdrop of rules and understandings of the judicial role that
the "on the merits" principle originally framed, the principle remains
influential. But the trend line in American procedure is running against
38. For a short statement of Pound's views on the issue, see Roscoe Pound, Enforcement of
Law, 20 GREEN BAG 401,403-05 (1908).
39. See Pound, supra note 8, at 397-98; Roscoe Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLUM.
L. REv. 20, 20-26 (1905).
40. See Pound, supra note 10, at 388-89. In particular, Pound argued for a theory of sociological jurisprudence, which he described in the following terms:
[W]ithin wide limits [the judge] should be free to deal with the individual case so as to
meet the demands of justice between the parties and accord with the reason and moral
sense of ordinary men.... [The] application of law is not a purely mechanical process. It
... involves, not logic merely, but discretion; that the cause is not to be fitted to the rule
but the rule to the cause....
Hence for us a proper proportion between the technical and the discretionary elements
in the administration of justice will give chief weight to the former. The present leaning
of the scale toward the latter may be counteracted by providing a more rational and flexible procedure .... The demand for wider discretion in the courts may be satisfied legitimately in the direction of procedure ....
Pound, supra note 38, at 405, 408.
41.
According to Professor Subrin, in 1987 judicial discretion is explicitly or implicitly provided for in twenty-eight of the eighty-four Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; included on his list are
the most significant Rules. Subrin, supra note 4, at 923 n.76. More recent amendments to Rules 16
and 26, among others, have continued to enhance judicial discretion in shaping the Federal Rules to
specific cases.
42. See Tidmarsh, supra note 3, at 521-23, 527.
43. Id. at 560.
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the "on the merits" principle and in favor of other principles, most notably, the related ideas of advancing efficiency and fostering settlements.
Running beneath these principles is also the political undercurrent that
the "on the merits" principle is politically skewed against the interests of
repeat-player defendants (typically corporations). Indeed, in a world in
which 97% or more of civil cases do not reach trial,44 in which more than
80% of civil cases settle or are decided for reasons unrelated to their merits,45 and in which American business must remain competitive in a
global environment, it is fair to ask what role the "on the merits" principle should play going forward.
III. THE FUTURE OF THE "ON THE MERITS" PRINCIPLE
Let me suggest four possible fates for the "on the merits" principle.
First, in the jostling of ideas around which we might organize our procedural system, it could occupy the lexically superior position; all other
principles (such as efficiency, fostering settlements, or favoring certain
interests) should be relegated to a lexically inferior status and should be
used only to help choose among procedural alternatives that equally satisfy the "on the merits" principle. A second alternative is to assign no
procedural principle to the superior position, and to shape procedural
rules pragmatically by balancing various principles, including the "on the
merits" principle, against each other. A third alternative is to invert the
lexical ordering, put some other principle (say, efficiency) in the primary
position, and use the "on the merits" principle (along with other lexically
inferior principles) to help choose among procedural alternatives that are
equally efficient. A fourth is to abandon the "on the merits" principle as a
relevant consideration in designing, interpreting, and implementing procedural rules.
As I have said, the first approach is consonant with the spirit in
which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and comparable state rules
were originally conceived. The second approach strikes me as the space
that rule-making and rule-implementing occupies today, as rule-makers
and judges struggle to balance the "on the merits" principle against other
principles that also demand satisfaction. The movement in the direction
LYNN LANGTON & THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF
44.
STATE COURTS, 2005: CIVIL BENCH AND JURY TRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 1 (rev. ed. 2008),

http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf (noting that "trials collectively accounted
for about 3% of all tort, contract, and real property dispositions in general jurisdiction [state]
courts"); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES 28 tbl.4.10 (2009),

http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/2008/all2008judicialfactsfigures.pdf (documenting the
steady decline in civil trials in federal courts to a low of 1.3% of filed cases in 2006; further noting a
slight uptick in trials in 2007 to 4.1% and 2008 to 2.0%, but explaining the reversal as being principally the result of trials in a mass action in one district).
45.
Due to the limitations of the way in which data about case terminations in federal courts
are collected, a more precise statement is not possible, but it is likely that this 80% figure is a conservative estimate. For a discussion of the issue and an examination of data and studies through
2005, see Tidmarsh, supra note 3, at 549.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:2

of designing and interpreting rules to achieve more efficient outcomes 46
suggests that we might be crossing over to the third approach, in which
efficiency is the lexically superior ideal. Indeed, it is only the lack of the
clear emergence of efficiency as a dominant principle, rather than the
continuing vigor of the "on the merits" principle,47 that keeps me from
asserting that we have already arrived at the third approach.48 Skeptics
might even argue that the "on the merits" principle is effectively dead
(the fourth approach), on the theory that today "on the merits" argumentation is nothing more than a feint by litigants or judges to mask desired
political outcomes in the language of a neutral, sensible principle.
In my judgment, we should adopt the fourth approach, and abandon
the current "on the merits" principle in favor of a related but distinct "fair
outcome" principle that I will propose shortly. Before I come to that proposal, let me explain my objections to the first three approaches.
A. The Problems of "On the Merits" Adjudication as a Lexically SuperiorProceduralPrinciple
The primary difficulty with a lexically superior "on the merits"
principle is its failure to account for the costs that a full opportunity to
participate in litigation can impose on others. This blind spot can be explained historically: Roscoe Pound was deeply influenced by the work of
the German legal philosopher Rudolf von Jhering,49 whose famous book,
Der Kampf ums Recht (The Struggle for Law), exhorted people to assert
and defend their legal rights regardless of cost. 50 But it is a different issue
to justify this blind spot rationally.
To take a simplistic example, suppose that a plaintiff alleges that
defendant has negligently destroyed $10,000 in currency belonging to the
46. See supra notes 5, 43 and accompanying text.
47.
I can think of no major reform to the Federal Rules over the past forty years in which the
ideal of deciding cases "on the merits" was the principal motivation behind the reform.
48. Thus far, rule-makers and judges have adopted the efficiency rationale only in a soft form.
In terms of allocative efficiency, the requirements of a procedural system can be stated with some
rigor. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 593-94 (7th ed. 2007) (demonstrating that, under rational-choice theory, procedural efficiency requires the minimization of the sum of
direct litigation costs and error costs). See generally ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE
ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (2003) (analyzing procedural rules under both rational-choice
theory and important limitations on the theory such as sunk costs, limited access to information,
agency costs, and bounded rationality). Neither our procedural rules nor judicial interpretations of
these rules engage in the detailed and often fact-specific inquiry needed to ensure that the rules in
fact meet the requirements of rational-choice theory and its limitations. For the most part, when rulemakers and judges discuss making the system more "efficient," they mean taking steps to reduce
direct litigation costs. See, e.g., Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (interpreting
Federal Rule 8(a)(2)'s pleading requirement in light of the fact that "antitrust discovery can be
expensive").
49.
See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence,25 HARV.
L. REV. 140, 140-47 (1911); Roscoe Pound, MechanicalJurisprudence,8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 610
(1908). Pound usually rendered Jhering's name as "lhering."
50. See William Seagle, Rudolf von Jhering: Or Law As a Means to an End, 13 U. CHI. L.
REV. 71, 81-82 (1945).
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plaintiff. The plaintiff now wishes to discover electronically stored information in the defendant's possession. The cost to the defendant of
responding to this request for discovery, which is relevant to the plaintiffs claim that the defendant acted negligently, is $50,000.51 If an "on
the merits" approach to discovery was lexically superior, the defendant
must spend $50,000.52 In this world, the defendant would be much better
though the value of the remedy
off settling the case for $25,000, even
53
that a court would order is $10,000.
The example is extreme, but the problem is not. In some areas of
practice, direct litigation costs consume anywhere from 48% to 63% of
the total amounts spent on litigation, including compensation paid to
plaintiffs.54 A large portion of these costs are associated with our system
of "on the merits" discovery, 55 which in turn is brought readily into play
51.
Although I have chosen an example in which the plaintiff's use of discovery imposes
costs, it is equally possible to turn the tables, and to hypothesize a case in which the defendant asks
for $50,000 worth of discovery from the plaintiff (or perhaps adds additional parties that will require
the plaintiff to spend $50,000 more in litigation expenses), so that the plaintiff is better off dropping
the lawsuit and taking nothing rather than continuing to litigate.
52. It is true that the defendant, rather than the plaintiff, must spend the money because of the
presumption that each party pays for the cost of responding to an opponent's discovery. If the rule
was the opposite, and the requesting party was required to pay, cf FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (permitting a court to "specify conditions," including shifting costs, for discovery of electronically stored
information), the plaintiff in the hypothetical would not spend more than her expected recovery
($10,000 or less) on the discovery, and greater efficiency would be realized. But nothing in the "on
the merits" principle dictates whether the requesting or responding party should pay for costs of
responding; the decision must be resolved by examining second-order considerations such as efficiency and a desire for open access to courts. Cf. Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 435 passim (1994) (employing economic
analysis to determine the circumstances in which a requirement that the requesting party pay for
discovery leads to a more efficient level of discovery).
Thus, it is possible to ascribe two possible motives to the plaintiff who requests the dis53.
covery. One is to obtain information that she legitimately needs to prove her case. The other is to
impose costs on the opposing party in order to extract an excessive settlement. This distinction
between case-relevant and impositional discovery will matter later. See infra note 84 and accompanying text. For now, it is useful to note that, if a court implements an "on the merits" discovery rule
according to its only legitimate purpose (i.e., ensuring that the parties have a full opportunity to
participate in the process of presenting proofs and reasoned arguments), it will prevent impositional
discovery from occurring. But a party is unlikely to admit that she is engaging in impositional discovery, and is likely to be able to present some plausible argument why the discovery is necessary to
prove the case. If a court makes errors in discerning the party's actual motives, or if it is willing to
tolerate impositional discovery as a means of pressuring the opponent to settle, some impositional
discovery will occur. In the real world, purely impositional discovery is arguably uncommon. See
Jack B. Weinstein, What Discovery Abuse? A Comment on John Setear's The Barrister and the
Bomb, 69 B.U. L. REv. 649, 654-55 (1989). Mixed-motive discovery is not; lawyers often seek
discovery both to obtain useful information and to erode an opponent's tolerance for litigation.
54.

See JAMES S.KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT

LITIGATION, at xiii (1986) (reporting that the costs of tort litigation ranged from 48% in automobile
cases to 57% in other tort cases, with plaintiffs receiving from 52% to 43% in compensation); JAMES
S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND, COSTS OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION, at vii tbl.S.2 (1983) (reporting that the
costs of asbestos cases consumed 63% of all money spent on asbestos cases, with plaintiffs receiving
37% in compensation); PAUL C. WEILER,MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 53 (1991) (estimating
that the total litigation costs of medical-malpractice cases is 55%, with plaintiffs receiving 45% in
compensation).
55. James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the Civil Justice
Reform Act EvaluationData, 39 B.C. L. REv. 613, 637 (1998) (reporting that an average of 36% of
all attorney time and a median of 25% of attorney time was spent on discovery); id. at 636 ("Subjec-
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by our "on the merits" approach of liberal pleading and joinder rules.
The judicial discretion that the "on the merits" principle dictates also
increases direct litigation costs, because discretion allows judges to reinvent the procedural wheel for each case and gives parties an incentive to
argue over the shape of that wheel.
Beyond the effects that a full opportunity to participate in litigation
can have on an opposing party's wallet and behavior, allowing this full
opportunity can create other undesirable effects, including disincentives
for putative litigants with meritorious claims to enter the litigation system. 56 In the same fashion, the method by which the old "on the merits"
principle is implemented-giving judges discretion--can create inappropriate incentives to settle or disincentives to litigate meritorious claims
for the less powerful if the judge is perceived to use that power to advance the interests of certain classes of litigants.57
In economic terms, the "on the merits" principle can impose direct
litigation costs, error costs, or both. The $50,000 discovery expenditure
is a classic example of a direct litigation cost that can distort the operation of efficient substantive rules.58 If the defendant settles for $25,000
instead, the difference between $25,000 and the actual value of the plaintiffs claim (which is between 0% and 100% of $10,000) is a type of
error cost, as are the costs associated with the decisions of putative litigants with meritorious claims not to enter the litigation system. 59
tive information from our interviews with lawyers also suggests that the median or typical case is not
'the problem.' It is the minority of the cases with high discovery costs that generate the anecdotal
Iparade of horribles' that dominates much of the debate over discovery rules and discovery case
management."). Of course, measuring costs only by attorney time does not fully capture all the
expenses of litigation, including litigants' time spent responding to discovery, expert witness fees,
and the like. Thomas E. Willging et al., An EmpiricalStudy of Discovery and DisclosurePractices
Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 531 (1998) (reporting that, with
regard to costs that flowed through the lawyer (attorneys' and expert witness fees, transcript costs,
and the like) the median for litigation costs per litigant was $13,000, with about half of that amount
devoted to discovery; this amount did not include costs incurred directly by the client).
56.
Cf Bruce L. Hay, Civil Discovery: Its Effects and Optimal Scope, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 481,
510-14 (1994) (arguing that heavy discovery can induce early settlements, thus resulting in less
exposure of illegal behavior); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behaviorof
the Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147, 1183-89 (1992) (summarizing
statistical evidence showing that less than 20% of injured people seek any form of redress, and,
depending on the nature of the claim, only 2-11% file civil cases).
57.
Cf.Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery and the Role of the Judge in Civil Law Jurisdictions, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1017, 1027-28 (1998) (noting that, in civil-law countries that have a
history of judiciaries associated with totalitarian or despotic rule, judges are required to obey the
precise letter of procedural law in order to avoid any hint of judicial activism or policy-making).
58.
If the defendant is aware ex ante that she might be liable not only for the $10,000 loss but
also $50,000 in discovery expenses, she will likely take more care to avoid losses than is socially
.optimal. See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCrION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 141-45 (3d ed.
2003); cf R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 passim (1960) (showing that,
in the absence of transaction costs, any rule is allocatively efficient).
59. In this essay I repeatedly use the example of the $50,000 discovery request in a $10,000
case for illustrative and dramatic purposes. Most cases do not involve such disproportion, but the
same concerns for the effects of litigation costs and error costs pertain if the plaintiff demanded that
the defendant spend $50 responding to discovery.
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To be sure, these costs are limited. They are offset by gains that result from not incurring litigation expenses in meritless cases whose filing
are discouraged by "on the merits" procedures but are countenanced by
other procedures. The costs must also be calculated on the margin-that
is, the difference between the costs associated with providing a full opportunity to litigate and the costs associated with the opportunity to litigate afforded by procedural rules constructed under a different principle
or set of principles. The effect of class actions and other massaggregation devices that reduce per capita direct litigation cases (but also
participatory opportunities) must be considered. In some states of the
world, it is possible that the "on the merits" principle leads to the adoption of procedural rules that are less costly than any alternative. 60 But in
other states of the world, including ours, the "on the merits" principle
leads to the adoption of procedural rules that are more costly than rules
based on alternative principles. 6'
If we adopt another principle to limit the costs associated with the
operation of rules constructed under an "on the merits" principle (for
instance, an efficiency principle that requires the use of procedural rules
that minimize the sum of litigation and error costs), then the "on the merits" principle would not be satisfied. Nor would it be lexically superior
to the limiting principle. Therefore, if the "on the merits" principle is
lexically superior, its costs and inefficiencies must be conceded and tolerated. An efficiency principle operates only as a method for choosing
between alternatives that each guarantee a full opportunity to litigate-in
other words, for choosing rules whose content the "on the merits" principle underdetermines.
Although this economic critique has limited reach,62 it highlights a
critical problem: on the assumption that unjustified wastes of resources
60.
See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray:The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive
Discovery Abuse and the Consequencesfor Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (1994)
(disputing the view that full, "on the merits" discovery results in abuse).
61.
I take note of the argument that "on the merits" rules have not been proven to be more
costly. See id. But the present efforts to construct procedural rules that reduce the costs of "on the
merits" rules, see supra notes 5, 43, 46-48 and accompanying text, reflect the considered view of
our present rule-makers and judges that an "on the merits" approach is more costly (whether economically or politically) than some alternatives.
62.
One problem is that the focus on litigation and error costs can mask other costs of the "on
the merits" principle. For instance, as a matter of public policy, we might wish to subsidize the
operations of certain product manufacturers. A set of "on the merits" procedural rules might subject
these manufacturers to more liability than we wish. In other words, harms to the socially desirable
distribution of resources are poorly captured in the notions of litigation and error costs, which focus
on allocative efficiency. But including such costs does not change the basic proposition that the "on
the merits" principle can impose excess costs; indeed, it enhances the proposition. For that reason, I
do not consider them further.
Another important difficulty is that economic arguments presume that a case has a true or fair economic value that can be determined apart from the procedures used to decide the case. Thus, in the
hypothetical discussed above, the assumption was that the case has a true-in other words, "preprocedural," "no transaction cost," or "accurate"-value of no more than $10,000. I have already
described the difficulties with the assumption that cases can be determined "accurately." See supra
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ought to be avoided, any decision to use the "on the merits" approach as
a lexically superior principle requires justification. If no justification can
be constructed and maintained, then the lexical superiority of the "on the
merits" principle must fall.
As an initial matter, things do not look good for the principle.
Pound never provided any theoretical arguments for it, and it has remained undertheorized ever since. In one sense, the problem is not
unique to the "on the merits" principle. Legal procedures-regardless of
the principle or principles that underlie their construction-permit litigants to engage in behaviors that do or might harm the interests of other
litigants in the case and that do or might negatively affect the litigation
choices of actual or potential litigants in other cases. On the assumption
that theories of ethics or justice ought to concern themselves with the
harms that one person imposes or might impose on others,63 structuring
64
any system of legal procedure raises questions of ethics and justice.
One question is whether and when a person pursuing her own purposes
can interfere with another person's opportunity to pursue his purposes.
Another is whether and when a government is justified in preventing
such interference. A third is whether and how the answers to the first two
questions should affect the way in which the procedures in a civil adjudicatory system are designed, interpreted, and implemented.
In another sense, however, the justificatory problem for the "on the
merits" principle is especially acute. Affording present litigants a full
opportunity to participate in presenting proofs and reasoned arguments,
note 7 and accompanying text. If the procedures help to define the merits of a case, see supra notes
17-19 and accompanying text, then it is not obvious that the true value of the case is $10,000, as
opposed to the $25,000 that a plaintiff can obtain in settlement by virtue of the expansive discovery
rule. Put differently, the "true" value of a case varies, depending on the procedures used to determine
the dispute.
There is also a more general critique of relying exclusively on rational-choice economic arguments.
See AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 174-93 (2009).

63.
Ronald Dworkin distinguishes between "bare harm" and "moral harm": not all harms we
inflict on each other are unjust or a cause for moral concern. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATrER OF
PRINCIPLE 80, 102 (1985). On this theory, the harms that litigants inflict on each other in litigation
could be seen as bare harms, and thus not subject to moral analysis at all. If we assume the correctness of this point, however, we should also conclude that there is no reason in morals or justice to
lexically prefer the "on the merits" principle to other principles: that any harm a person suffers in
being unable to exercise a full opportunity to litigate is a bare harm that can be traded in a utilitarian
way against other bare harms to minimize overall harm. In his discussion of the role of procedure,
which he sees principally as a means to achieve accurate outcomes, Professor Dworkin does not
contend that denial of a full opportunity to participate in litigation is a moral harm. Id. at 80-81; see
also Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the "Day in Court" Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion,67 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 193, 260-64 (1992) (arguing that the Dworkin approach to procedure does not necessarily
require that parties have a right to participate in litigation).
64.
See Solum, supra note 7, at 229 (noting that, in constructing a theory of procedural justice, a judge "ultimately may be required to resolve the great questions of moral theory and decide
whether utilitarianism, Kantianism, virtue-ethics, or some other view offers the best general account
of morality"); cf. ARTHUR RIPSTEN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT'S LEGAL AND POLITICAL

PHILOSOPHY 11 (2009) (noting that Kant drew "a series of sharp divisions between rights and ethics," so that the legal and political rights of individuals could not be derived from his ethical theory
but needed to be based on other postulates).
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and neglecting the effects of that opportunity on others, create the conditions under which a party can impose additional costs (i.e., harms) that
other principles do not. 65 The "on the merits" principle bears a heavier
burden of justification than these other principles do.
So is it possible to construct an adequate defense of the "on the merits" principle? The most common theories of ethics or justice fall into
three camps: utilitarian, rights-based (whether liberty-centered or equality-centered), and virtue-based.66 To begin, the justification for the "on
the merits" principle cannot be utilitarian-at least if we measure utility
in terms of money 67 and if procedures constructed under the "on the merits" principle cause more harm than procedures that can be constructed
under other principles or sets of principles (such as efficiency). 68 Therefore, the justification for affording the "on the merits" principle its lexical superiority can lie only in a non-utilitarian theory of justice or right.
Perhaps the most famous, and most controversial, such theory is the
"Harm Principle" offered by John Stuart Mill: "the only purpose for
which power can be rightly exercised over any member of a civilized
community against his will, is to prevent harm to others., 69 Because
people invariably harm each other every day (for instance, by competing
with each other in market economies), a standard corollary of the Harm
Principle is "the 'Reciprocal Harm Principle,' pursuant to which people
and the
are permitted to harm each other if those harms are reciprocal
70
beneficial.,
mutually
is
harming
such
allowing
of
practice
The Harm Principle and the Reciprocal Harm Principle both pose
difficulties for the "on the merits" principle. First, although all legal procedures cause harm (and thus run afoul of a relentlessly applied Harm
Principle), "on the merits" procedures cause some harms that procedures
constructed under other principles (such as efficiency) do not. For that
65.

See supranotes 60-61 and accompanying text.

66.

See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT'S THE RIGHT THING TO Do? 6-10 (2009).

67.
It could be argued that litigants' mutual preferences for a full opportunity to litigate is
more valuable to them than the extra money that the full opportunity costs. Although that fact might
be true of some litigants for whom "it's the principle of the thing, not the money, that matters," I am
skeptical that many litigants feel this way. Cf. Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The
Role of Plaintiffs' Counsel in Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REV. 1465, 1540 (1998)
(noting that members of class actions "would often rather have less procedural justice and more
substantive justice than the reverse").
68.
See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
69.
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 6 (Longmans, Green & Co. 1921) (1859). Although
Mill was a utilitarian, his Harm Principle is often viewed as being inconsistent with utilitarianism.
As a result, some have argued that "the Harm Principle is more properly based on Kant's doctrine of
right." E.g. William E. O'Brian, Jr., Distributive Justice and the Harm Principle 3 (Univ. of Warwick Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009-05, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1503963.
70.
O'Brian, supra note 69, at 2; see also Arthur Ripstein, Beyond the Harm Principle,34
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 215, 217 (2006) (noting that the Harm Principle has been modified to allow
"harm resulting from a fair contest, including market competition .... [O]n the claim that certain
benefits 'outweigh' the harms they inevitably cause").
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reason, the "on the merits" principle is more incompatible with the Harm
Principle than some other principles, notably efficiency. Second, the Reciprocal Harm Principle fails to justify "on the merits" procedures when
asymmetries prevent the parties from reciprocally inflicting harms or
when harming is not mutually beneficial. For instance, in the hypothetical above, if only the defendant has electronically stored information, an
"on the merits" rule that authorizes full discovery is not reciprocal and is
not beneficial to the defendant. Moreover, to the extent that the Reciprocal Harm Principle operates only at the macroscopic level (e.g., that a
rule authorizing broad discovery of electronically stored information is
reciprocal if both plaintiffs and defendants can use it, regardless of the
fact that there is an asymmetry that allows only one party to use the rule
in a particular case), the mutual benefit is still lacking whenever it can be
shown that rules developed under an "on the merits" approach are more
costly than alternative rules that better minimize costs (i.e., minimize
harms by maximizing benefits). Put differently, the Reciprocal Harm
Principle injects either an act-utilitarian or rule-utilitarian check on procedural rules that is inconsistent with the lexical superiority of the "on
the merits" principle. 7'
In canvassing other moral and political theories, the notion that a litigant enjoys a full opportunity to participate in litigation (regardless of
the costs that this participation imposes on others) could arguably be
justified by appealing to the theory of ethical egoism, in which a person
is free to pursue any self-interested goals without concern for the harms
that their pursuit causes to others. But the case is actually harder than it
seems. 7 2 In any event, egoism is not an attractive ethical theory for
many. 73 Standard theories of ethics and justice-such as virtue ethics,
libertarianism, Rawlsian equality, and Kantian right-provide no particular support for the "on the merits" principle, or are even antithetical to its
71.
See supra notes 23, 49-50 and accompanying text.
72. First, because laws and their enforcement frustrate the self-interest of the individual,
ethical egoism can account for legal norms, and the courts and procedures that enforce these norms,
only on the notion that cooperation with others sometimes best advances a person's self-interest;
laws and courts are necessary to enforce such cooperation and to prevent retaliation against a person
by others who are pursuing their self-interests. See Robert Shaver, Egoism, in STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 7, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/egoism. In such a
world, which sees law as a means to avoid mutual destruction, it is not evident that the "on the
merits" principle would be the principle on which egoists would agree. If I can impose $50,000
worth of discovery on you when my case is worth only $10,000, there is nothing to prevent you (or
someone else) from doing the same to me. The type of cooperation that egoism envisions might lead
the parties to agree that no party should be able to use a procedural rule to inflict more than a reasonable amount of litigation expense on another party-and certainly no more expense than the underlying claim is worth.
Second, if egoists do not cooperate, it is unlikely that they would adopt the procedural rules that the
"on the merits" principle requires. Rather, egoists would presumably craft procedural rules that
served their self-interest-including rules that countenanced imposing costs on opponents-and
would insist on the observation of procedural technicalities even if they thwarted resolutions based
the proofs and arguments.
73. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 117 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (1971) (stating
that "egoism ... is incompatible with what we intuitively regard as the moral point of view").
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use. For instance, I see no argument that a rule allowing parties a full
opportunity to litigate, even when it generates more costs and therefore
causes more harms than other rules, inculcates virtue in citizens. "On the
merits" procedural rules do not appear to help people achieve a good life
more than other procedural rules.74 Nor would a right to a full opportunity to litigate seem to be one of the basic goods that Rawls would require
to be equally distributed in the original position. 75 Although Rawls admits that the rights implicit in the rule of law are among these basic
goods,76 his discussion of the various forms of procedural justice stops
well short of specifying procedural principles or arguments that justify a
lexically superior position for the "on the merits" principle.77 Therefore,
the best that can be said is that theories of ethics or justice, for the most
part, are indifferent to the "on the merits" principle.7 8
Perhaps that indifference is understandable. As a general matter,
lawsuits fit within the Aristotelian concept of "corrective justice," which
requires rectification of injustices. 79 For the most part, philosophers have
For a highly readable discussion and defense of the aretaic approach to justice, see gener74.
ally SANDEL, supranote 66.
75.
One statement of Rawls' famous first principle of justice is this: "Each person has an
equal right to a fully adequate scheme of basic liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme of
liberties for all." JOHN RAWLS, POLrICAL LIBERALISM 291 (1993); see also RAwLs, supra note 73,
at 53 ("[E]ach person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties
compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.").
76. These basic liberties include political liberty (such as the right to vote and hold office);
freedom of speech; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedoms necessary to protect
integrity of the person; the right to hold property; and the rights and liberties implicit in the rule of
law. See RAWLS, supra note 73, at 53.
77. For the basic outline of Rawls's views on procedural fairness, which include the concepts
of "perfect procedural justice," "imperfect procedural justice," and "pure procedural justice," see id.
at 74-77, 206-10. Lawsuits would fit within the boundaries of imperfect procedural justice. According to Rawls:
[A] legal system must make provisions for conducting orderly trials and hearings; it must
contain rules of evidence that guarantee rational procedures of inquiry. While there are
variations in these procedures, the rule of law requires some form of due process: that is,
a process reasonably designed to ascertain the truth, in ways consistent with the other
ends of the legal system, as to whether a violation has taken place and under what circumstances. For example, judges must be independent and impartial, and no man may
judge his own case. Trials must be fair and open, but not prejudiced by public clamor.
Id. at 210. The "on the merits" principle's insistence on a full opportunity to participate seems inconsistent with-or at a minimum not compelled by-the requirement of reasonable limitations on the
goal of ascertaining the truth.
The most important effort to use a Rawlsian framework of procedural justice to specify
78.
more precisely the conditions of a just procedural system is that of Professor Solum. See Solum,
supra note 7. But Professor Solum's lexically ordered principles for a procedurally just system, see
id. at 305-06, cannot be read to demand adoption of the "on the merits" principle. His first lexically
superior principle is the "Participation Principle," which holds that "[t]he arrangements for the
resolution of civil disputes should be structured to provide each interested party with a right to
meaningful participation." Id. at 305. Although an "on the merits" principle seems consistent with
such a principle, it is not required by it, and subsequent rules for breaking ties (such as the principles
that procedural rules not affect rights securing the basic liberties, the need to attain systemic accuracy, and the need to "ensure that the systemic costs of adjudication are not excessive in relation to the
interests at stake in the proceeding or type of proceeding," id. at 306), seem to point away from the
"on the merits" principle.
79. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHicS bk. 5, pt. 4, at 120-21 (Martin Ostwald trans., BobbsMerrill 1962).
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assumed that this rectification can be accomplished costlessly and perfectly. They rarely engage the epistemological difficulties that are involved in determining the law, the facts, and the remedies-difficulties
that make the "on the merits" principle problematic in the real world.8 °
Arguably the strongest support for the "on the merits" principle
comes from Professor Ripstein's Sovereignty Principle, which he developed from a close reading of Kant. Intended as a response to the significant theoretical difficulties with liberal approaches such as the Millian
Harm Principle and Rawlsian egalitarianism, the Sovereignty Principle
holds that "the only legitimate restrictions on conduct are those that secure the mutual independence of free persons from each other."'" Professor Ripstein uses the Sovereignty Principle to describe the circumstances
in which the criminal law can be invoked to sanction intentional conduct,
and has little to say directly about the relevant behavioral rules in a civil
context, about the rules under which legal institutions should operate
when adjudicating civil disputes, or about how litigants can use those
rules.82
Nevertheless, it is possible to develop the Sovereignty Principle into
a defense of the "on the merits" principle. In general, the Sovereignty
Principle does not find problematic on justice grounds most harms that a
litigant causes to others (whether litigants in the same case or putative
litigants in other cases) because a litigant is justified in pursuing personal
ends as long as the litigant does not use others as means to those endsin other words, the Sovereignty Principle does not destroy or usurp the
ability of others to pursue their own ends. 83 Thus, on first blush, the Sovereignty Principle does not appear to condemn as unjust the actions of a
plaintiff who, having lost $10,000 at the defendant's hands, asks for
$50,000 worth of discovery-as long as the plaintiff wants the discovery
to determine the claim more accurately rather than merely to impose
costs on an opponent. 84 It certainly does not condemn as unjust any actions undertaken in the exercise of a party's full opportunity to participate when the existence of that opportunity causes putative litigants to
80.
This statement is certainly true of Aristotle. See id.; see also Ripstein, supra note 70, at
239-40 (noting, in the course of developing a Kantian theory of right and criminal responsibility,
that civil remedies should be available for injuries to a person's means to choose her own purposes
when the injuries are caused by accident or mistake, but failing to discuss the procedural difficulties
associated with making these civil remedies effective); Solum, supra note 7, at 186 (noting that "the
actual world is characterized by three problems of compliance with substantive legal norms: (1) the
problem of imperfect knowledge of law and fact, (2) the problem of incomplete specification of legal
norms, and (3) the problem of partiality").
81.
Ripstein, supra note 70, at 229.
82.
Id. at 239-40.
83.
Id. at 234. See generally RIPSTEIN, supra note 64 (developing Kant's theory of private
right, public right, and the role of law and public institutions in ensuring equal freedom).
84.
See Solum, supra note 7, at 250-51 (positing a Kantian deontological argument that "one
should never render an unjust decision at the expense of an innocent litigant in order to achieve
systemic benefits. Instead, we might choose to pursue case accuracy because it respects an important
political right--the right to an accurate determination of one's legal rights").
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avoid filing meritorious cases. In neither instance is a party who exercises the opportunity to participate usurping or destroying any means that
the opposing party or other putative litigants have to pursue their interests. The Sovereignty Principle, however, does judge as unjust a plaintiffs decision to ask for $50,000 in discovery if the plaintiff's purpose is
to extort an excessive settlement of $25,000 (when the plaintiff's loss is
only $10,000). Such action destroys the opponent's capacity to use
$15,000 of his resources to pursue his own purposes. Because that possibility results from the unavoidable slip between the purpose of a rule and
its application, not from a flaw in the "on the merits" rules themselves, it
can be discounted as a reason to reject the theory itself.
But this defense is flawed for two reasons. First, the Sovereignty
Principle was not designed to deal with issues of procedural justice. The
Sovereignty Principle requires a distinction among means. In the absence
of another's consent, I cannot use as a means to achieve my own purposes those means that another person possesses or can legitimately regard
as available to her for pursuing her own purposes. All other means, however, are available for my use in pursuing my purposes. Thus, the Sovereignty Principle distinguishes between harms that occur when I take
something of yours (I can't grab your body to block a bullet intended for
me because your body is one of your means to pursue your ends) and
harms that occur during market competition (I can sell my widget for less
than you sell yours even though I harm your ability to earn a living because the expectation that customers will purchase from you is not one of
85 On this distinction, it seems that the plaintiffs discovery
your means).
request, which requires the defendant to spend either $50,000 of his
means to respond or $25,000 of his means to settle, is more like using
86
another's body to block a bullet than engaging in market competition.
More generally, whenever any system of legal procedure allows one party to require that an opposing party undertake an action to advance the
first party's interests in winning the case, a violation of the Sovereignty
Principle occurs-a fact that suggests that the Sovereignty Principle is an
inapposite way to think about the principles of justice that should shape
procedural rules. Second, the Sovereignty Principle falls as a defense of
an "on the merits" approach because rules developed under the "on the
85.
RIPSTEIN, supra note 64, at 49-50.
86. Professor Ripstein mentions that "fair contests" are an exception to the usual rule that one
person cannot take another's means; if we agree to a contest conducted under fair rules, I can take a
means of yours pursuant to the rules of the contest. Id. at 48-49. But that argument does not direct
that, when the plaintiff takes either $50,000 or $25,000 from the defendant under "on the merits"
discovery rules that govern litigation "contests," the taking comports with this exception to the
Sovereignty Principle. First, the argument begs the question: whether "on the merits" rules are fair is
the issue. Second, this argument justifies any of a number of sets of procedural rules; it does not
uniquely justify "on the merits" rules. Third, litigants do not in any meaningful sense agree to use
the procedural rules; they are given by the rule-makers and judges who interpret and implement
them. The basis for the "fair contest" argument is the autonomy of the parties to consent to the game;
and litigants do not give consent in the way that they do if, for instance, they agree to arbitrate.
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merits" principle can inflict more harm on others than rules constructed
under principles such as efficiency. 87 Therefore, the "on the merits" principle is less clearly supported by the Sovereignty Principle as it might
have appeared initially.
In the end, the economic and philosophical case for the lexical superiority of the "on the merits" principle is weak. This does not mean that
the rational adjudication of legal disputes-a purpose that the "on the
merits" principle arguably advances--cannot be pursued. Nor does it say
that a party's right to participate in a lawsuit or the court's interest in
fostering settlements-two other purposes that the "on the merits" principle arguably advances-are illegitimate. In proper circumstances, the
"on the merits" principle might be a helpful means for achieving these
other goals. My point is that, despite its prominence in constructing our
modem American procedural system, providing the parties a full opportunity to participate in litigating
a case is not the foundation on which to
88
build a procedural system.
B. The Problem of Using the "On the Merits" Principleas an Equal or
Lexically Inferior ProceduralPrinciple
In reaching this conclusion, I could be accused of setting up a straw
man. Not even the strongest proponent of the "on the merits" principle
would likely countenance the use of procedures that require a party to
spend more money to respond to discovery than the value of the remedy
that the court will provide. This fact suggests that, despite the lip service
paid to resolving every case on its merits, the "on the merits" principle
operates either as one of several principles that are pragmatically melded
to shape a system of procedural rules 89 or as a second-level tiebreaker
when lexically superior principles underdetermine the best procedural
rule. Thus, the "on the merits" principle converts into a presumption that,
all things being equal, giving parties more opportunities to participate is
better than giving them less.
The arguments from the prior section, however, bear on the reasonableness and utility of this presumption. 90 If, as I have just argued, the
"on the merits" principle lacks a strong basis of economic or philosophi87. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
88. I am not suggesting that the "on the merits" principle is illegitimate as a matter of morality
or justice, but rather that the principle's costs should form part of the judgment about whether the
principle is worth maintaining.
89. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (stating that the Federal Rules "should be construed and administered
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding").
90. Although treating the "on the merits" principle as one of several first-order principles is
different from treating it as a lexically inferior principle, my difficulties with both approaches are
similar, so I will handle them together. Therefore, I note only in passing the evident objection to
pragmatically blending multiple factors: that it injects too much uncertainty into the design, interpretation, and implementation of procedural rules. Cf.Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 556 (2004)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that "malleable standards ... have a way of turning into vehicles for
the implementation of individual judges' policy preferences").
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cal support, it is unclear why the principle deserves any place among the
principles used to shape a procedural system. If we pragmatically blend
multiple principles, some of which are strongly justified and some of
which are not, the shape of the rules that will emerge will mostly reflect
the strongly justified principles, rather than the "on the merits" principle.
Similarly, if we lexically order strongly and weakly justified principles,
the weak principles will fall to the bottom of the ordering, and the resulting system of procedural rules will employ a full opportunity to participate only as a fairly low tiebreaker.
The best argument for the "on the merits" principle is probably a
prophylactic one: because litigants have a right to a strong opportunity to
participate in presenting proofs and reasoned arguments, guaranteeing a
full opportunity to participate ensures that the core of that right is protected. Thus, the "on the merits" principle becomes an instrumental principle justifiable only because it protects a fundamental principle (strong
opportunity to participate) better than any other.
This argument presupposes, of course, that a strong opportunity to
participate in presenting proofs and arguments is a right that can be justified economically or philosophically. I am willing to concede for now
that it could be.9' Even so, it seems unlikely that adopting the "on the
merits" principle as a prophylactic measure is the best way to protect the
strong-opportunity principle. Assume that we have only two co-equal
procedural principles that we will use to create a procedural system: the
strong-opportunity principle ("all things being equal, we want rules that
give the parties as much opportunity to participate as possible") and the
efficiency principle ("all things being equal, we want procedural rules
that are as efficient as possible"). If we prophylactically over-enforce the
strong-participation principle (turning it into an "on the merits" fullopportunity principle), then we must in fairness do the same with the
efficiency principle (turning it into the "only the most efficient rule will
do" principle). Expanding the scope of both principles to their maximum
prophylactic scope probably doesn't favor the strong-opportunity principle, because a maximal efficiency principle has an economic and philosophical (specifically, utilitarian) foundation that--even though the
foundation can be criticized-the "on the merits" principle does not.
Thus, this expansion risks sublimating the strong-opportunity principle to
the efficiency principle, rather than giving them an equal weight, in the

91.
See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 20, at 382 (arguing that adversarial participation in presenting
proofs and arguments is an optimal, and perhaps an essential, feature of adjudication); Solum, supra
note 7, at 308-09 (arguing that party participation is a lexically superior right). But see Bone, supra
note 63, at 236-79, 288 (arguing that a right of participation is not required on normative grounds
and that "the extent of an individual's right to participate in litigation should vary with the type of
case").
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process of pragmatically blending or lexically ordering principles that
shape procedural rules.92
More generally, I fail to see how the expansionof both principles to
their prophylactic maximum helps to resolve the question about the
shape of procedural rules. We do not avoid any of the difficulties in
shaping procedural rules if we stick with the original core principles of
providing, all things being equal, strong opportunities to participate and
the most efficient procedures possible. This conclusion holds true as we
add in additional procedural principles, such as fostering settlements,
providing open access to the courts, and so on.
Finally, in light of the trend in American litigation away from adjudicated resolutions,93 it is not obvious that insisting on a right to fully
participate in presenting proofs and reasoned arguments is even a useful
principle to use. Our experience with settlement and other methods of
alternative dispute resolution suggests that the relevant principle should
not be the litigant's opportunity to participate in shaping the court's adjudicated decision, but the litigant's broader and more amorphous opportunity to participate in shaping the outcome of a legal dispute. Moreover,
in a mass society, the prevalence and necessity of class actions 94 and
other mass-resolution processes (such as multidistrict litigation 95) further
undercut the notion that each litigant must have a full opportunity to participate in presenting proofs and arguments. In these contexts, litigants
might not enjoy any right to participate in presenting individualized
proofs and arguments. Insisting on a full opportunity to litigate vaults
into a privileged position a principle that few litigants insist on when
they are presented with opportunities to exit into other dispute resolution
mechanisms; nor is it one that our procedural system honors in mass controversies.
Obviously, the relationship between "on the merits" procedural
rules and non-litigated or mass-litigated resolutions is a complicated one.
To some extent, "on the merits" rules can increase the likelihood of nonlitigated outcomes 96 -albeit not always in a positive way, as the example
of a $25,000 settlement shows. Likewise, the expense of individual litigation under the "on the merits" principle helps to establish the need for
mass resolutions. 97 But focusing on the litigants' opportunity to partici92.

Indeed, the losing battle that the "on the merits" principle is fighting against the use of

more efficient procedures, see supra notes 5, 43, 46-48 and accompanying text, could be explained

in part because of this theoretical imbalance between the two principles.
93.

See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.

94.

See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.

95.
96.
97.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006).
See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.)

(noting that the situation "in which the rationale for [using class actions] is most compelling" occurs
when "individual suits are infeasible because the claim of each class member is tiny relative to the
expense of litigation"); see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997).
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pate in presenting proofs and arguments to an adjudicator presupposes a
particular view of the value and preeminence of adjudicated resolutions
that is at odds with the realities of modem litigation.
In the end, the "on the merits" principle owes its staying power to
three important and related impulses: we want cases decided accurately,
we want them decided without procedural trickery affecting the outcome,
and we want them decided with input from those affected. Neither of the
first two impulses is precisely what the "on the merits" principle delivers.
Providing litigants a full opportunity to participate does not necessarily
make case resolutions more accurate, and the costliness of a full opportunity to participate creates ample room for the type of "trickery" that
can influence outcomes. Although I am somewhat skeptical of an excessive reliance on the first two impulses in shaping procedural rulesbecause they assume a correct pre-procedural answer to a legal dispute98 -it is better to place them directly on the table in any pragmatic
horse-trading or lexical ordering that shapes rules, rather than letting the
"on the merits" principle act as their proxy. As I have just argued, the
same is true of the third impulse, which is poorly served by the overprotecting claim that each litigant deserves a full opportunity to participate
in presenting proofs and arguments.
Nonetheless, the "on the merits" ideal does summarize, in a pithy
way, some of the basic aspirations of our procedural system. Its "slogan
value" might itself be an argument for keeping the principle around if no
better principle could be found to replace it. I consider whether it is possible to restate the principle in the next section.
C. Replacing the "On the Merits" Principle
In light of the foregoing discussion, let me suggest a new standard
that ought to replace the "on the merits" principle: the "fair outcome"
principle. It can be stated as follows:
Lawsuits should be decided according to procedural rules that
are designed, interpreted, and implemented to give the parties
the maximal opportunity to participate in shaping an outcome
that can be sustained upon critical scrutiny.
This "fair outcome" principle differs from the "on the merits" approach in several ways. First, it eliminates the "on the merits" principle's
second clause, 99 which prohibited rule-makers or judges from considering the consequences that ensuring a full opportunity to litigate cause.
Second, it replaces the word "full" with the admittedly ambiguous word
"maximal." The combination of these two changes requires rule-makers
and judges who design, interpret, and implement procedural rules to con98.
99.

See supra notes 7-19 and accompanying text.
See supra text preceding note 20, note 23 and accompanying text.
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sider the consequences of their decisions on the behaviors of litigants in
the case and on the capacity of others to access the court system; it further requires them to factor those consequences into the design of procedural rules and their interpretation and implementation in specific cases.
Third, a "fair outcome" definition moves from the purely procedural
approach of the "on the merits" principle, which gives the parties a right
to participate in the process by which the judge decides the case, to an
approach that includes both "procedural" and "substantive" elements: the
justness of the outcome matters in addition to the process by which the
outcome is achieved. Fourth, the relevant outcome is not necessarily a
litigated outcome as the "on the merits" principle presupposes; rather, it
is any outcome, including settlement, that is fair (understood here to
mean an outcome that can be sustained upon critical scrutiny'0°). Procedural rules can be constructed with other end games than individualized
adjudication in mind.
Because the "fair outcome" approach is intended to serve as a replacement for the "on the merits" approach, it might be subject to the
criticism that it tries to do too much, and thus becomes meaningless. Indeed, it can become the vessel into which those who believe that procedure should be about accuracy in outcomes, 0 1 those who believe that
procedure must avoid technical traps, 10 2 those who believe that guaranteeing participation is the fundamental goal of process, 10 3 and those who
want procedural rules to be constructed to foster more settlements" °4 can
all pour their preferences. It is true that, on its own and shorn of any realworld context, the "fair outcome" principle settles little about the content
of procedural rules. Its blending of procedural and substantive aspects
also seems out of line with much modem thinking, which more sharply
distinguishes the roles of process and substance. It refuses to commit
clearly to one side or the other in the debate over whether process has
inherent value apart from substance. 10 5 It is also subject to the criticism

100.
The phrase "an outcome that can be sustained upon critical scrutiny" is a close paraphrasing of a concept of Amartya Sen. See SEN, supra note 62, at 180. I will discuss Professor Sen's
theory in detail shortly. See infra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
101.
See, e.g., DWORKIN, supranote 63, at 80-81.
102.
See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
103.
See supranote 91 and accompanying text.
104.
See, e.g., Michael Moffitt, Pleadings in the Age of Settlement, 80 IND. L.J. 727, 769-71
(2005) (discussing ways in which pleading rules might be designed to enhance settlement).
105.
The prevailing assumption among many people who do not consider procedural issues
deeply, and even among some who do, is that procedure exists only to ensure that substantive values
are transmitted into adjudicated results as seamlessly as possible. This proposition sees "the relation
of rules of practice to the work of justice . . . to be that of handmaid rather than mistress." In re
Coles, (1907) 1 K.B. 1, 4; see also Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q.
297, 297 (1938). For others, however, procedure encompasses important independent values that
counterbalance the policies of the substantive law. See Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making
Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887,
939 (1999) ("Although the matter is controversial, many proceduralists believe that litigants enjoy
process-based procedural rights unrelated to outcome quality.").
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that I leveled against the "on the merits" principle: that it is insufficiently
supported by any theory of morality or justice.
Let me respond to these criticisms with a brief defense that better
explicates the working of the "fair outcome" principle. To begin, I intend
the principle as an emendation to the idea of corrective justice, which
typically presupposes the legal system's costless (in both senses of that
word: without expense and without error) ability to correct legal
wrongs. 1°6 Both factually and legally, however, real-world determinations about whether a person has committed a wrong face epistemological difficulties.' 0 7 Procedural rules cannot completely overcome this
problem (no system of procedure leads to perfectly accurate outcomes in
all cases), and they can even exacerbate the problem (litigation expenses
and error rates can cause behaviors that lead to undercorrection or overcorrection of wrongs). In addition, the manner by which we inquire into
whether a wrong has occurred and how to correct it says something about
the values that a society holds dear' 08-values that are independent of the
arguably universal impulse to correct wrongs. In accounting for these
real-world concerns, it is not possible to shape a principle more specific
than a "fair outcome" principle.
It probably does not lie in the mouth of advocates of the "on the merits" principle to complain too loudly about indeterminacy, for the "on
the merits" ideal is itself a skeletal notion. That matter aside, the criticism of the indeterminacy of a "fair outcome" principle reflects a desire
for certainty in procedure that is associated with the type of moral and
political philosophy that Amartya Sen has described as "transcendental
institutionalism."' 1 9 Represented in modern form by such thinkers as
Kant and Rawls, transcendental institutionalism seeks to specify socially
just institutions and the rules by which these institutions operate, and
then trusts that the institutions will deliver just outcomes. Put differently,
transcendental institutionalism does not concern itself directly with consequences. It assumes that just institutions will yield just outcomes;
therefore, all the philosophical energy goes into the project of specifying
the conditions under which perfectly just institutions operate. Sen contrasts that approach with its standard philosophical alternative: consequentialism (most famously represented by utilitarianism), in which the

106.
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
107.
See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
108.
See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.) ("The history of
liberty has largely been the history of observance of procedural safeguards."). See generally MIRJAN
R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY (1986) (suggesting that nations with

different attitudes toward the organization of authority and the regulation of human behavior have
different procedural norms); John C. Reitz, PoliticalEconomy as a Major ArchitecturalPrincipleof
Public Law, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1121 (2001) (suggesting that the major "architectural" features of a
country's laws and legal system can be derived from the notion of "political economy").
109.

SEN, supra note 62, at 5-8.
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measure of justice is the quality of the results, or "culmination outcomes," that the decision-making process yields.1 10
Sen's approach, which he labels either the "realization-focused" or
"comprehensive outcome" approach,' 11 straddles the traditional divide.
Outcomes matter, but not to the exclusion of the process by which we
arrive at those outcomes. 1 2 Particularly critical to Sen is the idea of capacity, or freedom to act; freedom, which concerns the process by which
we achieve an outcome rather than the outcome itself, is not the absolute
113
measure of justice, but in general more freedom is preferable to less.
He also argues for a social-choice or comparative approach to justice, in
which disagreements over comprehensive moral theories should not prevent us from remedying evils that different comprehensive theories can
condemn as unjust, merely because people cannot agree on the proper
comprehensive theory or on whether other situations require a remedy. 114
Reason helps to achieve these often partial or incomplete agreements.
Although reason does not necessarily lead to a single correct solution
about how to act, it does impose a serious obligation to make "choices
...on reasoning that we can reflectively sustain if we subject them to
critical scrutiny."' 1 5 As an aspect of employing reason, Sen appeals to the
idea of the "impartial spectator"-a person whose outsider perspective
prevents the
discussion from becoming entirely captured by parochial
1 16
interests.
Sen's theory of justice underlies the "fair outcome" principle, which
considers both the quality of the procedures by which a dispute's outcome is decided and the quality of the outcome these procedures deliver.
The consequences of procedural rules can never be ignored. But it is
equally important to consider whether, independent of consequences, the
rules provide the affected parties an opportunity to participate in shaping
outcomes; giving people the capacity to participate is a valuable, even if
not an absolute, right that ought to be maximized to the extent possible.
Sen's theory and the "fair outcome" principle both emphasize the danger
of assuming that good procedures will deliver good results; they also
emphasize the danger of assuming that good results justify the procedures that create them. They recognize that there might be a range of
outcomes that can be justified by reason, not simply the single outcome

110. Id. at 7, 215-16.
111.
Id.
at 10, 22-23,215-17.
112.
Sen links the idea of the comprehensive outcome to Indian philosophy, which distinguishes between niti-the performance of duty regardless of consequence-and nyana--the regard for
consequences as an aspect of determining the moral quality of a person's actions in the world. He
sees his theory as being consistent with the idea of nyaya. Id. at 20-22, 208-14.
113.
Id.
at 225-52, 299-301.
114.
Id. at 87-113.
115.
Id. at 180.
116.
id. at 44-46.
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that most precisely meets the demands of corrective justice. 1 7 In considering the fairness of an outcome and the procedures that bring them
about, Sen's theory and the "fair outcome" approach require that we try,
to the extent we can, to leave parochial interests of plaintiffs or defendants aside and consider matters from a more objective and impartial
frame of reference. They also leave open the possibility of thinking about
procedural rules in a broader way: not just as the way by which we adjudicate disputes, but rather as the way by which we resolve disputes.
Unlike the "fair outcome" principle, the "on the merits" principle
fails under Sen's theory of justice. In the way in which I defined it, the
"on the merits" principle leans far too heavily on process (guaranteeing a
full opportunity to participate by presenting proofs and arguments) and
far too lightly on the consequences of that opportunity for other litigants
or putative litigants. To the extent that the principle instead can be understood to require accurate decisions," 8 it has the opposite difficulty,
focusing too much on outcomes and too little on the processes that bring
those outcomes into existence. In either case, the "on the merits" principle mistakenly weds procedure to adjudicated outcomes, when the reality is that legal procedure most often guides cases toward settlement.
Let me make two final notes about the "fair outcome" principle:
First, the principle almost certainly requires a fair degree of judicial discretion. As I have discussed, discretion imposes costs,1 19 and one of the
things that rule-makers and judges must consider in designing, interpreting, and implementing rules under a "fair outcome" principle is the cost
of discretion. But some discretion is necessary to ensure that strict adhe20
rence to process does not frustrate the realization of just outcomes.
Second, the "fair outcome" principle strikes me as lexically superior to
all others. Part of the reason is its breadth: its requirement of reasoned
scrutiny is capacious enough to allow rule-makers and judges to consider
numerous ideas-including efficiency, accuracy, and participation-that
already dominate procedural discourse. Part of the reason is the principle's tie to a comprehensive theory of how justice should be advanced.
The "fair outcome" principle can certainly be criticized, for it is not
perfectly consistent with any of the standard moral and political theories-such as those of Kant, Bentham, Mill, or Rawls. Nor does it align
perfectly with rational-choice economic theory. But it works well within
117.
For instance, in a world of uncertainty, a settlement for fifty cents on the dollar might well
be a rational and fair result, even though the theory of corrective justice requires an all-or-nothing
response to an allegation of wrong.
118. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
119.
See supra text accompanying note 55.
120.
In this regard, Pound was surely right, even if he went too far in the direction of dismissing the value of how we achieve justice-in other words, the value of process. See supra notes 8-13
and accompanying text; cf David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of
Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1991-97 (1989) (arguing that judicial discretion and the
disuniformity it creates are not necessarily undesirable despite their costs).
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Sen's inclusive, comparative framework for advancing justice. Whether
this theory of justice stands the test of time remains to be seen. Whether
it does or not-and I see great merit in his theory-the advantage of the
"fair outcome" principle over the "on the merits" principle is its anchoring in a significant theory of justice. If nothing else, consideration of
whether the "fair outcome" principle is the best procedural principle relocates the discussion about legal process to the larger discussion about
the meaning of justice and the way in which process must contribute to
achieving it.
CONCLUSION

It is tempting to close by showing how a "fair outcome" principle
solves some nettlesome problems of procedural reform-perhaps, to take
a presently raging controversy, to decide once and for all how much specificity should we expect of pleadings. 121 But I will resist the urge to do
so. One reason is my desire to posit the principle and lay it open for discussion, without necessarily sweeping it up in the particular political
controversies of the moment. Another reason is my sense that the "fair
outcome" principle probably does not, by itself, provide an answer to the
question about the specificity of pleadings. The principle requires that we
step back from particular questions of design, interpretation, or implementation to examine how any given procedure fits into the procedural
and legal system as a whole. It requires us to think broadly, without undue consideration of parochial interests, about what goals we can rationally justify and what processes we as moral agents should or should not
use in advancing them. My argument here is only that a "fair outcome"
principle should be our primary guide as we think about procedural
reform.

121.

See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.

APPORTIONING DUE PROCESS: PRESERVING THE RIGHT TO
AFFORDABLE JUSTICE
ELIZABETH J. CABRASERt
INTRODUCTION

This country was founded upon an ideal of due process accorded to
everyone, in courts accessible to all, free of political and economic influence, and dispensing affordable justice with reasonable efficiency. Our
nation's founders had the audacity to proclaim themselves possessors of
inalienable rights, and founded their society upon a civil contract, enforceable in its courts. Access to justice was not a luxury to be enjoyed by a
fortunate few; it was part and parcel of citizenship. The Declaration of
Independence defines the essential terms of this contract:
We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness-That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among
Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed,
that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these
Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles, and
organizing its Powers in such Form, as1 to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.
The language of the Declaration of Independence is not that of a
mere political manifesto, and it is not unique to the Declaration itself.
The notion that men form governments through a reciprocal and symbiotic system of rights and responsibilities, shared among equals, is, as the
foundation of civil governance, mirrored in the earliest constitutions of
the thirteen rebellious states. The profoundly self-conscious creation of
these American States was expressly contractual, in nature, intent, and

t
Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, San Francisco, California. Ms. Cabraser has
represented plaintiffs in complex civil litigation, mass torts, and class actions in the federal and state
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THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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content. As the 1780 Constitution of Massachusetts states in its preamble:
The body-politic is formed by a voluntary association of individuals; it is a social compact, by which the whole people covenants with
each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be
governed by certain laws for the common good. It is the duty of the
people, therefore, in framing a Constitution of Government, to provide for an equitable mode of making laws, as well as for an impartial interpretation and a faithful execution2 of them, that every man
may, at all times, find his security in them.
The people of the newly-minted Commonwealth of Massachusetts
likewise, by a written compact, transformed a colonial enclave into a
contract-based sovereign state. The Massachusetts creation-by-compact
narrative is explicit: they "deliberately and peaceably, without fraud,
violence, or surprise, [entered] into an original, explicit, and solemn
compact with each other; [and formed] a new Constitution of Civil Government for [them]selves and posterity ....
The state-creating compacts enacted by the thirteen colonies were
styled as contracts among persons with inherently equal bargaining power, and hence, equal rights. The state, through its institutions-notably
the Courts-served the people as agents to enforce their civil contractual
rights. The Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776) states it at the outset:
Section 1. That all men are by nature equally free and independent,
and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a
state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their
posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means
of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining
happiness and safety.
Sec[tion] 2. That all power is vested in, and consequently derived
from, the people; that magistrates are their trustees and servants, and
at all times amenable to them.4
This nation was not, upon its founding, a paradise now lost. The social contract, and the due process at law that served as its enforcement
mechanism, was formed among and existed for a small segment of socie2. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pmbl., reprinted in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE SEVERAL
INDEPENDENT STATES OF AMERICA 36, 36-37 (William Jackson ed., 1783) [hereinafter
CONSTrrUTIONS]. My favorite tattered, well-thumbed old law book is this compendium of the thirteen original state constitutions, the Declaration of Independence, and the Articles of Confederation,
published in London by J. Stockdale, Piccadilly, in 1783. These passages, and the passages of the
other eighteenth century state constitutions quoted in this article, are from the original versions, as
published in CONSTITUTIONS, supra.
Id.
3.
THE VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS §§ 1-2 (Va. 1776), reprintedin KERMIT L. HALL
4.
ET AL., AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 92, 92 (3d ed. 2005).
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ty, not its whole. The egalitarian concept of due process apportioned
equitably among all is an ideal we have not yet reached; it is not simply
an earlier state of social grace to be restored. Not everyone was acknowledged to be equal. Not everyone was included in the social contract.
For example, the above-quoted Virginia Declaration of Rights,
which was drafted by George Mason and served as a prototype for many
of the bills of rights sections in subsequently enacted state constitutions,
illustrates the contradictions inherent in the contractual creation of a society of equals when many of its would-be citizens owned, and wished to
keep, human slaves. The political solution was the insertion of the phrase
"when they enter into a state of society," which supposedly prevented the
language of freedom and equality from being applied to slaves.5 The
problem of women was resolved simply by limiting those who were "by
nature equally free and independent" to those who were also "men."96 It
would take later amendments to the federal Constitution to admit women
and former slaves, at least in theory, into the social contract. Yet progress
toward inclusion has been made, and the courts have been the notable
agents of this progression.
The landmark civil rights legislation of the 1960s was itself preceded by momentous judicial decisions at the federal appellate and Supreme Court levels, of which Brown v. Board of Education is the most
famous illustration. 7 The courts thus undertook the difficult, unpopular,
and in retrospect heroic task of reminding society of the necessary inclusivity of the contract by which its constituents' civil, legal, and procedural rights were protected and enforced.
It is a paradox--or at least a matter of irony-that as time has
passed and as more categories of persons were admitted into the social
contract, the price tag of due process in civil litigation has increased exponentially beyond the most extravagant imaginings of the founders.
Civil litigation has been priced beyond the reach of most Americans,
regardless of the ameliorating effects of the contingent fee system, and
the presumed economies of scale of the class action mechanism. Due
process has been priced as if it were a scarce resource, which in some
respects it is, being limited by the number of judges and courtrooms
available to hear disputes and the funds taxpayers (or their representatives) are willing to funnel into the judicial system. But due process itself
is not inescapably expensive; it is, rather, the efforts of defendants in
civil litigation to resist enforcement of the social contract, such as by
deploying procedural devices as weapons in a war of attrition, that transforms procedural mechanisms, such as discovery, depositions, and pretrial motions into anti-due process devices. The ability of a few citizens,
5.
6.
7.

Id. § 1, reprintedin HALL ET AL., supra note 4, at 92.
Id., reprintedin HALL ET AL., supranote 4, at 92.
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:2

notably corporate citizens, to afford due process at any cost, and to insist
upon all of the process they can afford, has so unbalanced the civil litigation process that, in the experience of many practitioners, meritorious
claims with damages of less than $1 million are economically unfeasible
to prosecute.
The category of claims traditionally considered by courts to be too
large or too dissimilar to be grouped in a class action, yet too small to
merit individual litigation, is an expanding civil justice wasteland lacking
due process. The price tag has simply become too high. Thus, many violations of the social contract go unredressed, and wrongdoers face no
predictable penalties or consequences for their breaches of the social
contract. In many such instances, paradoxically, it is those economically
(and politically) powerful corporate citizens that can best afford the nowextravagant cost of due process that are least likely to need it, because
due process prices have placed them above the law.
Reducing the cost of civil litigation is always desirable, if only to
reduce the frustration and dissatisfaction that judges, lawyers, and sophisticated litigants experience when faced with litigation practices that
are inefficient, obsolete, unnecessary, or protracted. Cost reduction has
become not merely desirable, but necessary, because to many parties
such experiences are beyond mere annoyance: they have driven them
from the system completely. The litigation system was conceived as a
crucible of direct democracy, in which citizens would bring their disputes before a judge, and a jury of their peers for adjudication in the context of community values. In the late eighteenth century, this was, in
many respects, a true "do-it-yourself' system: credentialed lawyers were
not necessary (and were frequently unavailable), and many lawsuits
could be filed and tried within the same week-or even the same day.
Change is inevitable, and that system likely could not exist today simply
because most individuals do not possess the time or resources to maintain complex litigation at the trial and appellate levels against the large
and well-capitalized corporate entities with which the vast majority of
commercial, employment, and consumer transactions occur, and from
which such litigation arises. Face-to-face transactions among members of
the same community can feasibly be handled either informally, or in a
small claims, non-lawyer assisted litigation system. The era when commercial and community life was characterized by such personal transactions has, however, long faded from the collective memory.
The restoration of due process as an affordable reality, rather than
an unattainable luxury, should nonetheless be a goal toward which our
judicial system continues to aspire. The more citizens are able to utilize
an institution, and the more fairly and efficiently it is perceived to serve
them, the higher repute it will enjoy. Legal professionals concerned
about disrespect for the law, derision toward lawyers, and the alienation
that pervades a society that believes wealth buys justice would do well to
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make good on the promise of access by lowering the cost, and equalizing
the distribution, of due process in civil litigation.
I. IN THE BEGINNING: DUE PROCESS AS A REVOLUTIONARY IDEAL

The United States' war for independence from Great Britain was
motivated, or at least justified, by deep dissatisfaction with lack of access
to a fair, affordable, and responsive justice system. The Americans of the
late eighteenth century were separated by geography, lack of influence,
and by relative lack of wealth, from the basic institutions of justice:
courts, judges, and juries. Judges were perceived to owe their allegiance
to the sovereign, not to justice itself. There were few local courts. The
once venerable jury system had fallen into disrepute and disuse, and the
sovereign was suspicious of juries.
Prominent among the complaints adduced against the King of Great
Britain in the Declaration of Independence are "Injuries and Usurpations",8 relating to the justice system:
He has obstructed the Administration of Justice, by refusing his
Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary Powers.
He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the Tenure of
their Offices, and the Amount and Payment of their Salaries.

9
For depriving us, in many Cases, of the Benefits of Trial by Jury.

As the War for Independence dragged on, the thirteen original
American states declared a civil revolution as well: they each issued constitutions, forerunners of the federal constitution, which declared the
terms of the social contract that bound each state's citizens together. In
each, the ideals of access to justice, and the essential role of the jury trial
in accomplishing justice, were explicit.10
The Delaware Constitution, for example, defines the social contract
in article I in these terms: "That all government of right originates from
the people, is founded in compact only, and instituted solely for the good
of the whole."11 Article XII of the Delaware Constitution implements this
compact by declaring:
That every freeman, for every injury done him in his goods, lands, or
person, by any other person, ought to have remedy by the course of

8.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

9.
Id. paras. 10-11, 20.
10. See generally CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at 30-344. A reading of these constitutions,
in sequence, reveals recurring language, often uniform, reiterating these essential common points.
See, e.g., id. at 215.
11.
DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. L reprintedin CoNsTrruTIoNs, supra note 2, at 212, 212.
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the law of the land, and ought to have justice and right for the injury
done to him, freely without sale, fully without any12denial, and speedily without delay, according to the law of the land.
This due process formula is echoed in the cornerstone of our operative Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1, which declares that the
federal rules "should be construed and administered to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." 1 3 Article XIII defines the trial as the centerpiece of due process, as
it declares "[t]hat trial by jury of facts where they arise, is one of the
greatest securities of the lives, liberties, and estates of the people. 1 4
As the Constitution of Massachusetts states in its article VII: "Government is instituted for the common good; for the protection, safety,
prosperity, and happiness of the people; and not for the profit, honour, or
private interest of any one man, family, or class of men ... ,,15 To enforce this system of reciprocal rights, article XI provides:
Every subject of the Commonwealth ought to find a certain remedy,
by having recourse to the laws for all injuries or wrongs which he
may receive in his person, property or character. He ought to obtain
right and justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it;
compleatly [sic], and without16any denial; promptly, and without delay; conformably to the laws.
As article XXIX explicates the rationale for the primacy of the
rights of recourse to the laws, and of access to justice:
It is essential to the preservation of the rights of every individual, his
life, liberty, property, and character, that there be an impartial interpretation to the laws, and administration of justice. It is the right of
every citizen to be tried by Judges as free, impartial, and independent, as the lot of humanity will admit. It is, therefore, not only the
best policy, but for the security of the rights of the people, and of
every citizen, that the Judges of the supreme judicial court should
hold their offices as long as they behave themselves well; and that
they should have honourable salaries, ascertained and established by
standing laws. 17
The New Jersey Constitution of 1776, in its preamble, likewise expresses the concept of sovereignty and the source of law, as "by compact
derived from the people, and held of them for the common interest of the
whole society, allegiance and protection are, in the nature of things, reci-

12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. art. XII, reprintedin CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at 215.
FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. XII, reprintedin CONSTrruTIONS, supra note 2, at 212, 215.
MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. VI, reprintedin CONSTUTlONS, supra note 2, at 38,41-42.

16.
17.

Id. art. XI, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at 43.
Id. art. XXIX, reprintedin CONSTITrTlONS, supra note 2, at 48-49.
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procal ties, each equally depending upon the other, and liable to be dissolved by the other's being refused or withdrawn."1 8 To enforce it, article
XXII declares "that the inestimable right of trial by jury shall remain
confirmed, as a part of the law of this colony, without repeal for ever "1' 9
The Constitution of Pennsylvania, article XI, is in accord: "[I]n controversies respecting property, and in suits between man and man,
' 20 the parties have a right to trial by jury, which ought to be held sacred.
As the North Carolina Constitution phrases it in article XIV of its
Declaration of Rights: "[I]n all controversies at law respecting property,
the ancient mode of trial by jury is one of the best securities of the rights
of the people, and ought to remain sacred and inviolable.'
We know that the relationships of freedom and property these Constitutions declared, and strove to protect, were far from perfect: not every
natural person was or could be a property holder, a citizen, or even a full
human being. Yet in some respects, the potential participants in civil
litigation, with its guarantee of jury trial, were more equally situated than
the range of potential litigants today. They most likely belonged to the
same community, as means of transportation and communication had not
yet enabled what we are familiar with as interstate and international
commerce; and it was to be several generations before the modem limited liability corporation, as we know it now, would evolve. Litigation
was local, among members of the same community. The function of
"lawyer" was not yet its own more-than-fulltime profession. A complete
law library, anchored by the works of Sir William Blackstone and Lord
Coke, Justinian's Codex, and the
22 political documents of the new nation,
were able to fit upon one shelf.
In a society without radio, television, institutionalized performing
arts, or the Internet, the courtroom was a place of news and entertainment
for the community. Trials were exercises in rhetoric, as much or more
18.
N.J. CONST. of 1776, pmbl., reprintedin CONsTrrUTIONS, supra note 2, at 166, 166.
19.
Id. art. XXII, reprintedin CONSTITUTIONS, supranote 2, at 177.
20. PA. CONST. of 1776, art. XI, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at 182, 186. In
other respects, the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 was less than ideal. "The constitution acknowledged slavery and did nothing about it, and limited officeholding to men who acknowledged
God and the 'scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be given by Divine inspiration."' HALL ET
AL., supra note 4, at 94. As commentators have noted, this last provision, if enforced, "would have
prevented not only Jews but also deists, like Benjamin Franklin and Tom Paine, from holding office." Id. at 95. This Constitution, unlike those of the other states, which long endured, was annulled
in 1790 in favor of one with a more secular orientation. Id.
21.
N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XIV, reprintedin CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at 291, 293.
22.
It is one of the many ironies of American law and legal history that Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England served as the cornerstone of American law and
American legal education for decades, although Blackstone was an avowed British Imperialist. See
HALL ET AL., supra note 4, at 84. He looked down upon the American colonists as subjects, not
citizens of the Empire, and believed that they had no right to enjoy the common law of England
which "has no allowance or authority there." I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *108,
reprinted in HALL ET AL., supra note 4, at 84. Rather, Blackstone considered that America was a
"distinct (though dependent) dominionl]" subject to parliamentary control. Id.
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than demonstrations of evidence. It is not overly romantic to imagine the
civil litigation process of those times as readily accessible, relatively
cheap, responsive, efficient, and even entertaining. 23
We cannot realistically return to--or realize-the ideal of the local
trial. We no longer live, work, produce, and conduct commerce within
geographically circumscribed boundaries. Goods and services are marketed and sold around the world. The divide between the average citizen
and the modem multinational corporation is a nearly incalculable economic gulf, a disparity between "citizens" that would have been incomprehensible to our founders. Those who produce and those who consume
goods are not known to, or neighbors of, each other. The idea that they
are co-equal parties to a social contract of reciprocal rights and responsibilities might seem quaintly cute or cynically cruel, if brought to the attention of a modem individual consumer or corporate CEO. Yet that contract remains at the heart of our justice system, and civil litigation retains
its enforcing role.
It is due process that assures that disputes can be brought to court at
all, and that they will be resolved fairly on the merits, rather than upon
the relative power or wealth of each side. Much of what we have come to
accept as normal and appropriate in civil litigation works against due
process, and interferes with its fair allocation among litigants. The strategic insistence by a corporate defendant upon a separate jury trial in
each of several thousand cases involving the same product may invoke,
as its justification, the Seventh Amendment (and the above-noted American reverence for the jury trial) but may in reality consign the majority of
such claims to no trial at all, at least in the claimants' lifetimes. The
courts have long decried scenarios in which the plaintiffs' insistence
upon individualized adjudications of multitudinous claims might impoverish the defendant before all cases could be decided, thus relegating the
litigation process to "an unseemly race to the courtroom door with monetary prizes for a few winners and worthless judgments for the rest." 24 As
one district court noted, after doing the inexorable math in a relatively
small mass tort class action involving 10,000 plaintiffs:

23.
Litigation, by which the public understands "trials," is still considered high entertainment
today. Broadcasts of actual trials, and dramatized imaginary ones, are favorite television fare. Of
course, the fictitious trials with which the public is most enthralled are conducted and concluded in
the space of an hour, including commercial breaks: a level of concentrated efficiency to which even
the most intense civil justice reform advocates do not aspire. Although, a more reasonable accommodation to the cost of modem trial time, and the abbreviation of modem attention spans, is the
utilization of the limited-time trial in which each side is given a specified number of hours (e.g.,
twenty-four or forty-eight) to present its case. "The burdens of an unduly long trial on jurors and on
the public's access to the court may... require setting limits during trial." MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 12.35 (2004); see also Gen. Signal Corp. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 66 F.3d
1500, 1507-10 (9th Cir. 1995).
24. Cobum v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43, 45 (E.D. Ky. 1977).
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Pragmatically, the jury could not hear testimony of nearly 10,000
plaintiffs in this action within any practicable and reasonable time, to
do justice to the class members .... Here, individual trials for each of

the 9,541 plaintiffs would take decades. Most of that time would be
wasted since the nature of the injuries would be similar,
if not iden25
tical, [and] the testimony would be largely duplicative.
It may seem crass to discuss due process in not only pragmatic, but
specifically monetary terms, but if we are to be honest about barriers to
the optional functioning of our civil justice system, and if we are to
achieve any true civil justice reform, money must be mentioned. The
essence of due process is proportionality: in the expenditure of time and
money, the issues and amounts at stake in a particular controversy, as
well as the amount of process each side-and the system itself----can
afford to devote to the dispute.26 Every procedure has a price tag, yet
instead of paying the most attention to ameliorating that price-or allocating and amortizing it fairly among the litigants-we have instead
come to accept all too often that due process is a commodity like any
other. It is there for the buying, by anyone with the means to do so, and
anyone who can afford it may have as much of it as desired. Those who
cannot afford it must do without. Thus, the wealthy litigant may, and
often does, purchase delay at the expense of, and ultimately prejudice to,
a less wealthy opponent.
Courts do not often set limits on the amount each side may spend in
the civil litigation process, presumably believing that such limitations
offend due process. However, failure to do so may simply encourage a
system in which the wealthiest party wins-via attrition or by defaultwhile due process is both dishonored and denied.
II. DUE PROCESS STICKER SHOCK

The Seventh Amendment to our Constitution provides for jury trials
"[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars.", 27 A twenty-dollar jury trial? The concept seems absurd,
notwithstanding that when the Bill of Rights was signed, twenty dollars
bought more than lunch. In 1791, the year that the ten Amendments constituting the Bill of Rights were ratified, twenty dollars represented the
equivalent of $473.19 (using the Consumer Price Index), $454.69 (using
the Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") deflator), or, utilizing a more sophisticated relative value calculus, either $7,958.14 (using the unskilled

25. In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1460, 1462, 1467 (D. Haw.
1995), affd sub nom. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996).
26.
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-36 (1976); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 481 (1972).
27.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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wage) or even $18,849.64 (using the nominal GDP per capita)., 8 Under
any calculation, this is far under the operative $75,000 jurisdictional
threshold for entry into the federal courts under diversity jurisdiction.29
Whether the $20 claim that entitles the aggrieved plaintiff to a jury
trial is actually a $400 claim, $7,000 claim, or $19,000 claim, it is a
claim that cannot affordably be litigated under current conditions. A right
too expensive to exercise is no right at all. Due process has been priced
beyond the means of most claims of most people. Civil litigation has
become the province of the elite, and neither the legal profession nor the
judiciary that polices it have done enough to concern themselves with,
much less control, the due process sticker shock that confronts the average litigant.
Sometime in the early to mid-nineteenth century, virtually unnoticed judicially, corporations happened. The modem limited liability corporation was born and somehow became a full-fledged citizen, a legal
(albeit non-human) person with full legal rights by the courts, as a matter
beyond peradventure, long before slaves were freed or women achieved
constitutional recognition. 30 The legal personhood of corporations has
gone largely unquestioned for over 100 years. The limited liability corporation was an unsurpassed vehicle of capital accumulation, and the
engine of our spectacular national economic growth. At the same time,
however, the justice system, in according equal rights to entities which
were, by definition, unequal in status (with far greater economic power
and far more diffuse responsibility) than the human citizens who faced
them in court, created a functional due process problem that recurs in
virtually every modern civil damages case.
It has been so long since this startling disparity was considered remarkable (or indeed has even been remarked upon) that, when newlyappointed Justice Sotomayor commented in the course of a recent oral
argument before the Supreme Court that while judges "created corpora28. These calculations were derived from MeasuringWorth-a service for calculating relative
worth over time. See Samuel H. Williamson, MeasuringWorth, Six Ways to Compute the Relative
Value ofa U.S. DollarAmount, 1774 to Present (2009), http://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare
(providing a simple online calculator and a thorough explanation of the indicators used).
29.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006). In practical terms, § 1332 as amended by the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005 provides federal diversity jurisdiction in cases brought as class actions "in
which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and
costs" enabling, through class action aggregation, many claims of small individual value to be combined into a single proceeding that is economically feasible to prosecute. Id § 1332(d)(2). However,
the process of class certification is itself an expensive and increasingly difficult process, and the
costs of class certification and the requisite class notice alone frequently range in the millions of
dollars. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOuRTH) § 21.133 (2004).
30. See Spear v. Grant, 16 Mass. (16 Tyng) 9, 14-16 (1819); Vose v. Grant, 15 Mass. (15
Tyng) 505, 520-22 (1819). Among the earliest cases, Vose v. Grant and Spear v. Grant endorse the
principle that stockholders are not personally liable for the actions of their company. Spear, 16 Mass.
at 15; Vose, 15 Mass. at 523. Instead, the company was the responsible "individual": "That individual is a corporation; a creature of the legislature. It may die, or become insolvent, like any other
person." Vose, 15 Mass. at 520.
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tions as persons, gave birth to corporations as persons ...[t]here could
be an argument made that that was the court's error to start with... [imbuing] a creature of state law with human characteristics," a major furor
ensued.3'
Whenever, precisely, it first emerged, corporate personhood was
well entrenched by 1886 when, in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co.,32 the Supreme Court reporter quoted Chief Justice Waite
as telling the attorneys to skip their arguments over whether the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause applied to corporations,
because "[w]e are all of opinion that it does. 33 More explicitly, in 1928,
the Supreme Court struck down a Pennsylvania tax on transportation
corporations because individual taxi cab drivers were exempt. 34 The
Court, through the words of Justice Butler, wrote that corporations are
entitled
to "the same protection of equal laws that natural persons" en35

joy.

It is far too late, and likely far too unwise, to disenfranchise limited
liability corporations. By the same token, it is late, but not too late, to
consider the economic reality of disparity of wealth, power, and influence between corporate persons and natural persons, and determine
whether ignoring that disparity in the civil litigation context violates due
process. The framers of our original state and federal Constitutions might
well have considered the courtroom the last place where wealth and
power ought to be allowed to throw its weight around. The disparity of
wealth has allowed, and the courts have passively-aggressively enabled,
some litigants to improperly add the burden of cost and delay to the burden of proof that plaintiffs must carry to prevail in court. Civil litigation,
as practiced today, cannot be obtained "freely, and without being obliged
to purchase it; compleatly [sic], and without any denial; promptly, and
without delay; conformably to the laws. 36
111. HYDRAULIC PRESSuREs, ENTREPRENEURS, AND CLASS ACTION
WARS: DUE PROCESS GETS POLITICAL (AGAIN)

There is a long-established due process solution for the smallest of
claims, including those worth $20 (or less) in 2010 dollars: the class ac31.
Jess Bravin, Sotomayor Issues Challenge to a Century of Corporate Law, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 17, 2009, at A19, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125314088285517643.html

(second and third
alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sotomayor, J.);
see also John Byrne, Quietly, Sotomayor Turns on Corporations, RAW STORY, Sept. 18, 2009,

http:\\RawStory.com\08\news\2009\09\18\quietly-Sotomayor-tums-on-corporations.

The case in

which this comment was made has now been decoded. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876

(2010). Justice Sotomayor joined in Part IV of the majority opinion, and with Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer, joined Justice Stevens's opinion concurring in part and dissenting in pare
32.
118 U.S. 394 (1886).
33. Id. at 396.
34.

Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389,402 (1928).

35.
36.

Id. at 400.
MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. XI, reprintedin CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at 38,43.
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tion. The class action has had a long, venerable, sometimes controversial,
and recently high-profile history. It is extolled, or at least endured, when
it is utilized in certain contexts, such as the enforcement of civil rights,
but frequently maligned and attacked when its goal is compensatory (or
to deter) and its targets are private corporations. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA"), 37 for example, which expanded federal diversity jurisdiction to include most class actions, was promoted by business and manufacturers' groups in part to channel state court class action
litigation into the federal courts where class certification standards were
supposedly stricter, in order to reduce the number of class actions and to
discourage their filing. a
Despite the class action-and plaintiffs' lawyer-bashing that attended the passage of CAFA, the Act itself, albeit plagued by internal
inconsistencies and undefined terms, announced benign goals. As the
CAFA preamble states, "Class action lawsuits are an important and valuable part of the legal system when they permit the fair and efficient resolution of legitimate claims of numerous parties ....
CAFA's paradoxes are legion. Economies of scale, efficiencies of
process, and increased speed and reduced cost in bringing justice are
among its explicit, and commendable, purposes. As Section 2(b) of
CAFA states:
The purposes of this Act are to: (1) assure fair and prompt recoveries
for class members with legitimate claims; (2) restore the intent of the
framers of the United States Constitution by providing for Federal
court consideration of interstate cases of national importance under
diversity jurisdiction; and (3) benefit
society by encouraging innova4
tion and lowering consumer prices.
Yet the task of assuring such "fair and prompt recoveries" is directed by CAFA itself to a relatively small cadre of jurists, composed of
fewer than 1,000 members of the federal judiciary, which is a far smaller
population than the combined nationwide corps of state and federal
judges that presided over class actions in the pre-CAFA era. In literally
"making a federal case" out of the vast majority of class actions, Congress intentionally or otherwise complicated and marked up the price tag
on the delivery of "fair and prompt recovery to class members with legitimate claims" by forcing class actions into competition for the scarce

37.

Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified at 28 U.S.C.

1711 etseq. (2006)).
38.
See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action FairnessAct of 2005 in Historical
Context: A Preliinnary View, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1439 (2008); Richard L. Marcus, Assessing
CAFA's Stated JurisdictionalPolicy, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1765 (2008).

39.

Class Action Fairness Act § 2(a)(1).

40.

Id. § 2(b), quoted in Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469,473 n.1 (3d Cir. 2006).
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judicial resources of a well-respected, but under-populated, federal judicial community.
Whatever Congress has done, purposefully or inadvertently, to help
or hinder the prosecution of class actions, class actions retain a profound
legitimacy of societal purpose, at least as viewed by the nation's highest
courts. Nearly forty years ago, in Vasquez v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County,4 1 the California Supreme Court recognized the need to extend the benefit of the class action-which had been successfully deployed on behalf of investors-to average consumers. The judicial purpose was not simply to enable compensation for such claims (which were
far too small to be prosecuted singly) but to empower consumers to enforce the social contract against increasingly powerful sellers of massproduced, mass-marketed consumer goods and services. The Vasquez
court was explicit on this point. It reaffirmed the societal stake in collective prosecution of similar claims to preserve the civil litigation process
as an effective social contract enforcement mechanism, and cautioned
that insistence on one-on-one litigation could fail in this essential enforcement function:
If each is left to assert his rights alone if and when he can, there will
at best be a random and fragmentary enforcement, if there is any at
all. This result is not only unfortunate in the particular case, but it
will operate seriously to impair the deterrent
effect of the sanctions
42
which underlie much contemporary law.
The United States Supreme Court has articulated a similar policy
with respect to class actions brought under Federal Rule 23:
The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive
for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights.
A class action solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry
potential recoveries
into something worth someone's (usually an at43
torney's) labor.

41.
484 P.2d 964 (Cal. 1971).
42. Id. at 968 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Chi. L. Rev. 684, 686 (1941)). The
principles of Vasquez have, lately, enjoyed a renaissance in the California courts, which have invoked them in the context of employee rights class certification decisions. See, e.g., Gentry v. Superior Court of L.A. County, 165 P.3d 556, 561 (Cal. 2007); Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 9 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 544, 565-66 (Ct. App. 2004).
43. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)); accord Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 813 (1985) (stating that class actions facilitate "an aggregation of small individual claims, where a large number of claims are required to make it economical
to bring suit. The plaintiffs claim may be so small, or the plaintiff so unfamiliar with the law, that he
would not file suit individually" (citation omitted)).
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Courts have sometimes viewed class actions as too powerful, aggregating claims to such an extent that the whole of the class is more
threatening to the defendant than the sum of its parts, and potentially
more threatening than the merits of the class members' claims may warrant. The idea is that a certified class may incite more fear in the heart of
even the wealthiest and most powerful defendant than would the same
claims, with the same merits, left uncertified. Rather than being seen
simply as the consequence of an unaffordable civil justice system, in
which small claims (good, bad, or indifferent) have been priced out of
the system and can only be brought in the aggregate, this perspective
suggests that such disenfranchisement is the desirable, or at least the natural state, and that class members ought to be returned to it through denial of class certification. Then, at least, they pose no threat to corporate
conduct or the status quo.
The idea that class actions are undesirable because they are effective, and that they can and should be denied class certification to protect
defendants, found its first important, and most elegant, expression in the
opinion of Judge Richard Posner in the Rhone-Poulenc case. 44 Judge
Posner originated the notion (defendant did not brief it) that class certification of the personal injury hemophiliac claims at issue would place the
defendant "under intense pressure to settle" lest it be "hurl[ed] ...into
bankruptcy. '45 As an alternative, Judge Posner recommended "a decentralized process of multiple trials, involving different juries, and different
standards of liability, in different jurisdictions" because "a sample of
trials makes more sense than entrusting the fate of an industry to a single
jury."46 Whatever its provenance, the "intense pressure to settle" of class
certification became accepted as fact among the federal judiciary, and
went from "fact" to factor in determining whether to grant class certification: "One sound basis for granting jurisdiction under Rule 23(f) [to implement interlocutory appellate review of a district court class certification decision] is ...the circumstance that the class certification places
inordinate or hydraulic pressure on defendants to
settle, avoiding the risk,
47
however small, of potentially ruinous liability.
44.
In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
45.
Id. at 1298, 1300.
46.
Id. at 1299, 1304. As a result, in part, of the influence of Rhone-Poulenc, judges faced
with the challenge of effective case management in subsequent mass torts have developed, and
refined, the system of "bellwether trials" which, indeed, selects, on some systematic basis, a sample
of cases for multiple trials, whose results are intended to inform the parties on issues of liability and
damages, so as to facilitate an ultimate settlement (class or non-class) without the predicate of trialpurposes class certification. The most comprehensive discussion of the bellwether trial concept, in
actual practice, is Eldon E. Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L.

REv. 2323 (2008). This article's lead author is Hon. Eldon E. Fallon, an experienced federal judge
who presided over, inter alia, the Propulsidand Vioxx multidistrict litigations which, as described in

the article, successfully employed the bellwether technique. Id. at 2332.
47.
Hevesi v. Citigroup Inc., 366 F.3d 70, 80 (2d Cir. 2004) (second alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280

F.3d 124, 148 (2d Cir.2001) (Jacobs, J., dissenting)).
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Other courts have pragmatically (or cynically) noted that "[t]he effect of certification on parties' leverage in settlement negotiations is a
fact of life for class action litigants ...

[and] cannot defeat an otherwise

certification. ' ' 8

Such courts seem to have accepted the validity of
proper
the Rhone-Poulenc premise, including the "hydraulic pressure to settle"
anti-certification factor as one of the variables to be weighted in determining whether Rule 23 class certification criteria are met.
As had been judicially noted, however, hydraulic pressures work
both ways: "while affirming certification may induce some defendants to
settle, overturning certification may create similar 'hydraulic' pressures
on the plaintiffs, causing them to either settle or-more likely-abandon
their claims altogether., 49 As the Eleventh Circuit noted in Klay v. Humana, "Mere pressure to settle is not a sufficient reason for a court to
avoid certifying an otherwise meritorious class action suit .... '[N]o matter how strong the economic pressure to settle, a Rule 23(f) application,
in order to succeed, also must demonstrate some significant weakness in
the class certification decision."' 50 The Klay court addressed, with skepticism as to its bona fides, the defendants' plea for deliverance from the
classed mass of enraged doctor-plaintiffs in these words:
We have nothing but the defendants' conclusory, self-serving
speculations to support their claim that this trial could devastate the
managed care industry ....

[I]f their fears are truly justified, the de-

fendants can blame no one but themselves. It would be unjust to allow corporations to engage in rampant and systematic wrongdoing,
and then allow them to avoid a class action because the consequences
of being51held accountable for their misdeeds would be financially
ruinous.
The Klay decision is impressive in its recognition that defendants'
resistance to an aggregate format for the adjudication of the claims
against them, although couched in the language of due process protection, was in reality a plea for protection from due process. This was an
arrogant exercise in special pleading which Klay rebuffed as follows:
"We are courts of justice, and can give the defendants only that which
from highthey deserve; if they wish special favors such as protection
52
Congress.
to
turn
must
they
deserved-verdicts,
though
Class actions have sometimes been conceptualized as quasicorporations, albeit corporations created for the sole and finite purpose of
prosecuting defined claims in a particular piece of litigation. Similarly,
48. In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d at 145 (majority opinion) (Sotomayor, J.); see also Swack v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 230 F.R.D. 250, 263 (D. Mass. 2005).
49.
Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1275 (1lth Cir. 2004) (citing In re Diet Drugs
Prods. Liab. Litig., 93 Fed. App'x. 345, 350 (3d Cir. 2004)).
50. Id. (quoting Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 295 (1st Cir. 2000)).
51.
Id. at 1274.
52. Id.
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the lawyers who bring class actions have been likened to corporate entrepreneurs, a conceit that, for better or worse, some such lawyers themselves have come to believe, and boast of. Our society admires entrepreneurs, and the notion of entrepreneurial lawyers counteracting the economic power of corporate wrongdoers by investing the capital of their
time and money in the massive undertaking
that is a modem major class
53
action has resonated with the courts.
It has become a truism that "class certification is a pivotal moment"
in every case brought as a class action, because "[a] certified class, which
increases a defendant's potential exposure exponentially, can be a catalyst for settlement., 54 A superficial look at recent statistics tends to back
that proposition. As recently reported in the legal press, "[a]mong 231
class actions tracked in a 2008 Federal Judicial Center report, there were
70 certification motions and 30 certified classes." 55 Every single certified
case resulted in settlement. The average settlement was $9.5 million.56
However, that is just a fraction of the damage class actions can do to a
company's bottom line. The largest award in a class-action case came in
57
2008, when Enron shareholders won a settlement of $7.2 billion.
If every single certified case results in settlement, it is at least equally true that not every case brought as a class action achieves certification-far from it. As the above figures indicate, only three out of every
seven class certification motions are won, and most class actions (nearly
70%) do not reach the class certification stage. It may thus be argued that
those class actions that deserve to be certified are, and certified actions
deserve to be settled. This may actually be the operative truth, as merits
determinations and class certification have converged. It is an obsolete
proposition that the merits are irrelevant, are not considered, or at least
should not be considered, in the context of class certification.58 The class
53. See Ravens v. Iftikar, 174 F.R.D. 651, 653 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (noting that, as to counsel for
both plaintiffs seeking legal plaintiff status, "[tihe lawyers heading up both class actions are prominent 'entrepreneurial' lawyers that specialize in, and have long dominated, securities class action
practice")
54. Rebecca Beyer, The Clash over Class Actions, DAILY J., Oct. 13, 2009.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Class certification nowadays takes place after substantial document and deposition discovery, and after experts have been retained, deposed, and issued their reports. In some cases, not
only does class certification occur virtually on the eve of trial, the evidentiary class certification
hearing becomes a "mini trial." Courts need facts to make class certification findings, and the facts
implicate the merits. See id Some courts have deferred class certification until after trials of test, or
"bellwether" cases. See, e.g., In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 252 F.R.D. 83, 87
(D. Mass. 2008). As the Court noted, conducting the bellwether trial gave the Court the opportunity
to understand the "complex factual and legal disputes" in the "difficult area of drug pricing" implicated in the litigation. Id. This pre-class certification trial certainly had the benefit of informing the
Court as to the significance of common versus individual issues, and other criteria relating to class
certification under Rule 23. It also undoubtedly added to the cost, delay, and risk for plaintiffs and
their counsel who were forced to endure years of intensive and expensive litigation, without knowing whether an ultimate grant of class certification would render their investment a rational one.
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certification consideration has morphed from the issue of whether the
class action presents claims or issues which are, structurally, susceptible
to common proof at trial, to whether the plaintiffs can convince the court
that they will prevail on that proof at trial. 59 As the merits continue to
inform (or intrude) in the class certification context, at some point it can
only be hoped that defendants will acknowledge, having "lost" in an ever-more-rigorous class certification exercise that essentially requires
plaintiffs to pre-prove their claims, that a class deserving of certification
is likewise deserving of serious settlement consideration, without the
drama of the "hydraulic pressure to settle" refrain or harangues on the
evils of class actions. 60
Meanwhile, much of the value of class actions, to the system itself
as well as to the class members, is being lost as cost and delay in the
class certification process accrete. No party should be allowed to engage
in litigation busy work, or hysterical arguments, designed to place access
to the courtroom out of the reach of the other side by subverting procedures intended to provide economies of scale to counteract past attrition
tactics. The spiral of cost and delay must be halted, and it will take judicial will power to do so.
"The class action and the entrepreneurial layer may be the best
1 Lawyers on both sides
possible solution to some legal problems ....,,6
of complex civil litigation may enjoy the image of themselves as entre59. It was accepted for years that class certification was decided on the pleadings, that the
allegations of the complaint were accepted as true for certification purposes, and that the merits
could not be considered in the class certification context. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S.
156, 177-78 (1974). The Eisen barrier between merits determination and class certification has been
breached by subsequent decisions. See, e.g., In re Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24
(2nd Cir. 2006); Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2001).
60. The courts have insisted on maintaining a razor-thin distinction between merits proof and
proof that Rule 23's class certification criteria are met, even as they have incrementally erased it.
Szabo articulated the distinction as follows:
A court may not say something like "let's resolve the merits first and worry about the
class later".... But nothing.., prevents the district court from looking beneath the surface of a complaint to conduct the inquiries identified in [Rule 23] and exercise the discretion it confers .... Eisen has not been interpreted so broadly ... as to foreclose inquiry into whether plaintiff is asserting a claim which, assuming its merit, will satisfy the
requirements of Rule 23 as distinguished from an inquiry into the merits of plaintiffs
particular individual claim."
Szabo, 249 F.3d at 677 (fourth alteration in original) (quoting Eggleston v. Chi. Journeyman Plumbers' Local Union No. 130, 657 F.2d 890, 895 (7th Cir. 1981)).
61.
County of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 866 F.2d 839, 850 (6th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Carter v. Berger, 777 F.2d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1985)). "Moreover, the
weight of independent analysis amply confirms the societal benefit derived from vigorous prosecution of class actions." McMoris v. TJX Cos., 493 F. Supp. 2d 158, 166 (D. Mass. 2007) (citing
Myriam Ellis & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Cost Myth: The Social Utility
of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 103, 106-108 (2006); see also DEBORAH R.
HENSLER ET AL., RAND CORP., CLASS ACrION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE

GAIN 472 (2000), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph-reports/MR969 (stating that whether the
benefits of class actions outweigh their costs is "a deeply political question, implicating fundamental
beliefs about the structure of the political system, the nature of society, and the roles of courts and
law in society").
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preneurs, and certainly the spectacular growth of civil litigation defense
firms during the 1990s was overtly entrepreneurial. Plaintiffs' lawyers
followed this example, on a much smaller scale: the inexorable economics of a contingent fee-based practice set limits on the size to which a
plaintiffs' firm can grow. Plaintiffs' firms tend to grow-and contractmuch more rapidly, have far fewer partners, are often owned by a proprietary single partner, and frequently do not outlast the death or retirement of their founders.
There are notable exceptions, but they tend to prove the rule. The
author is a founding partner in a firm that has grown, gradually, over the
past 33 years, from a two-lawyer firm to one that employs approximately
60 attorneys and their support staff. Half of these lawyers are partners in
the firm, and share in its risks and rewards. This broad partnership base
lends a stability to the firm that the sole proprietorship model does not.
However, this firm is still quite small when compared to the national law
firms that represent defendants in modern complex litigation, which may
boast hundreds of partners and over one thousand lawyers. Yet, the author's firn is considered a large one among the plaintiffs' bar, and often
shares leadership roles with counsel whose firms number ten lawyers or
fewer.
The reality that most plaintiffs' counsel are solo or small-firm practitioners, are thinly-capitalized, and often have no backup, hourly-fee
generating bread-and-butter practice to subsidize their contingent fee
work, has not prevented courts from overestimating the economic resources of plaintiffs' firms, and indeed the constant concern that plaintiffs' firms might be overpaid for their successes is a factor that has constrained the attorneys' fees subject to judicial scrutiny and approval in
class actions. 62
The prevailing methodology in calculating a reasonable percentage
of the recovery obtained for the class as an appropriate class counsel fee
thus counteracts the perceived entrepreneurial motivations of class counsel by decreasing, rather than increasing, the percentage of the recovery
awarded as fees as that recovery scales upward. This anti-bonus system
reduces the percentage on very large recoveries-so-called "mega" cases-such that "the percentage of recovery is generally far less than the
typical range and may be as low as 4%. Generally, as the total recovery

62.

See, e.g., BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,

MANAGING

CLASS

ACTION

LITIGATION:

A POCKET

GUIDE

FOR JUDGES

22-25

(2005),

http://www.fjc.gov/publiclpdf.nsf/lookup/ClassGde.pdfl$file/ClassGde.pdf. Judges presiding over
class actions are, understandably, concerned about preventing "unnecessary litigation and overstaffing" but focus on the organization of plaintiffs' counsel (who have little economic incentive to
over-litigate or over-staff), rather than the defendants' counsel, who are paid by the hour, regularly
and regardless of outcome, and who may thus face incentives to do so. See id. at 4-5.
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increases[,] the percentage allocated to fees decreases. 63 The legitimate
must protect the
rationale for this approach is that "the district judge
64
class's interest by acting as a fiduciary for the class."
IV. RESTORING PROPORTIONALITY BY "FIXING" FEES

The role of traditional hourly attorneys' fees in expanding the cost
and delay of civil litigation cannot be understated. Attorneys billing by
the hour will tend, intentionally or not, to maximize the time spent on
completing assigned tasks, and to invent or elaborate tasks for which
time can be billed. The inverse relationship between hourly billing and
due process is so imbedded that it has literally become a joke. As a cartoon lawyer informed his judge in the caption of an October 5, 2009 New
Yorker cartoon, "The way I see it, justice delayed is that many more billable hours. ' 65
Much of the inefficiency in modem complex civil litigation has its
roots in the hourly billing system. The "makework" produced by timebilling attorneys generates additional work for litigation participants who
do not bill by the hour: judges and plaintiffs' lawyers. Plaintiffs' lawyers
typically work on contingency, which means they are not paid unless and
until a monetary recovery is produced for their clients. In the meantime,
they also typically advance the out-of-pocket costs of the litigation,
which may also be magnified by the industry of their time-billing opposing counsel; and, in current complex civil litigation, such contingency
fees are usually subject to court approval, court scrutiny, and court reduction. Judges, of course, are on fixed salaries (set at the whim of Congress or state legislatures) and do not get bonuses for efficiency or productivity.
Thus, as a matter of pragmatism and necessity, if not morality,
plaintiffs' lawyers and judges tend to see efficiencies and economies in
litigation, while outside counsel representing defendants may not. There
is no reciprocal or mutual pressure to reduce the cost of litigation, or at
least there has not been, until lately. The recent economic nearcatastrophe has hit major law firms hard, as well as their corporate
clients. Lawyers and staff have been laid off, major firms have dissolved
or merged, and major corporate clients are, suddenly or not, articulating a
commitment to controlling litigation costs. We may be beginning to see

Id. at 22 (citation omitted) (citing MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) §
63.
14.121 (2004)).
64.
In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 396 F.3d 294, 307 (3d Cir. 2005). But see Vizcaino v.
Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1048, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that class counsel may properly
be awarded fees that fall outside a benchmark or historical range where counsel achieved "exceptional results" and undertook an "extremely risky" case in representing the class, and upholding a
28%-of-recovery fee award, approximately $27 million, in a case prosecuted over an I1-year period).
65. P.C. Vey, NEW YORKER, Oct. 5, 2009, at 72.
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the necessary convergence of attitude toward litigation cost and delay as
detrimental to due process.
While it may seem that focusing on fees to reduce cost and delay,
and hence promote due process, "fixes" the problem at the expense of its
advocates, such is not necessarily the case. When courts exercise their
inherent authority to scrutinize the fees being charged and paid to the
counsel who appear before them, such scrutiny must be directed evenhandedly, on defendants' and plaintiffs' counsel alike.
Courts, in both class actions and non-class action mass torts cases,
have long considered it a function of their inherent authority and case
management jurisdiction to keep track of lawyers' time and costs, on an
ongoing basis, and to set limits, not only on court-awarded class counsel
fees, but on private contingency fees as well. This trend has recently accelerated. The express authority provided by Federal Rule 23(g) and (h)
to appoint class counsel and award class counsel fees and costs has been
augmented by a series of recent decisions in which federal judges presiding over non-class mass tort multidistrict litigation have set "caps" on the
fees individual plaintiffs' attorneys
may collect under their contingent
66
fee contracts with their clients.
The Manualfor Complex Litigation devotes an entire chapter to attorney fees, providing practical suggestions for judges presiding over
complex cases, including but not limited to class actions and mass torts,
to scrutinize, award, and control attorney fees and costs. 67 The Manual
provides access, in turn, to other authorities, such as the Third Circuit
1985 Task Force Report,68 which articulated a judicial preference for
percentage-of-recovery fee awards over the time-based "lodestar" method, 69 and influential decisions that have set benchmarks and guidelines
for prevailing ranges of percentage fees in major cases, including mass
torts 70 and class actions. 71 The Federal Judicial Center has provided re66.
See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., - F. Supp. 2d -, MDL No. 1657, 2009 WL
2408884, at *7-11, 13 (E.D. La. Aug. 3, 2009) (affirming 32% contingent fee cap imposed on recoveries in the non-class settlement multidistrict product liability suit based upon the court's inherent
and implied authority from the settlement to limit the fees, and to promote the just and efficient
conduct of the suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006) [the multidistrict litigation authorizing statute]); In re Guidant Corp. implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708
(DWF/AJB), 2008 WL 682174, at *18-19 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008) ("[Tlhis Court has the inherent
right and responsibility to supervise the members of its bar in both individual and mass actions,
including the right to review contingency fee contracts for fairness.") (capping contingent fees at
20% subject to appeal to a special master for upward departures based upon specific factors); In re
Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Utig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 491 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (exercising the court's inherent power to impose "fiduciary standards to ensure fair treatment to all parties and counsel regarding fees and expenses," capping fees at 35%, but allowing for departure, downward or upward,
based upon the unique facts of the given case).
67.

MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 14 (2004).

68.
Third Circuit Task Force, Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237 (1985).
69.
Id. at 258.
70.
See, e.g., In re Nineteen Appeals Arising out of the San Juan DuPont Plaza Hotel Fire
Litig., 982 F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1992).
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source materials for federal judges that include detailed attorneys' fees
guidance.72
The inherent authority of courts presiding over complex litigation to
enhance due process and manage litigation costs by controlling fees is
neither fairly nor logically limited to the control of plaintiffs' counsel
fees. Indeed, plaintiffs' counsel can often do little or nothing to control
their out-of-pocket advances (which someone must ultimately pay,
whether the clients directly or the defendants funding the judgment or
settlement indirectly) because they are frequently responding to the feegenerating work product of the other side. Until very recently, defense
counsel have had little incentive to suggest innovations, limitations, or
efficiencies in discovery and other pretrial proceedings. Indeed, maximizing the cost and time consumed by such proceedings not only boost
the law firm's bottom line, but may also be a weapon intentionally selected by the corporate client in a defense strategy of litigation by attrition.
Courts, in their frustration at such tactics have often reacted, understandably but inappropriately, by reducing plaintiffs' fees. The more
equitable-and effective-approach would be to also reduce or "cap" the
fees to be charged, or at least the hours spent, by defendants' counsel.
Indeed, the Manual suggests-at least as a technique for judicial use in
evaluating the plaintiffs' fee request-"[h]aving defendants submit billing records" because "[r]ecords showing defendants' attorney fees may
provide a reference for determining the reasonableness of fees where
defendants oppose plaintiff's counsel's fee request. 73 The Hirsch &
Sheehey Attorney Fees benchbook makes the same suggestion, and
quotes several federal judges who have utilized this approach. 74 However, this suggestion is made in the context of reviewing plaintiffs' fees, not
directly setting limits on defendants' fees, although the anticipation of
judicial review of billing records may itself serve to moderate such fees.
The courts have long been aware, and have long noted, that lawyers' time is not a fungible commodity, that every hour spent does not
generate an equal value to the client, and that time-based billing is deeply
and fundamentally flawed. Oft-cited is this venerable and pithy encapsulation of the maxim, "One thousand plodding hours may be far less productive than one imaginative, brilliant hour., 75 Even more to the point is
71.

See, e.g., In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2001); In re Vitamins Anti-

trust Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 209 (D.D.C. 2005).
72.
See, e.g., ALAN HIRSCH & DIANE SHEEHEY, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., AWARDING
ATrORNEYS'

FEES

AND

MANAGING

FEE

LITIGATION

(1994),

http:llwww.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/attyfees.pdf/$Fileattyfees.pdf; ROTHSTEIN & WILLGING,
supranote 62, at 22-24.
73.
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LrIGATION (FOURTH) § 14.231 (2004).
HIRSCH & SHEEHEY, supra note 72, at 105-106.
74.
75.
George D. Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factorin Counsel Fee Awards,
69 Harv. L. Rev. 658, 660 (1956), quoted in Prandini v. Nat'l Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1019 n.5 (3d
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the next sentence by the same commentator, which reflects the primary
societal value of results obtained, rather than time spent: "A surgeon who
skillfully performs an appendectomy in seven minutes is entitled to no
smaller fee than one
who takes an hour; many a patient would think he is
76
more.,
to
entitled
The courts that cite these insights do so in the context of scrutinizing, reviewing, and awarding plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. In these cases,
courts discern a conflict, or at least a divergence, of interests between
class counsel and class clients, seeking to protect the class members from
overpayment of the class fund to their counsel. Although the courts' inherent authority also extends to defendants' counsel, as noted above,
such counsel largely escapes such scrutiny because their clients are considered sufficiently sophisticated and economically powerful to fend for
themselves in fee contract negotiations. In practice, however, this discrepancy devolves into a costly situation in which, in the same litigation,
"skilled surgeons" are paid less than plodding ones.
One thin silver lining of the 2008-2009 economic recession has
been a new (or at least renewed) corporate urgency to control litigation
costs, coupled with the efforts of fiercely competing major defense firms
to offer greater value to their hoped-for and current corporate clients. The
defense analog to the contingent fee-the "fixed fee"-has thus generated recent interest and enthusiasm, with prominent corporate counsel and
senior litigation firm partners calling for its adoption. The appeal for the
"fixed fee" was made in a recent American Lawyer article co-authored
by prominent in-house corporate and outside litigation counsel:
In these troubled economic times, fixed fees for particular legal matters have appeal both for law firms and their corporate clients. As a
former general counsel of a major company and as current comanaging partner of an Am Law 100
finm, we strongly believe that
77
this is an idea whose time has come.
The "fixed fee" proponents primarily see this system's value
through the lens of law-firm and corporate-client interests:
For in-house counsel facing tremendous budgetary pressures, the
fixed fee addresses the problems caused by the hourly rate, such as
unpredictability, high costs divorced from actual value and, most importantly, the maddening law firm definition of "productivity"- defined as more lawyers and more hours per matter.

Cir. 1977), Mashburn v. Nat'l Healthcare, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 679, 689 (M.D. Ala. 1988); see also
Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 394 n.18 (1970) (citing the article).
76.
Hornstein, supra note 75, at 660.
77.
Ben W. Heineman, Jr. & William F. Lee, The Time Has Come: Two Veteran Lawyers Say
that Clientsand Firms Should ConsiderFixed Fees, AM. LAW., Oct. 2009, at 59, 59.
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For law firms facing reduced demand and cash flow problems (if
not crises), the fixed fee addresses the issues of increasing overhead
devoted to the billing process, clients flyspecking bills and demanding after-the-fact
discounts, and delays in payments and falling reali78
zation rates.
The foregoing defense firm perspective on fixed fees, which focuses
on predictability, administrative practicality, and client relations, understates the power of the fixed fee to promote pragmatic due process by
reducing overall legal costs at the same time it protects, or perhaps increases, law firm profitability. After all, plaintiffs' firms practice the
fixed fee system exclusively, with one crucial exception: the fixed fees
they charge their clients are prospective. They are contingent upon success, and expressed as a fixed percentage of recovery, rather than a fixed
dollar amount. A supposedly healthy contingent fee percentage rate of
30%, or one-third of a recovery (which often, in contingent fee contracts,
increases to 40% if the case is tried or defended upon appeal), can wither
in protracted litigation-thus the inescapable incentive of plaintiffs' lawyers to conserve on costs and to save time. Experience has shown, however, that one side's devotion to efficiency and economy cannot accomplish the goals of cost-effective litigation and proportional due process if
the other side is striving to implement contrary objectives. The adoption
by defense litigators of a fixed fee system would more closely approximate the plaintiff lawyer's contingent fee in terms of implementing a
cost-reducing and time-saving imperative.
The idea of the fixed fee-that is, a total fee for a specific service,
representation, or litigation (refined, perhaps, by bonuses and penalties
for spectacular or less-than-satisfactory performance)-has been around
for some time, but has not truly caught on. However, "[t]he credit meltdown and the deep global recession may provide the impetus for real
change in this comer of the economy, as in so many others., 79 Hourly
fees have not led to efficiencies or economies in legal services, particularly in the litigation context-but the fixed fee just might. A law firm
that knows it will be receiving a set amount of money for a service rendered has a real incentive to seek economies and efficiencies in performing that service. One suspects that fewer and shorter, rather than more
and longer, depositions, interrogatories, motions, and hearings might
occur in complex cases in which the litigation defense firms are serving
on a fixed fee, as opposed to an hourly fee, basis. Such economies create
a reasonable profit for defense firms under a fixed fee regime, and, as a
by-product, produce economies for plaintiffs and courts as well.
There are major challenges in the design of a successful fixed fee
system, but its key objective "to set price with quality and achieve cost
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
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and value alignment" has demonstrably not been reached under the hourly billing system.8 0 What is interesting is that these newly urgent calls for
implementation of a fixed fee system have come at a juncture where,
admittedly, corporations can no longer afford process for its own sake, or
simply as a strategy to exhaust opponents. Plaintiffs' counsel may no
longer be alone in their complaints that hourly-billing wastes the private
time and money of plaintiffs and their counsel, and the public time and
money invested by taxpayers in the judicial system: they may be joined
by those who send, and those who pay, such bills. These proponents of
the "fixed fee" system predict enhanced productivity and morale because
attorneys "will be paid for doing quality work within the fixed-fee budgets on more matters in smaller teams, rather than billing endless busywork hours on overstuffed megamatters.,, 81 As the American Lawyer
article concludes:
The fixed fee is not an easy answer to the economic conflicts between firms and corporate clients. But the current financial crisis
makes it imperative to have greater predictability and regularity on
billing and payment for both law firms and corporate clients. This
closer alignment between matters and money, between in-house and
outside lawyers, can serve a broader societal goal in this time when
trust in boards of directors
82 and CEOs has been shredded and wise
counseling is so critical.
V. DUE PROCESS AS

A CASUALTY OF LITIGATION

BY ATTRITION

The waves of individual and class action litigation against tobacco
companies over the past forty years illustrate many of the points discussed earlier. A comprehensive survey of tobacco litigation is far
beyond the scope of this article, and indeed cannot yet be written because
tobacco litigation is still unfolding. To date, however, the broad array of
federal and state cases spanning the past four decades has seen both the
worst and the best of litigation tactics and strategies, and, most recently,
has generated several examples of pragmatic due process that may serve
as exemplars in the quest to bring true due process back into complex
civil litigation.
Early tobacco litigation saw the perfection, if not the invention, of
the strategy of litigation by attrition: the simple expedient of making
litigation so expensive for the opposing side that it could not afford to
win. A company, or an industry, willing and able to spend unstintingly
on defense in order to avoid paying anything in compensation can successfully deploy this strategy, unless judges proactively and courageously enforce the proportionality and limiting principles inherent, and ex80.
81.
82.

id.
Id.
Id.

20101

APPORTIONING DUEPROCESS

pressed, in the Federal Rules. Litigation by attrition is expensive, exhausting, and demoralizing, but it can work. The tobacco litigation defendants made it work to their benefit for many years, even as the courts
charged with supervising the tobacco litigation decried the tactic.
Tobacco counsel knew how to make even nominally valuable
wrongful death claims, in which a jury finding for the plaintiff might be
persuaded to award $1 million or more, too expensive to pursue. As R. J.
Reynolds's counsel put it:
[T]he aggressive posture we have taken regarding depositions and
discovery in general continues to make these cases extremely burdensome and expensive for plaintiffs' lawyers, particularly sole practitioners. To paraphrase General Patton, the way we won these cases
was not by spending all of [RJR]'s
money, but by making that other
83
son of a bitch spend all of his.
In the Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc. case in which the above boast
was quoted, there were over 100 motions, four interlocutory appeals, one
final appeal, and two petitions for certiorari. 4 Defendants deposed one of
plaintiffs' experts, a doctor, for 22 days. 85 The verdict for plaintiffs was
$400,000.86 Plaintiffs expended over $500,000 in out-of-pocket costs and
$2 million in lawyer and paralegal time. 87 The defendant tobacco companies had spent an estimated $50 million in defense.88 Their attorneys
were quoted in the press as stating, "This verdict sends a message to all
plaintiff attorneys that these cases are not worth pursuing., 89 The verdict
was followed by appeals to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal; from
there,90 it journeyed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed and reversed in
part.

Of course, the tobacco companies could have settled these individual smokers' cases for a small fraction of what they spent in each case on
defense costs. The industry feared that if any cases were settled, the news
of settlement would generate an endless stream of "thousands of potential claimants to whom payment-no matter how small-would be [cumulatively] prohibitive." 9 1 The industry therefore demanded that its law83.
Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 414, 421 (alterations in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (D.N.J. 1993) (quoting Memorandum from J. Michael Jordan to unspecified Smoking and Health Attorneys (Apr. 29, 1988)).
84. Id. at 418 n.7, 421.
85.
id. at 421.
86.
Id. at 419.
87.
Id. at 418.
88.
Andrew Blum, Will Next Round of Smoking Challenges Be Worth Pursuing?,NAT'L L.J.,
June 27, 1988, at 3, 3.
89.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
90.
See Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), affd in part, rev'd in
part,505 U.S. 504 (1992). The Haines case was argued under the name Cippolloneon appeal.
91. E.J. JACOB & JACOB MEDINGER, REPORT PREPARED BY RJR OUTSIDE LEGAL COUNSEL
TRANSMITTED TO RJR EXECUTIVES FOR THE PURPOSE OF RENDERING LEGAL ADvICE CONCERNING
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yers "[v]igorously defend any case; look upon each as being capable of
establishing dangerous precedent and refuse to settle any case for any
amount., 92 This strategy was far from secret; its very efficacy depended
on the fact that it was widely publicized in the media and well-known in
the popular culture, and also on93 its consistent deployment to exhaust
plaintiffs before the point of trial.
The strategy of attrition surfaced early in tobacco litigation in the
context of superior resources deployed to multiply litigation proceedings,
which prevented plaintiffs from obtaining in discovery the information
they needed to win. For example, the 1970 Thayer case, brought by an
individual smoker, ended in a jury verdict for defendant Liggett &
Myers. 94 Afterward, the trial court-disturbed by the defendant's "overwhelming superiority in resources" and "insatiable appetite for procedural advantage"-detailed abuses that, in its view, rendered the trial a
mockery.9 5 Among other things, the court noted that the defendant was
evasive in discovery, "confidently risk[ed] tactics" knowing that the
plaintiff "could not afford the luxury of a mistrial, 9 6 and obtained a
sweeping protective order "on grounds which later proved largely illusory" to isolate plaintiffs counsel. 97 Meanwhile, the defense counsel
98
freely engaged in extensive cooperation with other industry attorneys.
The Thayer decision is an extraordinary chronicle of judicial frustration and dismay with the ability of one litigant to exploit the procedural rules ostensibly equally available to both sides, in order to thwart
the ability of plaintiff to prosecute effectively a potentially meritorious
case. Rather than illuminating the merits, the Federal Rules became offensive weapons in the defendant's hands-weapons that succeeded in
concealing and obscuring the facts, in secreting key documents, and, in
the Thayer court's own words, "mock[ing] the mandatory jury instruc-
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92.
J.F. HIND, REPORT CONCERNING SMOKING AND HEALTH PREPARED BY RJR EMPLOYEE
PROVIDING CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION TO RJR IN-HOUSE LEGAL COUNSEL, TO ASSIST IN THE
RENDERING OF LEGAL ADVICE, AND TRANSMITTED TO RJR MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEE 12 (1977),

available at http://tobaccodocuments.org/bliley-jdr/505574976-4977.html.
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Patricia Bellew Gray, Legal Warfare: Tobacco Firms Defend Smoker Liability Suits With
Heavy Artillery, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 1987; see also BERT C. GOSS, BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON
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available

at

http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/wvc34c0O. A central strategy for the cigarette industry's approach
to litigation "is a lavishly financed and brutally aggressive defense that scares off or exhausts many
plaintiffs long before their cases get to trial." Gray, supra. Those plaintiffs who proceed with their
cases "are vastly outgunned," encountering the tobacco industry's "overwhelming strength and
prowess at every turn." Id.
94.
Thayer v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., No. 5314, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12796, at *1
(W.D. Mich. Feb. 19, 1970).
95.
Id. at *"18-19.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at *18.
Id. at *16; see also id. at 10-14.
See id. passim.
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tion that individuals and corporate institutions are always equal before
the law." 99
To the Thayer court, the case that unfolded before it-with its protected and multiple trials, petitions for writs of mandamus and prohibition, and multiple appeals-demonstrated that civil justice, at least in the
context of the tobacco litigation which played out before it, was simply
beyond the ability of "a single individual human being" to afford.' °°
Looking beyond the particulars of the individual case before it, the Thayer court voiced its concern for the peril such practices imposed on the
ability of plaintiffs to obtain, and the courts to deliver, due process in
other cases in which defendants, emboldened by the tobacco company's
success, would adopt in a widening array of cases.
The Thayer court did possess, but did not exercise, the power to
sanction, punish, and deter such procedural abuse. It could, for example,
have granted plaintiffs the remedy of a new trial, one in which the plaintiffs had the necessary documents and information they had sought in
discovery, and could present their case on its merits. Plaintiffs could thus
achieve the sine qua non of the American concept of due process: a jury
trial by fact finders empowered to enforce the social contract and restore
balance and reciprocity to the rights and responsibilities of the parties
before them.
Unfortunately, as the Thayer court concluded, defendants' success
in deploying their strategy of attrition deprived plaintiff of obtaining any
meaningful benefit from the grant of such a remedy: the remedy itself
had become unaffordable. While the court stated its conviction that the
impact of the disparity in resources between the parties had approached a
denial of due process which would compel the granting of a new trial,
"[t]his question, unfortunately, is now moot because plaintiff cannot afford further proceedings. Therefore, if a denial of due process has in fact
occurred, it has at this point slipped past the safeguards existing within
'
the system and cannot be corrected." 10
VI. THE LONG CLIMB: COURTS RESUME THE ASCENT TO PRINCIPLED
AND PROPORTIONAL DUE PROCESS

In early 1994, worn out by Thayer and the Haines-Cippollonesaga
and emboldened by the sudden exposure of tobacco industry documents
revealing the industry's active role in misrepresenting and suppressing
information regarding the health hazards of smoking and the addictive
nature of nicotine, plaintiffs' lawyers began to file class actions. This
effort included the nationwide Castanov. American Tobacco Co.102 class
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at *59.
Id. at *58.
Id. at *59.
160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:2

action, which was certified by the district court, only to be reversed by
the Fifth Circuit. 10 3 Efforts to certify nationwide or statewide classes for
injured or addicted smokers were largely unsuccessful; however, there
were some procedural victories for plaintiffs, and some judicial recognition that the cumulative damage of litigation by attrition to the system
and its reputation, as well as to plaintiffs, deserved to be counteracted.
For example, in Simon v. PhillipMorris, Inc. (Simon I1),1°4 Judge Weinstein looked beyond discovery to its historical goal-trial-to determine
whether and how to determine important issues without the cost, delay,
and inconsistency of multiple repetitive trials of the same conduct of the
same actors, with respect to the determination of a permissible level of
punitive damages
liability, in the challenging context of the tobacco
"mass tort."10 5 The Simon II court found that Rule 1 supported a conclusion that severance of issues and trials before the same (or separate) juries was appropriate. 1°6 In this class action seeking class-wide determination of punitive damages for the conduct of the tobacco industry, the
court considered whether the class certification and severance of the punitive damages issues from underlying individual compensatory damages
claims would violate the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial. 10 7 Judge
Weinstein began by discussing trial judges' broad discretion to sever
issues for trial, observing that "[t]he language and spirit of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provide trial judges with the authority to structure trials efficiently and fairly."10 8 The Simon 11 court concluded that
"[s]everance of issues is one of the trial judge's most useful trial management devices to ensure the just and efficient determination of civil
actions as required by Rule l."'09
The district court in Simon 11 reasoned that severance was supported
by the "public policy favoring the efficient and fair determination of
mass torts on the merits, utilizing flexible class actions where they are
appropriate."' 110 The court explained that modem adjudicatory tools such
as severance "must be adopted to achieve the original framers' goal of
'securing the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.""' . After surveying authorities that encourage adjudicatory innovation, the court stated that "[a]djudicating mass torts as class actions instead of on a case-by-case basis helps fulfill the dictates of Rule 1.,,1 2 In
turn, the court reasoned, mass tort class actions lend themselves to sever103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
REV. 157,

See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
200 F.R.D. 21 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
Id. at 24.
Id. at 26-27.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 26 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 1).
Id. at 27.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 44 (quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 1).
Id. (citing Mary J. Davis, Toward the Proper Role for Mass Tort Class Actions, 77 OR. L.
168 (1998)).
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ance because "[t]he very nature of injuries arising from mass production
and mass marketing efforts makes trial judges' discretion to sever issues
for trial one of the most necessary and natural" tools for efficient adjudication. 113 After examining the Seventh Amendment's history and case
law, the court held that it did not substantially inhibit severance of these
issues and trials because the amendment "is only implicated where a
severed issue is presented to a subsequent jury in a confusing or uncertain manner."'1 14 Despite this analysis, the Second Circuit reversed the
Simon H class certification decision without much explanation or analysis of the issues and policies explored by Judge Weinstein."15
Simon II was a counterpoint to another smokers' class action: the
Florida state court Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc. 116 litigation. The Engle
jury verdict of $146 billion in punitive damages was widely viewed as
excessive under U.S. Supreme Court standards, was beyond even the
tobacco industry's ability to pay, and would have benefited the citizens
of only a single state. The Simon II action thus sought a nationwide class
to determine the maximum punitive damages award (if any) that could
constitutionally be imposed against the industry for its conduct. Injured
smokers within the Simon II class definition would have shared equitably
in any such award, if and when they proved their own actual damages.
The Engle punitive damages verdict was likewise reversed, as was
the class certification, but with a pragmatic difference which at least partially erased the attrition advantage of the tobacco defendants: In Engle,
the Florida Supreme Court granted res judicata to eight key liability
findings of the trial jury, enabling members of the defined class who
timely filed individual suits to carry these findings with them, and proceed to proof of individual medical causation and damages, without retrying (or re-discovering) these class-wide findings. 117 Approximately
7,000 Floridians within the Engle class definition thereafter filed individual damage suits, which, as of early 2010, were pending in Florida
state and federal courts. A handful have already8 gone to trial, with victories for both smokers and tobacco companies. 1
In Engle, the Florida Supreme Court achieved, via its declaration of
the common liability facts determined by the jury in the class action trial
as res judicata, the type of severance of common and individual issues
that Simon 1I had attempted-albeit via a roundabout route. The decision
approved the intermediate appellate holding vacating the $145 billion
113.
114.

Id.
Id. at24.

See In re Simon 11Litig., 407 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2005).
115.
945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006).
116.
117.
Id. at 1257 n.4, 1276-77.
118.
One federal district court rejected the Engle res judicata ruling. See Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1347-48 (M.D. Fla. 2008). The Brown decision is on
appeal to the Eleventh Circuit.
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award of punitive damages; it upheld the award for compensatory damages for two of the class representative plaintiffs and expressly approved
the class trial Phase I findings for the class as to eight key questions
(Questions 1 through 8 on the jury verdict form), which included findings that smoking cigarettes causes a specified list of diseases; that the
defendants concealed or omitted material information regarding the
health effects and addictive nature of smoking cigarettes; that the information was concealed or omitted with the intention that smokers and the
public would rely on it to their detriment; that all of the defendants sold
or supplied cigarettes that were defective; that they all sold or supplied
cigarettes that did not conform to their representations of fact; and that
all of the defendants were negligent.'1 19
After surveying federal decisions discussing the class certification/common treatment of specified claims or issues within a case under
Rule 23(c)(4)(A), the Engle court found procedural and constitutional
support for its desire to conserve the considerable judicial effort and resources that had been invested in the Engle pretrial, trial, and appellate
proceedings. Accordingly, it acted to preclude the endlessly duplicative
re-adjudication of specific issues of fact that it determined the Phase I
class jury had properly heard and decided. The Engle court held:
In this case, the Phase I trial has been completed. The pragmatic
solution is to now decertify the class, retaining the jury's Phase I
findings other than those on the fraud and intentional infliction of
emotion distress claims, which involved highly individualized determinations, and the finding on entitlement to punitive damages questions, which was premature. Class members can choose to initiate individual damages actions and the Phase I common core findings we
approved above will have resjudicata effect in those trials....

119. Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1276-77. The decision specifies:
We approve the Phase I findings for the class as to Questions 1 (that smoking cigarettes
causes aortic aneurysm, bladder cancer, cerebrovascular disease, cervical cancer, chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease, coronary heart disease, esophageal cancer, kidney cancer,
laryngeal cancer, lung cancer (specifically, adenocarinoma, large cell carcinoma, small
cell carcinoma, and squamous cell carcinoma), complications of pregnancy, oral cavity/tongue cancer, pancreatic cancer, peripheral vascular disease, pharyngeal cancer, and
stomach cancer), 2 (that nicotine in cigarettes is addictive), 3 (that the defendants placed
cigarettes on the market that were defective and unreasonably dangerous), 4(a) (that the
defendants concealed or omitted material information not otherwise known or available
knowing that the material was false or misleading or failed to disclose a material fact
concerning the health effects or addictive nature of smoking cigarettes or both), 5(a) (that
the defendants agreed to conceal or omit information regarding the health effects of cigarettes or their addictive nature with the intention that smokers and the public would rely
on this information to their detriment), 6 (that all of the defendants sold or supplied cigarettes that were defective), (7) (that all of the defendants sold or supplied cigarettes that,
at the time of sale or supply, did not conform to representations of fact made by said defendants), and 8 (that all of the defendants were negligent). Therefore, these findings in
favor of the Engle Class can stand.
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..Individual plaintiffs within the class will be permitted to pro-

ceed individually with the findings set forth above given res judicata
effect in any subsequent trial between individual class members and
the defendants, provided such action is filed within one year of the
mandate in this case.120
The Engle Phase I class-wide jury trial had consumed more than
one year. Understandably, the Florida Supreme Court sought, and found,
a way to avoid consigning thousands of Florida smokers to the impossibility of replicating this trial in each of their individual cases. Because
the class jury's product- and conduct-related findings were given res
judicata effect, individual smokers within the class definition could now
go to trial, in a reasonable period of time, to prove medical causation and
damages, in trials spanning days instead of months or years. A number of
these cases have now gone to trial, with predictably mixed results. Of the
five Florida cases that went to trial in 2009, for example, only one case
resulted in an award of punitive damages. In the cases that plaintiffs have
won, juries have tended to apportion fault between the tobacco company
defendant and the plaintiff, thereby reducing compensatory damages.121
The cost and duration of the trials was thus proportionate to the amounts
in controversy, both plaintiffs and defendants are able to win, depending
upon the individual merits of the cases, and punitive damages, when
awarded, will not cripple the industry.
Another state's high court likewise approved the due process propriety of severing individual and common issues for phased trials, to
prevent the excesses of attrition strategy by avoiding the duplicative adjudication of the same issue across multiple cases. The In re Tobacco
Litigation (PersonalInjury Cases)122 decision by the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia answered a certified question arising from the
trial court's case management order, which provided for bifurcation of
the trial of a group of consolidated personal injury tobacco cases. Under
the bifurcation order, punitive damages were to be determined in the first
phase, along with liability issues. This is a structure similar, though not
identical, to that utilized by the trial court in Engle. The Tobacco Litigation court answered the following certified question:
Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution, as interpreted by State Farm v. Campbell, prec-

lude a bifurcated trial plan in a consolidated action consisting of per120.
Id. at 1269, 1277.
See Amanda Bronstad, The Bloom is off the Rose for Tobacco Claims: As Memories Dim
121.
of Industry Wrongdoing, a New Generation of Jurors is Proving Less Sympathetic to Smokers,
NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 2009, at 10, 10; Jim Loney, Smokers, Tobacco Both Winners in Early Engle
at
available
2009,
20,
Aug.
REUTERS,
Cases,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE57J52Y20090820 ("The scorecard: seven judgments for
smokers and their families, ranging from $600,000 to $30 million; two wins for tobacco firms.")
(reporting nine verdicts to date in cases brought by former Engle class members).
122.
624 S.E.2d 738 (W. Va. 2005).
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sonal injury claims of approximately 1,000 individual smokers,
wherein Phase I of the trial would decide certain elements of liability
and a punitive damages multiplier and Phase II of the trial would decide for each plaintiff compensatory damages and punitive damages
based upon the punitive damages multiplier determined in Phase I?123
The West Virginia high court answered the certified question in the
negative; that is, it determined that the bifurcated trial plan was consistent with due process and the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 24 As the court
noted, "trial courts have significant leeway in implementing a mass trial
format., 125 Thus:
A creative, innovative trial management plan developed by a trial
court which is designed to achieve an orderly, reasonably swift and
efficient disposition of mass liability cases will be approved so long
as the plan does not trespass upon the procedural due process rights
of the parties.126
As the certified question indicates, defendants' due process arguments against the bifurcated trial plan were based on the premise that the
United States Supreme Court's decision in State Farm v. Campbell.127 In
State Farm, the Court recognized a due process right on the part of defendants to protection from excessive punitive damages awards based on
wrongdoing directed to non-parties,128 requiring all plaintiffs to prove
compensatory damages before proceeding to the punitive damages
phase. 129 As the West Virginia court pointed out, however, State Farm
was not a mass tort case, and held that State Farm, which did not involve
mass tort litigation, did not per se preclude the circuit court's original
trial plan. Limiting its analysis to the issue of whether State Farm precludes a bifurcated trial plan like the one designed in the trial court, the
West Virginia Supreme Court found nothing in State Farm that would
"mandate[] a reexamination of our existing system of mass tort litigation. ' 130 And nothing in State Farm "that per se precludes a bifurcated
trial plan in which a punitive damages multiplier is established prior to
the determination of individual compensatory damages.' 3 1
As Justice Starcher of the West Virginia Supreme Court noted in his
concurring opinion applying his state's version of Federal Rule 1 to confirm as constitutional a bifurcated trial process that included a single,
123.

Id. at 739.

124.
125.

Id.
Id. at 740 n.1.

126.

Id. (quoting State ex rel. Appalachian Power Co. v. MacQueen, 479 S.E.2d 300, 300 (W.

Va. 1996) (syllabus)).

127.

538 U.S. 408 (2003).

128.
129.

Id. at 422-23.
See id. at 425-426.

130.
131.

In re Tobacco Litig., 624 S.E.2d at 741.
Id.
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aggregate determination of punitive damages liability, no court is "constitutionally mandated to deny the plaintiffs a just, speedy and inexpensive resolution of their claims in order that the defendants' property
rights may be fully protected.' 32 In a judicial system of finite resources,
the due process rights of any litigant cannot be absolute, lest opponents
or others be shortchanged of their due process. Like it or not, due process
is allocated on a "sliding scale." Each side must get its due, each is due
something, and what process is due must
be carefully decided under the
33
circumstances and nature of each case.'
Justice Starcher's concurring opinion contains a more detailed explanation of the West Virginia "mass litigation" system and a reasoned
statement as to "why such a system is necessary."' 34 As Justice Starcher
acknowledges, "[t]he defendants are certainly entitled to due process,"
but it is "the trial judge's duty to afford all parties due process.' 99135 As
Justice Starcher explained the context:
In the current age, a single mistake by a product manufacturer can injure dozens, hundreds, or even thousands upon thousands of individuals. A few manufacturers take a callous, deliberate, and knowing
approach and choose to ignore the injuries caused by their products,
or conspire to conceal the problems with their products. Sometimes,
the injuries caused by the product cover the nation and span many
decades. 136
Justice Starcher went on to describe the evolution of asbestos mass
tort litigation in the West Virginia courts, and the trial-and-error process
by which various forms of consolidation and bifurcation were employed. 137 These included utilizing various forms of consolidation under
Rule 42 of West Virginia's Rules of Civil Procedure, the state analogue
to the Federal Rules. As other states have done, West Virginia formalized its "mass litigation" system by creating a "Mass Litigation Panel"
consisting of six "specially trained judges who are ready and willing to
take on cases with common questions of law or fact where large numbers
of individuals have potentially been harmed, physically or economically,
as a result of a catastrophe or as a result of a defective product.' 3 8 The
experience gained by such specializing judges or specialized courts may
render them more sophisticated and efficient as they gain familiarity with
recurring issues, similar products, and repeat players, such as the New
Jersey-headquartered pharmaceutical companies who are frequently be132. Id. at 744 (Starcher, J., concurring).
133.
Id. at 748.
134. Id. at 744.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138.
Id. at 747-48 (describing Trial Court Rule 26.01 and the West Virginia "mass litigation"
system).
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fore the New Jersey state courts. New Jersey has, in fact, enacted a "mass
tort court" system under which cases are transferred and centralized for
39
coordinated proceedings managed by specialized "mass tort" judges. 1
Our mass litigation system enables expert and experienced judges to
employ procedures-including consolidation, bifurcation, and/or class
action treatment-to fashion litigation structures that accord due process
to each side, without exhausting either, and that are within the available
resources of the system. The crucial question is whether our judiciary,
aided by counsel of integrity, will test the limits of its independence by
deploying its Constitutional powers to adopt such innovative (or underutilized) procedures notwithstanding the protestations of those who had
come to expect-and to profit from-"litigation as usual." Justice
Starcher, in the West Virginia Tobacco litigation, summarized the defendants' argument of entitlement, pursuant to the due process clauses of the
State and federal Constitutions, to try the question of punitive damages
one case at a time so that the jury would assess each defendant's culpability to each plaintiff individually rather than collectively. He noted the
defendants' insistence that the only way punitive damages may be reasonably related to the potential harm caused to an individual plaintiff is
by a jury hearing evidence about both a defendant's conduct and the actual or potential harm to the plaintiff at the same time. In sum, Justice
Starcher acknowledged the defendants' recurring assertion in large mass
litigation, that the issue of punitive damages can never be assessed under
Rule 42(a), "or for that matter in a class action under Rule 23."140
Justice Starcher exposed the pivotal defect with this argument: its
inherent flaw is "the assumption that due process, particularly to protect
property rights, is a concrete concept. Instead, what process is due under
the due process clause is determined under a sliding scale, and changes
with the facts of each case.' 4 1 Once it is determined that due process
142
applies, the question to be answered is "What process is due?"'
The due process analysis explicated by Justice Starcher proceeds
from an analogy to criminal litigation, in which the concept of due
process is sacred. Nonetheless, as he notes, the courtroom process due to
someone who has several parking tickets is different from the procedural
139.
For a description of the New Jersey system, see New Jersey Courts Online, Mass Tort
Information Center, http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/mass-tort/index.htm.
140. Id. at 748.
141. Id. Other cases have employed similar reasoning:
When due process applies, it must be determined what process is due and consideration
of what procedures due process may require under a given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as
well as the private interest that has been impaired by government action.
Bone v. W. Va. Dep't of Corr., 255 S.E.2d 919, 919 (W. Va. 1979). "[D]ue process is flexible and
calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471,481 (1972), quoted in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
142.
Tobacco Litig.,
624 S.E.2d at 748 (Starcher, J., concurring).
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protections afforded a shoplifter, and "vastly different from the process
to be accorded someone who is accused of murder."' 143 If these real and
practical gradations in due process are permissible-indeed necessaryin the criminal realm, they can hardly be withheld from the arena of civil
litigation. While the interests at stake in civil cases are different in kind
than the life and liberty interests at risk in criminal prosecutions, the
stakes in modem complex litigation nonetheless can be very high.
Comparing the criminal and civil litigation systems is, from many
perspectives, problematic: the two fulfill different crucial functions in
our society. The first imposes penalties upon individuals who breach the
social contract by harming or imperiling others, through violence or
fraud. The second enforces the social contract against those who breach
the integrity of the commercial life of the community, although the
harms attending such breaches may likewise involve death or injury to
the victims. We accord the utmost due process to those accused of criminal wrongdoing, precisely because their lives and liberties, which the
social contract was designed to protect, are in jeopardy. In civil litigation,
it is the plaintiffs whose lives or property has already been taken, damaged, or imperiled. It should be a matter of equal concern to deliver the
due process these litigants deserve by refusing to consign them to an
endless wait for a trial which can never come because their opponent
insists on a complete, costly, time consuming trial in each of a multitude
of cases, rather than the group, aggregate, class action, test case, or consolidation alternatives the Federal Rules provide.
Our society need not tolerate undue expense and delay in civil litigation simply because some defendants are willing to endure it, and can
afford to impose it upon their opponents. The limited resources of our
court system must be apportioned fairly among all of the litigants who
need them, and, in our era of mass production, mass marketing, and nationwide consumer markets bombarded with myriad standardized products, those who need to avail themselves of the system when products
kill, injure, fail to perform as represented. The demand on scarce judicial
resources is greater than ever, and the need to apportion them fairly is
now critical.
We are far indeed, both in time and in economic reality, from the
beginnings of our nation, when the judicial system could, and was expected to, enforce the social contract effectively by dispensing one trial
per customer. Literally applying that notion of due process to the contemporary context negates due process itself. As Justice Starcher put it, if
due process were reduced to the literal concept of a defendant's right to
one jury trial per claim, in litigation involving thousands injured or damaged in similar ways by the same product or practice, "we would essen143.

Id.
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tially be saying that the more people a defendant injures with its defective product, the less likely the defendant is ever going to have to pay
compensatory or punitive damages to the people injured by the product.144 This "right" to jury trials in a magnitude the system cannot administer within any reasonable time span is a "right" which trumps and
obliterates the corresponding due process rights of opposing litigants.
And, as we know from the social contract which animates and justifies
our legal system and which endows it with its operative mission, rights
are reciprocal; they must be maintained in balance. As Justice Starcher
characterized the "rights" that the Tobacco defendants were insisting:
[The defendants] would therefore be accorded a right to thousands
upon thousands of individual trials that would cause the legal system
to grind to a halt. At the same time, we would be telling the individual plaintiffs that they have no rights to any process-because of administrative gridlock, the
individual plaintiffs would de facto be de145
nied their day in court.
CONCLUSION: DUE PROCESS FOR "BOTH SIDES Now"
If our civil litigation system is to maintain-or recapture-its integrity, its efficiency, and the confidence of the public whose health, safety, and financial security depends upon it, pragmatic due process, in
which necessity is the mother of procedural innovation, must be practiced. The term "pragmatic" may be disfavored, because it may, to some,
connote a disregard or discount of principle. In the case of due process,
however, principle and pragmatism are allies. Pragmatic due process is
no less pure than that which ignores the devastating realities of cost and
delay upon the administration of justice. Pragmatic due process is proportional, and is most faithful to the underlying principles of due process
in its recognition that perfect due process, from the standpoint of one
side, may work as a denial of process upon the other. Due process does
not tolerate the stark disparities all too often observed, but uncorrected,
in complex litigation. Advocates and adjudicators who fall into the trap
of seeing due process from one perspective risk distorted decisions that
prejudice one side while seeking to protect the other. Due process de146
mands a recognition and protection of the rights of "both sides now."
Due process does not exist if it is not shared among adversaries. It must
be apportioned. Each side may feel affronted, or deprived, of perfect due
process if it does not receive all of the process that it wishes in a given
case. But if there is a shortage of judicial resources, as indeed there is,
and if the time and money of each side is finite, which it is, then due
process must be allocated so that all have some, lest many have none.
144.

Id.at 749.

145.

Id.

146. Apologies to Joni Mitchell, composer of Both Sides Now, and to everyone who will now
be unable to get that song out their heads.

LIMITING EVASIVE DISCOVERY: A PROPOSAL FOR THREE
COST-SAVING AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES
DANIEL C. GIRARD & TODD I. ESPINOSA

t

INTRODUCTION

Discovery accounts for the majority of the cost of civil litigationas much as ninety percent in complex cases, according to some estimates.1 While the simplest and most effective way to control litigation
costs would be to restrict or eliminate discovery, any savings would
come at a high price. The truth-seeking and fairness values implicit in the
American civil justice system depend on the right to develop proof in the
hands of one's adversary, particularly in "asymmetrical" cases where
individual citizens square off against well-funded corporate adversaries.
The challenge remains one of balancing the imperative of controlling
costs against the need to preserve the core values underlying our justice
system.
Central to the problem of cost efficiency is the adversarial nature of
discovery in modern litigation. In an effort to reduce the impact of gamesmanship and promote a more collaborative approach to discovery,
civil rule amendments since at least 1993 have emphasized cooperation
among parties and counsel. Rule 26(a) initial disclosure requirements,
Rule 26(f) discovery conference requirements, the pre-motion conference
requirement of Rule 37(a)(1), and, most recently, various aspects of the
amendments governing discovery of electronically stored information
("ESI") mandate voluntary exchanges of information and cooperative

t
Mr. Girard is a partner with Girard Gibbs LLP. He is a member of American Law Institute
and serves on the Federal Civil Rules Advisory Committee, where he has participated in the Committee's recent drafting of amendments governing electronic discovery, summary judgment, and
discovery of expert witnesses.
Mr. Espinosa is an associate with the firm. He is a former law clerk with the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California and a former research attorney with the Superior Court of California. The authors thank Amanda Steiner and Dena C. Sharp, also with Girard
Gibbs LLP, for their editorial assistance and comments.
1. Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to Hon.
Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 11, 1999), 192 F.R.D.
340, 357 (2000) ("[Ihe cost of discovery represents approximately 50% of the litigation costs in all
cases, and as much as 90% of the litigation costs in the cases where discovery is actively employed."); see also Navigant Consulting, The State of Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: A Survey
of Chief Legal Officers 8 (Oct. 29, 2008), http://law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/uploadsThe%20
State%20of%7o20Discovery%2OAbuse%2in%2OCivil%2OLitigation%20A%2OSurvey%20of%2Chi
ef%20Legal%200fficers.ppt ("On average, 45-50 percent of respondents' civil litigation costs in
2007 related to discovery activities.").
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efforts to identify and resolve the contentious issues that arise during
discovery. 2
Rules that depend on cooperation between opposing counsel function well, to the extent that professionalism or the relative parity of the
litigants leads the parties and their counsel to approach their obligations
in good faith.3 As a number of courts have observed, however, a party
who elects to obstruct or manipulate the discovery process can impose
extraordinary costs on the court system and opposing parties.4 A determined litigant will exploit every available means of thwarting an adversary's efforts through delay, distraction, confusion, and obfuscation. Discovery in high-stakes litigation appears to be growing ever more contentious, with collateral proceedings over discovery compliance becoming
commonplace.
The most contentious and costly battleground in civil discovery surrounds the production of documents in response to requests propounded
under Rule 34. To be sure, the problems often begin with overbroad,
poorly crafted "kitchen sink" style document requests served by the re-

2. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(2)-(3). Civil Rule amendments have also addressed a wide range of
other issues. The 2000 amendment to Rule 26(b)(1), for example, limited the scope of discovery to
matters relevant to parties' claims and defenses, where previously the Rule had permitted discovery
into any matter reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence without prior leave of court.
See, e.g., In re Subpoena to Witzel, 531 F.3d 113, 118 (1st Cir. 2008) ("In 2000, Rule 26(b)(1) was
amended to distinguish between discovery regarding matters that are relevant to a party's claim or
defense and discovery of a broader scope encompassing 'any matter relevant to the subject matter
involved in the action."' (quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1))). Similarly, the 2006 ESI amendments
added new provisions for cost shifting and new procedures for the assertion of claims of privilege or
work-product protection. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iv); id. 26(b)(2), (b)(5)(B), (f)(3)(D).
3. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Neb. v. BASF Corp., No. 4:04CV3356, 2007 WL
3342423, at *5 (D. Neb. Nov. 5, 2007):
The overriding theme of recent amendments to the discovery rules has been open and
forthright sharing of information by all parties to a case with the aim of expediting case
progress, minimizing burden and expense, and removing contentiousness as much as
practicable. If counsel fail in this responsibility-willfully or not-these principles of an
open discovery process are undermined, coextensively inhibiting the courts' ability to objectively resolve their clients' disputes and the credibility of its resolution.
(citations omitted); In re Sept. 11th Liab. Ins. Coverage Cases, 243 F.R.D. 114, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
("Discovery is run largely by attorneys, and the court and the judicial process depend upon honesty
and fair dealing among attorneys.").
4.
See, e.g., Gipson v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., No. 08-2017, 2009 WL 790203, at *21 (D. Kan.
Mar. 24, 2009):
The costs associated with adversarial conduct in discovery have become a serious burden
not only on the parties but on this Court as well. While the Court is well aware of counsel's obligations to act as advocates for their clients and to use the discovery process for
the fullest benefit of their clients, those obligations must be balanced against counsel's
duty not to abuse legal procedure.
Network Computing Servs. Corp. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 223 F.R.D. 392, 395 (D.S.C. 2004) ("Hardball
discovery ... is costly to our system and consumes an inordinate amount of judicial resources."); In
re Spoonemore, 370 B.R. 833, 844 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2007):
Discovery should not be a sporting contest or a test of wills, particularly in a bankruptcy
case where the parties' resources are limited and the dollar value of the stakes is often
low.... [The parties'] conduct in the discovery phase of this matter ha[s] significantly
multiplied its burdens, both on the Trustee and the Court.
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questing party. Courts have shown little hesitation in paring back or restricting these overzealous or insufficiently focused discovery requests.'
In many cases, however, evasive or incomplete responses leave the
requesting party unable to determine whether the responding party has
agreed to produce all of the requested documents, when production will
be made and, once made, whether the production is complete. The responding party gains an immediate tactical advantage by serving an evasive or incomplete response-the ability to prevent, or at least delay, the
production of damaging documents, and to shift to the requesting party
the obligation of enforcing the responding party's discovery obligations.
The Federal Rules prohibit evasive responses and provide mechanisms to shift fees to compensate requesting counsel for the cost of enforcing compliance. 6 In practice, however, these rules are not enforced. 7 Service of evasive discovery responses has become a routine-and rewarding-litigation tactic. Litigants who lack the sophistication or the resources to detect evasive behavior and successfully move for relief bear
the cost of non-compliance, despite the Rules' express prohibition on
evasive conduct.
This essay proposes three amendments to the Federal Rules to promote efficient discovery by dissuading evasive conduct: (1) an express
prohibition on evasive responses in Rule 26(g); (2) a clarification of
"production" and "inspection" in Rules 34(b) and 37(a)(3); and (3) a
requirement in Rule 34(b)(2)(C) for specific disclosure of withheld documents. While the proposed amendments are an admittedly modest step,
the cost of implementing them should be equally modest. They should
5.
See, e.g., Regan-Touhy v. Walgreen Co., 526 F.3d 641,650 n.6 (10th Cir. 2008):
[A]t the end of the day, it is the parties' obligation to frame their own discovery requests
and to seek to narrow any disputes with opposing counsel; the district court is obliged only to rule on the requests for enforcement or protection eventually presented to it, not to
do the parties' work for them by editing discovery requests until they comply with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
See also Surles v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 474 F.3d 288, 305 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that the district
court properly narrowed document requests because "district courts have discretion to limit the
scope of discovery where the information sought is overly broad or would prove unduly burdensome
to produce"); I'mnaedaft, Ltd. v. Intelligent Office Sys., LLC., No. 08-cv-01804-LTB-KLM, 2009
WL 1537975, at *6 (D. Colo. May 29, 2009) (characterizing overbroad discovery requests as "a
fishing expedition, or more probably, a search for ammunition to use in this particular war. 'Ammo
recon' missions, like fishing expeditions, are rarely appropriate and uniformly discouraged").
6.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B) ("For each item or category, the response must either state
that inspection and related activities will be permitted as requested or state an objection to the request, including the reasons."); id. 37(a)(4) ("For purposes of this subdivision (a) [authorizing a
motion to compel], an evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response must be treated as a
failure to disclose, answer, or respond."); id. 37(a)(5) (providing for payment of moving party's
reasonable costs).
7.
According to a recent study by the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal
System, discovery sanctions are sought in only about 3 percent of cases. Of the motions that are
filed, only 26 percent are granted in whole or in part. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM.
LEGAL SYS.,

CIVIL CASE

PROCESSING IN THE
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http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/pubs/PACER%20FINAL%201-21-09.pdf.

46

(2009),

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:2

also be non-controversial, as evasive conduct is already prohibited and
there is no defensible countervailing interest in encouraging evasive conduct. The remaining Parts of this essay discuss the proposed amendments
in detail.
I. THE BARGAINING PROBLEM

Under the current Rules, parties and their counsel are motivated to
treat discovery requests and responses as merely their first offers in what
will often be a protracted series of bargaining sessions. On their face, the
Rules do not suggest that this should be the case. The scope of discovery
is well established under Rule 26(b)(1) and it is usually relatively clear
whether a document is responsive to a particular request.
The bargaining occurs for two reasons. First, the mechanism by
which a propounding party may seek to compel compliance with its discovery requests is typically slow, cumbersome, and costly. A noticed
motion or equivalent procedure is often not enough; some courts also
require appendices, separate statements, or other lengthy documents in
support of the usual motion papers. 8 Second, the pre-motion conference
requirement of Rule 37(a)(1) provides incentive to bargain. 9 In practice,
this requirement removes nearly any deterrent to evasive or incomplete
initial responses to discovery requests. Because of this Rule, the responding party is guaranteed at least one opportunity to cure its responses, no
matter how deficient, before the matter is brought to the court's attention.
Without doubt, different cases involve different questions of privilege, relevance, and related issues, some more open to debate than others. In most instances, however, an experienced attorney will recognize
an evasive discovery response almost immediately. The tactics are all too
familiar, and include: unilaterally narrowing the scope of the discovery
request, such as by redefining terms used in the request; agreeing to provide documents "subject to" specified objections without stating whether
responsive documents are being withheld on the basis of the objections;
agreeing to provide documents without stating when the production will
be made; and so forth. With the advent of electronic discovery, a whole
new array of possibilities has arisen, ranging from burying the propound8.
See, e.g., C.D. CAL. R. 37-2.1 (requiring a joint stipulation that sets forth verbatim all
requests and responses in dispute along with argument from both parties as to each request and
response); N.D. GA. R. 37.1(A) (requiring a motion to compel to set forth verbatim all requests and
responses and provide separate argument for each).
9. Some courts impose special audio-visual or stenographic recording requirements in the
pre-motion conference process. See, e.g., Jason Krause, Rockin' Out the E-Law, A.B.A. J., July
2008, at 48, 52, available at http://www.abajoumal.com/magazine/rockin out the e law (describing videotape practice employed by Magistrate Waxse of the District of Kansas); see also Sullivan v.
Kelly Servs., No. C07-2784 CW (BZ), slip op. at I (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2008) (directing, in an initial
discovery order by Magistrate Zimmerman, that for pre-motion conferences, the "parties shall ...
make a contemporaneous record of their meeting using a tape recorder or a court reporter). While
these types of requirements may deter some forms of discovery misconduct, they also present a
further procedural hurdle to parties seeking relief.
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ing party in millions of pages of irrelevant or duplicative documents, to
playing games with key word searches, to producing data that is so riddled with technical problems that it is essentially unusable.10
In short, the actual operation of the Rules and the incentives they
create for parties and their attorneys almost automatically turn what
should be a two-step process of discovery requests followed by responses
into an iterative, multi-step ordeal, in which responses are followed by
conferences, then amended responses, then further conferences, and so
on. All of this haggling and negotiation over what should largely be wellsettled matters not only drives up costs, it may even encourage propounding parties to serve broader discovery requests than they otherwise
would in order to leave themselves room to bargain. Such unnecessarily
broad requests encourage similarly broad objections, in turn leading to
further bargaining and significantly driving up costs."
H. AMENDING THE FEDERAL RULES TO DISCOURAGE EVASIVE
DISCOVERY RESPONSES

Three relatively narrow amendments to the discovery rules would
help to clarify parties' discovery obligations and minimize gamesmanship: (1) revising Rule 26(b)(1)(B) to explicitly require the party or attorney to certify that the responses are not evasive; (2) amending Rule
34(b)(2)(B) and Rule 37(a)(3)(B)(iv) to address the now-common practice of producing rather than permitting inspection of documents; and (3)
adding a provision to Rule 34(b)(2)(C) that requires the responding party
to specify whether documents are being withheld on the basis of any
asserted objection.
A. Rule 26(g): Express Prohibitionof Evasive Responses
Rule 26(g)(1)(B) provides that a party or attorney who signs a discovery response or objection is certifying that, "to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief formed after a reasonable in10.
See In re Seroquel Products Liab. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 650, 665 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (sanctioning party for production that "had load file, metadata, page break and key word search problems,
making the 10 million pages of documents inaccessible, unsearchable, and unusable as contemplated
under the Rules"); see also Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, No. 07 Civ. 9931(WHP)(FM),
2009 WL 2568431, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2009) (relating that, in a music copyright infringement
case, counsel directed his client to search emails using "design" as the sole search term); Bray &
Gillespie Mgmt. v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 6:07-cv-222-Orl-35KRS, 2009 WL 546429, at *23-24
(M.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 2009) (sanctioning party and counsel for misrepresentations to court about the
gathering and production of ESI and manipulation of ESI to withhold requested information, including metadata); ReedHycalog UK, Ltd. v. United Diamond Drilling Servs., Inc., NO. 6:07 CV 251,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93177, at *5, 9 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2008) (In a patent dispute, a production of
750 gigabytes of data that "allegedly included baby pictures, audio folders, and pornography"
amounted to "a data dump with an instruction to 'go fish.' That this fishing is done electronically is
of no consequence." (citations omitted)).
11 . See, e.g., Network Computing Servs. Corp. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 223 F.R.D. 392, 395
(D.S.C. 2004) ("Judges often find themselves in a position similar to NFL referees, who have to peel
the players off of each other in an effort to find the player in the middle who started the melee.").
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quiry," the response or objection is: (i) "consistent with" the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and other applicable law, (ii) "not interposed
for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or
needlessly increase the cost of litigation," and (iii) "neither unreasonable
nor unduly burdensome or expensive."' 2 This Rule is essentially the discovery counterpart to Rule 1I's requirements for representations
made to
13
a court, which do not apply in the discovery context.
Rule 26(g) was intended to discourage evasive discovery practices.
As the Civil Rules Advisory Committee emphasized in its note to the
1983 amendments, the Rule "provides a deterrent to both excessive discovery and evasion by imposing a certification requirement that obliges
each attorney to stop and think about the legitimacy of a discovery request, a response thereto, or an objection.",14 While the text of the rule
would seem to be sufficient to deter evasive conduct, it has not operated
that way, likely because of the
general reluctance of courts to impose
15
sanctions for discovery abuse.
A lack of specificity may also be a contributing factor. Evasion of
discovery obligations is, of course, an "improper purpose," but it is not
one of the three listed in subsection (g)(l)(B)(ii). 16 Similarly, to the extent that subsection (g)(1)(B)(i) requires compliance with the federal
rules, it incorporates Rule 37(a)(4)'s provision that "an evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response must be treated as a failure to
disclose, answer, or respond." 17 Nonetheless, Rule 26(g) does not explicitly require a responding party to certify that it is not attempting to
evade its obligation to produce non-privileged documents and information that are responsive to the propounding party's discovery requests.
This absence of express language gives responding parties room to
maneuver. Only a handful of district court decisions, and no reported
12.
FED R. CIv. P. 26(g)(1)(B).
13. Id. 11(d) ("[Rule 11] does not apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses,
objections, and motions under Rules 26 through 37.").
14.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g) advisory committee notes to 1983 amendment (emphasis added)
("Because of the asserted reluctance to impose sanctions on attorneys who abuse the discovery rules,
Rule 26(g) makes explicit the authority judges now have to impose appropriate sanctions and requires them to use it. This authority derives from Rule 37, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the court's inherent
power." (citations omitted)).
15.
See Scott A. Moss, Reluctant Judicial Factfinding: When Minimalism and Judicial Modesty Go Too Far,32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 549, 562-63 (2009). Professor Moss notes that the reasons
given by courts for reluctance to impose sanctions for discovery disputes include:
a distaste for becoming involved in discovery disputes that litigants should be able to resolve themselves; a feeling that litigants should seek sanctions against an adversary only
when they have been without fault in complying with discovery; and a feeling that the
imposition of a sanction embarrasses or humiliates the attorney or party and should thus
be resorted to only in extreme situations.
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Georgene Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 589, 595 (1998)).
16.
FED R. Ctv. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(ii).
17.
See id. 26(g)(l)(B)(i); id. 37(a)(4).
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appellate decisions, appear to have squarely held that evasiveness itself is
a violation of Rule 26(g).1 8 Given the lack of established authority, the
Rule would benefit from greater clarity on this point. ff the purpose of
the Rule is to awaken the conscience of attorneys about evasive discovery responses, the Rule should do so with express language. This could
be accomplished simply by amending Rule 26(g)(1)(B)(i) to provide that
by signing a discovery response or objection the signer is certifying that
the response or objection is "not evasive," in addition to being consistent
with the federal rules and applicable law. The revised Rule 26(g)(1)(B)(i)
would read as follows:
not evasive, consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law
or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing
existing law, or for establishing new law;
B. Rule 34(b) and 37(a)(3): Clarificationof "Production" and "Inspection"
The provisions of the discovery rules governing requests for documents and other records contemplate an arrangement under which the
responding party makes the requested documents available to the propounding party for inspection and copying. 19 The rules are largely silent
regarding the more common practice today where the responding party's
counsel simply produces copies of documents to the propounding party's
counsel.
The practice of producing copies rather than permitting inspection
has attained quasi-official status, at least for ESI, since 2006. The 2006
ESI amendment to Rule 34(b)(2) refers to "producing electronically
stored information. ' 2° The Advisory Committee's note regarding the
18.
See, e.g., Gibbs v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 08-cv-00355-JPG, 2009 WL 2143772, at *5
(S.D. I1.
July 15, 2009) (finding that the plaintiffs "evasiveness and possible deceit warrant sanctions under Rule 26 because he certified that he was giving specific and complete information");
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 02 Civ. 7618(KMW)(HBP), 2009 WL 1810104, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2009) ("Rule 2 6 (g) is intended to deter and curb discovery abuses, including
evasive responses, by 'explicitly encouraging the imposition of sanctions."'); Covad Commc'ns Co.
v. Revonet, Inc., 258 F.R.D. 17, 20 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting that an evasive interrogatory response
"hardly comports with the obligation imposed by Rule 26(g)(1)(A)"); Aecon Bldgs., Inc. v. Zurich
N. Am., No. C07-832MJP, 2008 WL 3927797, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 21, 2008) ("Rule [26(g)]
allows the court to impose sanctions on the signer of a discovery response when the signing of the
response is incomplete, evasive or objectively unreasonable under the circumstances." (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Commercial Fin. Corp., 198 F.R.D.
508,515 (N.D. Iowa 2000))); Wagner v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 606,609-10 (D. Neb. 2001):
The parties have a duty to provide true, explicit, responsive, complete and candid answers
to discovery, and their attorneys have a continuing duty to advise their clients of their duty to make honest, complete, non-evasive discovery disclosures, as well as the spectrum
of sanctions they face for violating that duty.
(citation omitted); see also United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece Packing Corp.,
182 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision) (noting that Malautea v. Suzuki Motor
Co., 987 F.2d 1536, 1545 (11 th Cir. 1993), upheld Rule 26(g) sanctions for a "pattern of conduct"
that included partial answers to discovery questions that were evasive and misleading).
19. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 34(a)(1), (b)(l)(B).
20. Id.34(b)(2)(D)-(E).
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2006 amendment specifically discourages inspection of ESI storage systems:
The addition of testing and sampling to Rule 34(a) with regard to
documents and electronically stored information is not meant to
create a routine right of direct access to a party's electronic information system, although such access might be justified in some circumstances. Courts should guard against undue
intrusiveness resulting
21
from inspecting or testing such systems.
The immediate problem that this situation creates is uncertainty
about timing requirements. Rule 34's provisions regarding time are all
keyed to inspection, not production. Rule 34(b)(1)(B) states that the propounding party is required to "specify a reasonable time, place, and
manner for the inspection and for performing the related acts" in its
record request. 22 Under Rule 34(b)(2), the responding party must provide
a written response within thirty days of the service of the request, in
which it must state whether "inspection and related activities will be
permitted as requested., 23 Thus, Rule 34 currently contemplates a date
by which the propounding party will get its documents, at least if the
inspection procedure is used. But where the responding party states that
it will produce documents in response to a request, Rule 34 provides no
direction as to when the production is to be made and completed.
This disconnect between the language of the rule and current practice also leads to uncertainty in the enforcement of requests. Rule 37(a)
contemplates the inspection of documents by a propounding party, not
the production of copies by the responding party. The Rule authorizes a
propounding party to move to compel a discovery response where the
responding party "fails to respond that inspection will be permitted--or
"
fails to permit inspection-as requested under Rule 34.,24
Rule 37 does
not specifically address the situation where a responding party states that
it will produce responsive documents but fails to produce them, fails to
complete the production, or fails to state one way or the other whether
production is complete. So-called "rolling productions," where a party
periodically doles out documents over the course of many months with
no set completion date, are now commonplace.

21.
Id.
34 advisory committee's notes (2006).
22. Id.
34(b)(1)(B).
23. Id.
34(b)(2)(A)-(B).
24. Id.
37(a)(3)(B)(iv).
25. See, e.g., Tiemo v. Rite Aid Corp., No. C 05-02520 TEH, 2008 WL 3287035, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. July 31, 2008). In response to plaintiffs motion to compel production of documents Rite Aid
had agreed to produce, Rite Aid "protested that it would produce the documents on a rolling basis,"
but the court ordered production on a date certain. Id.;
see also Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier
Racing Tire Corp., No. 02:07cv1294, 2008 WL 2487835, at *2 (W.D. Pa. June 16, 2008) (observing
that the party producing documents on a "rolling basis" refused to specify a date when the production would be complete).
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The solution is to bring the provisions of Rules 34 and 37 in line
with current discovery practices. First, Rule 37(a)(3)(B)(iv) should be
amended to specifically authorize a motion to compel when a responding
party "fails to produce documents." Second, a new provision should be
added to Rule 34(b)(2)(B) to read:
If the responding party elects to produce copies of documents or electronically stored information in lieu of permitting inspection, the response must state that copies will be produced and the production
must be completed no later than the date for inspection stated in the
request.
This proposal is not intended to minimize the burden of producing
documents or the very real need for cooperation among parties and their
counsel in discovery, as currently provided for in the rules. The collection and pre-production review of documents is unquestionably a difficult and time-consuming logistical feat. A party who seeks to compel
compliance with wide-ranging requests without giving the producing
party adequate time to search for and produce documents can expect to
be met with a motion for a protective order under Rule 26(c). Large-scale
review and production of documents has, however, been made somewhat
less burdensome by the recent amendment of Federal Rule of Evidence
502(b) strengthening and clarifying protections against inadvertent waiv26
er of attorney-client privilege and work-product protection, as well as
the related amendments to Rule 26(b)(5)(B) setting forth procedures for
making claims of privilege and protection. 27
In contrast, a propounding party has very few options when a responding party insists that it is acting in good faith, yet delays document
production for months. 28 Without some specific timeframe for production-recognizing that current Rule 34(b)(1)(B) already expressly re26. See FED. R. EviD. 502(b):
When made in a Federal proceeding or to a Federal office or agency, the disclosure does
not operate as a waiver in a Federal or State proceeding if: (1) the disclosure is inadvertent; (2) the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and (3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error, including (if
applicable) following Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B).
27. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(5)(B):
If information produced in discovery is subject to a claim of privilege or of protection as
trial-preparation material, the party making the claim may notify any party that received
the information of the claim and the basis for it. After being notified, a party must
promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified information and any copies it has;
must not use or disclose the information until the claim is resolved; must take reasonable
steps to retrieve the information if the party disclosed it before being notified; and may
promptly present the information to the court under seal for a determination of the claim.
The producing party must preserve the information until the claim is resolved.
28. See, e.g., U & I Corp. v. Advanced Med. Design, Inc., 251 F.R.D. 667, 675 (M.D. Fla.
2008) (responding party "repeatedly delayed the production of responsive documents" resulting in a
"sporadic and incomplete document production" after four motions to compel); In re Seroquel Products Liab. Litig., 244 F.R.D 650, 661 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (noting party's "purposeful sluggishness" in
production of electronic documents).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:2

quires that the time specified in an inspection request be "reasonable"the propounding party's ability to demonstrate that production has been
unduly delayed will nearly always be uncertain. As a practical matter, it
is difficult to say when delay becomes unreasonable in the absence of a
deadline.
C. Rule 34(b)(2)(C): Specific Disclosureof the Withholding of Documents
While courts have repeatedly criticized the routine use of "boilerplate" objections to document requests, the practice remains common.29
Parties routinely (and seemingly indiscriminately) object to virtually
every request on the same grounds, including broad relevancy objections,
objections that requests are unduly burdensome, harassing, or assume
facts not in evidence, privacy objections, and attorney-client privilege/work-product objections.
A typical set of discovery responses begins with a list of "general
objections" that run the gamut from ambiguity, undue burden, overbreadth and irrelevance, to objections that the requests seek confidential,
proprietary, or trade secret information, work product, or attorney-client
communications. Rarely tailored to the actual requests or the facts of the
case, the objections often appear to be the responding law firm's state-ofthe-art boilerplate insert.
The responses to specific requests usually incorporate the litany of
"general objections" in its entirety, add some additional (or sometimes
even duplicative) objections, and then state that "subject to and without
waiving the foregoing objections," the responding party will produce
documents in response to the request. Alternatively, the response may
state that "based upon the foregoing objections" the responding party
will not produce documents in response to the request.
It is not unusual for a single discovery request to be met with a dozen or more objections, regardless of whether the responding party agrees
to produce responsive documents. The propounding party cannot determine whether any documents are actually being withheld on the basis of
any of the objections, or even the specific objections relied upon. 30 Com-

29.
See, e.g., Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 358 (D. Md. 2008)
(collecting cases: "[Bloilerplate objections that a request for discovery is 'overbroad and unduly
burdensome, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of material admissible in evidence,' persist despite a litany of decisions from courts, including this one, that such objections are
improper unless based on particularized facts." (citation omitted)); Burkybile v. Mitsubishi Motors
Corp., No. 04 C 4932, 2006 WL 2325506, at *6 & n.6 (N.D. 111.Aug. 2, 2006) (collecting cases:
"Despite court[s'] repeated admonitions that these sorts of 'boilerplate' objections are ineffectual,
their use continues unabated, with the consequent institutional burdens, and the needless imposition
of costs on the opposing party." (citations omitted)).
30.
See, e.g., Cason-Merenda v. Detroit Med. Ctr., No. 06-15601, 2008 WL 4901095, at *4
(E.D. Mich. Nov. 12,2008):
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pounding the problem is the common practice of asserting general objections "to the extent" they may apply to a particular request. 3' The upshot
is that the propounding party is unable to assess the extent to which the
responding party has complied with a discovery request.
The rules should be amended to conform to the judicial consensus
against generalized and boilerplate objections by adding the following
provision to Rule 34(b)(2)(C): "Each objection to a request or part thereof must specify whether any responsive documents are being withheld
on the basis of that objection."
Requiring that the responding party specify whether documents
have been withheld in response to a request would discourage the use of
boilerplate objections. More importantly, the amendment would help the
requesting party and the court determine what objections are actually "in
play" for purposes of any motion for relief. Limiting the range of disputed issues should promote efficiency and control discovery costs.
CONCLUSION

The reluctance of courts to impose sanctions under Rule 37 has encouraged the use of evasive and dilatory behavior in response to discovery requests. Such behavior serves no purpose other than to increase the
cost and delays of litigation. The amendments proposed in this Essay
would discourage evasive and dilatory behavior without materially adding to the burden of discovery on the party producing documents. By
requiring the responding party to certify that its responses to discovery
requests are not evasive, state when responsive documents will be produced and whether documents will be withheld in response to any of its
Plaintiffs could reasonably be uncertain about precisely what information these Defendants would ultimately produce and what would be withheld. Although Defendants'
complaints of overbreadth, undue burden, and irrelevance were included among their objections to the specific discovery request at issue, as opposed to in the section of their
responses labeled 'general objections,' they presumably would concede that these objections also were 'general,' in the sense that they did not alert Plaintiffs to any specific information that would be withheld.
10 Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., No. C06-03926 HRL, 2007 WL 1113800, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 13, 2007):
Here, Veoh asserted a number of General Objections which it, in boilerplate fashion, purported to incorporate into its specific responses-whether or not those objections were
actually raised in response to a particular request. This practice obscures the extent to
which Veoh is withholding information and does not satisfy the requirement for specificity under Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b).
31.
Swackhammer v. Sprint Corp. PCS, 225 F.R.D. 658, 660-61 (D. Kan. 2004):
This Court has on several occasions disapproved of the practice of asserting a general objection 'to the extent' it may apply to particular requests for discovery. This Court has
characterized these types of objections as worthless for anything beyond delay of the discovery. Such objections are considered mere hypothetical or contingent possibilities,
where the objecting party makes no meaningful effort to show the application of any such
theoretical objection to any request for discovery. Thus, this Court has deemed such ostensible objections waived or [has] declined to consider them as objections.
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sonnino v. Univ. of Kan.
Hosp. Auth., 221 F.R.D. 661, 666-67 (D. Kan. 2004)).
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objections, the amendments seek to reduce expense and delay while ensuring that meritorious claims that depend on discoverable facts are fairly
and promptly adjudicated.

RULE 68: THE SETTLEMENT PROMOTION TOOL THAT HAS
NOT PROMOTED SETTLEMENTS
JAY HOROWITZt
INTRODUCTION

Any attorney experienced in civil litigation necessarily would agree
that a rule intended to promote settlement can effectively serve that function only if it authorizes shifting the payment of attorney's fees from the
party offering settlement to the party rejecting that offer. Parties to civil
litigation often incur extremely sizeable fees. Consequently, a rule that
shifts the burden of paying fees from one party to the other can be a powerful-indeed intimidating-tool for promoting settlement. By like
measure, parties seeking to induce a settlement with their adversary likely will not even bother to invoke a rule that does not shift the burden of
paying attorney's fees, reasoning that the shifting of costs alone is not
worth the effort.' Attorney's fees, as distinguished from other costs incuffed by the parties to a civil lawsuit, invariably account for a much
larger portion of the total expense of the litigation than do the other costs
and, therefore, can serve as a much more formidable hammer in bringing
about settlement.2
Notwithstanding these facts, Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, uniformly recognized as a rule whose sole purpose is to serve
the function of settlement promotion, refers on its face only to costs and
not to attorney's fees Rule 68's focus in this regard is counter-intuitive.
No real incentive for settlement exists under a settlement promotion rule
when the rule provides only that, should a party refuse to settle, it might
Jay Horowitz, Harvard Law School, LLB, 1967, was senior law clerk to the Hon. Thomas
t
Masterson, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, an Assistant United
States Attorney in the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York and
Assistant Special Prosecutor for the Watergate Special Prosecution Force, and has been engaged in
private practice in Denver, Colorado since 1976.
Appreciation is due to Beth Nesis, Esq. and Ian London, University of Denver Sturm
College of Law, Class of 2011, Staff Editor, Denver University Law Review, for their assistance in
researching and writing this Article.
1. 13 JAMES WM. MOORE ErTAL, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 68.02[4] (3d ed. 1997 &
Supp. 2009) (observing that defendants do not invoke Rule 68 because "the costs that they might
recover simply do not make it worth their effort").
A study conducted by the Federal Judicial Center concluded that costs, not including
2.
attorney's fees, "accounted, on average, for less than twenty percent of the total cost of litigation"; a
fact referenced in Daniel Glimcher, Note, Legal Dentistry: How Attorney's Fees and Certain Procedural Mechanisms Can Give Rule 68 the Necessary Teeth to Effectuate Its Purposes, 27 CARDOZO
L. REv. 1449, 1478 n.244 (2006). This 20% figure materially exceeds the proportionate amount of
expenses and costs, relative to attorney's fees, incurred in the civil litigation in which the author has
been involved for more than thirty years.
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be required to pay the small amount of money representing the costs typically awarded to the party who prevails in a litigation-such as filing
fees, service of process costs, and the like, totaling perhaps a thousand
dollars or less.3
In order to understand this dysfunctional situation and to examine
ways to make Rule 68 more useful, this Article discusses the history of
Rule 68 and the role of the United States Supreme Court in dealing with
this intended mechanism for settlement promotion. Part I focuses on the
Supreme Court's role as the promulgator of the federal rules of civil procedure, having the power and the responsibility-subject to Congress's
approval-to adopt, revise and rescind the rules that govern the litigation
of all civil cases prosecuted in federal court.
Part I1 discusses Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August4 and Marek v.
Chesny,5 the Court's two principal decisions interpreting and applying
Rule 68. These cases represent the two important occasions upon which
the Court has dealt with Rule 68, not in the exercise of the Court's "rulemaking" function, but in the exercise of the Court's "rule-interpretation"
function. Part II also discusses the train of cases following Marek that
have variously applied Marek's holding that, in certain circumstances,
Rule 68 does authorize the shifting of attorney's fees, as well as the shifting of costs, to the plaintiff. Most of these cases, however, have significantly limited the application of Marek by holding that only the plaintiff's own fees can be shifted (by the plaintiffs being deprived of its
right to recover fees), not that the defendant's fees can be shifted.
Part HI examines the settlement promotion rules and statutes
adopted in several representative states. Many, although not all, of these
rules and statutes call for the shifting of attorney's fees and costs to the
party who has declined a settlement offer and then later obtains a lessbeneficial result.
Finally, Part IV suggests changes that should be made to Rule 68 in
light of the rule's intended function. There is an undeniable need for our
courts and legislatures to adopt settlement promotion rules and statutes.
3.
The "costs" referenced by Rule 68 customarily are deemed to be the costs typically
awarded pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). These costs are itemized in 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2006),
as follows:
A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the following:
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
(2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript necessarily
obtained for use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the
case;

(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;
(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries,
fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services under section 1828 of this title.
4. 450 U.S. 346 (1981).
5.
473 U.S. 1 (1985).
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Rule 68, as it exists and as it has been interpreted, manifestly is not an
effective settlement promotion rule. As the title 6of this Article indicates,
Rule 68 simply has failed to promote settlement.
To be effective, any such rule must include provisions that permit
the shifting of attorney's fees. At the same time, a revised Rule 68 must
include other provisions not contained in the present Rule 68 that can
ensure that the rule is both fair and reconcilable with substantive statutes
that themselves authorize fee-shifting. In particular, a revised Rule 68
must authorize a plaintiff, as well as a defendant, to bring about a shifting of costs (and fees) by making a settlement offer. And, a revised Rule
68 must furnish the court with the discretion to shift costs and fees when
the triggering event has occurred, rather than mandating a shifting in an
amount set by reference to an inflexible standard.
I. RuLE 68 AND ITS HISTORY
Three characteristics of Rule 68 stand out from a review of its history and commentary concerning the rule: (1) Rule 68 is, rather mysteriously, viewed as "mysterious"; (2) Rule 68 is the only rule among the
many federal rules of civil procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court
that concerns the subject matter of settlement; and (3) Rule 68's content
has been altered rarely-and even then, altered only slightly-during its
more than seventy-year history. Each of these characteristics is discussed
below.
A. Rule 68-A Mystery?
It cannot be disputed that, certainly on the face of Rule 68, there is
nothing "mysterious" about this rule. To the contrary, Rule 68 in its current version is simple and straight-forward:
Rule 68. Offer Of Judgment.
(a) Making an Offer; Judgment on an Accepted Offer. At least
14 days before the date set for trial, a party defending against a claim
may serve on an opposing party an offer to allow judgment on specified terms, with the costs then accrued. If, within 14 days after being
6. See generally Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Thomas A. Eaton, The Contours of a New FRCP,
Rule 68.1: A ProposedTwo-Way Offer of Settlement Provisionfor Federal Fee-Shifting Cases, 252
F.R.D. 551 (2009) [hereinafter A New FRCP Rule 68.1] (constituting a study of why "Rule 68 offers
of judgment are rarely made in the very types of cases in which they, theoretically, would be most
effective," i.e., cases based upon fee-shifting statutes); Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Thomas A. Eaton,
Rule 68 Offers of Judgment: The Practices and Opinions of Experienced Civil Rights and Employment DiscriminationAttorneys, 241 F.R.D. 332 (2007) [hereinafter Rule 68 Offers of Judgment]
("Rule 68 has played only a minor role in federal civil litigation since its enactment in 1937.").
7. What we refer to here as the "current version" of Rule 68 appears in FEDERAL CIVIL
JUDICIAL PROCEDURE AND RULES 285-86 (rev. ed. 2009), which includes a version of Rule 68
which is "effective until December 1, 2009, absent contrary Congressional action," and which also
includes the version of Rule 68 that is "effective December 1, 2009, absent contrary Congressional
action." The minor differences between these two versions of Rule 68 are discussed in Part I.C.
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served, the opposing party serves written notice accepting the offer,
either party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance, plus
proof of service. The clerk must then enter judgment.
(b) Unaccepted Offer. An unaccepted offer is considered withdrawn, but it does not preclude a later offer. Evidence of an unaccepted offer is not admissible except in a proceeding to determine
costs.
(c) Offer After Liability Is Determined. When one party's liability to another has been determined but the extent of liability remains
to be determined by further proceedings, the party held liable may
make an offer of judgment. It must be served within a reasonable
time-but at least 14 days-before the date set for a hearing to determine the extent of liability.
(d) Paying Costs After an Unaccepted Offer. If the judgment that
the offeree finally obtains is not more favorable than the unaccepted
offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the offer was
made.

The Rule seems entirely unremarkable: if a defendant offers to have
judgment entered against it for a specific amount, and if the plaintiff rejects the offer and subsequently obtains a judgment in an amount less
than the defendant's offer, the plaintiff must then pay the costs incurred
by the defendant after the offer was made.
Reading Rule 68's language as critically as one might, there is nothing "mysterious" about that language. The principal operative terms are
not esoteric: Rule 68 refers to an "offer," a "judgment," an obligation to
"pay" and "costs." This is not to say that parties to a litigation may not
find many aspects of Rule 68 contestable, including its seemingly plain
language.8 But, disputes about the meaning of the terms of any of the

8. As is evident from our discussion later in this Note, litigation concerning the meaning of
Rule 68's seemingly simple word "pay" is relevant to this Note's focus upon Rule 68's applicability
to attorney's fees as distinguished from traditional costs.
Rule 68(d) states simply that the offeree who has obtained a judgment "not more favorable" than the offer made to it by the defendant, "must pay the costs incurred after the offer was
made." FED. R. Civ. P. 68(d). No less an analyst than Justice Stevens has suggested that this language merely means that Rule 68, when triggered, cancels the operation of Rule 54(d), and relieves
the defendant from paying plaintiff's post-offer costs, but does not require, in addition, that the
plaintiff/offeree pay defendant's post-offer costs. Delta, 450 U.S. at 360-61.
Crossman v. Marcoccio, 806 F.2d 329 (1st Cir. 1986), rejected Justice Stevens' suggestion, emphasizing that Rule 68 refers to "costs" without any modifying language or further adornment, i.e., Rule 68 does not refer to "the offeree's own costs," and adding that Rule 68 "stresses that
the offeree must pay the costs incurred, thus suggesting an affirmative action." Id at 331. Thus,
Crossman held that the plaintiff/offeree who "fails to obtain a more favorable judgment, must pay
the defendant's post-offer costs," in addition to "paying," in the sense of "bearing," his own costs.
Id. at 333.
Rule 68's actual language reasonably supports either interpretation. The resolution of the
issue, however, can have great practical consequences. As the courts wrestling with the Supreme
Court's holding in Marek are quite aware, while it may be punitive to require a plaintiff to "pay" its
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rules of procedure are commonplace, and it remains a mystery why Rule
68 in particular receives the unflattering sobriquets accorded to it.
Yet legal commentators are more than interested in Rule 68; they
are perplexed by it. Rule 68, seemingly plain on its face, regularly has
been decried as "complex and ambiguous," 9 described as a "mystery,"
and characterized as "a riddle" and "among the most enigmatic of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'"
One might suspect that the source of the "mystery" regarding Rule
68 is a disagreement about the Rule's purpose. But, with one notable
exception, all commentators, the Supreme Court itself and all lower federal courts agree that Rule 68's function is to bring about the settlement
of cases; as the Supreme Court put it: "The plain purpose of Rule 68 is to
encourage settlement and avoid litigation."'" The one exception is Professor Robert G. Bone who rejects the "conventional view" that "Rule 68
is meant to encourage settlements by forcing plaintiffs to think hard before rejecting an offer" and instead concludes that the rule's limited and
narrow purpose is to protect a defendant from the conduct of an "unreasonable plaintiff' who persists in prosecuting its lawsuit even after the
"defendant offered what the plaintiff was entitled to receive from trial. ' 2
But, as intriguing and persuasive as Professor Bone's hypothesis
may be, all other commentators accept the conventional view of Rule 68
as a "settlement promotion" device. Thus, considering that Rule 68's
language is as simple as it is, and Rule 68's purpose is virtually a subject
of stipulation, one is left questioning why all commentators view Rule 68
as such a strange animal. The "mystery" surrounding Rule 68 is itself a
mystery-unless those who label Rule 68 as a "mystery" intend to say
own post-offer attorney's fees in the sense of "bearing" those fees, it could be disastrous to require a
plaintiff to "pay" the defendant's attorney's fees in addition to "bearing" his own attorney's fees.
9. Lesley S. Bonney et al., Rule 68: Awakening a Sleeping Giant, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
379, 379 (1997).
10. Robert G. Bone, "To Encourage Settlement": Rule 68, Offers of Judgment, and the History of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1561, 1561 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Crossman, 806 F.2d at 331; Roy D. Simon, Jr., The Riddle of Rule 68,
54 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1985)).
Professor Bone himself describes Rule 68 as a mystery in the sense that Rule 68, although
understood as a "settlement promotion device," includes four features which Professor Bone suggests have impeded its utility as such a device: "The Rule is written in a way that makes it an extremely poor tool for settlement promotion. Four aspects are particularly noteworthy: its small penalty, asymmetric application, requirement of a formal judgment, and timing limitations." Bone, supra,
at 1563, 1566. In other words, to Professor Bone, Rule 68's "mystery" inheres not in what Rule 68
says but, rather in why Rule 68 says what it does say if Rule 68's function is to promote settlement.
Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 5 (1985).
11.
See Bone, supra note 10, at 1562, 1570. It is Professor Bone from whom we have appro12.
priated the term "settlement promotion tool." This is Professor Bone's shorthand for contrasting the
purpose of Rule 68 as conventionally perceived with what Professor Bone calls the "unreasonable
plaintiff model" a phrase which captures his characterization of the circumstances giving rise to Rule
68's adoption. Id at 1570.
See id. at 1562. To be sure, nearly all of them examined Rule 68 before Professor Bone
13.
and, therefore, without the benefit of his analysis.
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only that the mystery inheres in the fact that Rule 68 is worded differently than one might expect that it4 would be worded given its intended purpose of settlement promotion.'
B. Rule 68-The Only Rule of Procedure Concerning Settlement
For more than seventy years the Supreme Court has been responsible for promulgating and revising the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
subject to contrary action by Congress. 15 The Court has also been responsible for interpreting and applying these rules. Because the great
majority of civil cases filed in federal court-and controlled by the rules
of procedure-settle, rather than being adjudicated at trial or dismissed
on the merits, it is reasonable to expect the Court to have paid concentrated attention to promulgating rules of procedure that specifically concern settlement.16 But, in fact, the Court has paid little attention to this
fundamental element of civil litigation, having adopted only one rule,
among all of the federal rules of civil procedure, which specifically addresses settlement. That rule, of course, is Rule 68.
The Supreme Court's passivity in promulgating rules dealing with
settlement is at least as much of a mystery as the "mystery" concerning
Rule 68 itself. The Court's failure to promulgate rules of procedure dealing with settlement does not however indicate that the Court is uninterested in encouraging parties to settle their disputes. To the contrary,
although the Court has promulgated only the beleaguered Rule 68 to
specifically address settlement, the Court has explicitly authorized district courts to enter orders encouraging parties to settle their cases. For
example, Rule 16 contains three separate provisions that empower a district court to direct parties to attend mediation.' 7 By those provisions the
14. This is Professor Bone's apparent perception. See Bone, supranote 10.
15. The Supreme Court is vested with the power to prescribe general rules of practice and
procedure for cases in the federal courts and to report its recommended rules to Congress by the
Federal Rules Enabling Act of 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
2072 (2006)). The Supreme Court first exercised this power in 1937 when it recommended to Congress the adoption of the first set of the federal rules of civil procedure (although Justice Brandeis
stated that he did not approve). See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-81 (1938).
In practice, the federal rules of procedure are regularly reviewed and revisions are proposed by the Judicial Conference of the United States which acts through its Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure. The Standing Committee, in turn, relies upon the work of the
Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules. This process is discussed in GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET
AL., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE: STATE AND FEDERAL 27-29 (8th ed. 1999).
16.
A settlement, not a judgment on the merits, is the fate awaiting the overwhelming percentage of civil lawsuits. See Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years
War, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1255, 1259 (2005) (reporting that in 2003 only 1.7% of what the author
refers to as "civil terminations" in federal civil cases occurred during or after a trial).
17.
These three provisions are FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(1), (a)(5), (c)(9). They provide as follows:
(a) Pretrial conferences; Objectives. In any action the court may in its discretion direct
the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear before it for a conference or conferences before trial for such purposes as:
(1) expediting the disposition of the action;
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Supreme Court effectively encourages parties to settle cases through
their own efforts, perhaps employing third parties such as arbitrators and
mediators to assist.
But the Court has eschewed assigning the federal district courts a
more meaningful and direct role in the settlement process, and the Court
itself has shied away from promulgating rules of procedure that might
encourage settlement. There is no obvious explanation for the Court's
more actively in such an imreluctance to have the judiciary participate
18
portant part of the litigation process.

(5)facilitatingthe settlement of the case.
(c) Subjects for Consideration at Pretrial Conferences. At any conference under this rule
consideration may be given, and the court may take appropriate action, with respect to
(9) settlement and the use of special procedures to assist in resolving the dispute when
authorized by statute or local rule.
Id. (emphasis added).
The Court's interest in encouraging parties to mediate or to resolve their disputes by some
method other than participation in a plenary trial is an interest shared by Congress. In the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 471-482 (2006)) [hereinafter CJRA], Congress empowered federal courts to adopt plans intended
to bring about "delay reduction." CJRA provides as follows with respect to the "civil justice expense
and delay reduction plan" which district courts are directed to adopt:
(a) In formulating the provisions of its civil justice expense and delay reduction plan,
each United States district court, in consultation with an advisory group appointed under
section 478 of this title, shall consider and may include the following principles and
guidelines of litigation management and cost and delay reduction:
(6) authorization to refer appropriate cases to alternative dispute resolution programs
that(B) the court may make available, including mediation, minitrial, and summary jury trial.
28 U.S.C. § 473.
18.
Starting in the late 1970s, the legal profession-to be sure, as a result in part of prodding
by the judiciary-has been virtually obsessed by the need to devise ways to bring about settlements
and thereby resolve cases short of a full trial on the merits. During that period of time "settlement
has become the centerpiece of federal civil adjudication." Bone, supra note 10, at 1562. As a result,
there is today a thriving and seemingly always expanding cottage industry constituted of for-profit
and nonprofit mediation and arbitration companies, which did not exist twenty-five years ago. One
dimension of this development is that many practicing attorneys now promote themselves as experienced in arbitration or mediation. An attorney's experience in trying arbitrations or mediations, as
contrasted with an attorney's experience in trying cases, is characterized as a specialty, just as tax
law or corporate law is characterized as a specialty. Beyond this, many practicing attomeys seek
employment, not as the lawyer representing a party to an arbitration or mediation, but as the arbitrator or mediator himself.
Given this extensive activity by attorneys and by others who promote themselves as
"facilitators," the judiciary's failure to itself effectively address and bring about the settlement of
cases through its adoption and implementation of rules which could harness the coercive power of
the court system is baffling. As discussed supra note 15, the Supreme Court, fully aware of the
importance of settlement, has adopted rules of procedure which authorize district courts to require
litigants to participate in activities which may facilitate settlement. But the Supreme Court has failed
to adopt rules which themselves facilitate settlement. One would think that refined and tailored rules,
accessible to all and administered by the institution whose very charge is to preside over the resolution of lawsuits, would necessarily be as helpful in promoting settlements of lawsuits as are the ad
hoc results of private mediations.
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C. Rule 68 Has Been Amended Rarely and Only Slightly in Its Seventy
Year History
One of the more intriguing facts about Rule 68 is how little the current rule has changed from the first version of the rule adopted in 1938.
Rule 68, in its entirety, provided as follows in 1938:
Offer of Judgment. At any time more than 10 days before the trial
begins, a party defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse
party an offer to allow judgment to be taken against him for the money or property or to the effect specified in his offer, with costs then
accrued. If within 10 days after the service of the offer the adverse
party serves written notice that the offer is accepted, either party may
then file the offer and notice of acceptance together with proof of
service thereof and thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment. If the
offer is not so accepted it shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence
thereof is not admissible. If the adverse party fails to obtain a judgment more favorable than that offered, he shall not recover costs in
the district court from the time of the offer but shall pay costs from
that time. 9
The current version of Rule 68 contains sub-parts and words not
contained in the original version. But, the essence of Rule 68 has remained strikingly the same. 20
This lack of change does not reflect a lack of trying to change, particularly with respect to the difficult and important subject of whether
Rule 68 should be amended to authorize an award of "attorney's fees" in
addition to an award of "costs." To the contrary, as observed by Justice
Brennan in his dissenting opinion in Marek, the Judicial Conference and
Congress have regularly considered and debated making changes to Rule
68.21 These efforts to amend Rule 68 have continued to the present.
For example, the minutes of the November 17-18, 2008 meeting of
the Civil Rules Advisory Committee contain extensive discussion of
Rule 68.22 That discussion refers to the Committee's own "efforts to address Rule 68 in the 1980s and 1990s," notes the sentiment expressed by
some Committee members to "abrogate the rule" altogether, and sets
19.
See Advisory Comm. on Rules for Civil Procedure, Report of Proposed Amendments to
Rules of Civil Procedurefor the District Courts of the United States, 5 F.R.D. 433, 482-84 (1946)
(providing redlined version of Rule 68).
20.
The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 68 refer to and explain amendments to Rule 68
made in 1946, 1966, 1987, 2007 and 2009 (the latter changes are discussed in the body of this Note).
The Committee's Notes make it obvious that these amendments uniformly have been changes of
little consequence. See FED. R. CIV. P. 68 advisory committee's notes.
21.
See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Finally, both
Congress and the Judicial Conference of the United States have been engaged for years in considering possible amendments to Rule 68 that would bring attorney's fees within the operation of the
Rule.").
22.

See CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., MINUTES: Nov.

17-18 (2008), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CV 11-2008-min.pdf.
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forth a "list of topics that might be addressed by a modest revision" to
the Rule, wryly observing that this list "has a way of expanding., 23 Following this discussion, the Advisory Committee concludes as follows: "A
motion to do nothing now carried unanimously. Rule 68 will be carried
forward on the agenda, perhaps for more detailed consideration in the fall
of 2009. " 24
The Advisory Committee thereby did not determine that changes to
Rule 68 are uncalled for, but rather that the problems confronted by the
rule are so numerous that the Committee did not know where to start.
Adjourning its examination of this problem for another day (actually,
another year) presented itself as the most attractive course of action.
And, sadly, when the Advisory Committee convened in October 2009, it
devoted no time at all to Rule 68.25 Again, the Committee resolved (this
time apparently by unspoken agreement) to do nothing now.
In fact, at some point after its November 2008 meeting (and before
the October 2009 meeting), the Advisory Committee had decided to recommend several changes to Rule 68, as indicated by the fact that during
that time the Supreme Court did adopt several changes to Rule 68 which
became effective on December 1, 2009, after Congress failed to reject
those recommended changes.2 6 Given the extensive discussion of Rule
68 through the years, including the extensive discussion at the fall 2008
Advisory Committee meeting, it is remarkable how minor these several
amendments are.
First, Rule 68 was amended to extend the ten day period of time before trial which fixes the deadline by which an offer must be made, to a
fourteen day period of time before trial, and to extend the ten day period
of time following the service of an offer within which an offer must be
accepted, to a fourteen day period.27 These changes merely adjusted Rule
68's existing time periods to accommodate recent changes to Rule 6(a).28
In other words, these changes to Rule 68 were not driven by a consideration of any substantive issue raised by the application of Rule 68.
The second amendment to Rule 68 effective as of December 1,
2009, did address a matter specifically raised by Rule 68. More particularly, under the former Rule 68 the offering party was required to make
23.
Id. at 15.
24.
Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
25.
See CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., MINUTES: Oct.
8-9 (2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CVlO-2009-min.pdf.
26.
FED. R. CIv. P. 68 ("Text of subdivision (a) effective December 1, 2009, absent contrary
Congressional action."). These changes, explained below, have been incorporated into the current
version of Rule 68 as it is quoted in the body of this Note above.
27.
Id. 68(a).
28.
Rule 6(a), the rule for computing time periods, uses time periods shorter than 11 days as a
cut-off, namely that in calculating time, parties must "[e]xclude intermediate Saturdays, Sundays,
and legal holidays when the period is less than 11 days." Id. 6(a)(2).
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its offer more than ten days (fourteen days to accommodate the new rule
for computing time periods) "before the trial begins." Rule 68, as
amended, requires that the defendant make its offer more than ten days
(as amended to fourteen days) "before the date set for trial." The Advisory Committee explains this change by observing that, as a matter of
practice, the date "a trial begins" may differ from the date originally "set
for trial"; apparently it was this pedestrian fact which accounts for this
amendment. Frankly, it is difficult to see how the putative uncertainty
created by the reference to the "beginning of a trial" in the former version of Rule 68, as contrasted with the reference to a date "set for trial"
in the new version of the rule, could meaningfully affect either the plain29 But, in all events,
tiff or the defendant.
this amendment is not a matter
30
moment.
of great
The lack of amendments to Rule 68 is not only notable because of
Congress' and the Supreme Court's sustained interest in encouraging the
settlement of cases, but also because of the controversial nature of the
Supreme Court's two decisions interpreting and applying Rule 68. Neither holding is obvious; both decisions were delivered by a deeply divided Court. These holdings are discussed in Part II. One must question
why these decisions did not inspire the Supreme Court or Congress to
work at amending Rule 68 so that the rule would be invoked more frequently or used more successfully. Perhaps the explanation is that these
decisions were too31controversial and that Rule 68 touches upon highly
sensitive concerns.
29. Id. 68(a) advisory committee's notes to 2009 amendment. Requiring a defendant to make
his offer within a specific period of time "before the date set for trial," rather than within a specific
period of time "before the trial," arguably could serve the plaintiffs interest. In accordance with this
new language, and in light of the fact that cases often are "set" for trial more than once, the defendant who is motivated to try to settle his case may wind up making more than one offer of judgment
and, as a result, the plaintiff will have more than one opportunity to evaluate the offer.
From the defendant's perspective, this change seems inconsequential. Under the present
version of Rule 68 the defendant who is interested in making an offer knows that there is a deadline
by which he must make the offer. But, the new version of Rule 68 also contains a deadline by which
the defendant must act. As discussed immediately above, the only difference is that the new version
of Rule 68 may make it somewhat more likely that the defendant winds up making more than one
offer.
30.
Although the particular changes in Rule 68's timing deadlines affected by the 2009
amendments discussed here are matters of little consequence, the timing deadlines contained in Rule
68 in general are not inconsequential. For example, Rule 68's requirement that the offeree respond to
an offer within a relatively very short period of time-as of December 1, 2009 this is fourteen days
and currently this is ten days-makes little sense. Id. The exemplary federal civil lawsuit has a
lifetime considerably longer than one year. There is no good reason why the plaintiff confronted
with an offer of judgment should be required to decide upon a final resolution of his case in such a
short period of time. Nor is this short period of time necessary to serve the defendant's interests;
having made its offer the defendant is protected from having to pay post-offer costs whenever the
plaintiff may decline the offer (assuming that the plaintiff ultimately obtains a judgment in an
amount less than the offered judgment).
31.
In fact, in 1983 and again in 1984 the Advisory Committee did make proposals to extensively amend Rule 68. The goal of the 1983 proposal was to "empower the Rule as a settlement
promotion tool in order to meet 'public demand' for action in the face of an out-of-control litigation
system." See Bone, supra note 10, at 1608. But, this proposal "sparked a firestorm of controversy,"
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I1. DELTA AIR LINES, INC. V. AUGUST, MAREK V. CHESNY, AND THE RULE
68 LITIGATION WHICH HAS FOLLOWED

As indicated above, the Supreme Court has authored two principal
decisions which discuss Rule 68 in detail. These decisions were rendered
in Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August 3 2 and Marek v. Chesny.33 These decisions-handed down only four years apart-are of interest in part because they reflect a Court fighting with itself: Delta adopts a restrictive
interpretation of Rule 68, whereas Marek adopts an expansive interpretation. Notwithstanding this disparity, both decisions claim to be applying
Rule 68's "plain meaning." Are they both right in so claiming? Or is one
necessarily wrong? If the latter, which is wrong?
After discussing both decisions below, this Article turns to a discussion of an important issue related to Rule 68's applicability to attorney's
fees which the Court in Marek was not asked to decide and, therefore,
did not decide. This issue has led to continuing controversy and constitutes one of the more vexatious issues involving Rule 68: Does Rule 68
ever authorize the shifting of the offeror's attorney's fees to the offeree?
Marek itself held, as discussed below, that Rule 68 only requires in certain circumstances that a plaintiff-offeree pay his own attorney's fees
when he otherwise could seek to shift them under a substantive statute
providing for fee-shifting. As is also discussed below, most decisions
concerning this issue have held that Rule 68 does not authorize the shifting of such fees, a holding which necessarily renders Rule 68 considerably less effective as a settlement promotion rule.
A. The Supreme Court's Interpretationsof Rule 68
1. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August
In Delta, the Supreme Court addressed a single, seemingly easy
question: "whether the words 'judgment finally obtained by the offeree,'
as used in [Rule 68] should be construed to encompass a judgment
againstthe offeree as well as a judgment in favor of the offeree," a construction which would result in a more expansive application of Rule
8. The Court's answer to this "narrow question," an answer favoring a
narrow application of Rule 68, was no.
Pursuant to Rule 68, the defendant in Delta had made an offer of
judgment in a nominal amount to the plaintiff, who refused the offer.35
At trial, the plaintiff, who brought her claims under the civil rights statutes, lost her case entirely-or, in the terms of Rule 68, the plainand a 1984 proposal, although "designed to placate the opposition" to the 1983 proposal, fared no
better. l at 1609.
32.
450 U.S. 346 (1981).
33. 473 U.S. 1 (1985).
34.
Delta,450 U.S. at 348.
35.
Id.
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tiff/offeree did not "obtain" any judgment in her favor. 36 And again referencing the terms of Rule 68, because the "judgment finally obtained" in
the case was "not more favorable than the offer"-a development which,
under Rule 68's language, seemingly triggers the application of the
rule-the defendant argued that Rule 68 required 37the district court's ordering plaintiff to pay defendant's post-offer CoStS.
The Supreme Court disagreed, and held that the defendant was not
entitled under Rule 68 to an order requiring that the plaintiff pay the defendant's post-offer costs, even though the defendant had succeeded in
prevailing entirely in the case.38 As articulated by Justice Powell, who
concurred in the Court's decision (basing his concurrence on an issue
separate from this central issue), the defendant's rejected position seems
irrefutable: "It is anomalous indeed that, under the Court's view, a defendant may obtain costs under Rule 68 against a plaintiff who prevails
in part but not against a plaintiff who loses entirely. '39 The Court was
not swayed, and, in a decision authored by Justice Stevens, ruled that a
denial of the defendant's application for an award of costs was supported
not only by "the language of the Rule and its clear purpose" but also "by
the history of Rule 68." 4
While Justice Stevens mustered an interesting array of arguments to
support the holding in Delta, it was Rule 68's "plain language" that provided the strongest argument in favor of the plaintiff's position. After all,
Rule 68 unambiguously and specifically provides that the plaintiff offeree must pay costs only when "the judgment that the offeree finally obtains is not more favorable than the unaccepted offer. ' 4! Confining one's
attention to these "plain words," it is difficult to conclude that an offeree
must pay the defendant's costs even when the offeree had obtained no
judgment at all.
However, for the reasons stated by Justice Powell, when Rule 68's
settlement-promotion purpose is taken into consideration the Court's
holding in Delta seems flatly wrong. After all, how could the Supreme
36. Id. at 349.
37. Id. at 347-48 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 68).
38.
Id. at 352.
39.
Id. at 362 (Powell, J., concurring). Notwithstanding Justice Powell's opinion that the
Court's holding resulted in this anomaly, Justice Powell concurred in the Court's ruling that defendant was not entitled to an award of post-offer costs, Id. at 366. Justice Powell's concurrence was
based on the narrow ground that the defendant's offer of judgment which plaintiff had rejected had
not "specified some amount of substantive relief, plus costs and attorney's fees to be awarded by the
trial court" but instead, had offered that judgment be taken against it in "'the amount of $450, which
shall include attorney's fees."' Id at 365-66 (quoting Delta's putative offer of judgment). The
problem for Justice Powell was that the offer as made referred to attorney's fees as "included" with
the substantive amount of the offer itself whereas, according to Justice Powell, the offer should have
distinguished between the principal amount of the settlement offer and then specified that attorney's
fees were to be added. Id.
40. Id. at 356 (majority opinion).
41.
FED. R. Crv. P. 68(d) (emphasis added).
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Court conceivably hold that a defendant offeror who had defeated a
plaintiff's claims in their entirety was entitled to be awarded less than a
defendant who had only partially defeated a plaintiff s claims? 42 Clearly,
settlement promotion would be served by awarding the defendant who
was entirely successful at least as much as the award entered in favor of
the defendant who was only partially successful. It appears that it was
precisely this focus upon Rule 68's "settlement promotion" purpose
which led, only four years after Delta, to the Court's holding in Marek.
2. Marek v. Chesny
In Marek, the defendant, like the defendant in Delta, was confronted
with a claim under the civil rights statutes, which provide that a prevailing plaintiff can recover both attorney's fees and costs. 4 3 Pursuant to
Rule 68, the defendant tendered an offer of judgment to plaintiff in the
amount of $100,000. 44 The plaintiff rejected the offer, the case proceeded
to trial, and the plaintiff obtained
a judgment in an amount less than the
5
offered judgment of $100,000.4

The plaintiff, having "prevailed" within the meaning of the relevant
civil rights statutes, applied for an award of costs and fees.4 6 The defendant objected on grounds that its Rule 68 offer required that the plaintiff,
not defendant, pay all post-offer costs; the defendant argued as well that
such costs included attorney's fees. 47 In other words, the defendant's
position was that Rule 68 barred the plaintiff from recovering attorney's

42.
To be sure, in addition to relying upon Rule 68's language for support, Justice Stevens
discussed Rule 68's so-called settlement promotion purpose-asserting that the Court's interpretation of Rule 68, which held that Rule 68 applied only in circumstances in which the plaintiff "obtained" some judgment, was "consistent with [Rule 68's] purpose." Delta, 450 U.S. at 352. Justice
Stevens' discussion on this point included his observation that, "Rule 68 would provide little, if any,
additional incentive [for settlement] if it were applied when the plaintiff loses," since, in such circumstances, the plaintiff likely would be required to pay costs to the defendant in any event pursuant
to Rule 54(d)(1). Id. In other words, in a case in which a plaintiff loses its case in its entirety to the
defendant, the plaintiff already is subject to the imposition of costs. Accordingly, applying Rule 68
to shift costs to the losing plaintiff would be nugatory.
This argument is correct, of course, only if it is assumed that under Rule 68 the plaintiff is
required to pay only costs and not attorney's fees. If Rule 68 is held to authorize an award of attorney's fees, then the plaintiff facing a loss of his case would have a major incentive to settle in response to the Rule 68 offer because Rule 54(d)(1) explicitly excludes fees. Interestingly, when
Justice Stevens wrote his opinion in Delta there was little support for the proposition that Rule 68
authorizes an award of attorney's fees. Four years later there was firm support for this proposition
when the Court decided Marek. As discussed below, Marek specifically holds that, once triggered,
Rule 68 (when considered together with certain fee-shifting statutes which may underlie the plaintiff s case) requires a plaintiff to pay its own post-offer attorney's fees rather than recovering those
fees from the defendant (leaving open the separate issue of whether Rule 68 also requires the plaintiff to pay the defendant's post-offer attorney's fees).
43.
Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1,3-4 (1985).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 4.
46.
Id.
47.
Id.
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fees that the plaintiff otherwise would have been entitled to recover under the fee-shifting provisions of the underlying civil rights statutes.4 s
The district court agreed with the defendant,49 the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed, 50 and the Supreme Court granted certiorarito
decide "whether attorney's fees incurred by a plaintiff subsequent to an
offer of settlement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 must be
paid by the defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 when the plaintiff recovers
a judgment less than the offer. 51 Observing that the "drafters of Rule 68
did not define the term ['costs']," and ignoring the fact that Rule 68 on
its face says nothing about attorney's fees-at least nothing which implies that Rule 68's word "costs" is intended to mean costs and fees-the
Court held that plaintiff was not entitled to recover his post-offer attorneys fees:
[T]he most reasonable inference is that the term "costs" in Rule 68
was intended to refer to all costs properly awardable under the relevant substantive statute or other authority. In other words, all costs
properly awardable in an action are to be considered within the scope
of Rule 68 "costs." Thus, absent congressional expressions to the
contrary, where the underlying statute defines "costs" to include attorney's fees, we are satisfied such fees are to be included as costs for
purposes of Rule 68.52
Based on this reasoning, in particular the fact that the statutes un-

derlying the plaintiff's claims provided that a prevailing plaintiff could
recover fees as well as costs (i.e., that fees were "properly awardable"),
the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could not recover any of his
post-offer costs, including any of his post-offer attorney's fees.53 In the
language of Rule 68, the plaintiff-offeree was required to "pay" his own
attorney's fees.
Justice Brennan's dissent is powerful. 54 Framing the question in
terms of "whether the term 'costs' as it is used in Rule 68 . . . refers

simply to those taxable costs defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and traditionally understood as 'costs' .

.

. or instead includes attorney's fees when an

underlying fees-award statute happens to refer to fees 'as part of the
48.
Id.
49.
Id.
50.
Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d 474, 480 (7th Cir. 1983).
51.
Marek, 473 U.S. at 3.
52.
Id. at 9.
53.
Id. at 9, 11-13.
54.
Justice Brennan's dissent radiates power and outrage. Justice Brennan refers to the majority's ruling that a plaintiff could be required under Rule 68 to pay its own post-offer attorney's fees,
depending upon the terms of the particular statute underlying the plaintiff's claims, as follows: "It is
simply preposterousto think that Congress or the drafters of the Rules intended to sanction differing
applications of Rule 68 depending on which particular subsection of [one of any number of different
federal statutes] the plaintiff happened to invoke." Id. at 26-27 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
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Justice Brennan makes a series of compelling argu-

ments why Rule 68's "costs" do not include attorney's fees, no matter
what the substanti e statute(s) underlying plaintiffs claims might say.
Among these arguments is Justice Brennan's reliance upon Rule 68's
plain language, in particular the fact that Rule 68, unlike a number of
other federal rules of civil procedure, does not contain the words "attorney's fees."5 6
Justice Brennan specifically refers to each of these "[e]leven different provisions of the federal rules" which refer to "attorney's fees. 5 7 His
discussion is particularly powerful when one reads the entire series of
provisions one after the other. Such a review conclusively establishes
that, when Congress uses the term "attorney's fees," it does so advisedly. 58 Correlatively, when Congress does not include the term "attorney's
fees" in a statute or rule, particularly a rule in which Congress would
likely have considered using the term if Congress had "attorney's fees"
in mind-to wit, Rule 68--Congress has also acted advisedly.59 But, the
power of Justice Brennan's dissent was for naught. Marek established as
law that Rule 68, if triggered by a plaintiffs recovery of a judgment
smaller than the offer of judgment made by a defendant, calls forindeed requires-a court order requiring that the plaintiff pay its own
statute makes attorney's
attorney fees, although only
6 ° if the underlying
awardable."
"properly
fees
In sum, Delta and Marek comprise an interesting set of bookends to
the volumes of discussion about Rule 68. Delta relies upon Rule 68's
allegedly "plain" language to limit the application of the rule, and to limit to a narrow category of cases in which a plaintiff obtains a favorable
judgment that is less than the amount of the defendant's settlement offer.
Marek relies upon Rule 68's allegedly "plain" language to make the rule
more expansive, holding that in certain cases, a court is required to order
a plaintiff who has rejected an offer in an amount greater than the
amount of judgment ultimately obtained by the plaintiff, to pay its own
attorney's fees as well as its own costs. Ostensibly, Rule 68's "plain lan55.

Id. at 13-14, 27.

56. Id. at 20 ("When particular provisions of the Federal Rules are intended to encompass
attorney's fees, they do so explicitly. Eleven different provisions of the Rules authorize a court to
award attorney's fees as 'expenses' in particular circumstances, demonstrating that the drafters knew
the difference, and intended a difference, between 'costs,' 'expenses,' and 'attorney's fees."').
57. Id. at 20 & n.11.
As explained in note 15, supra, both the Supreme Court itself and Congress participate in
58.
the writing and the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hence, Justice Brennan's
observation that the "drafters knew the difference, and intended a difference, between 'costs,' 'expenses,' and 'attorney's fees,"' is applicable to both the Supreme Court itself and to Congress. Id. at
20.
59. The eleven provisions in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which specifically refer to
attorney's fees are: Rules 11, 16(f), 26(g), 30(g)(1), 30(g)(2), 37(a)(4), 37(b), 37(c), 37(d), 37(g) and
56(g). Id. at 20 n.1 1.
60.
This is the particular phrase in Marek which, as discussed later, winds up being endowed
with great significance. Id. at 9 (majority opinion).
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guage" is the talisman in both cases, yet that plain language drives very
different results. 61 The intellectually unsatisfying (but probably correct)
explanation for this incongruous result is that Delta was decided as it was
because the more "liberal" pro-plaintiff justices held sway; Marek, although decided only four years later, evidenced the ascendancy of a more
conservative, pro-defendant bloc.
B. The Post-Marek Interpretationof Rule 68 by the Circuit Courts of
Appeals
At the trial court level, the defendant in Marek had contended that
Rule 68 required that the plaintiff not only "pay" his own post-offer attorney fees, as part of the plaintiff's post-offer costs, but, beyond this,
that the plaintiff "pay" the post-offer attorney fees incurred by the defendant.62 The district court agreed with defendant's position that plaintiff
must pay his own post-offer attorney's fees, but rejected defendant's
request that plaintiff be ordered, pursuant to Rule 68, to pay defendant's
post-offer attorney's fees as well.63 The defendant did not appeal the
latter ruling. Accordingly, during the appellate proceedings in Marek,
neither the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court was
61.
As discussed above, there can be little dispute that, as Justice Stevens observed in Delta,
the "plainlanguage of Rule 68 confines its effect to the second type of case-one in which the
plaintiff has obtained a judgment for an amount less favorable than the defendant's settlement offer."
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 351 (1981) (emphasis added). Accordingly, Rule 68's
"plain language," taken alone, establishes that a plaintiff who has not "obtained" a judgment cannot
be ordered pursuant to Rule 68 to pay its own costs. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun agreed with this "plain language" conclusion.
Justice Rehnquist strongly disagreed. Justice Rehnquist asserted that the majority's reliance upon Rule 68's "plain language" made no sense. "But we may call upon the various canons of
statutory construction to pass before us in review as many times as we choose without being reduced
to this anomalous conclusion." Id. at 370 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist thereby
agreed with Justice Powell's description of the Delta holding as "anomalous." Id. at 362 (Powell, J.,
concurring); see also supra text accompanying note 36.
Then, four years later, in Marek, the "plain language" of Rule 68 was argued by Chief
Justice Burger as support for the Court's holding there: 'The plain language of Rule 68 and § 1988
subjects such fees to the cost-shifting provisions of Rule 68." Marek, 473 U.S. at 11 (emphasis
added). Justices White, Powell, Stevens, and Rehnquist agreed. For his part, Justice Brennan, having
agreed with the majority's plain language ruling in Delta, eschewed the Court's "plain language"
approach in Marek: "Applying the Court's 'plain language' approach consistently throughout the
Id. at 21 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices
Rules, however, would produce absurd results .
Marshall and Blackmun agreed.
The most striking reversal of position between Delta (1981) and Marek (1985) was made
by Justice Rehnquist. In Delta, Justice Rehnquist, addressing an issue separate from the principal
issue in that case concerning the meaning of "obtaining a judgment," unqualifiedly stated that Rule
68's reference to "costs" means only costs and not attorney's fees. Delta, 450 U.S. at 377 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In Marek, Justice Rehnquist unabashedly and without explanation changed his
mind: "In Delta ... I expressed in dissent the view that the term 'costs' in Rule 68 did not include
attorney's fees. Further examination of the question has convinced me that this view was wrong
." Marek, 473 U.S. at 13 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
62. Chesny v. Marek, 547 F. Supp. 542, 545 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
Id. at 547. Even though the district court did not grant defendant all of the relief defendant
63.
sought, the district court's more limited order requiring that, pursuant to Rule 68, the plaintiff pay its
own post-offer attorney's fees was itself virtually unprecedented, as pointed out by Justice Brennan
in his dissent in Marek. Marek, 473 U.S. at 20-21 & n.12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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required to decide whether Rule 68 required the plaintiff to pay not only
his own post-offer attorney's fees, but also the defendant's post-offer
attorney's fees.
Not surprisingly, however, this question, which obviously could
have great consequences for parties litigating claims based upon feeshifting statutes, has arisen in Rule 68 cases arising after Marek. Also not
surprisingly, there is a split of authority on the question. 64 Most courts

have held that while Rule 68, if triggered in a case based on a statute
which itself authorizes the shifting of fees, does require that plaintiff pay
its own post-offer attorney's fees, Rule 68 does not require that plaintiff
also pay the defendant's post-offer attorney's fees-at least not unless
the defendant has been held to be entitled to an award of attorney's fees
in the case in question (a circumstance probably encountered rarely, if at
all).65
For example, after observing that Marek had not reached this issue,
the First Circuit in Crossman v. Marcoccio held that Marek's analysis
concerning the particular "attorney's fees" issue which Marek did reach
also supported a holding concerning the attorney's fees issue which Marek did not reach which, according to Crossman, justifies a holding
which results in a more restrictive application of Rule 68 even though
Marek's express holding results in a more expansive application of Rule
68. 66 In particular, the Crossman court held that a plaintiff cannot be
ordered pursuant to Rule 68 to pay a defendant's post-offer attorney's
fees unless the defendant himself was entitled to payment of his fees
under the statute(s) underlying the case.67 Crossman's disposition of this
issue relies heavily on this language from Marek: "the term 'costs' in
Rule 68 was intended to refer to all costs properly awardable under the
relevant substantive statute or other authority., 68 Thus, Crossman states
that "although [plaintiffs post-offer attorney's] fees were 'properly
awardable' costs under section 1988 [of the civil rights statute], [defen64.
Compare Jordan v. Time, Inc., Ill F.3d 102, 105 (11 th Cir. 1997) (concluding that Rule
68 "costs" do include post-offer, non-prevailing party attorney's fees), with Crossman v. Marcoccio,
806 F.2d 329, 334 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that Rule 68 "costs" do not include post-offer, nonprevailing party attorney's fees), and Harbor Motor Co. v. Arnell Chevrolet-Geo, Inc., 265 F.3d 638,
646-47 (7th Cir. 2001) (agreeing with the First Circuit that Rule 68's "costs" language does not
include non-prevailing party attorneys' fees), and Champion Produce, Inc. v. Ruby Robinson Co.,
342 F.3d 1016, 1030-31 (9th Cir. 2003) (agreeing with the First and Seventh Circuits).
65. There are many federal statutes which underlie federal civil lawsuits and which authorize
an award of attorney's fees to the "prevailing party." Those statutes include the civil rights statutes
which provide, in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006), that a prevailing party in a lawsuit brought under § 1983,
may be awarded attorney's fees "as part of the costs" incurred in the lawsuit. While the civil rights
statutes-on their face and without delineation-authorize the awarding of fees to a "prevailing
party," judicial construction of those statutes has established a standard for a defendant to be deemed
a "prevailing party" which is more rigorous than the standard to be satisfied by the plaintiff claiming
to have been the "prevailing" party.
66. Crossman, 806 F.2d at 333-34.
67. Id. at 334 ("Rule 68 can never require prevailing civil rights plaintiffs to pay defendants'
post-offer attorney's fees.").
68. Marek, 473 U.S. at 9 (emphasis added).
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dant's post-offer] attorney's fees were not. The statute awards costs only
to a 'prevailing party' [and defendant did not prevail]. 6 9
In other words, Crossman holds that, when Marek refers to Rule 68
costs as including costs "properly awardable" under the underlying statute(s), Marek is holding that a determination of whether attorney's fees
constitute Rule 68 costs depends upon the lower courts' analysis of the
fee-shifting provisions in the underlying statute(s).7 ° Put another way,
Crossman holds that the unelaborated term "costs" in Rule 68 does not
simply mean costs, but actually means this: costs and also attorney's
fees, but attorney's fees only in circumstances controlled by a lower
court's interpretation and application of the fee-shifting provisions in the
statute(s) underlying a particular case. According to Crossman, this is
what Marek meant by the shorthand phrase "properly awardable., 71 And,
most courts which have addressed the question of whether Rule 68 does
require a plaintiff to pay defendant's post-offer attorney's fees, have
blithely followed Crossman's lead.72
There is a line of authority, however, albeit a line of authority much
shorter than the Crossman line, which interprets Marek as holding that
Rule 68, when triggered, requires the plaintiff to pay not only its own
post-offer costs-including its post-offer attorney's fees-and the defendant's post-offer costs as "costs" generally is defined, but also to pay
defendant's post-offer attorney's fees. In Jordan v. Time, Inc.,7 3 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals unqualifiedly so ordered:
The language contained in Rule 68 is mandatory; the district court
does not have the discretion to rule otherwise. Thus, the district court
erred when it used its "equitable discretion" to deny [the defendant's]
motion for attorneys' fees and costs. [Plaintiff] must pay the costs incurred by [defendant] after the making of its offer.... Costs as used
herein includes attorney's fees. Under Marek v. Chesny, Rule 68
"costs" include attorney's fees when the underlying statute so prescribes. The Copyright Act so specifies .... 74

69.
Crossman, 806 F.2d at 334.
70.
Id.; see also Marek, 473 U.S. at 9 (explaining that the court may award attorney's fees as
"properly awardable" costs only "where the underlying statute defines 'costs' to include attorney's
fees").

71.

Crossman, 806 F.2d at 333-34.

72.

See, e.g., Champion Produce, Inc. v. Ruby Robinson Co., 342 F.3d 1016, 1029-31 (9th

Cir. 2003); Le v. Univ. of Pa., 321 F.3d 403, 411 (3d Cir. 2003); Harbor Motor Co. v. Amell Chevrolet-Geo, Inc., 265 F.3d 638, 646-47 (7th Cir. 2001); Poteete v. Capital Eng'g, Inc., 185 F.3d 804,
807-08 (7th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Bailey Ford, Inc., 26 F.3d 570, 571 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Boisson v. Banian Ltd., 221 F.R.D. 378, 380-82 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
73.
74.

111 F.3d 102 (1llth Cir. 1997).
Id. at 105 (citation omitted); see also Lucas v. Wild Dunes Real Estate, Inc., 197 F.R.D.

172, 177 n.2 (D.S.C. 2000) (explaining Jordan's holding as follows: "This court notes that the
Eleventh Circuit did not even consider whether a defendant seeking costs, including attorneys' fees,
pursuant to Rule 68 had to be a prevailing party because the Eleventh Circuit implicitly read Marek
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In the absence of the Supreme Court's own explanation of what has
become its much commented-upon phrase, "properly awardable," one is
tempted to review the parties' briefs in Marek to see whether the litigants' arguments support Crossman's holding that Marek was a "carefully crafted decision" or alternatively support Jordan'sholding that Marek
used the phrase "properly awardable" in a matter-of-fact manner. In fact,
the principal briefs filed by the parties in Marek did not address this issue
at all, let alone raise for the Court's consideration the "carefully crafted"
distinction for which Crossman praises the majority in Marek. As discussed above, the defendant in Marek requested that the trial court award
it its post-offer attorneys' fees under Rule 68. The district court denied
the defendant's request and the defendant did not appeal that ruling.76
Hence, there was no need for either the plaintiff-respondent in its brief,
or defendants-petitioners in their brief, to address that issue. 7 7 Accordingly, the Court in Marek addressed only the question of whether Rule 68,
when triggered, requires the plaintiffs payment of its own post-offer
attorney's fees. Because the issue of plaintiffs responsibility for defendant's post-offerfees was not before it, the Court did not reach that question.78

to mean that the underlying statute simply must define costs to include attorneys'fees in orderfor
attorneys'feesto be properly awardableunder Rule 68." (emphasis added)).
75.
Chesny v. Marek, 547 F. Supp. 542, 545 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
76. Id. at 547-48; see also Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 4 n.1 (1985).
77. See Brief of the Respondent at i, Marek, 473 U.S. 1 (No. 83-1437), 1984 WL 565431;
Brief of the Petitioners at i, Marek, 473 U.S. 1 (No. 83-1437), 1984 WL 565430. Comparison of the
briefs reveals that the petitioners' brief, quite lengthy and analytic, gave rise to Chief Justice Burger's unusually short and conclusory majority opinion; by contrast, respondents' brief, much shorter
than its counterpart, raised only some of the arguments which were extensively developed by Justice
Brennan in his powerful and thorough dissenting opinion.
78.
There were numerous amici briefs filed in support of the respective parties' positions, but
the principal amicus brief which directly addressed the issue of whether Rule 68 also requires a
plaintiff to pay a defendant's post-offer attorney's fees was that filed by the United States. Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 8 n.3, Marek, 473 U.S. 1 (No. 831437), 1984 WL 565432. This analytic brief, which furnished Chief Justice Burger with many of the
arguments adopted by him (although not discussed by him in detail), addressed this issue in the
context of responding to a concern expressed by Justice Rehnquist in Delta. The United States'
exegesis of this issue is as follows:
Thus, this case does not present any issue concerning the circumstances in which a defendant might seek to collect his post-offer costs from the plaintiff.
In any event, reading "costs" in Rule 68 to include Section 1988 attorneys' fees does not
have the result, suggested in Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Delta Air Lines,
Inc. v. August, of requiring civil rights plaintiffs who reject Rule 68 offers also to absorb
the defendant's attorneys' fees as costs. Delta Air Lines held that Rule 68 is entirely inapplicable when judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant. Thus, in any case to
which Rule 68 applies, the defendant will by definition have lost the case. Section 1988,
on the other hand, provides that fees may be awarded only to the prevailing party. Thus,
the condition that entities the defendant to be considered for the benefits of Rule 68 is the
same condition that precludes him from taking advantage of Section 1988.
Id. (citation omitted). It is doubtful that Chief Justice Burger, notwithstanding his receptivity to
many of the United States' arguments supporting the petitioners' position in general, intended to
encapsulate the reasoning stated in the above footnote, when he adopted the phrase "properly awardable." Chief Justice Burger appears to have been principally influenced by the United States' and the
petitioners' arguments pointing to the economics of plaintiff's position, which Chief Justice Burger
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Thus, the "properly awardable" phrase in Chief Justice Burger's
opinion in Marek appears merely to be the Chief Justice's short-hand
reference to underlying statutes which include fee-shifting provisions,
not a phrase that reflected the Chief Justice's advised resolution of a specific issue debated by the litigants. The phrase took on special prominence only when, after Marek, the lower federal courts struggled with
Rule 68 motions filed by defendants who invoked Marek and who asked
that the court order a plaintiff to pay all post-offer attorney's fees, including the defendant's post-offer attorney's fees. It was then that the
phrase "properly awardable" became the allegedly advised phrase which
Crossmanportrays it as being.79
1II. THE APPROACH TAKEN BY SEVERAL STATES IN ADDRESSING THE
ISSUE OF SETTLEMENT PROMOTION

It is telling that, since 1938, the only federal rule on the subject of
settlement has been titled the "offer of judgment" rule.8 ° In addressing
this identical issue many states title their rule "offer of settlement" or
something similar, not offer of "judgment. 81 While this distinction
seems merely semantic, and does not appear to alter the way a rule intended to serve the function of settlement promotion might work, the
distinction reflects the states' greater sensitivity to the important role that
settlement plays in modem litigation and the states' awareness of
nuances which otherwise may have deterred the invocation of Rule 68. In
summarized as follows: "[Tihe $139,192 in postoffer legal services resulted in a recovery $8,000
less than petitioners' settlement offer." Marek, 473 U.S. at 11. That fact alone may have been the
single fact most responsible for the Marek holding.
79. Commentators have disagreed with Crossman's analysis of Marek's holding and, in
particular, with Crossman'sinterpretation of the '"properly awardable" phrase:
Allowing attorney's fees to shift under Rule 68 is supported by a clear reading of the
rule and the language of Marek.... In other words, when attorney's fees are defined as
part of costs in the underlying substantive statute, they are properly awardable costs
which can be shifted pursuant to the rule.
Glimcher, supra note 2, at 1476; and,
Based on the Court's answer [in Marek] to the first question--that attorney's fees are
included in the term "costs" in Rule 68-if the substantive statute defines attorney's fees
"as part of costs," attorney's fees should likewise be shifted pursuant to Rule 68.
Rather, Rule 68 operates independently, relying only on the substantive statutes to determine what things are included in the Rule's definition of "costs." Rule 68 shifts the responsibility to pay "costs," and the "prevailing party" language in the substantive statutes
is irrelevant as Rule 68 does not look to the underlying statutes to determine who "prevailed."
Christopher W. Carmichael, Encouraging Settlements Using Federal Rule 68: Why Non-prevailing
Defendants Should Be Awarded Attorney's Fees, Even in Civil Rights Cases, 48 WAYNE L. REV.
1449, 1455-57 (2003).
80. See FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
Colorado, for example, includes in its rule caption the term "offer of settlement." COLO.
81.
REv. STAT. § 13-17-202 (2009). Other states, such as California, refer to their rule as "Offers by a
Party to Compromise." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 998 (West 2009). The 1983 and 1984 proposed
amendments to Rule 68 would have changed Rule 68's caption to "offer of settlement." Proposed
Court Rules, 102 F.R.D. 407, 432 (1984); PreliminaryDraftof ProposedAmendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,98 F.R.D. 337, 361 (1983).

2010]

REVISING RULE 68

other words, the implementation of Rule 68, as worded, results in the
entry of what might be viewed as a portentous "judgment," rather than
merely the effectuation of a neutral "settlement., 82 In general, the states
have been far more responsive in seeking to remedy Rule 68's observed
inadequacies than the United States Supreme Court has been.83 Indeed a
representative sample of the states' rules of civil procedure 84reveals a
myriad of creative approaches to the settlement promotion rule.
For example, some states have made their settlement rule applicable
to offers made by the plaintiff as well as to offers made by the defendant. 85 Many states explicitly include attorney's fees within the awardable costs, and some of those states authorize the courts to require that one
party pay its opposing party's fees. Finally, some states introduce into
the calculus an element of reasonableness, permitting courts to use their
discretion in awarding post-offer costs, including attorney's fees, rather
than including Rule 68's mandatory language providing that the "offeree
must pay the costs incurred after the offer was made."
A. Efforts to Make Rule 68 a Two-Way Settlement Promotion Tool
Many state versions of Rule 68 allow either party to make an offer
of settlement. 86 A rule allowing a two-way offer of settlement incentivizes settlement exchanges by making the award of costs mandatory (assuming, of course, that Rule 68's historical cast as a mandatory rule is
maintained), rather than discretionary under Rule 54(d).87 Indeed, a quick
glance at a representative sampling of state rules shows that every offer
of settlement rule adopted since 1970 is a two-way rule.
The Supreme Court has not ignored the possibility of making Rule
68 a two-way rule. On the contrary, amendments to Rule 68 proposed by
the Standing Committee in 1983 and in 1984 addressed this specific issue. 88 The 1983 proposed amendment in particular characterized Rule
82. The notes accompanying the 1983 proposed amendment to Federal Rule 68 explained that
Rule 68 "has been recaptioned to refer to 'settlement' to indicate it is that process rather than entry
of judgment that is being fostered." PreliminaryDraft,98 F.R.D. at 364.
83. See, e.g., Michael E. Solimine & Bryan Pacheco, State Court Regulation of Offers of
Judgment and Its Lessons for Federal Practice, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 51, 52-53, 63-65
(1997).
84. For the purposes of this article, the author examined offer of settlement rules from Alaska,
Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Nevada, New York, and Washington. Most of
these states were chosen because their offer of settlement rule differs considerably from Rule 68, but
some states were chosen because their offer of settlement rule is similar or identical to Rule 68.
85.
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.30.065 (2010); ARiz. R. Civ. P. 68; CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE
§ 998; COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-17-202(1)(a); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.79(1) (West 2009); N.J. R. CT.
4:58-2; TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 42.004 (Vernon 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 807.01
(West 2009).
86.
See ARIz. R. Civ. P. 68; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 998; COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-17-202;
NEV. R. Civ. P. 68.
87.
Bone, supranote 10, at 1599; see also FED.R. Civ. P. 54(d).
88.
PreliminaryDraft of ProposedAmendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,98
F.R.D. 337, 353 (1983).
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68's one-way structure as one of the two "principal reasons for the rule's
past failure., 89 Nevertheless, Rule 68 remains to this day a "one-way
street. ' 90
B. Efforts to Explicitly Address Attorney's Fees in Rule 68
As is evident from our discussion above, a common critique of Rule
68 is that it fails to address attorney's fees. Indeed, an attempt to fix this
failure may explain the much-maligned Marek decision. But again, the
States have been much more responsive than the United States Supreme
Court in addressing this shortcoming.
Every drafter of a state settlement promotion rule in the representative sample of state rules that was drafted after 1970, has explicitly addressed whether the court may shift attorney's fees in addition to shifting
more traditional "costs." 9' From the representative group, only New
York and Washington fail to discuss attorney's fees, and the rules from
those states are based on Rule 68 as it was originally adopted in 1938.92
Thus, a review of the states' approach to settlement promotion indicates
that the parties responsible for crafting the rules of procedure in the states
agree that, if an offer of settlement rule is to actually promote settlement,
it must explicitly address the issue of shifting attorney's fees as well as
shifting costs.
C. Efforts to Inject Discretion into Rule 68
Some states have dealt with Rule 68's perceived inadequacies by
adopting an offer of settlement rule that vests the trial court with discretion to award costs, including attorney's fees. States have approached the
issue of discretion in two different ways: (1) some versions of Rule 68
only permit the award of "reasonable" attorney's fees; and (2) other versions of Rule 68 permit the award of attorney's fees when the offeree's
rejection of the offer was "unreasonable."
For example, Florida, Arizona, and Nevada authorize an award of
attorney's fees under their offer of settlement rules, but only an award of
fees which are "reasonable." 93 The Advisory Committee's 1983 proposed
amendment to Rule 68 would have incorporated a similar reasonableness
requirement. 94 Florida's reasonableness standard does not vest the court
with significant discretion in awarding attorney's fees.95 Florida's courts
89. Id. at 363.
90. Id.
91.
Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Nevada, and Colorado all explicitly address whether
attorney's fees are included within shiftable costs. While most states that explicitly address the issue
include attorney's fees within the shiftable costs, Colorado explicitly excludes them.
92. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3221 (McKinney 2010); WASH. CIrv. R. 68.
93.
ARiz. R. Civ. P. 68; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.79 (West 2009); NEv. R. Civ. P. 68.
94. PreliminaryDraft, 98 F.R.D. at 363.
95.

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.79.
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must award attorney's fees when the underlying statute's prerequisites
are met,
even if the offeree's rejection of the offer is entirely reasona6
ble.

9

Like Florida, Arizona uses a reasonableness test albeit one which
cabins a court's discretion in awarding attorney's fees. Arizona allows a
court to award "reasonable" attorney's fees, but only if the fees have
been separately identified in the offer. 97 On the other hand, Nevada's
Supreme Court translated the Nevada rule's reference to "reasonable
attorney's fees" into a four-part test:
(1) whether the plaintiffs claim was brought in good faith; (2)
whether the defendants' offer of judgment was reasonable and in
good faith in both its timing and amount; (3) whether the plaintiff's
decision to reject the offer and proceed to trial was grossly unreasonable or in bad faith; and (4) whether98the fees sought by the offeror are
reasonable and justified in amount.
Nevada, therefore, directs a trial court asked to award fees to examine the
reasonableness of the conduct of both the offeror and the offeree.
The Advisory Committee's proposed 1984 amendment to Rule 68
incorporated a similar version of the reasonableness requirement:
If, upon a motion by the offeror within 10 days after the entry of
judgment, the court determines that an offer was rejected unreasonably, resulting in unnecessary delay and needless increase in the cost
of the litigation, it may impose an appropriate sanction upon the offeree. In making this determination the court shall consider all of the
relevant circumstances at the time of the rejection, including (1) the
then apparent merit or lack of merit in the claim that was the subject
of the offer, (2) the closeness of the questions of fact and law at issue,
(3) whether the offeror had unreasonably refused to furnish information necessary to evaluate the reasonableness of the offer, (4) whether
the suit was in the nature of a "test case," presenting questions of farreaching importance affecting non-parties, (5) the relief that might
reasonably have been expected if the claimant should prevail, and (6)
the amount of the additional delay, cost, and expense that the offeror
reasonably
would be expected to incur if the litigation should be pro99
longed.

This 1984 proposal contrasts with the Nevada approach in that it
contemplates a determination of reasonableness that is more legislative
than judicial in character. According to one commentator, a legislative
approach conserves judicial resources and is subject to less judicial con96.
TGI Friday's, Inc. v. Dvorak, 663 So. 2d 606, 611 (Fla. 1995); Schmidt v. Fortner, 629
So. 2d 1036, 1040 (Fa. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
97.
ARiz. R. Civ. P. 68.
98.
Beattie v. Thomas, 668 P.2d 268, 274 (Nev. 1983).
99.
ProposedCourt Rules, 102 F.R.D. 407, 433 (1984).
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fusion-both seemingly obvious points. °° Until recently, California used
a similar legislative reasonableness test, which also was arguably more
effective than its Nevada counterpart. 1 However, the California rule
was repealed in 2005.102
IV. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?

Despite the Supreme Court's and Congress' expressed interest in
encouraging settlement, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-in particular Rule 68-have played a relatively small role in addressing this important issue. The question remains why Rule 68 has failed to serve as a
meaningful mechanism for settlement and why, in light of that failure,
Rule 68 was not long since amended to be more useful.
The answer becomes clearer once one focuses upon the large number of fee-shifting statutes that serve as the basis for federal lawsuits.
Proposals for amending Rule 68, particularly if they suggest applying the
rule to fees as well as to costs, invariably confront the fact that many
federal lawsuits are based on statutes that themselves contain fee-shifting
provisions. When Congress has decided that certain policies will be best
served by a statute's prescribed allocation of attorney's fees, applying a
procedural rule that also allocates attorney's fees may interfere with
those legislative goals.
In addition, the application of Rule 68 to deprive a civil rights plaintiff of an award of his attorney's fees, even when that plaintiff has "prevailed" in obtaining a judgment in his favor, arguably violates the Rules
Enabling Act of 1934.103 Application of Rule 68 to require that the civil
rights plaintiff, even though it has "prevailed," not only bear his own
post-offer attorney's fees, but also pay the defendant's post-offer attorney's fees, would raise an even more troublesome question under the
Rules Enabling Act. 104
Hence, any effort to make Rule 68 work must address the problem
raised by applying Rule 68, if it is amended to explicitly authorize the
100.
Anna Aven Sumner, Note, Is the Gummy Rule of Today Truly Better than the Toothy Rule
of Tomorrow? How FederalRule 68 Should Be Modified, 52 DuKE L.J. 1055, 1072 (2003).
101.

Id.

102.
See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1021.1 (West 2009).
103.
The Federal Rules Enabling Act, see supra note 15, specifically provides that the rules of
practice, which are prescribed by the Supreme Court in accordance with that Act, "shall not abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right." 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
104.
Of course, requiring a civil rights plaintiff to pay a defendant's attorney's fees does not
appear to be a practical problem in light of the interpretation of Marek made by most Circuit Courts
of Appeals. Those courts, adopting the reasoning of Crossman, have held that, even though Rule 68
has been triggered, a plaintiff may not be ordered to "pay" the defendant's post-offer attorney's fees
unless the defendant has been the "prevailing party" under the underlying civil rights statutes. This
circumstance simply will not occur in light of the fact that Rule 68, by its terms, assumes that the
plaintiff and not the defendant has obtained a judgment in its favor, albeit a judgment in an amount
less than the amount of the offered judgment and, accordingly, the plaintiff and not the defendant is
the prevailing party under the underlying civil rights statutes.
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shifting of fees, to cases where the underlying substantive statutes themselves already authorize fee-shifting. Two possible approaches to this
problem are: (1) Rule 68 is not applied to any cases in which the parties
are litigating issues involving rights established by a fee-shifting statute; 1°5 and (2) Rule 68 is applied to the entire range of federal civil cases, but the rule is revised to provide that the imposition of Rule 68's
"sanction" will not be mandatory but, instead, will be at the discretion of
the court.106 The court's discretion in deciding what post-offer costs or
fees, if any, should be imposed on the plaintiff, will be guided by a consideration of all relevant circumstances, including the policies to be
served by the underlying statute(s).
The second of these approaches is obviously more attractive. A
large number of federal statutes contain fee-shifting provisions. The federal judicial system, and all who work in that system, would best be
served by a rule which promotes the settlement of all federal civil cases
instead of merely the settlement of certain categories of cases.
But, as indicated above, our recommendation that an amended Rule
68 be applied to all federal cases is based on the assumption that Rule 68,
as amended, will provide for a discretionary shifting of fees and costs.
The mandatory language originally included and still included in Rule 68
may have been suitable in an era of less complicated cases, where Rule
68's settlement-promotion function could be effectuated in an almost
ministerial manner. But, particularly when Rule 68 is amended to provide for the imposition of attorney's fees-almost surely not a circumstance envisioned in 1938 (notwithstanding Chief Justice Burger's surmise to the contrary in Marek)-the implementation of a mandatory settlement promotion rule providing no discretion for the trial court will
fail. There are simply too many variables implicated by the settlement of
civil rights cases in particular for a mandatory rule,0 requiring
the shifting
7
of fees as well as costs, to bring about a fair result.
Altering Rule 68 to make its imposition of costs (and fees) discretionary rather than mandatory will not undermine Rule 68's settlementpromotion function. To be sure, a mandatory imposition of fees against a
plaintiff confronting the possibility of "guessing wrong" is a frightening
prospect and no doubt could bring about settlement by intimidation. Such
105.
See Bone, supra note 10, at 1619 (observing that "the likely effect of conditional fee
shifting on settlement probably varies too much by case type to justify a single uniform rule," and
observing also that "the Rules Enabling Act or respect for the goals of congressional fee-shifting
statutes might require excepting civil rights cases").
106.
Roy D. Simon, Jr., The Riddle ofRule 68 (pt. 1), 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 71-75 (1985).
107.
These variables include the factors referenced by the Advisory Committee in its proposed
1984 amendment to Rule 68 discussed above, and facts as fundamental as the plaintiff's financial
wherewithal. Any federal settlement promotion rule must be flexible enough to accommodate parties
with limited resources, for example, the plaintiff in a civil rights case who is unable to pay costs
other than its own and, a fortiori, is unable to pay such items as the attorney's fees incurred by the
defendant.
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a regime is intolerable; encouraging settlement must not be the equivalent of requiring surrender.
A Rule 68 that vests a trial court with discretion to consider all circumstances bearing upon the reasonableness of the conduct of the parties, insofar as the parties' conduct has concerned settlement, will serve
to strongly encourage settlement. The party who rejects a Rule 68 settlement offer will know that the reasonableness of its rejection, together
with all other relevant circumstances, may be evaluated by the court at
the conclusion of the case, necessarily causing that party to pay close
attention to settlement offers.
Several other changes to Rule 68, in addition to those discussed
above, are necessary to make Rule 68 more useful. 0 8 First, Rule 68 must
authorize the awarding of attorney's fees as well as the awarding of
costs; and to this end, Rule 68 should explicitly refer to fees as well as to
costs. This should be done even under the current regime since, as discussed, Marek does authorize Rule 68's application to attorney's fees
(albeit in a limited way) and plaintiffs should be informed of that fact by
amending Rule 68's language.
Secondly, Rule 68 should be a two-way rule. The experience of
many states in making their settlement promotion rule a "two-way rule"
argues in favor of such a change to Rule 68, and so does logic; indeed,
one wonders why, in light of the settlement promotion purpose, this
change has not long since been made. Third, a more minor change, and
one which seemingly is unexceptionable: Rule 68 should itemize the
specific costs that can be awarded. Itemization of the specific "costs"
will harm no one but, like the Rule's explicit reference to attorney's fees,
will inform litigants of the possible consequences of making, or of responding to, a Rule 68 offer. Fourth, to serve a similar purpose, Rule 68
should prescribe the form of the actual document by which the Rule 68
offer is to be conveyed, perhaps eliminating in the future the extensive
litigation over a defendant's settlement offer that is not as clear as it
might be. 1°9
It is impossible to know which of these changes may lead to parties'
more frequent use of Rule 68 and, beyond that, which may lead to more
settlements. My view is that the use of Rule 68 would increase significantly were the rule available to both plaintiffs and defendants and were
the trial court granted discretion in applying the rule. Certainly, Delta
108.
A large number of possible changes to Rule 68, including some changes recommended
here, all of which possibly could be codified in a new "Rule 68.1," are discussed in Lewis & Eaton,
A New FRCP Rule 68.1, supra note 6.
109. There has been extensive litigation concerning difficulties encountered in interpreting
"offers" made by defendants under Rule 68, as catalogued by Danielle M. Shelton, Rewriting Rule
68: Realizing the Benefits of the FederalSettlement Rule by Injecting Certainty into Offers of Judgment, 91 MINN. L. REV. 865, 880-911 (2007).
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and Marek would have produced opinions less irreconcilable with one
another had the Court been construing a rule providing for a trial court's
discretionary shifting of costs (and fees) and had Rule 68 been a settlement promotion device available to both parties. Almost certainly Justice
Stevens would have been less concerned about a broad application of
Rule 68, as sought by the defendant in Delta, were Rule 68 a discretionary "two-way" rule. Similarly, Justice Brennan's dissent in Marek likely would have been less spirited.
CONCLUSION

There is a lot of work to be done to create an effective and fair federal settlement-promotion rule. It seems axiomatic that the judicial system should assume a major portion of the responsibility for that work.
After all, the judiciary exists for the purpose of presiding over, monitoring, and bringing about the resolution of lawsuits. Lawsuits are the raison d'etre of the judicial branch of government. The judiciary itself
therefore should play the most prominent role, rather than only an ancillary role, in addressing this central and critical element of every civil
lawsuit. Indeed, it is perverse that currently the issue of settlement is
handed over to mediators or the like and that the federal courts wind up
as passive, albeit interested observers.
It is beyond debate that there should be a Rule 68. It is beyond debate that Rule 68 should be improved. And, it is beyond debate that the
Supreme Court should assume the responsibility for that improvement.
All litigators will watch with interest.

PROPORTIONAL DISCOVERY: MAKING IT THE NORM,

RATHER THAN THE EXCEPTION
GORDON W. NETZORG' & TOBIN D. KERN'
INTRODUCTION

Our discovery system is broken. It is broken because the standard of
"broad and liberal discovery," the hallowed principle that has governed
discovery in the U.S. for over seventy years,' has become an invitation to
abuse. Only the most well-heeled litigants can afford to bring or defend a
case that is likely to generate significant discovery, as most cases in this
electronic age do. Until the default is reversed from "all you can eat"
discovery to proportional discovery geared to the needs of the case, as
the rules already contemplate,2 the courthouse doors will remain closed
to legitimate cases that the average citizen 3 cannot afford to bring or defend.
This Article argues proportional discovery should replace the
"broad and liberal" discovery currently permitted under the Federal
Rules. Rather than examine the theoretical underpinnings of the discovery rules, this Article assesses the current default rule from a practitioner's perspective. Part I begins by examining the history of federal discovery rules, including recent developments. Part II surveys the typical
reading given to Rule 26(b)(1) and the burdens it imposes in practice.
Part III attempts to assess the systemic impact of modern discovery by
reference to federal court statistics published by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, and examines an illustrative case that demonstrates the costs and delays that may deter the assertion of meritorious
claims and defenses. Part IV argues for a return to the concept of proportional discovery as a default rule in place of broad and permissive discovery. The concept of proportional discovery and proposed model rules
t
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Trial Practice Group at Sherman & Howard, LLC.

t
Tobin D. Kern is a partner in the Trial Practice Group at Sherman & Howard, LLC, with a
practice focusing on complex litigation including securities, banking, intellectual property, class
actions, and business torts.
1.

See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,506 (1947).

2. Rule 26(b)(2)(C) directs federal courts to "limit the frequency or extent of discovery" if
the court first determines that "the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely
benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the
issues." FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C).
3.
See Justice Powell, Amendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521,
522 (1980) (dissenting statement, joined by Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, opposing the 1980
amendments).
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are then described in depth by reference to principles already welldeveloped by practice groups and the bench.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF DISCOVERY RULES
A. The Emergence of the "Broadand Liberal" Standard
The "broad and liberal discovery" standard first appeared in the
United States in 1938, when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
promulgated.4 With thirty-five states having adopted the federal rules as
their own in the years since,5 the rule of "broad and liberal" discovery
established by current Rule 26(b)(1) now dominates in both federal and
state courts. Under Rule 26(b)(1), parties are presumptively entitled to
unearth any fact "relevant" to the case-and to do so at the expense of
the other party-unless the opposing party blocks the discovery. It is an
invitation few litigants decline or avoid, if they dare to enter the courthouse.
Broad discovery functioned without widespread dissatisfaction for
decades after Rule 26 was enacted. In fact, as late as 1970 the Advisory
Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure described the rule in glowing
terms. 6 Rule 26(b)(1), the Committee noted, in combination with the shift
to notice pleadings, had marked a "striking and imaginative departure"
from judicially supervised discovery and the cumbersome rules of chancery pleading. 7 A 1968 field survey conducted by the Advisory Committee lent support to this position, and revealed no major complaints regarding the broad scope or cost of discovery or its potential for abuse,
leading the committee to conclude:
[T]here is no empirical evidence to warrant a fundamental change in
the philosophy of the discovery rules. No widespread or profound
failings are disclosed in the scope or availability of discovery. The
costs of discovery do not appear to be oppressive, as a general matter,
either in relation to ability to pay or to the stakes of the litigation.
Discovery frequently provides evidence that would not otherwise be
available
to the parties and thereby makes for a fairer trial or settle8
ment.

4.
See AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY & INST. FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT
OF
THE
AM.
LEGAL
Sys.,
FINAL
REPORT
9
(2009),

http://www.du.edu/legalinstitutepubs/ACTL-IAALS%20Final%2OReport%20Revised%204-1509.pdf [hereinafter ACTLIJAALS, FINAL REPORT].
5. Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modem Civil Process, 1994
Wis. L. REv. 631, 632 n. 1(1994) (noting that over 35 states have adopted the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for their trial courts).
6. See FED. R. Cv. P. 26 advisory committee's notes to 1970 amendment.
7. See id. tit. V advisory committee's explanatory statement concerning 1970 amendments to
discovery rules.
8. Id. The Advisory Committee survey was done in conjunction with Columbia Law School.
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B. The Current View of Discovery
Forty years later, much has changed. With the emergence of the information society, sentiments among the bench and bar towards discovery have shifted dramatically. Judges and litigants now routinely describe
modem discovery as a "morass," "nightmare," 9 "quagmire," "monstrosity," and "fiasco."' If this is how judges and practitioners describe modem discovery, imagine the disdain of the parties themselves whose interests the system is supposed to protect and serve through a "just, speedy,
and inexpensive" resolution of disputes." In 2008, the American College
of Trial Lawyers ("ACTL") Task Force on Discovery joined with the
Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System ("IAALS")
to survey members of the ACTL on the role of discovery and any perceived problems in the United States civil justice system.' 2 Nearly 1,500
ACTL members responded, speaking with an average thirty-eight years
of experience in civil litigation and with nearly equal representation of
plaintiffs and defendants.1 3 An overwhelming majority of the survey
participants reported that discovery has become an end in itself-a costly
weapon used to "bludgeon" parties into settlements. 14 The participants
commented that attomeys, rather than clients, "drive excessive discovof them believed that discovery is abused in
ery."' 5 Forty-five percent
"almost every case,' 16 and fifty-three percent believed that changes to the
17
discovery rules since 1976 have not curbed the abuse.
The Task Force Survey further revealed a widespread belief that
radical changes to the system are necessary, rather than continued tinkering with the existing rules. Participants complained that "[w]e have sacrificed the prospect of attainable justice for the many in the interest of
finding that one needle in the ...haystacks," and that "[tihe total lack of
control of discovery.., is killing civil litigation."' 18 The fact that many of
the country's leading trial lawyers provided this feedback after significant rule changes to address the problem were made in 1983, 1993 and
2000, indicates that in practice, the changes have failed to reduce discovery abuse.

9.
AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY & INST. FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., INTERIM REPORT & 2008 LITIGATION SURVEY OF THE
FELLOWS OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS B-i to B-2 (2008),

http://www.du.edullegalinstitute/pubsllnterim%2Report%2OFinal%20for%20webl.pdf [hereinafter
ACTUIAALS, INTERIM REPORT].
10. PSEG Power N.Y., Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-657 (DNH/RFr),
2007 WL 2687670, at *1, 8, 12 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007).
11.

FED.R. CIv. P. 1.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

See ACTULAALS, FINAL REPORT, supranote 4,at 1.
Id. at2.
See ACT[IIAALS, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 9, at B-1.
See id. at A-4.
Id. at4.
See id. at 5 (emphasis added).
See id.
at B-1.
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So is the current discovery system merely imperfect, or is it really
broken? Following its Interim Report and the Task Force Survey, the
ACTL and IAALS task force members issued a final report concluding
that "[o]ur discovery system is broken."' 19 If the system is broken, the
report concludes, then it is time to reverse the default discovery rule to
one of proportionality. 2° In other words, it is time to stop tweaking the
rules and change the default from "everything is discoverable" to "you
only get what you need." Discovery has become the tail wagging the dog
in many-if not most-civil cases, resulting in "unacceptable delays and
prohibitive expense.",2 ' The effects of such delays on the broader goals of
the civil justice system are severe: fewer jury and bench trials, abandonment of meritorious claims by plaintiffs, and relinquishment of valid
defenses by defendants. Many litigants with valid claims or defenses
simply cannot rationalize the time and expense that must be devoted to
bringing or defending
a civil case, with the waves of discovery that nor22
mally follow.

Judicial attitudes toward the discovery process and the resolution of
discovery disputes show similar frustration and despair, particularly as
electronic information proliferates. Judges now must moderate and determine a whole host of e-discovery disputes, including where such information resides, in what format, in whose possession, on what fixed or
mobile device, in live, "deleted," or archived status, on whose server, and
on what type of system. And that is just the start. Judges then must sort
through issues such as the existence and relevance of "metadata," alteration and manipulation of electronic information, and the benefits and
burdens of allowing or forbidding forensic examinations. Then comes
assessment of the penalties that should be imposed upon a party who
permitted a "relevant" byte of data to slip away unpreserved.
These issues are not going away. In the modem era, "virtually all
discovery involves electronic discovery to some extent., 23 One can sympathize with Judge Randolph Treece of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of New York, who bemoans a "landscape [that] may be
littered with more casualties than successes" in the modem era of electronic discovery. 24 The "scope, mechanism, cost, and perplexity" of
modem discovery is now, more often than not, simply laid at the feet of
the courts when well-heeled litigants-armed with expensive e-

19.
See ACTLIIAALS, FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 9.
20. See id.
at 10.
21.
Id.
at 1.
22. See id. at 2.
23.
Beard Research, Inc. v. Kates, No. 1316-VCP, 2009 WL 2997984, at *7 (Del. Ch. May
29, 2009).
24.
PSEG Power N.Y., Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-657 (DNH/RFr),
2007 WL 2687670, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007).
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consultants--cannot resolve the issues themselves after months or even
years of wrangling.25
Like the ACTL and LAALS, many courts are now recognizing the
broader implications of the presumption of "broad and liberal" discovery
under Rule 26(b)(1) in the modem age. The costs and delays associated
with permitting discovery of "any non-privileged matter," so long as it is
relevant, can overwhelm the very purpose of discovery and the overarching goals of civil dispute resolution. As one court summarized, "The
more information there is to discover, the more expensive it is to discover all the relevant information until, in the end, 'discovery is not just
about uncovering the truth, but also about how much of the truth the parties can afford to disinter."26
C. ProportionalDiscovery: A New Trend?
Federal and state rules of discovery have, of course, long included
means by which courts and litigants can attempt to reign in the cost, delay and burdens of discovery. Such mechanisms include, principally, the
limitations and proportionality guidelines of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) and the
protective order provisions of Rule 26(c). In practice, however, those
protections lie dormant, or are made subservient, to the default rule in
favor of virtually unlimited discovery. Unless and until the responding
party can muster a specific objection to a particular discovery request,
with sufficient evidence to back it up, any and all relevant information
must be produced. The real burden, in practice, remains upon the party
resisting discovery. The bar is set so high on the resisting party that the
default rule in favor of virtually unlimited discovery of any relevant fact
routinely prevails.
Many participants in the civil justice system with divergent interests
and roles believe the time has come to recognize that the default rule of
"broad and liberal" discovery under Rule 26(b)(1) is not simply "competing" or in tension with the primary goal of ensuring the "just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination" of civil disputes.27 Instead, it presents an
irreconcilable conflict. Put bluntly and radically, as the ACTL and
IAALS suggest, not every conceivably relevant fact should be discoverable. 8 If we are to preserve our civil justice system, it must be available to
parties to resolve legitimate disputes, whether the damages are in the
thousands or millions of dollars. 29 And if we are going to restore mea25.
See id.
26.
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Rowe
Entm't, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421,423 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
27.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 1; cf Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 311 ("This case provides a textbook
example of the difficulty of balancing the competing needs of broad discovery and manageable
costs.").
28.

See ACTIIAALS, FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 9, 11.

29.
This applies equally to smaller defense cases, where defendants regularly settle claims
with valid defenses, rather than incur the disproportionate costs of discovery. See id. at 2.
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ningful access, we cannot
continue to price litigants out of the system
30
with "over-discovery."
The default rule, therefore, should be reversed: relevant facts should
be discoverable only in proportionto the specific claims and defenses in
dispute, as determined by the judge at an early case management conference using factors such as those set forth in Rule 26(b)(2)(C), and no
further discovery of facts should be allowed without a showing of good
cause.3 1 Under this reverse default rule, the ability to show relevancy is
not the dominating test; as experience has shown, "relevancy" is not
much of a test at all. Instead, the dominating factor under the new rule is
whether requested discovery passes a threshold, common sense,
cost/benefit analysis under established proportionality factors.3 z
II. "BROAD AND LIBERAL DISCOVERY" IN PRACTICE
The pre-2000 version of Rule 26(b)(1) defined the scope of discovery in now-familiar terms:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action,
whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party ....
The U.S. Supreme Court made clear from the onset of modem discovery that the scope of discovery authorized by Rule 26 was to be construed broadly and liberally. In its oft-quoted 1947 opinion in Hickman v.
Taylor, the Court declared that the common cry of a "fishing expedition"
no longer would be sufficient to block discovery; instead, litigants must
"disgorge whatever facts" they may have that are "relevant" to the subject matter.'
By 1978, the rule announced in Hickman v. Taylor was in full effect. The high court construed the scope of discovery authorized by Rule
26 so broadly that discovery could only be denied if its relevance was
limited to stricken claims or defenses, if it related to events occurring
well outside the relevant time period, or if it was sought for use in a different proceeding. 35 Such self-evident boundaries offered almost no protection from massive and intrusive discovery, because "relevancy," as
30.

See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) advisory committee's notes to 1983 amendment.
See ACTLIAALS, FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 9.
32.
See id. at 14 ("Electronic discovery should be limited by proportionality, taking into
account the nature and scope of the case, relevance, importance to the court's adjudication, expense
and burdens.").
33.
FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1) (1993 amendment), reprinted in 6 JAMES WM. MOORE Er AL.,
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26 app. 10 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2009).

31.

34.

329 U.S. 495, 507 (1946) (internal quotation marks omitted). We note that the decision

was rendered before the Xerox Model A, the first commercial copier, was introduced in 1949, and
long before the advent of electronically stored information.
35.
See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 352 (1978).
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defined by the rule, was virtually limitless. Discovery relating to the subject matter of the case would be deemed "relevant" whether or not it related to the merits of the case, the claims and defenses presented, or the
issues raised by the pleadings. The rationale, the court reaffirmed, was
that discovery serves to "help define and clarify the issues., 36
Lower federal courts picked up the Hickman v. Taylor theme in the
years afterward, and have described the scope of discovery under Rule
26(b)(1) in even broader terms. Discovery is presumptively permitted if
there is "any possibility" that the information sought relates to the "general subject matter" of the case; 37 conversely, information is off-limits
from discovery only if it can be said with assurance that the information
sought has "no possible bearing" on the issues actually pled or the issues
that may arise during the course of the case.38
With multi-count complaints and stock lists of affirmative defenses
having become commonplace in current litigation, along with the frequency of amended pleadings to add claims and defenses, one is left to
wonder whether broad and liberal discovery helps "define and narrow"
the issues to be tried, or merely serves to expand them. Causes of action
and affirmative defenses can be "piled on" at the pleading stage, in the
hope that broad and liberal discovery will eventually provide some sup39
port, so long as the relatively modest hurdle of Rule 11 is cleared. Jus-

tice Powell may have had it right all along, when he observed in 1980
that Rule 26 "invite[s] discovery of such scope and duration that district
judges often cannot keep the practice within reasonable bounds."0
On its face, of course, Rule 26 prohibits discovery that is unduly
burdensome, costly, duplicative or unnecessary, by way of Rule 26(b)(2)
and Rule 26(c). Such safeguards in theory counterbalance the broad reading given to "relevancy" under Rule 26(b)(1). In practice, however, the
sweeping scope of Rule 26(b)(1) has translated into a strong presumption
that "relevant" discovery is allowed unless and until the responding party
obtains a court order to prevent a specific request made. "[T]he resisting
party must show how, given the broad and liberal reading afforded the
Federal Rules of discovery, each interrogatory and document request is

36.
37.

Id. at 351 (citing Hickman, 329 U.S. at 500-01).
Marker v. Union Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 125 F.R.D. 121, 124 (M.D.N.C. 1989).

38. Hammond v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., 216 F.R.D. 666, 670 (D. Kan. 2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sheldon v. Vermonty, 204 F.R.D. 679, 690 (D. Kan. 2001)); see
also Foster v. Berwind Corp., No. 90-0857, 1990 WL 209288, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 1990).
39.
See FED. R. CIv. P. 11 (requiring certification that a reasonable inquiry was made before
filing).
40.
Powell, supra note 3, at 522. Justice Powell further commented that the effect of "untrammeled" discovery upon "the average citizen's ability to afford legal remedies" could not seriously be questioned. Id.
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irrelevant,
overly broad, burdensome, oppressive, or requested in bad
41
faith.
Many courts still pay lip service to the burden of "establishing relevancy" that the party requesting discovery bears,42 but in reality the bar
of relevancy is set so low as to present virtually no burden at all. The
requesting party need only show that the discovery sought is "germane"
to the case.43 Unless a party's request for relevant information is overly
broad or otherwise objectionable "on its face," the burden immediately
shifts to the party resisting discovery.44 It does not take an experienced or
clever practitioner to craft discovery requests that are at least germane to
the case on the face of the request. One can remain intentionally vague
and speak in the broadest of terms with discovery demands, unless and
until a specific objection is made and then sustained.
The resisting party, on the other hand, bears a heavy burden. The resisting litigant must "specifically demonstrat[e]" that discovery will
cause a "clearly defined and serious injury. 4 5 To meet that high standard, the resisting party must make a "particularized factual showing" of
the harm that will result.46 "[B]road allegations of harm, unsubstantiated
by specific examples, are insufficient, ' 7 and "a mere showing that the
discovery may involve inconvenience or expense does not establish good
cause" sufficient to block the discovery sought.4 8 Evidence must be marshaled by the resisting litigant as to each and every discovery request to
which an objection is made, and failure to do so can mean discovery is
granted in bulk, as a matter of course, with no further inquiry. 49 Not only
is the resisting party's obligation to produce information presumed, so
too is his duty to pay for the costs of production. 50 The resisting party can
even be required to spend her own time and resources compiling and
researching relevant data, and interviewing witnesses at the direction of
her opponent.5'
The potential for abuse, cost, and delay created by this system of
"broad and liberal discovery" has gradually received the attention of the
Advisory Committee. In 1983, Rule 26(b)(1) was amended to add specif41.
Phillips v. Dale, No. 86-2690, 1987 WL 9650, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 1987).
42.
PSEG Power N.Y., Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-657 (DNHIRFI),
2007 WL 2687670, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Sep. 7, 2007).
43.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
44.
Hammond v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., 216 F.R.D. 666,672 (D. Kan. 2003).
45.
Lakeland Partners, L.L.C. v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 124, 133 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Forest Prods. Nw., Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. CI. 109, 114 (2004)).
46.
Id. (quoting Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders,and Public Access to the
Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 433 (1991)).
47.
Id.
48.
Id. at 137.
49.
Phillips v. Dale, No. 86-2690, 1987 WL 9650, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 1987).
50.
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978).
51.
Medcorp, Inc. v. Pinpoint Techs., Inc., No. 08-cv-00867-MSK-KLM, 2009 WL 1049758,
at *3 (D. Colo. Apr. 20, 2009).
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ic grounds upon which the courts could limit the "frequency or extent" of
discovery, including a recognition that in some cases discovery is simply
disproportionate to the amount in controversy, the needs of the case, the
importance of the issues presented and the resources of the parties. 2 The
proportionality factors recited were intended to guard against "overdiscovery" and to encourage judges to be more aggressive in preventing
abuse.5 3
By 1993, the Advisory Committee explicitly recognized that "broad
and liberal" discovery might lead to vastly greater cost, delay, and widespread abuse, particularly with the proliferation of electronic information: "The information explosion of recent decades has greatly increased
both the potential cost of wide-ranging discovery and the potential for
discovery to be used as an instrument for delay or oppression." 54 Nevertheless, while attempting to put "tighter rein" on discovery, the Advisory
Committee left unchanged Rule 26(b)(1)'s presumptive rule in favor of
broad and liberal discovery.55
In 2000, the scope of discovery under Rule 26(b)(1) was finally narrowed substantively, by permitting only discovery that is relevant to the
"claims and defenses," and not merely the "subject matter" of the case. A
requirement of good cause was imposed for discovery beyond the new,
"refined" boundary. With the 2000 amendments to Rule 26(b)(1), the
Advisory Committee acknowledged that concerns among the bench and
bar over cost, delay, and "over-discovery" in general had become persistent. At the same time, the committee acknowledged that the new boundary would be difficult to enforce. The "dividing line" between information relevant to the general subject matter of the case, but not the actual
claims and defenses, is difficult to draw.56
Indeed, one might argue that there is no such dividing line at all. If
information is relevant to the subject matter of the case, which in turn is
determined by reference to the claims and defenses alleged, then by definition such information probably qualifies as at least "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence., 57 In the end, the
Advisory Committee summarized that the scope of discovery under the
amendment
"depends on the circumstances"-hardly a dividing line at
58
alL.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) advisory committee's notes to 1983 amendment.
Id.
Id. advisory committee's notes to 1993 amendment.
See id.
Id. advisory committee's notes to 2000 amendment.
Id.26(b)(1).
Id.advisory committee's notes to 2000 amendment.
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Judicial opinions appear to confirm that little has changed since the
1983, 1993 and 2000 amendments to Rule 26(b)(1).5 9 The default rule of
broad and liberal discovery remains intact. In 2010, even after all these
rule amendments, the presumption continues to be that if there exists
"any possibility" 6° that information or material is relevant to the case, "it
should generally be produced., 61 The resisting party continues to bear the
burden of showing by specific proof why information should not be produced, whether on the basis of cost, burden or need.62 In short, the
"strong preference for broad production" continues to dominate. So too
does the presumption that the responding party must pay the way of his
inquisitive opponent, whether or not the information sought is in paper or
electronic 63
repositories, live or archived, measured in bankers boxes or in
gigabytes.
Conversely, limitations on discovery are rarely enforced absent a
specific, fact-supported challenge mounted by the resisting party. Courts
with crowded dockets seem to prefer--or are simply more accustomed
to-resolution of discovery disputes by an itemized analysis of each disputed discovery request and the sufficiency of the specific objection. Still
largely missing is any assessment of whether the discovery sought is
proportional in its broader context, considering the needs of the case, the
amount in controversy, the significance of the issues, and the resources
of the parties. The judicial "vigor" hoped for by the Advisory Committee
when the proportionality guidelines were first adopted has failed to materialize. 64
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CURRENT DEFAULT RULE

A. "Broad and Liberal": By the Numbers
If the "strong preference for broad discovery" of all relevant facts
remains largely intact, does it matter? At least some cost, delay, and potential for abuse is inherent in any discovery system, of course. One
might argue such distasteful byproducts are "necessary evils" of a system
that strives for fair outcomes by allowing the parties and the courts to
consider all relevant facts. The ACTL and IAALS argue, however, that
the problems with the current discovery system are systemic, and the
consequences are severe. According to the members of the ACTL who

59.
See, e.g., Medcorp, Inc. v. Pinpoint Techs., Inc., No. 08-cv-00867-MSK-KLM, 2009 WL
1049758, at *2-4 (D. Colo. Apr. 20, 2009).
60.
Id. at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cardenas v. Dorel Juvenile Group,
Inc., 232 F.R.D. 377, 382 (D. Kan. 2005)).
61.
Id.
62.
Payless Shoesource Worldwide, Inc. v. Target Corp., No. 05-4023-JAR, 2007 WL
1959194, at *13 (D. Kan. June 29, 2007).
63.
Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, L.L.C., 655 F. Supp. 2d 146, 148 (D. Mass. 2009); Medcorp, 2009 WL 1049758, at *2-3.
64.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 2000 amendment.
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responded to the Task Force Survey, 65 parties with the means or fortitude
to use the court system now face longer waits than ever to get to trial,
and at exponentially greater costs. The result is far fewer jury and bench
trials. 66 Many parties are forced to settle to avoid the sheer cost and dethe
lay. The system can hardly be called "fair," "just" or "speedy," when 67
cost and delay of discovery is used to "bludgeon a case to settlement.,
Federal court statistics lend support to the ACTL and IAALS conclusions regarding fewer trials and longer delays, even if factors other
than discovery play a role. According to the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts, the delay in getting a federal civil case to trial in the last
seventeen years has steadily gone from 15 months to 25 months,68 and
the upward climb shows no signs of abating. Clients now must wait over
two years to get to trial, while the parties slog through expensive discovery and related motions practice. At the same time, the average number
of civil cases handled annually by each federal judge has remained constant, even as the economy and population grow. Thus, while the number
of cases remains constant, the number of trials conducted has steadily
decreased over the last seventeen years and has flat-lined, both in raw
numbers and as a percentage of civil cases filed. The following table
summarizes the statistics69:
Year

Median Months - Civil
Case Filing to Trial

Trials Per
Judge

Civil Cases
Per Judge

1992

15

32

355

1993

16

30

354

1994

18

27

364

1995

18

27

383

1996

18

27

416

1997

19

26

420

1998

19.5

25

398

65.
Nearly forty-two percent of the ACTL's membership responded. See ACTUIlAALS,
FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 2.
Id. at 3.
66.
ACTIJAALS, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 9, at B-1.
67.
See STATISTICS Div., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. DISTRICT COURT68.
JUDICIAL CASELOAD PROFILE (2008), http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsd2008.pl (click "generate" button) [hereinafter 2008 CASELOAD PROFILE]; STATISTICS Div., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, DISTRICT COURT-JUDICIAL CASELOAD PROFILE (1997), http://www.uscourts.gov/cgibin/cms.pl (click "generate" button) [hereinafter 1997 CASELOAD PROFILE].

69.
Data compiled from Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Court Management
Statistics, Judicial Caseload Profile, twelve-month annual statistics for period ending Sep. 30 of each
year. See 2008 CASELOAD PROFILE, supra note 68; STATISTICS Div., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, DISTRICT COURT-JUDICIAL CASELOAD PROFILE (2003), http://www.uscourts.gov/cgibin/cmsd2003.pl (click "generate" button); 1997 CASELOAD PROFILE, supra note 68.
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1999

20.5

23

403

2000

20.0

22

396

2001

21.6

20

377

2002

21.8

19

413

2003

22.5

19

372

2004

22.6

19

414

2005

22.5

19

374

2006

23.2

19

383

2007

24.6

20

380

2008

24.8

20

394

These numbers are troubling. Not only do they show that it is taking
longer to get to trial, but the "Trials Per Judge" statistic may overstate the
number of civil trials because it apparently also includes criminal trials.
Furthermore, the ACTL and IAALS conclude that "[s]ome deserving
cases are not brought because the cost of pursuing them fails a rational
cost-benefit test while some other cases of questionable merit and smaller cases are settled rather than tried because it costs too much to litigate
them., 70 This suggests that many parties with valid claims or defenses
simply opt out of the system altogether to avoid the costs, delays, and
disruption associated with the discovery system. If this is true, then the
current model of discovery might have an even stronger suppressive effect than is reflected in caseload statistics.
Proof that meritorious claims and defenses are simply abandoned by
potential litigants, in response to the costs imposed by the current discovery system, is difficult to find beyond the type of survey conducted
by ACTL and IAALS. But one can look to reported opinions to see that
litigants who may have meritorious claims or defenses often face punitive discovery burdens. If an aggrieved party dares to bring or defend a
case likely to trigger substantial discovery requests from the other side,
as most civil cases do today, she must be prepared for the overwhelming
costs and delay that will result. In other words, rational litigants have to
predict whether the discovery nightmare they can expect is worth it. The
following section illustrates one such case.

70.

ACTI.IAALS, FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 2.
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B. Case Study: Orrell v. Motorcarparts of America, Inc.71
Tanya Orrell brought a Title VII claim against her former employer,
alleging sexual harassment and a hostile work environment. 72 Orrell alleged that over a three-year period, beginning in 2002, she was harassed
by "several" co-workers and customers. 73 Some of the harassment allegedly took the form of "hundreds" of pornographic and offensive emails
directed to Orrell.74 Orrell, who traveled frequently for the defendant,
received many of the alleged emails on her company-issued laptop computer.75 Orrell also testified that it was her practice to forward emails
from her laptop to her home computer.7 6 In addition, Orrell had sent
some of the offensive emails to her husband over the 3-year period, delivered to his work computer.77
Upon termination of her employment, Orrell and her husband had
the laptop hard drive "wiped" of all data before returning it to her employer, allegedly to protect personal financial information. That, of
course, was an enormous mistake. The discovery sought by the employer
upon filing of the complaint was predictably exhaustive and penal. The
employer demanded Orrell and her husband identify all computers used
over the 3-year period of the suit, plus an additional four years going
back to the date of her original employment with the defendant in 1998. 79
The defendant then made demand for production of "[a]ny and all documents concerning [the employer] retained by you or obtained by you in
any manner during or from your [seven years of] employment., 80
Orrell produced twenty-two pages of emails from 2003-2004 supporting her claim, but the defendant deemed that production insufficient.8 ' Orrell and her husband then paid a technical consultant to produce back-up tapes of additional responsive documents including 10,000
printed pages. 82 The defendant also demanded a forensic examination of
the husband's business computer and a third computer the couple used
for a side business.8 3 The defendant further demanded that Orrell answer
interrogatories detailing each and every instance of alleged harassment
over the three-year period, by whom, the specific content, together with
the time, date, and location of each event and the identity of any observ71.

No. 3:06CV418-R, 2007 WL 4287750 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 5, 2007).

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at *3-4.
Id. at *2.
ld. at *2-3.

78.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See id.
Id. at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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ers or persons with knowledge of such event. 84 Orrell had specifically
identified persons with knowledge of the harassment she alleged, but she
did not give further explanation. 85 The defendant also demanded all
records relating to Orrell's post-termination employment to evaluate her
claim of lost wages and compliance with her duty to mitigate damages.86
Orrell had produced only her tax returns showing her income and sources
for all relevant periods.87
The Orrell court granted the defendant's motion to compel on virtually all issues, without ever discussing the cost or burden imposed upon
Orrell in light of the damages claimed and the importance of the issues
presented.88 For example, according to the published opinion, the court
failed to consider whether production of less than all of the offensive
emails by Orrell was sufficient in light of the claims made, or whether
she would simply have to risk losing the case on the basis of not having
retained all of the "hundreds" of emails alleged. 89 Nor, according to the
opinion, did the court consider whether relevant electronic communications were accessible by a search of the company's own computer systems, or the overall significance of the emails in light of other acts of
harassment alleged. Nor did the court evidently consider the feasibility or
nature of the burden that would be imposed upon the company by simply
interviewing the persons identified by Orrell. Instead, as might be expected, the court simply cited the default rule that all "relevant" information is presumptively discoverable, and chastised Orrell for not preserving all offending emails that accumulated over the three-year period. 90
Although the case involved a personal claim brought by a relatively unsophisticated plaintiff, the court cited the same rigid duty to produce and
preserve all electronic data that applies to corporate litigants engaged in a
multi-million dollar commercial dispute.9 1
Whether or not Orrell's claims had merit, any sexual harassment
victim or her counsel reading the discovery opinion would undoubtedly
think long and hard before filing a Title VII claim that relies on voluminous emails exchanged over a lengthy period of time-regardless of
the fact that email has become one of the primary means of intracompany communication in today's business world.
Perhaps creation of a disincentive to sue from the threat of massive
discovery is the whole point, from a defendant's perspective. Intentional
or not, massive discovery sends a message to the next potential plaintiff.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at *8.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *5-6.
Id. at *5.
See id. at *9-10.
See id. at * 1-2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at *1-6.
See id at *6-8.
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And, to be fair, plaintiffs and their counsel are equally incentivized by
the current discovery system to use the threat of costly, invasive, and
time-consuming discovery to cause defendants to settle cases quickly for
substantial payment rather than pursue valid defenses. That is not a fair
system. That is a system where the party able to launch the most aggressive and far-reaching discovery campaign prevails, regardless of how the
law applies on the merits. Once again, it appears Justice Powell accurately warned of such results nearly three decades ago. 92
IV. MAKING PROPORTIONAL DISCOVERY THE RULE, RATHER THAN THE

EXCEPTION
A. Proportionalityas a Default Rule
There is another way. The default rule for discovery should start
with proportionality, and a recognition that not all conceivably-relevant
facts are discoverable in every case.9 3 To be sure, proportionality factors
are already a part of the discovery rules. Rule 26(b)(2)(C) provides:
On motion or on its own, the court must limit the frequency or extent
of discovery otherwise allowed by these rules or by local rule if it determines that:
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or
can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive;
(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain
the information by discovery in the action; or
(iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its
likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake
in the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the is94
sues.
But while proportionality limits are available, in practice the guidelines are rarely used. Instead, proportionality takes a back seat to the
strong presumption in favor of broad and liberal discovery. As the ACTL
and IAALS put it, "these factors are rarely if ever applied because of the

92.
Powell, supra note 3, at 523 ("[A]U too often, discovery practices enable the party with
greater financial resources to prevail by exhausting the resources of a weaker opponent. The mere
threat of delay or unbearable expense denies justice to many actual or prospective litigants. Persons
or businesses of comparatively limited means settle unjust claims and relinquish just claims simply
because they cannot afford to litigate.").
93.
Large, complex cases, cases with important social issues, and other cases which require
extensive discovery would properly get extensive discovery. Less complicated and smaller cases that
do not require such extensive discovery would not.
94.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:2

longstanding notion that parties are entitled to discover all facts, without
limit, unless and until a court says otherwise. 9 5
Attorneys are required to zealously advocate for their clients. Excessive or evasive discovery tactics are among the most commonly used
tools to induce a favorable settlement--or to deter a claim altogether,
depending on which side abuses the process. Unless and until attorneys
are forced to make discovery proportionate, the abuses outlined in this
article will continue. Guidelines, to put it bluntly, are not enough. Courts
and litigants will continue to look primarily to the rules in discovery-as
they should. Therefore the rules must be explicitly changed to make limited discovery the primary and presumptive rule of discovery, not the
exception: "The primary goal [should be] to change the default from
unlimited discovery to limited discovery. . . . Additional discovery
beyond the default limits would
be allowed only upon a showing of good
96
cause and proportionality.,
Reversing the default rule means proportionality would replace relevancy as the most important principle guiding discovery. Relevancy
would remain a threshold requirement, but would not be a license to obtain discovery regardless of the burden or expense imposed on the opponent if the costs of discovery outweigh the likely benefit.97 While such a
costlbenefit approach to discovery may strike some practitioners as inviting subjectivity, it is a policy choice already built into the existing rules,
albeit secondary to the greater goal of allowing a virtually unbridled
search for truth. Until proportionality becomes the guiding principle,
virtually unlimited discovery will continue unless and until the responding party convinces the court to actually apply the proportionality factors-and almost none do.
In 2009, the ACTL and IAALS, following their eighteen-month
joint project and survey on discovery, developed "Pilot Project Rules"
designed to encourage the discovery reforms included in the groups'
final report. Proportionality takes center stage as the governing principle
for the entire pre-trial process:
Rule 1.2. At all times, the court and parties must address the action in
ways designed to assure that the process and the costs are proportionate to the amount in controversy and the complexity and importance

of the issues. The factors to be considered by the court in making a
proportionality assessment include, without limitation: needs of the
case, amount in controversy, parties' resources, and complexity and

importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. This proportionality

95.

INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL Sys., 21ST CENTURY CivIL. JUSTICE

SYSTEM: A ROADMAP FOR REFORM: PILOT PROJEcr RULES 2 (2009) [hereinafter IAALS, PPR].
96. ACTIAALS, FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 11.
97.
For example, the benefit of obtaining potentially tangential or duplicative facts may not
justify the added burdens and costs.
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including the discovery of
rule is fully applicable to all discovery,
98
electronically stored information.
The ACTL and IAALS suggested rule, in addition to reversing the
default rule, realistically recognizes that litigants, acting as zealous advocates for their clients, are likely to end the tug-of-war over relevancy and
instead focus upon proportional discovery only when they are forced to
do so. The suggested rule is perhaps an indirect concession that longstanding judicial calls for "cooperat[ion]" and "collaboration" 99 among
opposing parties and counsel, and hopes for more "reasonable lawyers," ° are at best inconsistent with the aggressive, zealous representation that lawyers strive to give their clients-and at worst naive. Opposing counsel are not companions in the discovery process. Unless required
by the rules to jointly devise a plan of proportionate discovery, mandated
by the court if necessary, lawyers will simply continue costly and timeconsuming battles over the scope of "relevant" information to be exchanged.
Proportionality is quickly becoming the guiding principle for discovery of electronic information, as courts are increasingly forced to
grapple with the issue.10 1 Thus, the reform we recommend is as follows:
make proportionality the guiding, mandatory principle for all discovery,
including the Rule 26 required disclosures, interrogatories, document
requests, requests for admissions, third party subpoenas, and party and
non-party depositions. If a weighting of the relative costs and benefits is
appropriate for electronic discovery, then there is no principled reason
why proportionality should not be the guiding principle for all forms of
discovery.
For example, The Sedona Conference Working Group has discussed
the costs of producing electronic information in terms that apply to all
discovery. 10 2 Electronic or other discovery must take into account not
only the hard costs of locating and retrieving relevant information, but
also the less quantifiable or even non-monetary costs, "including the
interruption and disruption of routine business processes and the costs of
reviewing the information" and "the resources required to review documents for relevance, privilege, confidentiality, and privacy."' 0 3 Absent a
balancing test required by a rule of proportionality, warns the Sedona
Conference, electronic discovery costs alone stand to "overwhelm the
IAALS, PPR, supra note 95, at 1-2.
98.
Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, 655 F. Supp. 2d 146, 149 (D. Mass. 2009).
99.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's notes to 2000 amendment.
100.
See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC., 217 F.R.D. 309, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Rowe
101.
Entm't, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421,426 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP ON ELEC. DOCUMENT RETENTION & PROD.,
102.
THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: SECOND EDITION BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS AND PRINCIPLES
(2007),
17
PRODUCTION
DOCUMENT
ELECTRONIC
ADDRESSING
FOR

http://www.thesedonaconference.org/dltForm?did=TSCPRINCP_2nd_ed_607.pdf.
Id.
103.
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ability to resolve disputes fairly in litigation."' 4 While the Sedona Conference addresses the issue in a business-to-business context, similar
considerations of costs and disruption should apply when determining
the discovery obligations of individuals like Tanya Orrell, discussed earlier.
B. Proportionalityin Practice:Early Developments
Building upon the proportionality factors of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) and
the work of the Sedona Conference, some federal courts are slowly beginning to enforce proportionality guidelines against litigants-albeit
primarily in the context of electronic discovery. In Rowe Entertainment,
Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., °5 for example, U.S. Magistrate
Judge James C. Francis IV developed an eight-factor proportionality test
for e-discovery that supplemented Rule 26(b)(2)(C) with considerations
such as "the likelihood of discovering critical information," "the specificity of the discovery requests," "the total cost associated with production," and "the relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to do so."

6

In Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 10 7 a federal opinion that has
emerged as a primary reference in many e-discovery disputes, Judge
Shira Scheindlin applied and revised the factors developed by the Rowe
court.108 Judge Scheindlin appropriately noted that the "total cost asso-

ciated with production," as referenced in Rowe, is almost always a large
number at least in cases where an objection to production and costshifting is sought. 1°9 Thus, real proportionality, as contemplated by Rule
26(b)(2)(C), requires weighing such production costs against the
"amount in controversy" and the "importance of the issues" for which
the information is sought.1 ° Similarly, Judge Scheindlin observed, real
proportionality requires an assessment of not merely the relative ability
of the parties to produce the discovery requested, but also the "total cost
of [the discovery] as compared to the resources available to each party."'' "Thus, discovery that would be too expensive for one defendant to
bear would be a drop in the bucket for another."'1 12 The "importance of
104.
Id.
105.
205 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
106.
Id. at 429 (emphasis added). The eight-factors are:
(1) the specificity of the discovery requests; (2) the likelihood of discovering critical information; (3)
the availability of such information from other sources; (4) the purposes for which the responding
party maintains the requested data (5) the relative benefit to the parties of obtaining the information;
(6) the total cost associated with production; (7) the relative ability of each party to control costs and
its incentive to do so; and (8) the resources available to each party.
Id.
107.
217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
108.
Id. at 316-21.
109.
See id. at 321 (internal quotation marks omitted).

110.

See id.

111.
112.

Id.
Id.
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the issues" factor, noted the court, also necessarily raises the question of
the potential public impact of the case." 3 A toxic tort class action or environmental case, for example, might1 4affect millions of citizens while
other disputes are truly private affairs.'
C. The 2006 Amendments
Following Zubulake, proportionality concepts were further developed in the 2006 "e-discovery amendment" to Rule 26, adopted as Rule
26(b)(2)(B).' 15 The e-discovery amendment specifically regulates production of electronically stored information. 6 Once again, while limited
to the context of electronic information, the rationale for proportional
discovery cited by the Advisory Committee applies with equal force to
all forms of discovery. The Advisory Committee explicitly recognized
that a producing party should be obligated to disgorge only electronic
information "reasonably accessible," as measured by burden and cost,
after which further information would require the requesting party to
show good cause. 17 The Committee specifically calls for a rational
cost/benefit analysis that takes into account the parties' resources, the
issues at stake in the litigation, and other proportionality factors. 1 8 This,
we urge, should be the guiding principle for all discovery.
It is too soon to tell whether the foregoing steps towards proportional discovery can be called a trend, but they do offer hope of a more rational discovery system. Plaintiffs and defendants will likely differ on the
fairness of proportional or limited discovery as applied in particular cases, or even systemically. 1 9 The perceived fairness of proportional discovery may depend upon the adoption of additional reforms that take
into account matters such as fact-based pleading standards applicable to
both plaintiff and defendant, judicial willingness to manage the discovery
113.
Id.
See id.
114.
115.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
116.
Id.
Id. advisory committee's notes to 2006 amendment.
117.
118.
Id.
A noted plaintiffs attorney, Elizabeth J. Cabraser, in commenting upon the ACTL and
119.
IAALS Final Report, notes that proportional or limited discovery may favor defendants unless done
in conjunction with other civil justice reforms:
Holistically, the FinalReport program seems balanced, with a potential to improve the quality, and
reduce the cost, of civil litigation. It is the product of extensive study, thoughtful reflection, discussion and compromise among those with opposing viewpoints, and it reflects the practicality gained
through the litigation experience of seasoned practitioners on both sides of the "v."
The danger is that the project's recommendations will be implemented piecemeal. Discovery limitations on their own spell disaster for the process of fact-finding. In any discovery limitation program,
the defense has the clear advantage: it has the information, and it can hide or destroy the information, without plaintiffs being the wiser. Punishment depends on detection, and discovery limitations
make concealment easier and detection less likely. An honor system depends upon the honor of the
participants--and this is the crux of the problem, perceived or real.
Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Uncovering Discovery, 59 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 55,
on file with authors); see also Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Apportioning Due Process: Preserving the
Right to Affordable Justice, 87 DENY. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2010).
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process before disputes arise, early production of documents by the parties, including documents which support defenses, 12mandatory
sanctions
0
for failure to produce documents, and other factors.
CONCLUSION

The time has come to recognize that the "broad and liberal" default
rule of discovery, dominant in the U.S. for over 70 years, has outlived its
useful life. It has increasingly led to unacceptable delay and abuse. The
bench, the bar, and litigants have few kind words for the system. The
threat of delay and cost from "over-discovery" likely means many litigants with deserving cases must simply opt out of the system, or settle
cases that otherwise would be tried on unfavorable terms. Those who use
the system are less likely to get a trial of their claims or defenses, and
face longer waits to get there.
Proportionality guidelines written into the existing rules, but rarely
used or enforced, should become the governing rule. This must be done
explicitly. Proportionality must be made the norm, not the exceptionthe starting point, rather than an afterthought. Proportionality guidelines
should not simply be available, they should be imposed. The "broad and
liberal" standard should be abandoned in place of proportionality rules
that make "relevancy" part of the test for permissible discovery, but not
the starting point. If we are to take back the system, and restore accessibility to meritorious cases, no matter their size, we are compelled to
make fundamental changes. Hopefully these changes will enable us to
stop litigating discovery and start trying a greater number of meritorious
cases. The Pilot Project Rules of the ACTL and IAALS are a bold step in
this new direction. If embraced by the courts, parties and their counsel,
such proportionality guidelines offer hope that the system can actually
live up to its first goal as expressed in Federal Rule 1: securing for the
average citizen, as Justice Powell 1would
say, a "just, speedy and inex21
case.
her
of
determination"
pensive

120. The ACTL and IAALS have recognized that such additional reforms may need to accompany proportional discovery to make it effective.
121.
Powell, supra note 3, at 522 & n.4.

MANDATING REASONABLENESS IN A REASONABLE
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PREFACE: DATA WARS
"Don't try to frighten us with your sorcerer's ways, Lord Vader.
Your sad devotion to that ancient religion has not helped you conjure
up the stolen data tapes, or given you clairvoyance enough to find the
rebels' hidden fortress."
- Admiral Motti to Darth Vadar, Star Wars

Just as today's litigators struggle with searching for relevant documents to respond to an opponent's discovery request, fictional adversat
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ries that existed "[a] long time ago in a galaxy far, far away" had similar
trouble locating missing data tapes on a planet-sized battleship. Searching for lost items is a difficult task--especially if your search team
doesn't know what to look for.
A physical search using a traditional brute-force technique does not
necessarily result in the desired outcome of locating everything requested
for the least amount of effort and cost, all while avoiding the wrong lookalike objects. Knowing where to look and how to deploy the proper tools
can help garner success; whereas hiring a squadron of "newbies," who
lack subject matter expertise, to search every nook and cranny for a treasure that might not even exist, might be a fool's errand. After all, Darth
Vader could not find the stolen data tapes because Princess Leah loaded
them onto R2D2.
Similarly, American lawyers lacking jedi-like clairvoyance must
develop subject matter expertise in knowing what to search for, and
creating strategies and techniques to search for and produce discovery
material in litigation using a cost-effective and reasonable process. Failure may result in a wrath of sanctions for underperforming, or heavy
expenses for "over discovery."' Thus, the most successful lawyers in the
electronic discovery age will be those who overcome the difficulty of
reasonably responding to their opponent's requests in the shortest
amount of time and for the least amount of effort and expense.
Yet litigants are at an impasse. The advent of electronically stored
information ("ESI') has rendered old-fashioned, spoon-fed document
review operations-which places three pairs of very expensive eyeballs
on every document-impractical and arguably ineffective. Inappropriate
search methodology not only increases litigation costs for the parties, but
such tasks also waste the precious time of the courts with avoidable motions and unnecessary orders.
The litigation community must reconsider traditional search and retrieval techniques, or we will face either a nation without justice or a
profession full of document reviewers. Traditional approaches to discovery now lead counsel away from the path toward a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of the law, and away from the mandate that
discovery responses be both reasonable and proportional to the controversy they surround.2

1. "Over discovery" is the practice of collecting and producing data that is largely irrelevant,
but for the fact that it may reside in the vicinity of relevant information.
2. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26 Advisory Committee's notes to 1983 amendment ("These practices
impose costs on an already overburdened system and impede the fundamental goal of the 'just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."' (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 1)); see also
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 179 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) "[Tlhe widespread abuse of
discovery ...has become a prime cause of delay and expense in civil litigation.").
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The authors of this Article-after responding to hundreds of discovery requests by deploying massive traditional brute-force document reviews-sought peer-reviewed alternatives that are as efficient, defensible, and at least as good as traditional document review. This Article, and
The Electronic Discovery Institute Study ("EDI study") that supports it,
seek to provide insight for legal practitioners who face the significant
challenge of navigating a response to an opponent's discovery requests.3
We conclude that alternate approaches to manual human document review are both valid and reasonable, perhaps even more reasonable than
traditional methodologies.
On a broader level, the EDI study and this Article underscore the
tremendous value and need for the measurement and understanding of
the effects of technology on litigation. As technology continues to imbed
itself in the social fabric of our lives, lawyers representing clients must
take on the task of learning how technology works and how it affects us,
both before and after litigation is commenced. Commentators and attorneys in the so-called "e-discovery" arena often blame the problems on
the technology. But we submit that it's not the technology; the problem
is the attorneys that fail to learn and embrace it. Accordingly, the authors
respectfully request that judges start to rule in favor of reasonableness,
and that the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure consider future supplemental commentary and committee notes that
(1) encourage attorneys to learn and study technology; (2) help them
better understand their options for meeting discovery obligations in litigation; and (3) assist courts with properly evaluating a disclosing party's
process for meeting those obligations.4 Quite simply, litigants require
tools and guidance to help them develop discovery processes to meet the
standards of Rule 1 and provide a clear path to alternatives to traditional
methodologies.5

3.
See generally Herbert L. Roitblat, Anne Kershaw & Patrick Oot, Document Categorization in Legal Electronic Discovery: Computer Classification vs. Manual Review, 61 J. Am. SOC'Y
FOR INFO. SC. & TECH. 70 (2010).
4. See Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251, 262 (D. Md. 2008) ("Selection of the appropriate search and information retrieval technique requires careful advance planning by persons qualified to design effective search methodology. The implementation of the methodology selected should be tested for quality assurance; and the party selecting the methodology must
be prepared to explain the rationale for the method chosen to the court, demonstrate that it is appropriate for the task, and show that it was properly implemented.").
5. The Sedona Conference Working Group Series, The Sedona Conference Best Practices
Commentary on the Use of Search and Information Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery, 8 SEDONA
CONF
J.
189,
198
(2007),
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/dltForm?did=Best_Practices RetrievalMethods
revisedco
verand_preface.pdf [hereinafter Sedona Conference WGS] ("However, with increasingly complex
computer networks, and the exponential increase in the volume of information existing in the digital
realm, the venerated process of 'eyes only' review has become neither workable nor economically
feasible.").
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I. GENERAL COMMENTARY OF THE DISCOVERY PROCESS

A. Discovery Defined
For the non-lawyer, discovery is best defined as an investigation of
the facts surrounding a lawsuit or case. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grant each party in a lawsuit the broad investigative right to retrieve information (both technical and theoretical) from the party opponent.6 Typical methods of discovery include document requests, written
interrogatories, or depositions of an opponent's representatives. During
this investigation of the facts, a responding party must identify the potential locations of relevant information, collect that information, examine it
for both responsiveness and privilege, and then finally produce it to the
requesting party.
Similarly, The Sedona Conference® defines discovery as:
[T]he process of identifying, locating, securing and producing information and materials for the purpose of obtaining evidence for utilization in the legal process. The term is also used to describe the
process of reviewing all materials that may be potentially relevant to
the issues at hand and/or that may need to be disclosed to other parties, and of evaluating evidence to prove or disprove facts, theories or
allegations. There are several ways to conduct discovery, the most
requests for production of doccommon of which are interrogatories,
7
uments and depositions.
8
B. Discovery Priorto the FederalRules

Prior to the final draft of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, discovery was significantly limited in both England and the United States. 9
Broad discovery rules were not a part of litigation in the United States
until Charles Clark, first reporter for the Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, sought the assistance of scholar Edson
Sunderland to draft the federal discovery provisions. Relying on George
Ragland, Jr.'s extensive research on pre-trial discovery, Sunderland's
additions "included every type of discovery that was known in the Unit-

6. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (b)(1). The Federal Rules state that "[p]arties may obtain discovery
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense." Id. To be discoverable, the information sought "need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Id.
7.
THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP SERIES, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE
GLOSSARY: E-DISCOVERY AND DIGITAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 15 (Conor R. Crowley &

Sherry B. Harris eds., 2d ed. 2007), http://www.thesedonaconference.org/dltForm?did=TSCGlossary
_12_07.pdf.
8.
See generally INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., HISTORICAL
(2009),
CIVIL
PROCEDURE
RULES
OF
TO
THE
FEDERAL
BACKGROUND

http://www.du.edu/legalinstitutepubsHistory%20FINAL.pdf [hereinafter IAALS].
9.
Id. at 2 (citing Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Backgroundof the 1938 FederalDiscovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691,694 (1998)).
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ed States and probably England up to that time."10 As a result, the Advisory Committee included every major discovery device proposed (but for
a mandatory disclosure provision) in the final draft of the Federal Rules,
but excluded a number of constraining devices. 1' The Supreme Court
approved the rules in December of 1937, which12 took effect on September
16, 1938 as a result of Congressional inaction.
C. Discovery Today
Courts and treatises state that the discovery rules, together with pretrial procedures, remove the risk of surprises at trial and provide for more
a fair contest "by requiring disclosure of all relevant information.' 3 Others have argued that full discovery will, among other things, "(1) help
focus controversies on the substantive issues; (2) make trials and settlements more rational; and (3) reduce pleading disputes."' 14 But as practicing litigators know all too well, the nature of the adversarial system has
pushed discovery well beyond its original purpose "to inform the adversary of what theories [a] party proposes to 'develop' at trial, and on what
basis a jury will be asked to award damages. 15 By requiring disclosure
of all possible relevant information in our electronic world, the discovery
rules allow the ultimate resolution of disputed issues to be based not only
on the full and accurate understanding of true facts, but also on which
party has more money to spend and whether litigants are before a judge
who does not understand the full cost implications of certain discovery
decisions.
D. Rule 26(g): A Reasonable Inquiry
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandate certain obligations of
counsel when responding to discovery requests. Like all obligations,
attorneys must adhere to a "standard of care." Rule 26(g) promulgates
this standard of care by requiring the responding party's attorney to certify "that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief
formed after a reasonable inquiry: with respect to a disclosure, [the response] is complete and correct as of the time it is made."' 16 Furthermore:
The duty to make a "reasonable inquiry" is satisfied if the investigation undertaken by the attorney and the conclusions drawn therefrom
are reasonable under the circumstances. It is an objective standard
10. Id. at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Subrin, supra note 9, at 718).
11.
Id.
12.
Id.
13.
In re PE Corp. Sec. Litig., 221 F.R.D. 20, 23 (D. Conn. 2003) (citing United States v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958)); 6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 26.02 (3d. ed. 1997 & Supp. 2009) (citing New Haven Temple SDA Church v. Consol.
Edison Corp., No. 94 Civ. 7128 (AGS) (BAL), 1995 WL 358788 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 1995)).
14.
IAALS, supra note 8, at 6 (citing Subrin, supra note 9, at 709).
15.
New Haven Temple SDA Church, 1995 WL 358788, at *5.
16.
FED. R. Ctv. P. 26(g)(1) (emphasis added).
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similar to the one imposed by Rule 11 .... Ultimately, what is reasonable is a17matter for the court to decide on the totality of the circumstances.

Thus, Rule 26(g) retains the principle that attorneys are obliged to
be reasonable in their discovery objectives and processes, and to refrain
from conduct that frustrates the objectives of Rule 1.
1. The Standard of Care for Today's Litigator: Preserve, Collect,
Review, and Produce
The concept of "reasonableness" that the drafters intertwined8
throughout the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure stems from tort law.'
The now-familiar objective reasonable person standard originally came
from Vaughan v. Menlove. 19 As many lawyers will recall from first-year
torts, in Vaughn the defendant negligently stacked hay on his property in
a way that caused it to spontaneously combust and subsequently destroy
his neighbor's homes. The court ruled that the defendant's lack of intelligence did not override his duty of care to his neighbors. The defendant
was required to maintain the care of reasonably prudent person. Thus,
ignorance was not an excuse for Mr. Menlove.
Similarly, in analyzing a litigant's actions in response to a discovery
request, "reasonableness" requires courts to place themselves in the
shoes of a reasonably educated litigator when determining if the res0onding party acted appropriately in conducting a reasonable inquiry. Yet
17.
Id. 26 advisory committee's notes to 1937 adoption; see also Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 357 (D. Md. 2008) ("The duty to make a 'reasonable inquiry' is
satisfied if the investigation undertaken by the attorney and the conclusions drawn therefrom are
reasonable under the circumstances."); Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 365 F.
Supp. 975, 982-84 (E.D. Pa. 1973). In Kinee, the court imposed sanctions for violation of Rule 11
because the plaintiffs decided to sue every lending institution in the phone book, rather than conducting an adequate investigation:
The plaintiffs' attorneys set out a dragnet. Having put a large number of parties to the inconvenience, expense and possible anxiety of being sued, they then were able conveniently to separate the wheat from the chaff without great effort .... If the plaintiffs had
attempted reasonable investigation, and if some of the lending institutions who were not
proper parties had not cooperated in that investigation, then perhaps they would have
been justified in undertaking the course of action which they undertook. But under the
circumstances of this case, the course of action which they chose was grossly improper.
Kinee, 365 F. Supp. at 982-83.
See Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 E.R. 490, 494 (C.P. 1837). In Vaughan, in an action con18.
cerning the defendant's liability for starting a fire, the court held:
Instead ... of saying that the liability for negligence should be co-extensive with the
judgment of each individual, which would be as variable as the length of the foot of each
individual, we ought rather to adhere to the rule which requires in all cases a regard to
caution such as a man of ordinary prudence would observe.
Id.
19.
Id.
20.
GEORGENE M. VAIRO, AM. BAR ASS'N, RULE 11 SANCTIONS app. 02[b][1] (2004) (excerpts from the REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES (1983)) ("The

[1983] amendments of Rule 26 are aimed at protecting against excessive discovery and evasion of
reasonable discovery demands. As amended Rule 26(b) would require the court, when certain condi-
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judges usually know less about the facts of the case, the true amount in
controversy, and the level of search and retrieval appropriate for each
case than the litigators themselves. 2' The reasonableness assumption also
requires that the court possess the requisite technological expertise to
assess a discovery process objectively, or seek educational assistance
from a special master. 22 It is the job of the attorneys to educate the court
on these matters.
What are the traits of a reasonably educated litigator in our electronic world of discovery? Recent surveys show that not only do lawyers fail
to learn the technical knowledge they need to properly assess what is
reasonable in terms of preservation and document review, they also fail
to follow the fundamental principle of the electronic discovery world: it
is vital to discuss these discovery issues
with your adversary as soon as
23
possible after the matter commences.
In a recent Federal Judicial Center ("FJC") survey, only one in three
respondents reported that their 26(f) conference to plan discovery included a discussion of ESI.24 More than half of all respondents reported
that the conference did not include discussion of ESI.25 Equally frightening was the finding that only one in five court-ordered discovery plans
included provisions relating to ESI. 26 46.5% of plaintiffs' lawyers and
55.5% of defense lawyers reported issues related to the retention (preservation) of ESI; more than 30% of the plaintiffs' lawyers reported issues
tions exist, to limit the frequency and extent of use of discovery methods. Rule 26(g) would impose
upon each party or attorney the duty, before proceeding with respect to any discovery matter, to
make a reasonable inquiry and to certify that certain standards have been met. A violation of this
duty would result in the imposition of sanctions.").
21.
Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 560 n.6 (2007) ("The judicial officer always
knows less than the parties, and the parties themselves may not know very well where they are going
or what they expect to find. A magistrate supervising discovery does not-cannot-know the expected productivity of a given request, because the nature of the requester's claim and the contents
of the files (or head) of the adverse party are unknown.... The portions of the Rules of Civil Procedure calling on judges to trim back excessive demands, therefore, have been, and are doomed to be,
hollow. We cannot prevent what we cannot detect; we cannot detect what we cannot define; we
cannot define 'abusive' discovery except in theory, because in practice we lack essential information." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69
B.U.L. REV. 635,638-39 (1989)).
22. Telephone interview with Hon. James C. Francis, U.S. Magistrate Judge, S.D.N.Y. (Nov.
23, 2009) ("The reasonable standard of discovery isn't one of an average random person. A court
should assume that the responding party had training on the subject matter [i.e., how to conduct an
investigation to respond to a discovery request]. Consider the duty of care of an airline pilot: the
pilot's conduct will be judged against the standard of a well-trained pilot, not an average person on
the street.").
23. See Anne Kershaw, Talking Tech: Automated Document Review Proves Its Reliability,
DIGITAL DISCOVERY & E-EVIDENCE: BEST PRACS. & EVOLVING L., Nov. 2005, at 10, 10-12, avail-

able
at
https://www.lexisnexis.com/applieddiscovery/NewsEvents/PDFs/20051 IDDEELegalLandscape.pdf.
24.
See EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CASE-BASED CIVIL
RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMrrEE ON

CIVIL RULES 15 (2009), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurvl .pdf/$file/dissurvl .pdf.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 16.

540

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:2

with preservation, collection, review and productions; 41.9% of the defense lawyers reported issues with restricting-the scope of discovery of
ESI; 37.5% had issues with respect to the preservation of ESI; and 36%
27
had issues pertaining to the collection, review and production of ESI.
These numbers are staggering for a profession that imposes on all
lawyers an ethical obligation to be qualified to undertake the representation of their clients. Unfortunately, because the lawyers and judges do
not understand the technology, they blame the technology and volume of
ESI for these issues, failing to recognize how so many of these issues
could have been avoided with a little self-education.
Problems and conflict arise when litigators lack the requisite knowledge and education (just like Mr. Menlove) to build and deploy defensible inquiry strategies. 28 An ignorant counsel's failure to seek guidance
from appropriate outside resources only heightens the problem. 29 As a
result of poor education and inadequate guidance, litigators lack the
ability to define the reasonable inquiry standard. 30 Litigators that misjudge the reasonable inquiry fall into two categories: attorneys that failed
to meet their obligations due to the lack of effort in conducting a reasonable inquiry (the "under-inquiry") to the detriment of the requesting party; and attorneys that cast a risk-averse overbroad net of inquiry (the
"over-inquiry") to the financial disadvantage of his client.
a. The Under-Inquiry
The reasonable inquiry of a certification of discovery responses requires counsel to conduct an independent investigation of the facts and
produce what is specifically requested.3 ' Courts tend to rule in favor of
sanctions against a certifying attorney for lack of a reasonable inquiry

27. Id. at 16-17.
28.
In considering if a responding attorney acted reasonably, a court might consider the methods an educated counsel chose to collect and produce the relevant information. The court might
consider how counsel weighed the value of the material sought against the burden of providing it,
and how he communicated that analysis to his opponent. For example, a litigant might restrict the
number of searched custodians based upon the type of case, amount in controversy, and number of
key players surrounding the case. Although courts have generally accepted an employee-centric "key
player" preservation and production model, the definition of "key players" has caused some debate
amongst clients and counsel. See Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., No. LR-C-95-781, 1997
WL 33352759, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 29, 1997) (finding that an employee-centric preservation
model under attorney supervision was reasonable and did not indicate a failure to meet obligations
imposed by law). See generally The Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan, et al. v.
Banc of Am. Sec. LLC, et al., No. 05 Civ. 9016 (SAS), 2010 WL 184312 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010)
(discussing an employee-centric preservation model).
29.
Assessment of appropriate outside resources should include considerations of experience,
case history, education, and whether the resource stands to gain financially from proffering certain
advice.
30.
See generally In re Fannie Mae Sec. Litig., 552 F.3d 814 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (reviewing the
district court order holding party in contempt for failing to comply with a discovery deadline).
31.
See FED. R. Ctv. P. 26(g).
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when that attorney failed to discover the obvious.32 For example, in R &
R Sails, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania, a defendant insurance
company certified that it conducted a reasonable inquiry, but failed to
produce an electronic claim log after the plaintiff repeatedly requested
the log. 33 After the defendant's employee certified that the claim log did
not exist, the same employee realized that the log was accessible on his
own computer. 34 United States Magistrate Judge Porter held (1) the defendant lacked evidence of the inquiry made by counsel; (2) the log
could have been easily found; and (3) the certifying employee was accessing the log immediately prior to the certification and, therefore, no
reasonable inquiry was completed, nor was the lack thereof substantially
justified.3 5 Thus, a responding party must make a reasonable inquiry and
document the steps it took to respond to the discovery request if the party
expects to defend his search in court.
Similarly, in the trademark dispute Gucci America, Inc. v. Costco
Wholesale, the court ruled for sanctions against defendant Costco for
failing to timely disclose cost figures related to the infringing jewelry
sold by defendant.36 Magistrate Judge Ronald Ellis held that Costco
"failed in its obligation under [Rule] 26(g) to make a 'reasonable inquiry' to ensure its disclosure was complete and accurate., 37 In his rationale, Judge Ellis indicated that defendant Costco was notified of the request early in the litigation, did not produce the cost information after
Gucci reiterated its request, and did not produce the information after the
court ordered it to do So.38 Furthermore, the court found that Costco
32. See, e.g., R & R Sails Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Penn., 251 F.R.D. 520, 525 (S.D. Cal. 2008)
("[T]o give meaning to the certifications provided on discovery responses, Rule 26(g) requires
attorneys or parties to sign their responses 'after a reasonable inquiry."').
33. Id.
34. Id. ("Evidence of such an inquiry prior to January 2007 [certification] may provide this
Court with justification for the incorrect certifications provided to Plaintiff. Instead, this Court is
presented with evidence that Lombardo was maintaining a claim log on his own computer using the
AEGIS system while failing to recognize that this log was the same 'record/log' being requested by
Plaintiff. Lombardo entered notes of a communication with counsel into the AEGIS system on
November 16, 2007, immediately prior to counsel's representation to this Court that such a system
was not possessed by Defendant and close in time to his signing a declaration that no such notes are
maintained. The Court cannot find that a reasonable inquiry was made into whether Defendant
possessed discovery responsive to Plaintiffs requests, and therefore the Court does not find Defendant's incorrect certifications to be substantially justified." (citations omitted)).
35.
Id.
36.
No. 02 Civ. 3190 (DAB) (RLE), 2003 WL 21018832, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2003) ("A
simple inquiry to Costco's Accounts Payable Operations department revealed that the cost information was easily retrievable. Costco has not shown that producing the document earlier would have
required any extraordinary diligence. Early in this litigation, Costco was on notice that Gucci sought
information on costs for commercial dealings in Gucci items. At a conference held on October 7,
2002, the Court instructed Costco to produce information for jewelry items bearing the terms 'Gucci
link' or 'Gucci style.' On November 21, 2002, the Court again reminded Costco of its obligation to
timely disclose information pertaining to the items. After Costco produced records lacking cost
figures, Gucci questioned its jewelry buyer who lacked any knowledge about records. In February
2003, Gucci reiterated its requests for the information. Yet Costco waited until the end of discovery,
after the issue was brought before the Court, to conduct a thorough search.").
37. Id.
38. Id.
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lacked any evidence indicating that an earlier document production
would have required any extraordinary diligence and waited until the end
of discovery to conduct a thorough search.39 Consequently, Costco was
ordered to pay costs and attorneys fees as a sanction for its poor discovery conduct.40
Other courts look to a set of factors when determining if the responding party conducted a reasonable inquiry. For example, in the insurance dispute St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Commercial Financial Corp.,
the plaintiff filed consistent boilerplate objections to defendants repeated
discovery requests. 41 In turn, the defendant filed a motion for expedited
relief pursuant to Rule 57. Chief Judge Mark Bennett opened his order
with a memorable quote:
Anatole France, a late 19th and early 20th century French writer, urbane critic and Nobel Prize winner penned: "It is human nature to
think wisely and to act in an absurd fashion." Little could France foresee that he would decades later capture the essence of 4laintiffs'
counsel's "Rambo" style discovery tactics in this litigation.
Judge Bennett ruled that "[c]ounsel need not conduct an exhaustive investigation, but only one that is reasonable under the circumstances," and
he provided four relevant circumstances to consider when challenging a
reasonable inquiry.43 These included: "(1) the number and complexity of
the issues; (2) the location, nature, number and availability of potentially
relevant witnesses or documents; (3) the extent of past working relationships between the attorney and the client, particularly in related or simi' 4
lar litigation; and (4) the time available to conduct an investigation. "
The court held that counsel's behavior "plummet[ed] far below any objective standard of reasonableness. Indeed, every single objection is not
only obstructionist and frivolous, but, as demonstrated above, is contrary
' 45
to the Federal Rules of Evidence and well-established federal law.
39. Id.
40.
Id. at *1.
41.
198 F.R.D. 508,511 (N.D. Iowa 2000).
42.
Id. at 510. Anatole France (1844-1924), a pseudonym for Jacques Anatole Franqois Thibault, was one of the major figures of French literature in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. He was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1921. See Petri Liukkonen, Anatole
France (2008), http://www.kijasto.sci.fi/afrance.htm. Other variations of the quoted aphorism
include: "It is human nature to think wisely and act foolishly" and "It is in human nature to think
wisely and to act in an absurd fashion."
43. St. Paul Reinsurance Co., 198 F.R.D. at 516 n.3.
44. Id. (citing Dixon v. Certainteed Corp., 164 F.R.D. 685, 691 (D. Kan. 1996)). "Under Rule
26(g), a 'signature certifies that the lawyer has made a reasonable effort to assure that the client has
provided all the information and documents available to him that are responsive to the discovery
demand. What is reasonable is a matter for the Court to decide on the totality of the circumstances.'
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting FED. R. Crv. P. 26(g)). "'Under Rule 26(g)(2) ... (the subject of the
inquiry] is the thoroughness, accuracy and honesty (as far as counsel can reasonably tell) of the
responses and the process through which they have been assembled."' Id. (alterations in original)
(quoting Poole ex rel. Elliott v. Textron, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 494, 503 (D. Md. 2000)).
45. Id. at 517.
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"Because Rule 26(g) 'mandates that sanctions be imposed on attorneys
who fail to meet the standards established in the first portion of 26(g),"46
the judge issued sanctions.47
b. The Over-Inquiry
Many litigators may surmise that the best way to avoid sanctions is
to do everything possible to satisfy discovery demands. After all, the
thinking goes, if a responding party does everything possible, how could
anyone argue that you did not make a reasonable inquiry? Unfortunately,
when attorneys couple this thinking with the challenges of electronic
data, the results can be disastrous for clients.
Courts tend to hold litigants to higher standard of inquiry if they expressly agree to it, even without a reasonable inquiry into the facts before
agreement. For example, in In re Fannie Mae Securities Litigation, the
attorneys for the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
(OFHEO), a non-party responding to subpoenas, entered into a stipulated
order to search, inter alia, disaster-recovery tapes without first assessing
the time and costs associated with doing so. 48 The OFHEO spent over $6
million-more than 9% of its annual budget-attempting to comply, but
ultimately failed in its efforts. The OFHEO was subject to a finding of
contempt and the imposition of sanctions. The findings were affirmed on
appeal.
In the recently settled case, Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel
Corp., Intel engaged in a massive preservation effort, issuing a litigation
hold initially to 4,000 employees and preserving thousands of backup
tapes. 49 When mistakes were discovered, Intel fell on its sword and proffered an elaborate and expensive "discovery remediation" plan. This
naturally led to discovery regarding compliance with the discovery remediation plan and surely placed the costs for discovery well outside the
proportionality requirements set forth in the Rules. Regrettably, trying to
boil the ocean to comply with discovery does little more than fuel the
notion that discovery can and should be perfect when in fact it never can
be. Indeed, the process of over-inquiry is more likely to lead to sanctions

46. Id. at 516 (quoting Poole, 192 F.R.D. at 503).
47. Id. at 517. Another interesting case looks to an attorney's conduct outside of the case in
dispute. See Thibeault v. Square D Co., 960 F.2d 239, 246 (1st Cir. 1992). ("In considering sanctions
for lapses in the course of pretrial discovery, a district court should consider all the circumstances
surrounding the alleged violation. The totality of the circumstances can include events which did not
occur in the case proper but occurred in other cases and are, by their nature, relevant to the pending
controversy. Once the district court has recognized a pattern of misbehavior on an attorney's part,
the court would be blinking reality in not taking counsel's proven propensities into account.... [A]
trial court may properly give some consideration to a lawyer's behavior in previous cases when
determining whether to accept the attorney's explanation of why he failed to comply with Rule 26(e)
in a current case." (citations omitted)).
48.
552 F.3d 814, 816 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
49.
See 258 F.R.D. 280, 282-83 (D. Del. 2008).
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and excess costs than a reasoned, contained, and sustainable scope and
process for discovery.
The "over-under" tug-of-war inquiry proves only one thing: A responsible attorney must balance the costs of electronic discovery with the
duty to thoroughly review all of the relevant documents. This requires
new tools and education in electronic discovery. Defaulting to traditional
methods is no longer an option.
2. Attorney Document Review
Typical case law addressing Rule 26(g)'s reasonable inquiry requirement focuses on the investigation, preservation, and collection of
discovery material. In the examples above, either the responding attorney
did too little, or alternatively promised "the moon and the stars" only to
face unwanted consequences. Yet, beyond an investigation, preservation
plan, and collection, stands another significant "reasonable inquiry" methodology under scrutiny: attorney document review.
Just as attorneys require education and diligence in balancing reasonableness for an early investigation of the case, counsel must possess
the very same skills in searching, analyzing, and categorizing discovery
material once sources have been identified and collected. Prior to the
proliferation of computers and e-mail, when discovery was limited to file
cabinets that interviewing attorneys could search during the client interviews, human review seemed logical. Now, when the average employee
hard drive has the capacity to store 160 gigabites (the equivalent of
12,000,000 text pages), the "reasonable inquiry" standard does not end at
the desk drawer of the employee; attorneys must now search supertankers full of documents. 50 And that is just the beginning: although the cases
above discuss the physical search51 efforts, what about the time spent after
documents have been collected?
Review and analysis methodology for the reasonable inquiry has not
kept pace with every changing technology, and the rapid data growth that
drives it. Unfortunately, many attorneys, judges, and other practitioners
still maintain the mindset that traditional brute-force page-by-page attorney document review is a best practice when responding to massive dis-

50. See, e.g., Ralph Losey, How Much Data Do You Have?, http://e-discoveryteam.com (last
visited Mar. 7, 2010).
51.
See Sedona Conference WGS, supra note 5, at 198 ("Historically, outside counsel played
a key role in the discovery process, and the process worked simply. Litigants, assisted by their counsel, identified and collected information that was relevant to pending or foreseeable litigation. Counsel reviewed the information and produced any information that was relevant and not otherwise
protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work product or by trade
secret protections. This worked fine in the days where most of the potentially relevant information
had been created in or was stored in printed, physical form, and in reasonable volumes so that it
required only 'eyes' to review and interpret it.").
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covery requests.52 Regardless of its effectiveness, the human review
process simply cannot keep pace with the speed at which society is accumulating data. 53 In 2008 alone, the Interactive Data Corporation says
the world created 487 billion gigabytes of information, up 73% from
2007. That was 3% more than it forecasted at the beginning of the year.
This trend shows no sign of slowing: going forward, the IDC forecasts
"the digital universe will double every 18 months. 54
E. Old Dog, Old Tricks
If the legal world generally understands that the volume of data is increasing exponentially, and that firms and their clients cannot sustain the
overwhelming burden of reviewing, why do some litigators continue to
rely primarily upon manual review of information to conduct a reasonable inquiry? 55 Attorneys have many different defensible search options
available to deploy, some more technologically advanced than others.56
The problem is not technology; it is attorneys' lack of education and the
judicial system's inattentiveness to ensure that attorneys have the proper
education and training necessary for a proportional and efficient discovery process. Lack of attorney education aggravates the problem because
uneducated litigators are unable to make informed judgments as to where
to draw the line on discovery, thereby creating unrealistic expectations
from the courts-particularly as to costs and burdens. For example, failing to understand how different methods of search methodology work,
some judges will unnecessarily mandate traditional and expensive "brute
force" attorney review.
Why do attorneys overestimate their judgment, yet lack a realistic
view of their level of precision? Uneducated lawyers tend to rely on old
52. See id. at 198-99 ("Accordingly, the conventional discovery review process is poorly
adapted to much of today's litigation.... It is not possible to discuss this issue without noting that
there appears to be a myth that manual review by humans of large amounts of information is as
accurate and complete as possible---perhaps even perfect-and constitutes the gold standard by
which all searches should be measured. Even assuming that the profession had the time and resources to continue to conduct manual review of massive sets of electronic data sets (which it does
not), the relative efficacy of that approach versus utilizing newly developed automated methods of
review remains very much open to debate.")
53. Id. at 198.
54. William M. Bulkeley, The Exploding Digital Universe, WALL ST. J. BLOGS, May 18,
2009, http://blogs.wsj.comldigits/2009/05/18/the-exploding-digital-universe (emphasis added); see
also EMC, Digital Universe, http://www.emc.com/digital_universe (last visited Mar. 7, 2010) (providing a real-time "Worldwide Information Growth Ticker" that measures the bytes of information
created since Jan. 1, 2010).
55. See KROLL ONTRACK, THIRD ANNUAL ESI TRENDS REPORT 9 (2009),
http://www.krollontrack.com/libray/esitrends3_ krollontrack2009.pdf (discussing challenges in
responding to ESI in Finding 12); see also JOHN GANTZ & DAVID REINSEL, IDC, AS THE ECONOMY
CONTRACTS,

THE

DIGITAL

UNIVERSE

EXPANDS

1

(2009),

http://idcdocserv.com/EMCMMWP-Digital_Universe (discussing how increased data volume is
the most significant factor bolstering the increased spending on electronic discovery).
56. For a listing of search and retrieval techniques see Sedona Conference WGS, supra note
5, at 217-18.
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tricks and the oxymoron of "gold-standard attorney document analysis,"
which does not necessarily amount to a high level of precision when attempting to review documents for relevancy. "For example, in the Blair
and Maron study, attorneys over-estimated their ability to create and
develop queries to assess the relevancy of 40,000 documents relevant to
a transit accident., 57 Additionally, "[l]awyers estimated that their refined
search methodology would find 75% of relevant documents, when in fact
the research showed only 20% or so had been found., 58 Clearly, a more
educated approach would eliminate such unjustified conclusions.
Counsel's overestimate of human ability could be based on a variety
of factors. First, attorneys' false notion of accuracy could emanate from
the core training attorneys receive early in their careers-including law
school-where using keyword search methods and basing decisions on
history and precedent is encouraged. 59 Such training results in an aversion to a change in methodology, and attorneys view that change, however reasonable, as risky. Accordingly, attorneys continue to rely on
keyword search methods bolstered by attorney review. A baseless lack of
education and knowledge by the bar only seems to accelerate the problem. 6°
Furthermore, there is a noticeable lack of positive feedback when
attorney do conduct efficient discovery. Judges don't award "gold stars"
in published opinions and orders to practitioners that conduct a reasonable search and review of information. 61 Unfortunately, litigators only
read the horror stories of when things go wrong, or how counsel failed to
perform a reasonable inquiry in the discovery phase by using inappropriate or overbroad keyword search terms.6 2 Although a properly researched and executed keyword search strategy can meet the reasonable
57.
Patrick L. Oot, The Protective Order Toolkit: Protecting Privilege with FederalRule of
Evidence 502, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 237, 239 (2009) (citing David C. Blair & M. E. Maron, An
Evaluation of Retrieval Effectiveness for a Full-Text Document-Retrieval System, 28 COMM. ACM
289 (1985)).
58.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sedona Conference WGS, supra note 5, at
206).
59.
Attorneys learn their inquiry strategy from Lexis, Westlaw, and Google. Keyword searching works well in these structured databases as they tend to exist in a far more categorized state than
litigation data. For example, Lexis and Westlaw have a team of editors to spell-check and categorize
cases by key concepts and headnotes. In addition, these databases only categorize a very limited
number of document types.
60.
See, e.g., William A. Gross Constr. Assocs., Inc. v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 256 F.R.D.
134, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (issuing a "wake-up call" to the Bar of the district).
61.
See Roithlat, Kershaw & Oot, supra note 3, at 71 ("Web searches are generally fairly
specific, for example, 'What are the best sites to visit in Paris?' In contrast, the information need in
eDiscovery is generally much broader and more vague. Discovery requests include statements like
'All documents constituting or reflecting discussions about unfair or discriminatory allocations of
[Brand X] products or the fear of such unfair or discriminatory allocations.' These requests will not
typically be satisfied by one or a few documents"). Standards of reasonableness lack certainty, as a
result attorneys show reluctance to change from a "generally accepted standard" to a new untested
method, even if that method is more reasonable under the circumstances.
62.
See cases cited infra notes 84, 86, 91, and 93; see also William A. Gross Constr. Assocs.,
Inc., 256 F.R.D. 134.
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inquiry standard under Rule 26, many alternative forms of search criteria
exist beyond the traditional human review63-yet the opinions tend to be
limited to keyword search terms and attorney review.
Simply put, the legal system has a crisis of education. Both attorneys and judges need to better understand technology as it applies to the
reasonable inquiry. Education initiatives mandated by state bars, law
schools, and advisory committee notes could help alleviate the problem.
II. TOWARD A REASONABLE INQUIRY: RESEARCH IN FINDING A BETTER
WAY TO CONDUCT ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY

Fortuitously, legal commentators have already started educational
and research programs to target the problem of discovery response.
However, it is the obligation of the bar, law schools, educators, and
courts to ensure that these research programs reach the intended audience.
A. TREC
The United States government has taken an interest in text retrieval
generally in a venture co-sponsored by the National Institute of Standards and Technology ("NIST") and U.S. Department of Defense. 64
"TREC (Text Retrieval Conference) is a multi-track project sponsored by
the National Institute for Standards and Technology and others to conduct comparative research on text retrieval technologies. 6 5 Since 2006,
"TREC has included a legal track whose goal is to assess the ability of
information retrieval technology to 'meet the needs of the legal community for tools to help with retrieval of business records.'" 66 In support of
this goal, they seek to develop and apply collections and tasks that approximate the data, methods, and issues that real attorneys might use

63.

See generally DOUGLAS W. OARD ET AL., OVERVIEW OF THE TREC 2008 LEGAL TRACK,

http://trec.nist.gov/pubs/trec17/papers/LEGAL.OVERVIEW08.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2010); Feng
C. Zhao et al., Improving Search Effectiveness in the Legal E-Discovery Process Using Relevance
Feedback (DESI III Global E-Discovery/E-Disclosure Workshop at ICAIL 2009),
http://www.law.pitt.edu/DESI3_Workshop/Papers/DESIINI.ZhaoOard_Baron.pdf.
A properly
executed keyword search method includes developing keyword search terms from interviews with
data users to identify terms-of-art, acronyms, or other non-traditional search terms, testing those
search terms by sampling the terms that were hits, as well as the misses, and communicating the
search strategy to your opponent. Some litigants suggest checking the extracted text index for likely
misspellings and a second meet and confer could provide better search results.
64.
See Text REtrieval Conference, Nat'l Inst. of Standards and Tech., Overview,
http://trec.nist.gov/overview.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2010) ("The Text REtrieval Conference
(TREC), co-sponsored by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and U.S.
Department of Defense, was started in 1992 as part of the TIPSTER Text program. Its purpose was
to support research within the information retrieval community by providing the infrastructure
necessary for large-scale evaluation of text retrieval methodologies.").
65.
Roitblat, Kershaw & Oot, supra note 3 at 71.
66.
Id. at 71-72 (quoting OARD ET AL., supranote 63, at 1).
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during civil litigation, and to apply objective criteria by which to judge
the success of various search methodologies.6 7
B. ElectronicDiscovery Institute Study
Similarly, The Electronic Discovery Institute has conducted a recent
study (the "EDI study") to determine if service providers offering autocategorization technology can equal or surpass the performance of a human based attorney document review system. The study hypothesized
that if the service providers could equal the response of a real-life attorney review team in a significantly disputed regulatory filing, the methodology used by the service provider would meet the reasonable inquiry
test of Rule 26(f). Little public information then existed regarding the
comparison of traditional litigation document review methodologies with
alternative technology approaches.68
The EDI study based its inquiry on a completed Verizon matter. In
2005, as part of an acquisition of a competitor, Verizon responded to a
governmental request for additional information for material relevant to
the proposed acquisition; also known as a "Second Request" under the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.69 To respond to
the Second Request, Verizon completed a voluminous document review
project: the company collected documents from 83 employees in 10
states, consisting of 1.3 terabytes of electronic files in the form of
2,319,346 documents. The collection included close to 1.5 million email
messages, 300,000 loose files, and 600,000 scanned documents. After
eliminating duplicates, 1,600,047 items were submitted for attorney review. It took the attorneys four months, working sixteen hours per day
seven days per week, for a total cost of $13,598,872.61 or about $8.50
per document. This sum included the fees of outside counsel specifically
assigned to document review tasks (but not attorneys working on other
aspects of the case), and hourly fees billed by contract attorneys hired
specifically for the review.
After spending many long hours managing the document review for
the Second Request response, Verizon attorneys John Frantz and Patrick
Oot agreed to seek a better alternative to the process of traditional human
document review. Frantz and Oot teamed up with Anne Kershaw and
Herb Roitblat, and shortly thereafter, Oot, Kershaw, and Roitblat (the
authors of this Article) formed The Electronic Discovery Institute, a non67.
For general information about TREC, see TREC Legal Track, http://treclegal.umiacs.umd.edu/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2010).
68.
See Kershaw, supra note 23, at 12. Commentator Anne Kershaw also completed a nonpublic study that compared a traditional human review process with an automated electronic review
process. Id. Ms. Kershaw's study revealed that using an electronic process to assist the document
review reduced the chances of missing relevant documents by as much as 90%. ld.
69.
See Roitblat, Kershaw & Oot, supra note 3, at 73. Verizon is New York based telecommunication carrier-corporation listed on the New York Stock Exchange (VZ). For more information
about Verizon, see http://www.verizon.com.
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profit research institution organized to complete a peer-reviewed study
comparing human document review with technology assisted document
review.
Unlike many data compilations available to researchers that have
been culled (perhaps using keyword search terms or some other form of
analysis) prior to human review, the data set of the EDI Study included
attorney relevancy decisions made by the original review team on every
user created computer readable document collected from Verizon employees.70 The EDI study sought to compare these final decisions of Verizon's original attorney review with the results of any provider willing
to undertake the significant task of responding to an already completed
Second Request. 7' Two providers responded. Over 75 people and organizations donated their time, services, and work product to the study.72
1. Methodology
The EDI study compared two different methodologies of computer
assisted document categorization with the original attorney review. Similar to the human review, the study required the computer-assisted systems to submit document relevancy decisions on the entire corpus of
computer readable user documents. The computer assisted systems did
not have any knowledge of the original attorney review team's categorization decisions.
A second human review was also completed on a sample set of
5,000 documents to compare the decision made by a second set of attorneys to the decisions made by the original review team. Again, the computer assisted systems did not have any knowledge of the original attorney review team's categorization decisions.
The EDI study sought to compare the level of agreement between
the original attorney review system and a second attorney review system.
The EDI study also sought to compare the levels of agreement of the
original attorney review with the two computer assisted systems individually. The hypothesis of the study stated that the computer systems will
70.
Many studies rely on pre-culled or reviewed datasets to analyze the reasonableness of
search retrieval methodology because these sets are all that is publically available. Both the Enron
litigation data set and the tobacco litigation data set are publicly available to those desiring to study
search and retrieval techniques. However, the Verizon data set was a real-life compilation of company documents collected from employees containing confidential and privileged information. The
data is not available to the public and never left the custody or control of Verizon, its legal service
providers, and law firms. Search and retrieval researchers are seeking raw data sets. Please contact
info@electronicdiscoveryinstitute.org for more information.
71.
In 2006, EDI gave an open invitation to the litigation technology community to participate
in the study, three service providers responded, of which, two finally agreed to participate under the
methodology created by the founders. In the years after the invitation closed, many other service
providers requested the ability to participate. Although the founders limited the first study to the two
original providers, there has been internal discussion on whether to expand participation. EDI will
revisit this discussion in November, 2010.
The authors suggest reading the study in conjunction with this law review article.
72.
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agree with the original attorney review at least as frequently as the
second attorney review. The teams were not instructed to achieve the
best results possible, but to equal or surpass traditional manual review.73
Specifically, the study set out to demonstrate that auto-categorization
technology will agree with the court-accepted standard of attorney review at least as frequently as a second attorney review of the same material.74
For the first of two auto-categorization systems, the participant deployed two new attorney teams that re-reviewed a sample set of documents. The attorneys received the same training materials and documentation that the original second request attorney review team received. A
senior litigator also reviewed and categorized documents on which the
two teams disagreed. The senior litigator arbitrated the conflicting document decisions without the knowledge of either teams' document decisions. The participating service provider then deployed proprietary automation algorithms that categorized the remaining documents dependently upon the original sample set. The service provider then validated
the results by sampling another subset, and then repeated the sampling
until it reached what it felt was a reasonable confidence level. No guidance was offered to the service provider from the client beyond the original sampling and senior litigator document decision arbitration. The entire process was completed in less than four weeks.
The second auto-categorization system did not request attorney review teams. The second system relied upon the documentation that the
original second request attorney review team received. In addition, the
service provider received answers to a set of approximately thirty interrogatories that it prepared and were answered by a senior litigator. The
second service provider deployed proprietary automation algorithms,
linguistics-based queries, legal professionals, computer scientists, computational linguists, mathematicians, and statisticians. The workflow
included: computer assisted categorization, testing by sample review,
assessment of different sample responses, adjustments and multiple supplemental iterations. No guidance was offered to the service provider
from the client beyond the senior litigator interrogatory answers. The
entire process was completed in less than four weeks.
73. Both service providers indicated that auto-categorization systems could actually perform
even better than their submitted responses in this study given unlimited time, expense, and resources,
but the EDI challenge was to perform as well as humans, an accepted standard.
74. See Roitblat, Kershaw & Oot, supra note 3, at 73 ("In the ideal case, we would like to
know how accurate each classification is. Ultimately, measurement of accuracy implies that we have
some reliable ground truth or gold standard against which to compare the classifier, but such a standard is generally lacking for measures of information retrieval in general and for legal discovery in
particular. In place of a perfect standard, it is common to use an exhaustive set ofjudgments done by
an expert set of reviewers as the standard (e.g., as is the practice in the TREC studies). Under these
circumstances, agreement with the standard is used as the best available measure of accuracy, but its
acceptance should be tempered with the knowledge that this standard is not perfect.").
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The EDI study "set out to answer the question of whether there was
a benefit to engaging a traditional human review or whether computer
systems could be relied on to produce comparable results. 7 5 It concluded
that "the performance of the two computer systems was at least as accurate (measured against the original review) as that of a human rereview. 76
In addition to the core conclusion of the EDI study, the authors of
the study made several additional observations:
* Many lawyers and judges need education regarding "reasonable
inquiry" discovery response techniques.
* Litigants should consider cooperation with an opponent early to
establish a search protocol.
* All categorization systems require some level of educated interaction. Better results result occur when knowledge is transferred early
and continuously throughout the process.
e The use of auto-categorization systems can potentially reduce
document request response times from over four months to as little as

thirty days for even the largest datasets. Assumingly, requesting parties desire their documents faster, as speedy response will allow a receiving party to conduct a more thorough and complete investigation.
e Government agencies should consider acceptance guidelines for
responding to document requests using auto-categorization technology.
" Human review is of unknown accuracy and consistency.
* Measurement against an accepted standard is essential to evaluating reasonableness.
e A litigant should sample
at least 400 results of both responsive and
77
non-responsive data.
e

Using auto-categorization will save money and time.

75.
Id. at 79.
76.
Id.
77.
E-mail from Maura R. Grossman, Counsel, Wachtell, Upton, Rosen & Katz, to Patrick
Oot, Director, Electronic Discovery Institute (Nov. 21, 2009, 13:38 EST) (on file with authors) ("If
you have a document collection containing 100,000 or more documents (which is not atypical these
days in the litigation or investigatory context), and you take a random sample of 384 documentsmeaning that every document in the collection has an equal chance of being selected for inclusion in
the sample-you can have 95% confidence (that is, if you repeated the exercise 100 times, you could
expect to get a similar result 95 out of 100 times), that your sample has an error rate of no more than
plus or minus 5%. If, instead, you were to use a random sample of 596 documents, you would have
the same 95% confidence interval, but an error rate of no more than plus or minus 4%. Therefore, it
seemed to me that, for the average matter with a large amount of ESI, and one which did not warrant
hiring a statistician for a more careful analysis, a sample size of 400 to 600 documents should give
you a reasonable view into your data collection, assuming the sample is truly randomly drawn.").
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e Based upon the service provider cost submissions, had Verizon
used auto-categorization in its Second Request response, EDI concludes that there would have been a minimal measurable cost savings
of $5 million using 2006 pricing.
* As data volumes increase, auto-categorization may be the only
practical solution to massive data sets common in today's corporations.
C. The Sedona Conference®
Both TREC and the Electronic Discovery Institute Study are educational initiatives proffered by the legal community to support considerations for alternate search and retrieval methodology. Also, The Sedona
Conference® has developed an extensive commentary on selecting an
appropriate search and retrieval method, titled The Sedona Conference®
Best Practices Commentary On The Use Of Search And Information Retrieval Methods In E-Discovery ("Sedona Commentary"). 78 It is interesting to note how the practice points set forth in The Sedona Commentary
dovetail with the points made by the ongoing research.
For example, Practice Point 1 of the Sedona Commentary states: "In
many settings involving electronically stored information, reliance solely
on a manual search process for the purpose of finding responsive documents may be infeasible or unwarranted. In such cases, the use of automated search methods should be viewed as reasonable, valuable, and
even necessary. '79 The EDI study clearly validates Practice Point 1. For
example, the complete review of the dataset took many millions of dollars, many months, and the efforts of hundreds of attorneys to complete.8 0 Had Verizon used either of the auto-categorization technologies
used in the EDI study, it might have saved millions of dollars and several
months of attorney labor.
Practice Points 2 and 3 of the Sedona Commentary hold respectively that "[s]uccess in using any automated search method or technology
will be enhanced by a well-thought out process with substantial human
input on the front end" and "[tihe choice of a specific search and retrieval method will be highly dependent on the specific legal context in which
it is to be employed. 81 The EDI study again supports these points, as
both systems relied upon a well-developed process with human interaction early on. For example, one system used real human review for input;
the other relied on subject matter experts and interrogatories to develop a
categorization system. Moreover, both service providers in the EDI study
deployed resources appropriate for the legal context; a Second Request
78.
79.
80.
81.

Sedona Conference WGS, supra note 5, at 189.
Id. at 194.
Roitblat, Kershaw & Oot, supranote 3, at 73.
Sedona Conference WGS, supra note 5, at 194.
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analyzes massive amounts of data. Therefore, auto categorization is more
appropriate than in a request where the document volume is low or limited. Both service providers understood the options available for designing a well thought out process and selecting the appropriate search
and retrieval method.
Sedona Commentary Practice Point 4 further underscores the need
for attorney education and due diligence in stating that "[plarties should
perform due diligence in choosing a particular information retrieval
product or service from a vendor., 82 Again, both service providers met
the practice point standard. Through EDI's inquiries, both service providers were able to explain their techniques, justify their results based
upon sampling, and maintain a reference list of prior cases and contacts
EDI could call upon to test results. In addition, both service providers
offered expert witnesses if auto-categorization techniques were challenged by an opponent or others.
Even so, perhaps the most important Sedona Commentary point is
Practice Point 8, which states that "[p]arties and the courts should be
alert to new and evolving search and information retrieval methods. 83
Redundant to the guidance of this article, Practice Point 8 mandates the
need for attorney education and training.
D. The End of Keyword Search Methods
Search and retrieval techniques for discovery responses have rapidly evolved since the turn of the century. Just a few years ago, courts ordered keyword culling techniques in discovery without the use of any
sort of testing methodology. 84 Although many attorneys still rely on
keyword search culling techniques, recent decisions have placed significant scrutiny on keyword search term culling, especially where a responding party failed to sample, check, and verify the results.
Courts tend to rule against parties that fail to sample, test, and verify
keyword search results. For example, in the drug liability case In re Se82. Id. at 194.
83. Id. at 195. Sedona Commentary Practice Points 5, 6 and 7 all fall under the category of
being a "good lawyer," as follows: "Practice Point 5. The use of search and information retrieval
tools does not guarantee that all responsive documents will be identified in large data collections,
due to characteristics of human language. Moreover, differing search methods may produce differing
results, subject to a measure of statistical variation inherent in the science of information retrieval."
Id. at 194. "Practice Point 6. Parties should make a good faith attempt to collaborate on the use of
particular search and information retrieval methods, tools and protocols (including as to keywords,
concepts, and other types of search parameters)." Id. at 195. "Practice Point 7. Parties should expect
that their choice of search methodology will need to be explained, either formally or informally, in
subsequent legal contexts (including in depositions, evidentiary proceedings, and trials)." Id.
84.
See Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 559 (W.D. Tenn.
2003) ("Using the vendor of its choice, [the plaintiff] shall search the 300gb of electronic data using
the Boolean search terms."); see also Tessera, Inc. v. Micron Tech., Inc., No. C06-80024MISCJW(PVT), 2006 WL 733498, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2006) ("The following search terms shall be
run through electronic document databases for production to plaintiff.").
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roquel Products Liability Litigation, defendant AstraZeneca selected
keyword search terms to cull data prior to producing it to the requesting
plaintiff.8 5 The court concluded that the defendant significantly failed in
meeting its discovery obligations. Magistrate Judge Baker ruled that:
[W]hile key word searching is a recognized method to winnow relevant documents from large repositories, use of this technique must be
a cooperative and informed process. Rather than working with Plaintiffs from the outset to reach agreement on appropriate and comprehensive search terms and methods, [counsel] undertook the task in
secret. Common sense dictates that sampling and other quality assurance techniques
must be employed to meet requirements of com86
pleteness.
As a result, Judge Baker ordered sanctions against the defendant for its
failure to produce readable and assessable documents.
Similarly, courts have identified the difficulty in selecting keyword
search terms. In United States v. O'Keefe, the government charged defendants with receiving gifts for expediting visas while working at the
Department of State in Canada. 87 The government searched for and produced documents using a self-selected Boolean search query of keyword
search terms. 8 In O'Keefe, Judge Facciola held that "if defendants are
going to contend that the search terms used by the government were insufficient, they will have to specifically so contend in a motion to compel
and their contention must be based on evidence that meets the requirements of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 89 The court emphasized the difficulty in selecting keyword search terms in its rationale
for a Rule 702 analysis:
Whether search terms or "keywords" will yield the information
sought is a complicated question involving the interplay, at least, of
the sciences of computer technology, statistics and linguistics....
Given this complexity, for lawyers and judges to dare opine that a
certain search term or terms would be more likely to produce information than the terms that were used is truly to go where angels fear
to tread. 90

Coincidentally, Judge Facciola revisited his O'Keefe ruling shortly91
thereafter in the employment case Equity Analytics, LLC v. Lundin.
85.
244 F.R.D. 650,651 (M.D. Fla. 2007).
86.
Id. at 662. The defendant failed to provide information "as to how it organized its search
for relevant material, [or] what steps it took to assure reasonable completeness and quality control."
Id. at 660 n.6.
87.
537 F. Supp. 2d 14, 16 (D.D.C. 2008).
88.
Id. at 18. The query deployed by the government to locate relevant documents was "early
or expedite* or appointment or early & interview or expedite* & interview." Id
89.
Id. at 24.
90.
Id.
91.
248 F.R.D. 331,333 (D.D.C. 2008).
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Again, Judge Facciola emphasized the difficulty in selecting search methodology, and the court's need of evidence to determine the validity of
the search technique.92
Other courts have ruled against a particular search technique as unreasonable while identifying a multi-factor test to determine if a search
methodology meets a reasonableness standard. In Victor Stanley, Inc. v.
Creative Pipe, Inc.,9 a litigant ineffectively settled on keyword search
terms to cull for privilege. 94 Finding the search methodology unreasonable, Judge Grimm put forth a multi-factor analysis litigants should deploy when selecting search techniques:
Selection of the appropriate search and information retrieval technique requires careful advance planning by persons qualified to design effective search methodology. The implementation of the methodology selected should be tested for quality assurance; and the
party selecting the methodology must be prepared to explain the rationale for the method chosen to the court, demonstrate that it is 95appropriate for the task, and show that it was properly implemented.
Courts are also requiring litigators to cooperate with one another by
invoking a multi-step framework when selecting search methodology.
For example, in the construction dispute William A. Gross Construction
Associates, Inc. v. American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co.,96 the
responding party deployed overbroad and imprecise keyword search
terms to respond to a discovery request. 97 Judge Peck warned:
This opinion should serve as a wake-up call to the Bar in this District about the need for careful thought, quality control, testing, and
cooperation with opposing counsel in designing search terms or
"keywords" to be used to produce emails or other electronically
stored information ("ESI")....

This case is just the latest example of lawyers designing keyword
searches in the dark, by the seat of the pants, without adequate (in92. Id. ("[D]etermining whether a particular search methodology, such as keywords, will or
will not be effective certainly requires knowledge beyond the ken of a lay person (and a lay lawyer)
and requires expert testimony that meets the requirements of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.").
93.
250 F.R.D. 251 (D. Md. 2008).
94. Id. at 256-57.
Id. at 262 ("[T]he Defendants have failed to demonstrate that the keyword search they
95.
performed on the text-searchable ESI was reasonable. Defendants neither identified the keywords
selected nor the qualifications of the persons who selected them to design a proper search; they
failed to demonstrate that there was quality-assurance testing; and when their production was challenged by the Plaintiff, they failed to carry their burden of explaining what they had done and why it
was sufficient.").
96.
256 F.R.D. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
97.
Id. at 134-35.
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deed, here,98apparently without any) discussion with those who wrote
the emails.

Furthermore, the court ordered a multi-step framework that the litigators must use when selecting a keyword search strategy. 99 Judge Peck
ordered that the litigators "at a minimum must carefully craft the appropriate keywords, with input from the ESI's custodians as to the words
and abbreviations they use, and the proposed methodology must be
quality control tested to assure accuracy in retrieval and elimination of
'false positives." ' ' ° Again, the opinion illustrates how courts are developing factors to determine the reasonableness of a litigants search methodology.
E. Avoiding Costly Evidence Motions and Proceedingsby Collaboration
and Informal Conferences
Some litigants have argued that the O'Keefe and Equity Analytics
rulings implicate the reliability of expert witness testimony under Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 and the Daubert factors during pretrial discovery.' 1 We disagree.
In Daubert, two minor children born with serious birth defects alleged that their defects were caused by their mothers' ingestion of Bendectin, a prescription anti-nausea drug marketed by Merrell Dow. After
extensive discovery, the parties submitted conflicting reports experts on
Bendectin causation. The issue in Daubert focused on how courts should
analyze the validity of the scientific data in expert reports as an attempt
to avoid junk science. On appeal, The U.S. Supreme Court ruled Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 applied. 10 2 Thus, when courts must analyze conclusions of expert reports that draw difficult and often theoretical causa98.
Id.
99. See id. at 136.
100. Id.
101.
See id. at 592. InDaubert,the Supreme Court said that "[flaced with a proffer of expert
scientific testimony... the trial judge must determine at the outset.., whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1)scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue." Id. Accordingly, the district judge is generally required to "ensure that any and
all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable." Id. at 589. In determining reliability, the Supreme Court further noted four non-exhaustive factors the district court may
use in determining the reliability of scientific expert testimony: (1) whether a theory has been tested;
(2) whether it has been subject to peer review; (3) whether a technique has a potential rate of error,
or standard operating procedures; and (4) whether a theory is generally accepted within the scientific
community. See id. at 592-94.
102. The task of ensuring that an expert's testimony rests on both a reliable foundation and is
relevant to the task at hand is assigned to the trial judge. Pursuant to Rule 104(a), the judge must
make a preliminary assessment of whether the testimony's underlying reasoning or methodology is
scientifically valid and can be properly applied to the facts at issue. Considerations include whether
the theory or technique in question can be (and has been) tested, whether it has been subjected to
peer review and publication, its known or potential error rate, and the existence and maintenance of
standards controlling its operation, and whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a
relevant scientific community. The inquiry is a flexible one, and its focus must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.
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tion arguments, and the only way to measure probability of causation is
through that expert opinion, a Daubert analysis is appropriate.
However, in testing the reasonableness of a producing party's inquiry in discovery, when the subject of the inquiry-the dataset-is
available for repeated testing and sampling without harm to the data, then
perhaps less formal methods of judicial analysis and questioning are appropriate. More simply, the causative factors that achieve a discovery
outcome are not hidden.10 3 In testing discovery response techniques, a
litigant can test the search and retrieval criteria for validity easily, transparently, and repeatedly. The technical processes and results for discovery can be observed, measured, and reported to the court directly without
expert testimony. All that the court and litigants really need in order to
assess the reasonableness of a discovery process is the information as to
what the parties did and why they believe it worked.
Moreover, neither O'Keefe nor Equity Analytics specifically held
that FRE 702 conclusively applies to discovery proceedings.10 4 Rather,
the courts ruled that litigators consider FRE 702 to underscore the point
that lawyers needed to look beyond their ordinary knowledge when dealtechnical concepts, such as the accuracy of
ing with matters involving
10 5
keyword searches.
We do not suggest limiting the court system's ability to discover
truth. 106 We simply anticipate that judges will deploy more reasonable
Unlike discovery, one cannot unring a bell in cases of toxic exposure to test and retest
103.
historical exposure levels. Since we cannot see the actual working of Bendectin in the human body,
we have no choice but to rely on epidemiological studies and other evidence from which experts
draw conclusions.
Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251, 261 n.10 (D. Md. 2008) ('The
104.
O'Keefe and Equity Analytics opinions have raised the eyebrows of some commentators who have
expressed the concern that they 'engraft [FED. R. EvID.] 702 (and [FED. R. EvD.] 104(a) into discovery... [which, it is feared] would multiply the costs of discovery', [sic] and, it is argued, this is a
'path [that] is rife with unintended consequences.' A careful reading of O'Keefe and Equity Analytics, however, should allay these concerns. In neither case did the court expressly hold that FED. R.
EvtD. 702 and 104(a) were 'engrafted' into the rules of discovery in civil proceedings (indeed,
neither opinion even mentions Rule 104(a)). Instead, Judge Facciola made the entirely self-evident
observation that challenges to the sufficiency of keyword search methodology unavoidably involve
scientific, technical and scientific subjects, and ipse dixit pronouncements from lawyers. Observations unsupported by an affidavit or other showing that the search methodology was effective for its
intended purpose are of little value to a trial judge who must decide a discovery motion aimed at
either compelling a more comprehensive search or preventing one. Certainly those concerned about
the O'Keefe and Equity Analytics opinions would not argue that trial judges are not required to make
fact determinations during discovery practice. Indeed, such fact determinations inundate them."
(alterations in original) (citation omitted)).
105.
See id.
Furthermore, courts have tremendous leeway in their quest for validated proof:
106.
In Kumho Tire Co., Ltd., the Supreme Court explicitly extended the Daubertgatekeeping
role to technical or other specialized expert testimony. The Supreme Court further noted
that Dauberr'sfour factors for determining scientific reliability need not be applied in all
cases. "Rather, we conclude that the trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony
is reliable." The Supreme Court also noted that the trial judge must have "discretionary
authority... both to avoid unnecessary 'reliability' proceedings in ordinary cases where
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and efficient standards to determine whether a litigant met his Rule
26(g)'1 7 reasonable inquiry obligations. Indeed, both the Victor Stanley
and William A. Gross Construction decisions provide a primer for the
multi-factor analysis that litigants should invoke to determine the reasonableness of a selected search and review process to meet the reasonable
inquiry standard of Rule 26(f)10 8:
1. Explain how what was done was sufficient;
2. Show that it was reasonable and why;
3. Set forth the qualifications of the persons selected to design the
search;
4. Carefully craft the appropriate keywords with input from the ESI's
custodians as to the words and abbreviations they use; and
5. Use quality control tests on the methodology1 9to assure accuracy in
retrieval and the elimination of false positives. 0
Interestingly, had any of the litigants in the above cases deployed
the auto-categorization methodologies examined in the EDI study, the
courts likely would have ruled differently because the study participants
met the five-part test of reasonable inquiry distilled from Victor Stanley
and William A. Gross Construction.110
CONCLUSION

The future of discovery and litigation rests heavily on a litigant's
ability to respond to discovery requests accurately, inexpensively, and
quickly. Lawyers must "wake-up" to Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding.""' The bar must empower itself to seek
knowledge on reasonable discovery. Historically, lawyers would research and learn new areas of the law to better represent their clients and
maintain a full understanding of their clients' case." 2 The nuances of
search and retrieval to meet the Rule 26 reasonable inquiry standard must
the reliability of an expert's methods is properly taken for granted, and to require appropriate proceedings in the less usual or more complex cases where cause for questioning
the expert's reliability arises."
Bureau v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 129 F. App'x. 972, 975 (6th Cir. 2005) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted) (quoting Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999)).
107.
FED. R. CIv. P. 26(g).
108.
Id. 26(0.
109.
See Victor Stanley, 250 F.R.D. at 262; see also William A. Gross Constr. Assocs., Inc., v.
Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 256 F.R.D. 134, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
110.
See Victor Stanley, 250 F.R.D. at 262; see also William A. Gross Constr., 256 F.R.D. at
136; supra Part I.B.1.
111.

FD. R. Civ. P. 1.

112.
If it is a medical malpractice case, an attorney must learn about medical procedures. If a
case involves accounting issues, an attorney must learn how the accounting was done. If an attorney
is hired for a construction case, he or she must learn construction techniques and agreements.
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be understood if attorneys plan to effectively represent their clients.
Moreover, litigators cannot continue to exempt themselves from information technology as discovery challenges continue to snowball-senior
litigators can no longer assume that because a keyboard is attached,
someone else, someone younger, will take care of it. The time to learn
about technology is now. In the words of Master Yoda: "Try not. Do. Or
do not. There is no try. ' 3 It is a matter of professional obligation.

113.

STAR WARS: EPISODE V-THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK (Lucasfilm 1980).

WYETH V. LEVNE: MOVING AWAY FROM THE GEIER TREND
INTRODUCTION

Federal preemption of state common law actions for injuries often
involves a balancing act between congressional intent and state sovereignty.' The existence of federal agencies, such as the FDA, has raised
issues concerning the relationship between comprehensive regulatory
schemes and the residual role of state laws. 2
Congress has done little to confront these issues,3 leading to various
interpretations of express preemption provisions. In cases of implied
preemption, the Supreme Court has employed the impossibility and obstacle analyses for determining the availability of state common law remedies.4
The FDA's recent position establishing its standards as the "ceiling"
in safety determinations has triggered a debate between giving preemptive effect to agency interpretations and preserving the presumption
against preemption expressed by saving clauses.5 In Wyeth v. Levine,6 the
Supreme Court sought to clarify these issues.
Part I of this Comment provides a general overview of preemption
and focuses on the preemption analysis the Court has previously employed with regard to FDA regulations. Part II summarizes the facts and
holding in Wyeth. Part III analyzes Wyeth, commends the Court's holding, but suggests a strict adherence to notice-and-comment rulemaking
and an abandonment of the obstacle analysis. This Comment concludes
by suggesting a classification of prescription drugs to balance the presumption against preemption with the FDA's safety determinations.
I. BACKGROUND

A. The Supremacy Clause and the PreemptionDoctrine
The Supremacy Clause states, "This Constitution, and the Laws of
the United States

. ..

shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the

Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.",7 The
1. See Sandra Zellner, Preemption by Stealth, 45 Hous. L. REv. 1659, 1666 (2009).
2.
See Mary J. Davis, The Battle over Implied Preemption: ProductsLiability and the FDA,
48 B.C. L. REv. 1089, 1092-93 (2007).
3.
See Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble:FederalAgencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227, 251 (2007).
See Zellmer, supra note 1, at 1666.
4.
See Davis, supra note 2, at 1092-93.
5.
6.
129 S.Ct. 1187 (2009).
7. U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl.2.
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preemption doctrine acts as "a tool for defining the parameters of federal
supremacy when Congress has adopted legislation pursuant to other
enumerated powers." 8 These pieces, working together, make clear that
the purpose of Congress acts as the ultimate "touch-stone" in every
preemption analysis. 9
Federal preemption can be express or implied.' ° Express preemption
occurs where Congress has included an express preemption provision in
the statute. Implied preemption arises either through field preemption,
"where the federal legislation is so comprehensive that Congress must
have intended to occupy the field,"
or through conflict preemption,
12
conflict.
laws
federal
and
state
where
Implied conflict preemption overrides a state law that either creates
an impossibility of complying with both federal and state laws ("impossibility analysis"), or "poses an 1obstacle
to the achievement of federal
3
objectives" ("obstacle analysis").
However, because states have historically held traditional police
powers to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens,
preemption of state common law remedies is often complex and controversial. 14 Federalism concerns drive a presumption against preemption of
state police powers where "a clear manifestation of congressional intent5
to preempt" state laws and state common law remedies does not exist.'
Moreover, Congress generally includes a saving clause in its legislation,
6
which statutorily preserves the presumption against preemption.
Absent an express preemption provision in the statute, the Court has
employed both the impossibility and the obstacle analyses of implied
conflict preemption. In applying the preemption analysis, the U.S. Supreme Court, faced with federal regulations and state concerns, has varied between its reliance on the statutory text and agency 7explanations in
determining the preemptive effect of a federal regulation.
18
B. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.

In Geier, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a state tort action was
preempted as an obstacle to the achievement of the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard ("FMVSS") 208.19 The standard, promulgated by
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Zellmer, supra note 1, at 1665.
Id. at 1666.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 1667.
See id.at 1660.
See Sharkey, supra note 3, at 258-59.
529 U.S. 861 (2000).
id. at 886.
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the Department of Transportation within its authority under the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act ("Safety Act"), sought a gradual
development of various passive restraint systems in cars-notably, the
installation of seat belts and airbags. 20 Although the FMVSS was aimed
at reducing traffic accidents, it did not mandate a strict airbag standard
for all vehicles.2 '
The petitioner suffered injuries from a car crash and brought a
common law suit against Honda for not equipping the car with an airbag. 22 The Court held that although the Safety Act did not expressly
preempt the "no airbag" suit, 23 requiring manufacturers to install airbags
presented an
obstacle to the mix of restraints allowed by the federal safety standard.24
In finding preemption by conflict, the Court gave weight to the
DOT's explanation contained in its litigation brief.25 The brief stated that
the FMVSS embodied the Secretary's policy judgment regarding safety
and that state tort actions would stand as an obstacle to federal objectives.26 The Court justified its reliance on the agency's explanation by
pointing to the technical subject matter and the complex and extensive
nature of the relevant history, stating that the DOT likely had a unique
and thorough understanding of its own regulation and objectives.2 7
The Court further reasoned that "[t]o insist on a specific expression
of agency intent to pre-empt, made after notice-and-comment rulemaking, would be in certain cases to tolerate conflicts that an agency, and
therefore Congress, is most unlikely to have intended. 28 The Court then
stated that the saving clause foresaw, and did not foreclose, preemption
of a state tort action when there was an actual conflict with the federal
standard. 29 Furthermore, the preemption provision and the saving clause

20.
Id. at 864-65.
21.
Id. (noting that the FMVSS gave manufacturers a choice of restraints).
22.
Id. at 865 (explaining that petitioner was injured after her car, which had been equipped
with manual belts but lacked airbags, collided with a tree); id. at 881 (claiming in her complaint that
Honda "had a duty to design, manufacture, distribute and sell a motor vehicle with an effective and
safe passive restraint system, including, but not limited to, airbags").
23.
Id. at 867-68 (finding "no convincing indication that Congress wanted to pre-empt, not
only state statutes and regulations, but also common-law tort actions").
24.
Id. at881.
25.
Id. at 883.
26.
Id. at 881 (stating that safety "would best be promoted if manufacturers installed alternative protection systems in their fleets rather than one particular system in every car" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance,
Geier,529 U.S. 861 (No. 98-1811), 1999 WL 1045155, at *25)).
27.
Id. at 883 (emphasizing that the DOT is "'uniquely qualified' to comprehend the likely
impact of state requirements").
28.
Id. at 885.
29.
Id. at 870-71 ("[T]his Court has repeatedly 'decline[d] to give broad effect to saving
clauses where doing so would upset the careful regulatory scheme established by federal law."'
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106-107 (2000))).
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together created a neutral policy regarding conflict preemption.3 ° In effect, the Court overcame the traditional presumption against preemption
by giving preemptive effect to the DOT's interpretations.
C. FederalFood and Drug Laws
Congress enacted the Federal Food and Drugs Act in 1906, in response to concerns raised by state regulators, prohibiting the manufacture
or shipment of adultered or misbranded food or drugs in interstate commerce. 31 In 1938, Congress expanded the law to cover medical devices
through the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA").32 The
FDCA required premarket approval of new drugs, and required the manufacturer to submit an application for approval to the FDA.33 Once a drug
received its initial approval from the FDA, any further changes to its
label had to be submitted and approved in a supplemental application.34
However, the FDA also allowed manufacturers to "add or strengthen an
instruction" through a "changes being effected" ("CBE") regulation for
any pre-approval
additions that were intended to increase the safety of a
35
drug.

In 1962, Congress added a saving clause to the FDCA to protect
state sovereignty, establishing that a state law action would only be
preempted when in positive conflict with the FDCA.36 Fourteen years
later, Congress enacted the Medical Device Amendments ("MDA") establishing an express preemption provision for medical devices and classifying devices into
three categories, with the highest risk devices identi37
fied as Class HI.
With regard to the FDA's rulemaking authority, Executive Order
13,132 directed agencies to provide states a notice and comment period
for proposed regulations that may affect them. 38 In 2006, the FDA promulgated new labeling rules through proper notice-and-comment rulemaking, explaining that the proposed rules would not preempt state tort law.39
However, after the comment period closed, the FDA inserted a preamble
asserting that its regulations preempted state tort claims. 4° The 2006
30.
Id. ("But we can find nothing in any natural reading of the two provisions that would
favor one set of policies over the other where a jury-imposed safety standard actually conflicts with a
federal safety standard.").
31.
Davis, supra note 2, at 1100.
32.
See id.
33.
Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1195 (2009).
34.
Id. at 1196.
35.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(C) (2008)).
36.
Id.
37.
See Zellmer, supra note 1, at 1686, 1690.
38.
Sharkey, supra note 3, at 253-54 (citing Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255,
43,257 (Aug. 4, 1999)).
39.
Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201.
40.
Christen Linke Young, Note, Agency Preemption Inputs in Riegel v. Medtronic, 118
YALE L.J. POCKEr PART 22, 25 (2008).
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preamble presented a dramatic shift toward preempting state laws that
deviated from federal labeling regulations and led to the controversial
debate on the role of agency safety determinations in the face of common
law tort claims. 4' The following cases illustrate how courts have applied
the preemption analysis to federal regulations.
42
1. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr

The Supreme Court in Lohr held that the MDA did not preempt a
state tort claim regarding a pacemaker that the FDA had approved as
being "substantially equivalent' 4 3 to other approved devices. 44 In examining the domain expressly preempted by the MDA, the Court found
that Congress did not intend to interfere with state remedies or "deprive
States of any role in protecting consumers. 4 5 It reasoned that the word
"requirements" in the MDA referred to additional state regulations but
excluded general state common law duties.46
Additionally, the Court held that the "substantially equivalent" exception to premarket approval was not intended to ensure the safety of a
device, but only established a status quo which included a possibility of
defending the device's design in a state tort suit.47 The Court concluded

that state requirements were only preempted where "the FDA has established 'specific counterpart regulations or ...other specific requirements
applicable to a particular device.",,48 In its determination, the majority
seemed to apply an impossibility analysis by stating that the MDA did
not preempt state rules that merely duplicated the duties imposed by federal law.49

41.
See Davis, supra note 2, at 1092-93.
42. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
43. Id. at 478 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(B) (1994))
(explaining devices the FDA considers "substantially equivalent" to approved devices can be marketed without premarket approval in order to ensure timely introduction of improved devices).
44. Id. at 481-82 (stating that "no State ...may establish. . . any requirement which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement... which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the
device" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994))).
45. Id. at 489. The Court relied on the presumption against preemption and congressional
intent, "'the ultimate touchstone' in every pre-emption case." Id. at 485 (first alteration in original)
(quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhom, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)).
46. Id. at 489 ("[Requirements refer to] device-specific enactments of positive law.., not the
application of general rules of common law by judges and juries.").
47.
Id at 494 ("There is no suggestion in either the statutory scheme or the legislative history
that the § 510(k) exemption process was intended to do anything other than maintain the status quo
with respect to the marketing of existing medical devices and their substantial equivalents.").
48. Id. at 498 (alteration in original) (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (1995)); see also id. at 501
("The generality of those requirements make this quite unlike a case in which the Federal Government has weighed the competing interests relevant to the particular requirement in question ...").
49.
See id. at 495 ("['lthe state requirement is not pre-empted unless it is 'different from, or
in addition to,' the federal requirement." (quoting § 360k(a)(1))).
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50

In Riegel, the Supreme Court held that a state tort claim regarding a
failed FDA-approved Class III catheter was preempted by the MDA as
imposing state requirements that differed from, or added to, federal requirements. 51 The Court distinguished the catheter from the pacemaker in
Lohr by finding that premarket approval imposed requirements under the
MDA. 52 Whereas Lohr dealt with a device that only received an equivalency review, the opinion emphasized that premarket approval was a
rigorous device-specific safety review that permitted almost no deviations from the approved specifications. 53 The Court therefore held that
the state tort claim, requiring the catheter to be safer but less effective,
was preempted by the MDA.-4
II. WYETH

V. LEVINE

5

A. Facts
On April 7, 2000, Diana Levine received the drug Phenergan by the
IV-push method for treatment of migraine-related nausea. 56 Phenergan is
an antihistamine manufactured by Wyeth Pharmaceuticals for the treatment of nausea. 57 The drug can be administered intramuscularly or intravenously. 58 Intravenous administration can occur through the IV-push
method, which involves a forced delivery of the drug using a syringe, or
the IV-drip method, which slowly drips a mix of the drug and saline solution from an intravenous bag into the vein.59 Phenergan is corrosive,
and causes gangrene upon contact with arterial blood. 6° Of the two intravenous methods, IV-push creates a higher probability of gangrene be61
cause of the risk of intra-arterial injection.
The warning label for Phenergan initially met FDA standards in
1955 and continued to comply in its supplemental applications.62 In
1988, Wyeth submitted a revised warning label in response to the FDA's
suggestion of a different warning regarding the risks of intra-arterial in-

128 S. Ct. 999 (2008).
50.
51.
Id.at 1011.
52.
Id. at 1007.
53. Id. (stating that premarket approval is only given to devices that the FDA has determined
as providing "a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness").
54. Id. at 1008.

55.
56.
treatment
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
new drug

129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
Id. at 1191. Ms. Levine had received the drug on previous visits to her local clinic for
of migraine headaches. Id.
Id. ("Phenergan is Wyeth's brand name for promethazine hydrochloride.").
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1191-92.
Id. at 1192. The FDA approved the use of Phenergan in 1955 and again in supplemental
applications in 1973 and 1976. Id
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jection. 63 However, in 1998, without responding to Wyeth's 1988 submission, the FDA approved Wyeth's 1981 supplemental application and
directed Wyeth to keep its then current label. 64
Levine had initially received Phenergan through intramuscular injections on previous visits for her migraine. 65 However, the IV-push me66
thod was used on April 7 after an ineffective treatment earlier that day.
Following the treatment, Phenergan was accidentally released into Levine's artery. 67 As a result, Levine developed gangrene, and doctors were
eventually forced to amputate her right arm.68
B. ProceduralHistory
Levine sued Wyeth under Vermont's state product liability claims
of negligence and strict liability. 69 Levine alleged that Wyeth failed to
warn clinicians to use the IV-drip method. 70 Although Phenergan's label
did warn against intra-arterial injection, it did not specifically warn
against the IV-push method. 7 1 Wyeth filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that federal law preempted the state failure-to-warn claims
because the FDA had approved Phenergan's warning label.72
The Vermont trial court held the state law claims were not
preempted by federal law because Levine's claims did not conflict with
FDA regulations.73 Under FDA regulations,74 a manufacturer could
strengthen its warning label without first attaining FDA approval.75 The
jury found Wyeth negligent for failing to provide adequate warnings
about the risks involved with IV-push administration of Phenergan, even
63.
Id. (explaining that after submitting a third supplemental application in 1981 in response
to a new FDA rule, Wyeth began corresponding with the FDA regarding its submission and in 1987,
the FDA suggested a revision).
64.
Id. (stating that the FDA made a few changes to Phenergan's label that were unrelated to
intra-arterial injection then instructed Wyeth to "[r]etain verbiage in current label" (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
65. Id. at 1191.
66. Id.
67. Id. ("Phenergan entered Levine's artery, either because the needle penetrated an artery
directly or because the drug escaped from the vein into surrounding tissue . . . where it came in
contact with arterial blood.").
68. Id. ("[D]octors amputated first her right hand and then her entire forearm. In addition to
her pain and suffering, Levine incurred substantial medical expenses and the loss of her livelihood as
a professional musician.").
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1191-92.
71.
Id. The warning stated in part: "Due to the close proximity of arteries and veins in the
areas most commonly used for intravenous injection, extreme care should be exercised to avoid
perivascular extravasation or inadvertent intra-arterial injection." Id. at 1191 n. 1 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
72. Id. at 1192 (contending that there was an "actual conflict between a specific FDA order"
and Levine's claim (internal quotation marks omitted)).
73. Id. at 1192-93.
74. Id. at 1196 (referencing the "changes being effected" ("CBE") regulation requiring manufacturers to change its label as new information becomes available).
75. Id. at 1193. The trial court had a record of at least twenty amputation reports since the
1960s. Id.
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if it had complied with FDA labeling requirements. 76 The jury compensated Levine for the amputation of her arm and the Vermont Supreme
Court affirmed, concluding that the federal FDA requirements created "a
floor, not a ceiling, for state regulation. ' 7
C. Majority
In a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Stevens, the U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed.78 The Court employed both an impossibility analysis and
an obstacle analysis to conclude that Levine's state law claims were not
preempted by federal law.79 In reaching its decision, the Court relied on
Lohr's fundamental principles of congressional purpose and presumption
against preemption.
First, in rejecting Wyeth's impossibility argument, the Court reasoned that the CBE's newly acquired information provision was not
strictly limited to new information, but also included any new analyses
of data that the FDA had already considered. 8 1 The Court found that
Wyeth had a duty to add to the warning when it became aware of the risk
of gangrene from IV-push injection of Phenergan.82 Therefore, it was not
impossible for Wyeth to add to the warning while still complying with
federal law. 83 Furthermore, although the FDA could have subsequently
rejected the change, there was no evidence that the FDA would not have
allowed for a stronger warning. 84
Next, the Court rejected Wyeth's argument that complying with the
state-law duty "would obstruct the purposes and objectives" of the

76.
Id. (stating that state tort liability "would not obstruct the FDA's work because the agency
had paid no more than passing attention to the question whether to warn against N-push administration of Phenergan").
77.
Id. (agreeing with the trial court that "state law serves a compensatory function distinct
from federal regulation").
78.
Id. at 1190, 1204.
79.
Id. at 1204 (concluding that it was not impossible for Wyeth to comply with both state and
federal laws, and that the state claims did not "stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress' purposes in the FDCA").
80.
Id. at 1194-95 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
81.
Id. (rejecting Wyeth's argument that unilaterally adding a warning would have subjected
it to misbranding liability).
82.
Id. at 1197-98 (emphasizing that Wyeth had knowledge of at least twenty amputation
incidents prior to Levine's injury); see also Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes
for Approved Drugs, Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 49,603, 49,605 (Aug. 22, 2008)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 314, 601, 814) ("Manufacturers continue to have a responsibility
under Federal law.., to maintain their labeling and update the labeling with new safety information.").
83. Id. at 1198-99 (stating that the CBE regulation allowed Wyeth to revise Phenergan's
warning label before receiving FDA approval).
84. Id. (concluding that "the FDA had not made an affirmative decision to preserve the Npush method or intended to prohibit Wyeth from strengthening its warning about N-push administration"); see also id. at 1199 n.5 (noting that although Wyeth had proposed changes to Phenergan's
warning in 1988, these changes were rejected by the FDA because they were not materially different
or stronger than the original language of the warning).
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FDA. 85 The Court reasoned that the FDCA was enacted to further the
protection available to consumers and that the lack of a federal remedy
evidenced congressional intent for remedy under state laws.86 The Court
also distinguished prescription drugs from medical devices for which the
FDCA contained an express preemption provision.87 It concluded that
Congress's silence on prescription drugs, throughout the seventy years
that the FDCA
had existed, revealed Congress's intent to preserve state
88
actions.
tort
The majority rejected Wyeth's claim that the FDA "must be presumed to have performed a precise balancing of risks and benefits.
that leaves no room for state law judgments. 89 Wyeth relied on the 2006
FDA regulation preamble containing the FDA's commentary that FDCA
regulations created both a floor and a ceiling. 9° However, the Court distinguished the preamble from the weight given to the DOT's explanations in Geier as a "mere assertion that state law is an obstacle to achieving its statutory objectives.' 91
Although the majority conceded that an agency's statements explaining the impact of state law on federal objectives was entitled to
some deference, it reasoned that the amount given "depend[ed] on [the
explanation's] thoroughness, consistency, and persuasiveness. ' 93 Moreover, the 2006 preamble failed to bear any force, absent the opportunity
for states to comment, after the FDA's 2000 notice of proposed rulemaking stated that the rule would "not contain policies that.., preempt State
law." 94 Finally, the Court buttressed its holding with Congress's
85. Id. at 1199.
86. Id. ("[Congress] determined that widely available state rights of action provided appropriate relief for injured consumers.").
87. Id. at 1200.
88. Id. ("Its silence on the issue, coupled with its certain awareness of the prevalence of state
tort litigation, is powerful evidence that Congress did not intend FDA oversight to be the exclusive
means of ensuring drug safety and effectiveness.").
89. Id.
90. Id. ("[The preamble] stated that certain state-law actions, such as those involving failureto-warn claims, 'threaten FDA's statutorily prescribed role as the expert Federal agency responsible
for evaluating and regulating drugs."' (quoting Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for
Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products (pt. 2), 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3935 (Jan. 24, 2006)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201,314, 601))).
91.
Id. at 1201.
92. Id. (stating that agency statements are entitled to some deference when "the subject matter
is technica[l] and the relevant history and background are complex and extensive" (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861,
883 (2000))).
93. Id. ("Even in such cases, however, we have not deferred to an agency's conclusion that
state law is pre-empted. Rather, we have attended to an agency's explanation of how state law affects the regulatory scheme. While agencies have no special authority to pronounce on pre-emption
absent delegation by Congress, they do have a unique understanding of the statutes they administer
and an attendant ability to make informed determinations about how state requirements may pose an
'obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."').
94. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Requirements on Content and Format of
Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs and Biologics; Requirements for Prescription Drug Product
Labels, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,082, 81,103 (proposed Dec. 22, 2000) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 201)).
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longstanding view that state laws complement FDA regulations.95 The
FDA's limited resources and the ability of state tort claims to help reveal
unknown risks associated with drugs "lend force to the FDCA's premise
that manufacturers, not the FDA, bear primary responsibility for their
drug labeling at all times." 96
D. Justice Thomas's Concurrence
Justice Thomas concurred with the majority opinion, agreeing that it
was not impossible for Wyeth to comply with both federal and state obligations. 97 Aside from the narrower physical impossibility standard, Justice Thomas emphasized that impossibility under the broader direct conflict standard also did not exist because the FDA approval did not shield
Wyeth from liability.98
However, Justice Thomas criticized the application of the "purposes
and objectives" preemption jurisprudence, under the obstacle analysis, as
reaching beyond statutory text. 99 Focusing heavily on preserving state
sovereignty, he characterized the Supremacy Clause as "accord[ing] preemptive effect to only those policies that are actually authorized by and
effectuated through the statutory text." ° Justice Thomas criticized Geier
as facilitating "freewheeling, extratextual, and broad evaluations" of federal law by relying on agency explanations instead of the text of the saving clause. l 1 Justice Thomas also reprimanded the Court's interpretation
of Congress's silence as intent to allow state tort actions.1°2 He concluded
that although the Court reached the correct decision, the judgment should
rather than the
have been based on the text of the statutory provision
03
Court's interpretation of congressional inaction.
Id. at 1201-02 ("(The FDA] cast federal labeling standards as a floor upon which States
95.
could build and repeatedly disclaimed any attempt to pre-empt failure-to-warn claims.").
96. Id. at 1202 ("The FDA has limited resources to monitor the 11,000 drugs on the market,
and manufacturers have superior access to information about their drugs, especially in the postmarketing phase as new risks emerge.").
Id. at 1204-05 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Breyer wrote a separate concurring opi97.
nion emphasizing the Court's statement that "we have no occasion in this case to consider the preemptive effect of a specific agency regulation bearing the force of law." Id. at 1204. Justice Breyer's
concurrence is outside the scope of this Comment.
98.
Id. at 1209.
99.
Id. at 1205 ("Under this approach, the Court routinely invalidates state laws based on
perceived conflicts with broad federal policy objectives, legislative history, or generalized notions of
congressional purposes that are not embodied within the text of federal law.").
100. Id. at 1216 (emphasis added).
101.
Id. at 1214, 1217.
102.
Id. at 1216-17 ("[O]nce the Court shows a willingness to guess at the intent underlying
congressional inaction, the Court could just as easily rely on its own perceptions regarding congressional inaction to give unduly broad pre-emptive effect to federal law.").
103.
Id.:
Certainly, the absence of a statutory provision pre-empting all state tort suits related to
approved federal drug labels is pertinent to a finding that such lawsuits are not preempted. But the relevance is in the fact that no statute explicitly pre-empts the lawsuits,
and not in any inferences that the Court may draw from congressional silence about the
motivations or policies underlying Congress'[s] failure to act.
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E. Dissent
Justice Alito authored the dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Scalia. The dissent argued that conflict preemption
prohibited state tort juries from overriding the FDA's drug safety determinations. 1°4 Justice Alito argued that Congress's purpose was clear in
"authorizing the FDA-not state tort juries-to determine when and under what circumstances a drug is 'safe."' 0 5 Justice Alito further reasoned
that the FDA had extensively considered the costs and benefits of the IVpush administration of Phenergan. 1°6 He stated that, as in Geier, conflict
preemption was not defeated by either a saving clause or the absence of
an express preemption provision as long as an actual conflict existed. 107
Furthermore, Justice Alito rejected the Court's interpretation of the
2006 preamble as having no weight, 10 8 and instead argued that the FDA's
labeling decisions bear the force of law.' 9 Under Geier,the presumption
against preemption and an agency's specific intent to preempt through
notice-and-comment rulemaking were not relevant" 0 where state tort
duties stood in actual conflict with federal objectives."' Finally, Justice
Alito stated that juries were "ill-equipped to perform the FDA's costbenefit-balancing function."" 2 He warned that juries would undermine
the drug-labeling function of the FDA and that those benefitting from the
drugs would suffer "if juries in all 50 states were free to contradict the
FDA's expert determinations."" 3
III. ANALYSIS
In Wyeth v. Levine, the Court properly reemphasized the importance
of congressional intent and the presumption against preemption as the
"cornerstones" of preemption jurisprudence." 4 In doing so, the Court
104.

Id. at 1218-19 (Alito, J., dissenting).

105.

Id. at 1219-20 ("Neither the FDCA nor its implementing regulations suggest that juries

may second-guess the FDA's labeling decisions.").
106.
Id. at 1222-26 (noting that the FDA cited numerous medical authorities to support IVpush administration of Phenergan and provided specific extensive warnings of the associated risks).
107.
Id. at 1220-21.
108.
Id. at 1228 (stating that the FDA has an understanding of how state law could obstruct
federal objectives and therefore "can translate these understandings into particularized pre-emptive
intentions... through statements in regulations, preambles, interpretive statements, and responses to
comments" (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 506 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring))).
109.
Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)).
110.
Id. ("It is well within the FDA's discretion to make its labeling decisions through administrative adjudications rather than through less-formal and less-flexible rulemaking proceedings, and
we have never previously held that our pre-emption analysis turns on the agency's choice of the

latter over the former." (citation omitted)).
111.
Id. (stating that "pre-emption follows automatically by operation of the Supremacy
Clause" (emphasis added)).
112.
Id. at 1229-30 (arguing that juries only see those injured by a drug but never see those

who have benefitted from the drug, whereas the FDA's judgments have considered all interests).
113.
114.

Id. at 1230.
Id. at 1194-95 (majority opinion).
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revamped the significance of a presumption against preemption in an
implied conflict preemption analysis. The Wyeth decision restored proper
weight to saving clauses and clarified the FDA approval debate by rejecting the approval of Phenergan as a conclusive statement of safety.
However, the Court's preamble analysis did not go far enough. A
more restrictive analysis of agency views would have led future cases
away from the Geier decision by requiring strict adherence to the noticeand-comment rulemaking procedures. On a broader level, while the impossibility analysis warrants adherence, the Court's purposes and objectives determinations in its obstacle analysis should be abandoned. Furthermore, a classification of drugs based on their level of risk could help
clarify future preemption battles.
A. The Restorationof the PresumptionAgainst Preemption
Although the presumption against preemption was relevant in Lohr,
the Geier Court failed to consider it in its conflict preemption determination. The Wyeth Court's holding, and its reliance on the longstanding
principle, signifies the importance of a presumption in all instances of
implied preemption and exposes the faulty reasoning in the wrongly decided Geier case.
The Wyeth dissent misinterprets Geier's focus on actual conflict as
making a presumption against preemption irrelevant.' 15 Justice Stevens's
opinion restores harmony between federal power and state sovereignty
by starting with a respect for traditional state powers absent an express
preemption provision. By rejecting Wyeth's argument that the presumption should not apply to instances where the federal government has
shown to have regulated drug labeling for over a century, the Wyeth
Court makes clear that the purpose of the principle is driven by a consid1' 16
eration of states as "independent sovereigns in our federal system."
Focusing on the cornerstones of preemption, the Wyeth Court properly
ensured that "the longstanding coexistence of state and federal law in the

115.
See id. at 1195 n.3.
116.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485
(1996)); see also David A. Dana, Democratizing the Law of FederalPreemption, 102 Nw. U. L.
REv. 507, 511 (2008):
The federalism-based presumption against preemption suggests, by its very terms, that in
preemption cases the courts must balance the potential harm to the efficacy of democratically enacted federal law against the importance of federalism principles rooted in state
sovereignty. When the balance is close.., the court should come down on the side of no
preemption.
Matthew S. Reid, Comment, Vermont Supreme Court Rules That Food and Drug Administration
Regulations Do Not Preempt State Failure-to-Warn Claims: Levine v. Wyeth, 4 J. HEALTH &
BIOMEDICAL L. 413, 425 (2008):
[H]ealth and safety has traditionally been considered part of the states' police-powers
since the founding of the Republic and the attempts of a federal agency to encroach on
the traditional legal territory of the states should only occur with the manifest consent of
the Congress which is clearly not indicated here.
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area of pharmaceutical warning labels would remain intact"'117 and re1 18
jected the Geier Court's attempt to undercut this balance.
B. The Decision'sEffect on Saving Clauses
The Wyeth Court's decision to preserve the presumption against
preemption principle also gives proper weight to saving clauses. Saving
clauses further reflect congressional intent to preserve state powers to
protect public health and welfare where a conflict with a federal law does
not exist. 119 The Wyeth Court's emphasis on the presumption against
preemption-requiring clear congressional intent to preempt state remedies-fortifies the general principle behind saving clauses.
The Geier Court previously rejected the presumption against
preemption, concluding that the existence of both a preemption provision
and a saving clause created a neutral policy of preemption. 120 This view,
however, undermines Congress's desire to avoid regulatory gaps left by
federal law by allowing for protection through state laws. 12 1 Whereas
preemption provisions, such as those in Lohr and Geier, are often ambiguous and can result in various delineations of state and federal law
boundaries, the presence of a saving clause remains clear in nearly all
instances as working to "leave ample room for state law to provide increased protection above the federal regulatory floor."' 122 Furthermore,
giving proper effect to saving clauses could work to override the recent
deference given to agency interpretations by acting as further evidence of
congressional intent to retain state remedies.
The Wyeth decision is a step toward both dispelling the "neutral policy" trend of the Geier Court and restoring the significance of saving
clauses for future cases. 23 The Wyeth Court cured the inability of future
courts to both narrow an agency's preemptive scope and create a safe
harbor for state law. 124 By utilizing the saving clause to reject the preamble's preemptive powers, the Wyeth Court avoided the risk of "sending
117. Dawn Goulet, Consumer News, LinkLine Decision Puts the Squeeze on the Price Squeeze
Theory of Liability, 21 LOY. CONSUMER L. REv. 429,434 (2009).
118. See Reid, supra note 116 ("The court accurately resolved the issue in a manner consistent
with judicial precedent, legislative history, and basic principles of federalism.").
119. See Zellmer, supra note 1, at 1660.
120. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 871 (2000).
121.
See Zellmer, supra note 1, at 1668.
122. Id. at 1660.
123. See id. at 1702; see also id. at 1732 ("[G]iving savings clauses appropriate weight honors
congressional choices, avoids regulatory gaps, fosters innovative measures to protect human health
... and enhances institutional competency by empowering governments at all levels to protect the
public at appropriate scales.").
124. Young, supra note 40, at 26 ("If the Court relies on the agency's preamble in Wyeth and
holds the state law preempted, then successive majorities will have frowned upon the FDA's attempts to limit preemption in Riegel, while welcoming its attempts to expand it in Wyeth. In the
hands of the Court, agency action defining preemptory authority risks becoming a one-way ratchetfully applicable in the service of strong federal preemption, but unable to narrow the preemptive
scope when it seeks to create a safe harbor for state law.").
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mixed messages to federal agencies-granting them authority to assert
broad preemption, but skeptically reviewing any attempt to narrow
preemptive scope.' 25
Furthermore, giving proper weight to the presence of a saving
clause will never act to unduly bar valid determinations of conflict
preemption. The Supremacy Clause ensures that actual conflicts between
12 6
federal and state laws will lead to the preemption of those state laws.
C. Clarificationof FDA Approval and Manufacturers'Responsibilities
The Wyeth Court's holding, despite Phenergan's FDA approval,
rightfully casts Riegel "in the narrow light it deserves, as a case governing only the limited group of Class III devices that receive the most rigorous FDA scrutiny available under federal law." 127 With its decision,
the Wyeth Court affirmed the notion that FDA approval of a drug is not
based on the optimal safety of a drug, but based1 2only
on the information
8
manufacturer.
drug's
the
from
receives
FDA
the
For close to fifty years, it has been the manufacturers' responsibility
to prove the safety of a drug in order to distribute the drug, instead of the
FDA's responsibility to prove a drug's harm in order to keep it out of the
market.'2 9 With a shift in the burden of proof, courts cannot assume that
the FDA has retained the same level of incentive or burden to actively
discover new risks posed by a drug. The FDA continues to be largely
dependent on the information provided by each manufacturer, and removing the manufacturers' incentive to maintain the safety of the
drugs-by awarding them immunity in tort claims-would result in less
safe drugs.1 30 The FDA's report stating "the budget and staff of the
[FDA] are inadequate to permit the discharge of its existing responsibilities for the protection of the American public"1 3 1 further supports this
view.1 32 The Wyeth Court's emphasis on the manufacturers' responsibili125.
Id. at 23 (pointing out the problematic implications of this outcome); see also id. at 25
("[Mhe... savings regulation has the general effect of limiting preemption, while the 2006 language
carves out the widest possible pieemptive space.").
126. Zellmer, supra note 1, at 1733.
127.
Id. at 1696.
128.
See id. at 1694-95.
129.
Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1195 (2009) (referencing the 1962 amendment to the
FDCA shifting the burden of proof to the manufacturer).
130. Reid, supra note 116; see also Dawn Goulet, Consumer News, Supporters and Opponents
of Federal Preemption Take Sides, Anticipate High Court's Ruling on Third FDA Preemption Case
This Year, 21 LOy. CONSUMER L. REv. 96, 104 (2008) ("Congress never intended that FDA approv-

al give blank immunity to manufacturers from liability for injuries caused by their products." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kennedy, Pallone Eye Legislation to Undo Preemption Ruling, FDA WK., Feb. 29, 2008, availableat 2008 WLNR 4025500)).
131.
Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1202 n. 11 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting CITIZENS
ADVISORY COMM. ON THE FDA, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND
WELFARE, H.R. Doc. No. 84-227, at 53 (1955)).

132.
See Goulet, supra note 130:
The [FDA's own science] board 'concluded that science at the FDA is in a precarious position,' and the agency 'is not positioned to meet the current or emerging regulatory re-
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ty of maintaining adequate warning labels appropriately rejects the
treatment of FDA approval as a conclusive statement of safety.133
Although Wyeth did not address Riegel's decision to include state
tort actions as falling within preemption, it restores the Lohr Court's favorable view of state tort claims. Though the Wyeth dissent argued that
the FDA's safety determinations should not be questioned, allowing state
tort judgments to proceed will increase consumer protection. As the
Wyeth Court stated, state tort suits often bring to light unknown dangers
of FDA approved drugs' 34 and motivate manufacturers to disclose those
risks.135 If FDA approval were to shield drug manufacturers from common-law liabilities, manufacturers might misrepresent information to the
FDA in order to attain approval. 36 Tort remedies, however, provide
manufacturers incentives to avoid liability by actively1 37
analyzing new
risks and working to improve the safety of their products.
D. The Effect of the Wyeth Court'sInterpretationof the 2006 Preamble
Wyeth rejected the preemptive effect of the 2006 preamble as meriting no deference. However, the Court's mere comparison to the DOT's
explanations in Geier fell short of setting the necessary precedent of requiring a clear congressional intent for preemption. The Court should
have used the opportunity to invalidate Geier's dependence on agency
explanation by strictly relying on statutory text in its preemption analysis.
The Wyeth Court acknowledged that certain agency views could
properly preempt state action through a thorough, consistent, and persuasive explanation regarding the obstacle that state tort actions would impose on federal objectives. 38 The Court further noted that while "agencies have no special authority to pronounce on pre-emption absent delegation by Congress,"' 39 weight is given to agency views when "the subject matter is technical[,] and the relevant history and background are
complex and extensive."' 14 By merely distinguishing the case from Gei-

sponsibilities.' It cited two resources for this deficiency: 1) demands on the FDA have
soared, and 2) resources allocated to the agency have not increased in proportion to those
demands.
(quoting SUBCOMM. ON SCI. & TECH., FDA, FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK 2 (2007),

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/08/briefing/2008-4365bl_02-04-Subcommittee%20Report
%20on%2OScience%20and%2OTechnol.pdf).
133.
See Zellmer, supra note 1, at 1694-95.
134.
See Goulet, supranote 117, at 436 (praising the benefits of a dual system and recognizing
that state tort suits "may motivate injured persons to come forward with information" (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1202)).
135.
Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1202.
136.
See Sharkey, supra note 3, at 238.
137.
See Zellmer, supranote 1, at 1674.
138.
Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201.
139.
Id.
140.
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000).
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er, the Wyeth Court failed to drive future decisions away 1from
the recent
41
determinations.
preemption
agency
regarding
controversy
Under Executive Order 12,988, agencies must clearly specify the
preemptive effect of a law. 4 2 Furthermore, under Executive Order
13,132, agencies must provide states notice and an opportunity to comment on regulations that may affect them. 43 This notice-and-comment
rulemaking, laid out in the Administrative Procedure Act, protects states
by ensuring that they are consulted for any preemption decisions.' 44 Although Congress entrusted agencies with the authority to regulate, agencies must adhere to the specificity and notice-and-rulemaking require145
ments in order to ensure that regulations reflect congressional intent.
Furthermore, these procedures prevent a boundless doctrine of implied
conflict preemption 146 and honor the crucial 47presumption against preemption when dealing with agency regulations. 1
Applying the above to Geier, the Court should have ended its analysis when it found that the FMVSS lacked any specific intent to preempt
state tort actions. Because agencies have the ability to make their intentions clear, courts should not encourage agencies 148 to deviate from these
procedures by taking into account an agency's views about how a state
action would create an obstacle to federal purposes and objectives. By
developing one strict standard, courts can avoid the debate regarding the
amount of deference given to agency views.
Additionally, any trend validating the Geier decision is troubling.
Allowing agencies to self-empower themselves to preempt state laws
without going through the proper procedures would completely bar a
private right of action. 149 While agencies can set forth rules under their
delegated authority, they lack the power to allow private rights of action. 150 This result, coupled with an absence of a federal remedy under
the FDCA, would be at extreme odds with the two cornerstones of the
preemption jurisprudence. Congress, in its expansion of the FDA's regulatory authority, did not include a private right of action for damages in
141.
142.

See Sharkey, supra note 3, at 254.
Id. at 242 (citing Exec. Order No. 12,988, 61 Fed. Reg. 4729, 4731 (Feb. 5, 1996)).

143.
Id. at 254-55 (citing Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255, 43,256 (Aug. 4,
1999)).
144.
See id. at 254.
145.
Geier,529 U.S. at 907 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe power of pre-emption [is] squarely
in the hands of Congress.").
146.
Sharkey, supra note 3, at 258 ("Agency preemption preambles represent the latest manifestation of a broader trend of the increasing federalization of law governing products regulated in a
national market.").
147. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 907 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
148.
Sharkey, supra note 3, at 254 (stating that "agencies are thumbing their noses at these
congressional and executive mandates").
149. See id. at 242.
150. Id. at 248 (recognizing that "[a]gencies may play the sorcerer's apprentice but not the
sorcerer himself' (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,291 (2001))).
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order to maintain the harmonious relationship between state and federal
regulations.1 5 1 Barring remedy through state tort actions would contradict
Congress's purpose 52 of having enacted the FDCA and would deny the
presumption against preemption without the required clear and manifest
purpose of Congress. 153 Because agencies, unlike Congress, are not
elected to represent the interests of states, their broad preemptive power
must be strictly regulated in order to prevent unjust results.
E. A NecessaryAbandonment of the "Purposesand Objectives" Obstacle Analysis
The concerns raised in permitting agencies to make their own
preemption determinations call for the abandonment of the Court's purposes and objectives preemption jurisprudence employed in the obstacle
analysis. As Justice Thomas' concurrence in Wyeth states, the broad approach to the purposes and objectives determination has allowed courts
to make their own judgments outside of what has been clearly expressed
by the statutory text."
The Tenth Amendment states that "[t]he powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively."'155 In order to abide by the Constitution and preserve this balance of power, the Supremacy Clause and its
preemption doctrine should only be applied to federal laws that are
"made in Pursuance" of the Constitution.1 56 Therefore, it follows that
"pre-emptive effect be given only those to federal standards and policies
' 57
that are set forth in, or necessarily follow from, the statutory text."'
In order to better respect the purpose of Congress as the touchstone
of the preemption inquiry, the broad purposes and objectives determination, found in the Geier decision and followed by the Wyeth Court,
should be abandoned. The Geier Court's reliance on the DOT's statements to concoct a federal objective of gradually phasing in a variety of
passive restraints was plainly at odds with the expressed purpose of the

151.
See Diana Rabeh, Issues in the Third Circuit, Is Preemption Right for You?: The Third
Circuit Applies Preemption to a Misleading Drug Advertisement Claim in Pennsylvania Employee

Benefit Trust Fund v. Zeneca, Inc., 53 VILL. L. REV. 743, 749-51 (2008) (finding that "a private
right of action for damages was 'unnecessary' because a 'common law right of action exists' (quoting Louis M. Bograd, Taking on Big Pharma--andthe FDA, TRIAL, Mar. 2007, at 30, 30)).
152.

Davis, supranote 2, at 1139 ("[Tlhe objective of the food and drug laws has been clear: to

protect the public health and safety from adulterated and misbranded drugs.").
153.
154.

Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,485 (1996).
See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1212 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring).

155.
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
156.
Wyeth, 129 S. CL at 1206 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
157.

Id. at 1207.
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Safety Act "to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons
resulting from traffic accidents. 158
Future compliance with the Wyeth Court's purposes and objectives
jurisprudence will only lead to additional unconstitutional invalidations
of state laws. Although saving clauses are in place to limit the Court's
broad determinations of federal objectives, the Geier decision serves as a
warning that saving clauses are often overridden. Furthermore, in the
absence of the obstacle analysis, the impossibility analysis will continue
to properly preempt the necessary state laws. Expanding the impossibility analysis to include both a narrower physical impossibility and a
broader conflict impossibility will also allow courts to preempt state laws
that would impose contradictory duties 159 even if a manufacturer could
comply with both laws. This standard will preserve the holdings of Lohr
and Wyeth while appropriately directing future decisions away from Geier. Basing implied preemption on the impossibility analysis would guarantee that the presumption against preemption will only be overridden
when the proper burden is met.
F. An Additional Suggestion to Balance ManufacturerConcerns in the
Preemption Battle
Requiring agencies to adhere to notice-and-comment rulemaking in
their preemption decisions, while abolishing the obstacle analysis, will
rightfully swing the preemption jurisprudence toward state sovereignty.
However, Congress has entrusted the FDA to regulate the safety and
effectiveness of drugs as "[t]he centerpiece of risk management," 160 and
these changes will undoubtedly bring harsh criticisms.
As pointed out by the Wyeth dissent, the FDA makes safety determinations based on long-term costs and benefits, and the interests of all
potential users. 16 1 The dissent warns that if every state were "free to contradict the FDA's expert determinations," others who would have benefitted from the drug would suffer. 162 Manufacturers could be doing all
they should to investigate potential new risks. Subjecting them to a myriad of state laws could shift their focus from improving their drugs to
constantly searching for potential new risks.
These concerns, in light of the proposed changes, require the establishment of a more instructive standard for prescription drugs. Like the
MDA classification of medical devices, prescription drugs should be
158.
See id. at 1215 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. § 1381 (1988) (repealed 1994)).
159. See id. at 1209.
160. Id. at 1219 (alteration in original) (quoting Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201,314, 601)).
161.
Id. at 1230 (Alito, J., dissenting).
162.
Id.
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classified based on the level of risk they pose to the public. Class Ell
drugs would require satisfaction of the most rigorous standards, and the
FDA should require the manufacturers of those drugs to report even individual cases of injury for immediate risk analysis and warning update.
Placing drugs such as Phenergan into the Class III category would provide courts with evidence of having complied with the most rigorous
safety standards. While the addition of a classification system for prescription drugs would not necessarily act to bar state suits, it would set
stricter standards for Class III drugs and allow manufacturers to point to
their compliance to reduce or eliminate their liability in tort suits such as
Ms. Levine's.
CONCLUSION

The battle between federal preemption and state sovereignty, in
matters of safety regulations, has been the center of an ongoing debate.
In examining the preemption of a state tort action regarding the safety of
a prescription drug, the Wyeth Court followed the impossibility and the
obstacle analyses employed in prior implied preemption cases. The decision in Wyeth properly reemphasized the significance of the presumption
against preemption and the need for clear congressional intent to preempt. By doing so, the Court gave weight to traditional state police powers and restored the meaning of saving clauses, which the Geier Court
had previously stripped.
However, the Court's preamble analysis did not go far enough. The
decision reveals the need for a stricter requirement of adhering to the
notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures to reflect congressional intent. Furthermore, the Wyeth Court's following of Geier's "purposes and
objectives" jurisprudence raises concerns about the textual validity of a
federal objective determination. Therefore, this Comment suggests that
the Court fully abandon the obstacle analysis. In doing so, the Court
should expand the impossibility analysis to encompass both physical
impossibility and conflict impossibility, to assure that implied preemption will adequately preempt state laws that impose a contradictory duty.
In light of these changes, this Comment suggests the classification of
drugs to provide a safeguard for manufacturers in future state tort actions.
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BARTLETr V. STRICKLAND: THE CROSSOVER OF RACE AND
POLITICS
INTRODUCTION

Since the passage of Voting Rights Act of 1965,1 the United States
Supreme Court has addressed a variety of forms of racial discrimination
in voter redistricting plans.2 For cases brought under § 2 of the Act, the
Court has developed specific standards to evaluate claims of vote dilution and political gerrymandering. In Bartlett v. Strickland,3 the Court
restricted dilution claims to instances where the racial minority would
constitute more than fifty percent of the voting age population in the proposed district. 4 In doing so, the Court correctly upheld the rights created
under the Voting Rights Act, maintained a workable solution for resolving § 2 claims, and reduced the role of race in election districting and
American politics.
Part I of this Comment reviews the history of vote dilution and race,
and pertinent case law. Part II summarizes the Court's decision in Bartlett v. Strickland, including the facts, procedural history, and opinions.
Part ll analyzes Bartlett and presents the negative consequences of expanding § 2 to crossover districts. The Comment concludes by arguing
that the Court's holding in Bartlett properly reflects the shrinking role of
race in American electoral politics.
I. BACKGROUND

A. Vote Dilution and § 2 of the Voting Rights Act
Although the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution granted African-Americans the right to vote shortly after the Civil
War,5 Southern states instituted an array of measures to disenfranchise
African-Americans and minimize their presence in the electoral process.6
These tactics included literacy tests, poll taxes, and gerrymandering.7
1.
2.
tion, 117
3.
4.

5.

42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2006).
See Note, The Implicationsof Coalitionaland Influence Districtsfor Vote DilutionLitigaHARV. L. REv. 2598, 2599 (2004).
129 S.Ct. 1231 (2009).
Id. at 1249.

U.S. CONST. amends. XIV-XV.

6.
GARRINE P. LANEY, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND
CURRENT ISSUES 3-6 (2003). For additional information on African-American disenfranchisement

and the history of minority voting rights, see generally PATRICIA GURIN ET AL., HOPE AND
INDEPENDENCE: BLACKS' RESPONSE TO ELECTORAL AND PARTY POLITICS (1989); ALEXANDER
KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES
(2000); J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND THE
UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION (1999).

7.

See LANEY, supra note 6, at 3-5.
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Beginning in 1890, eight states enacted literacy tests specifically designed to prevent African-Americans from voting, based on the fact that
more than two-thirds of the African-American population was illiterate.8
Many states instituted poll taxes intended to prevent minorities from voting. 9 In Florida, African-Americans who were able to pay the poll tax
often encountered technical problems, such as inaccurate voting certificates and address information, which disqualified them from voting. 10
Additionally, in 1882, South Carolina created one district out of seven
with a majority of African-American voters, even though AfricanAmericans outnumbered registered white voters by over 30,000 in all
districts.11 That district-pejoratively described as a "boa constrictor"ran over
150 miles, split six counties, and extended into the Atlantic
12
Ocean.
To fight these thinly veiled attempts to disenfranchise minority voters, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act in 1965.13 The Act addressed
racial disenfranchisement in three ways. 14 First, it prohibited the use of
literacy tests and other qualifications used to prevent minorities from
voting. 15 Second, § 5 of the Act required certain Southern states to seek
preapproval for any redistricting schemes from the Department of Justice. 16 Third, § 2 authorized minority voters to sue in federal courts for
violation of their voting rights. 17
In addition to the Voting Rights Act requirements, the Supreme
Court held in 1964 that state legislative districts must have roughly equal
voting populations throughout a state.' 8 States have enacted similar standards to the Court's holding and require that their legislative districts
have a roughly equal number of voters.1 9 While the original Voting
8.
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310-11 (1966).
9. J. Morgan Kousser, The Undermining of the First Reconstruction:Lessons for the Second,
in MINORrrY VOTE DILUTION 27, 30-31 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984).
10.
PAUL LEWINSON, RACE, CLASS, AND PARTY: A HISTORY OF NEGRO SUFFRAGE AND
WHITE POLITICS IN THE SOUTH 119 (1963).

11.
Donald Norton Brown, Southern Attitudes Toward Negro Voting in the Bourbon Period,
1877-1890, at 150-151 (1960) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oklahoma) (on file
with Bizzell Library, University of Oklahoma).
12.
Laughlin McDonald, The Looming 2010 Census: A Proposed Judicially Manageable
Standardand Other Reform Optionsfor PartisanGerrymandering,46 HARv. J. ON LEGIS, 243, 246
(2009) (citing Brown, supra note 11, at 150).
13.
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).
14.. Id. §§ 1973b-1973c.
15.
Id. § 1973b.
16.
Id. § 1973c.
17.
Id. § 1973b.
18.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568-69 (1964).
19.

See NAT'L CONFERENCE ON STATE LEGISLATURES, REDISTRICTING LAW 2010, at 127

(2009) (surveying redistricting criteria for all fifty states). In California, for example, seven general
criteria provide the basis for any redistricting plan:
(1) The districts in each plan should be equal in population, with strict equality in the
case of congressional districts and reasonable equality in the case of legislative districts.
(2) The territory included within a district should be contiguous and compact. (3) Insofar
as practical counties and cities should be maintained intact. (4) Insofar as possible the in-
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Rights Act and state regulations on redistricting addressed overt attempts
to disenfranchise minority voters, Southern states have employed more
subtle means of keeping voting rights in white hands. Vote dilution is
one such tactic.
Vote dilution occurs when an electoral districting body unlawfully
weakens a minority group's ability to elect a chosen candidate by creating a large, majority-dominated district.20 To remedy vote dilution, legislatures may create "majority-minority" districts, where the protected
minority group constitutes a numerical majority of the population within
the new district. 21 Initially, the Fifteenth Amendment served as the primary avenue for dilution claims. 22 In response to public outcry following

two Supreme Court holdings that required intentional discrimination to
prove a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment in voting dilution cases,23
Congress amended § 2 in 1982 to remove any intent requirements. 24 In
the amended version, a voting practice or procedure denies or abridges a
group's right to vote if:
[Biased on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a
class of citizens protected ... in that its members have less opportu-

nity than other members of the electorate to participate
25 in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.
The Senate also attached a report recommending that courts, in
place of a need for intent, use a "totality of the circumstances" test included in the Act. 26 The "totality of the circumstances" test and the juditegnity of the state's basic geographical regions should be preserved. (5) The community
of interests of the population of an area should be considered in determining whether the
area should be included within or excluded from a proposed district so that all of the citizens of the district may be represented reasonably, fairly and effectively. (6) State senatorial districts should be formed by combining adjacent assembly districts, and, to the degree practicable, assembly district boundaries should be used as congressional district
boundaries. (7) The basis for reapportionment should be the.., census, and in counties
where census tracts exist, such tracts should be used as the basic unit for district formation.
Legislature of Cal. v. Reinecke, 516 P.2d 6, 10 (Cal. 1973).
20. Adam B. Cox & Tomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of Voting
Rights Jurisprudence,75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1493, 1498 (2008).
21.
Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in CONTROVERSIES IN
MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 7,49 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler

Davidson eds., 1992). See generally id. at 7-51, for a historical framework and comprehensive
background of both the Voting Rights Act and minority vote dilution.
22. See id. at 30.
23.
See Cox & Miles, supranote 20, at 1498 (citing City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S.
55, 62 (1980) (plurality opinion)); Laughlin McDonald, The 1982 Amendments of Section 2 and
Minority Representation, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING, supra note 21, at 66, 67.
24.
McDonald, supra note 23, at 67-69. See id. at 66-84, for additional discussion and analysis on the 1982 amendments to § 2.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006).
26. See S. REP. No. 97-417, at 16, 21, 27 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 193,
199, 205.
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cial standard created in Thornburg v. Gingles27 serve as the two-pronged
evaluation that courts currently use to determine vote dilution claims
pursuant to § 2.
B. Thornburg v. Gingles
Decided in 1986, Gingles was the first major voting rights decision
after Congress amended § 2, and remains the landmark case on vote dilution and the Voting Rights Act. 28 In Gingles, the Court held that certain
multimember districts in the North Carolina Legislature illegally diluted
African-American voting opportunities.2 9
Gingles established the doctrinal framework for vote dilution claims
in multimember districts. 30 To prevail on a § 2 claim, the minority petitioner must meet three doctrinal requirements: (1) they must demonstrate
that their minority group is large enough and compact enough to constitute a majority if they were placed in a single member district; (2) they
must demonstrate that the minority group is politically cohesive; and (3)
they must demonstrate that a white majority group votes together in
enough numbers to defeat the minority's preferred candidate.31 If those
requirements are met, the Court will then examine the totality of the circumstances to determine if a violation occurred. 32 Although the two-step
framework in Gingles initially applied only to multimember districts,
subsequent decisions concluded that33single-member districting schemes
could be challenged as vote dilution.
C. Voinovich v. Quilter 34
In Voinovich, the Court held that the petitioners failed the Gingles
test, and therefore could not establish a § 2 violation. 35 Voinovich involved influence dilution, where a minority group is not overwhelmed by
whites within a district, but "packed" into super-majorities in fewer districts to dilute their overall influence across the state. 36 Since the petitioners conceded that Ohio did not experience a significant amount of
racially polarized voting (where voters choose their candidates based on
race), the Court found that the claim against the Ohio apportionment
27.
478 U.S. 30, 46 (1986).
28.
Cox & Miles, supra note 20, at 1500.
29.
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 80. See BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION
AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY 47-60 (1992), for further background and analysis of the
Court's decision in Gingles, and the implications of that decision.
30.
Cox & Miles, supranote 20, at 1501.
31.
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-52; see also GROFMAN Er AL., supra note 29, at 61-81 (discussing the three-pronged test).
32. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46.
33. E.g., Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1241 (2009) (plurality opinion); Growe v.
Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40-41 (1993).
34. 507 U.S. 146 (1993).
35.
Id. at 158.
36. u at 149-51.
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board failed to meet the third Gingles requirement.37 The Court noted
that the Gingles requirements must be tailored to the nature of each
claim, and adjusted the Gingles framework accordingly. 38 The Court
determined the first requirement-that a minority group constitute a majority in a single district-would need alteration or removal
39 in influence
met.
are
requirements
other
two
the
where
dilution claims
D. Johnson v. De Grandy 4°
In Johnson v. De Grandy, the Court addressed proportionality in
vote dilution. The Court held that no violation of § 2 occurs when minority voters form effective voting majorities in a number of districts roughly proportional to their share of the voting age population. 4' The petitioners in De Grandy argued that the Florida House of Representatives' redistricting plan fragmented minorities into separate districts, which illegally diluted their voting power.42 The Court found that their claim satisfied
the Gingles requirements and determined, on the totality of the circumstances, that the Hispanic minority group constituted a majority in a number of districts proportional to their overall population percentage.4 3
Justice Souter, writing for the majority, reasoned that § 2 does not
bestow on majorities the right to total maximization of their voting power.44 In its discussion of crossover districts-where a minority group does
not constitute a majority of the population in a district but is sufficiently
large to form coalitions with majority members that "crossover" to elect
their chosen candidate-the Court noted that "minority voters are not
immune from the obligation to pull, haul, and trade to find common political ground. '45
E. Georgia v. Ashcroft4
In Ashcroft, the Court authorized state districting bodies to create
crossover districts to replace majority-minority districts under § 5 of the
Voting Rights Act.47 Although the violation in Ashcroft was based on a
§ 5 violation, which requires certain Southern states to pre-clear with a
federal court any redistricting that may reestablish racial discrimination,
the Court's discussion of § 2 and vote dilution in crossover districts is
37.
Id. at 158.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40.
512 U.S. 997 (1994).
Id.at 1000.
41.
42.
Id. at 1002.
Id. at 1014-15.
43.
Id.at 1016.
44.
45.
Id. at 1020.
539 U.S. 461 (2003).
46.
Id. at 480-82; Michael A. Carvin & Louis K. Fisher, "A Legislative Task": Why Four
47.
Types of Redistricting Challenges Are Not, or Should Not Be, Recognized by Courts, 4 ELECTION
L.J. 2, 20 (2005).

586
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particularly relevant to the analysis of Bartlett. In Ashcroft, the AfricanAmerican minority group, which consistently voted Democrat by a large
margin, supported the decision by the Democratic-controlled Georgia
State Legislature to "unpack" districts with large African-American majorities to create more crossover districts. 48 This unpacking would not
result in fewer majority-minority districts, but would lessen the relative
majority of African-Americans in order to increase their influence in
other districts. 49 By allowing crossover districts, the Court recognized
that minority groups could also participate equally in elections in districts
where they are not a majority of the population. 50 For claims brought
under the Voting Rights Act, the Court held that any inquiry of districting violations must examine the districting plan across the entire state,
not just selected districts, to determine whether a § 5 violation has occurred.5 '
52
F. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry ("LULAC")

In LULAC, the Court held that a redistricting plan does not violate §
2 if the minority group involved could not elect a candidate of its choice
without illegal vote dilution.53 Among the multiple allegations put forth
in LULAC, African-American petitioners claimed vote dilution in a district where they constituted twenty-five percent of the voting population,
but sixty-four percent of those voting in Democratic primaries. 54 The
Court found this percentage of voters would influence, but not control,
the proposed district. Consequently, 55
the Court held the petitioners did not
satisfy the first Ginglesrequirement.
The LULAC Court reasoned § 2 only provides minorities with the
opportunity to elect their preferred candidates, which they cannot do if
they merely exert minority influence in primary elections.56 Minority
groups would still need "crossover" support from non-minority voters to
actually elect the preferred candidate. 57 Recognizing the petitioner's situation as a § 2 violation, the court reasoned, "would unnecessarily infuse
race into virtually every redistricting, raising serious constitutional questions."58
The above cases demonstrate that parties claim § 2 violations in a
wide variety of electoral circumstances. Before 2009, however, the Court
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

539 U.S. at 470-71.
Id.
Carvin & Fisher, supranote 47, at 20.
539 U.S. at 479.
548 U.S. 399 (2006).
Id. at 445.
Id. at 443-44.
Id. at 443.
Id. at 445.
See id.
I at 446.
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had not decided whether a state must redistrict an area where the minority group could not constitute a majority of voters, but could elect their
preferred candidate with help of majority voters in a crossover district. In
Bartlett v. Strickland, the Court addressed this issue.5 9
II. BARTLETT V.

STRiCKLAND

A. Facts
In 1991, to meet the Voting Rights Act requirements, the North
Carolina General Assembly created District 18 by dividing portions of
four counties, including Pender County. 60 At the time, the new District
18 would have had an African-American voting majority. 61 The North
Carolina State Constitution, however, prohibited dividing whole counties
when drawing legislative districts.62 Consequently, the North Carolina
Supreme Court twice used the state's "Whole County Provision" to reject
the General Assembly's redistricting attempts to divide Pender County.63
When the Assembly attempted to reapportion the region a third time, the
proportion of voting age African-Americans in the potential district had
fallen below fifty percent, and the Assembly could not create a district
with a majority of African-American voters. 64 Specifically, thirty-five
percent of the voters in the new district would have been AfricanAmerican if Pender County was not split, but thirty-nine percent would
be African-American if the Assembly divided the county. The Assembly justified the split-and the violation of the state constitution-by
arguing a failure to split would have "diluted the minority group's voting
strength in violation of § 2. ' ' 66
B. ProceduralHistory
In 2004, Pender County and members of its Board of Commissioners filed suit against the Governor, the Director of the State Board of
Elections, and other state officials in North Carolina state court, claiming
that the Assembly violated the Whole County Provision by dividing
Pender County.67 The defendants answered by claiming § 2 required the
division plan.68 Unlike § 2 claims in the previous cases, where petitioners
from minority groups claimed a violation of the Voting Rights against a
districting body, in Bartlett the districting body raised a § 2 defense to its
59. Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1238 (2009) (plurality opinion).
60. Id. at 1239.
61.
Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.; see also N.C. CONST. art. I1, § 3; Stephenson v. Bartlett (Stephenson 1), 562 S.E.2d
377, 381-395 (N.C. 2002) (discussing the Whole County Provision).
64. Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1239 (plurality opinion).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1240.
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own districting action. 6 9 As a result, the Assembly had to prove that a
vote dilution violation would have occurred without the split county
plan.7 °
Although the African-American minority could not constitute a numerical majority in the newly proposed district, thereby failing to meet
the first Gingles requirement, the trial court concluded the minority voting bloc constituted a de facto majority because they would be able to
elect candidates of their choice with some support from white "crossover" voters. 7' The court then concluded that the African-Americans in the
district voted together with enough cohesiveness to meet the second Gingles requirement.72 The petitioners did not have to prove the third Gingles requirement because the respondents had already conceded that it
had been met.73 With the Gingles framework satisfied, the trial court held
that, under the totality of the circumstances, § 2 required a split of Pender
County.74
On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed and found
the state did not establish a § 2 violation. 75 The court based its reversal
on the first Gingles element and ordered the General Assembly to redraw
the boundaries and keep Pender County whole. 76 Because the AfricanAmerican group did not constitute a numerical majority under the new
boundaries of District 18, the court held that no vote dilution could have
had occurred.77

C. PluralityOpinion
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether the first Gingles requirement can be satisfied in crossover districts where the minority group constitutes less than fifty percent of the
voting-age population in the proposed district.78 The plurality opinion,
written by Justice Kennedy and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, affirmed the North Carolina Supreme Court decision.79

69. Id.
70. Id.
71.
Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1243. The Court, in affirming the Supreme Court of North Carolina's holding,
elaborated on the first Gingles requirement-a numerical majority of minority voters-when it
stated, "[b]ut because [African-Americans] form only 39 percent of the voting-age population in
District 18, African-Americans standing alone have not better or worse opportunity to elect a candidate than does any other group of voters with the same relative voting strength."
77.
Id. at 1240.
78.
Id. at 1241.
79.
Id. at 1238, 1250.
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The Court reached two conclusions in holding that § 2 does not extend to crossover districts. 80 First, the Court held that § 2 only provides
minority groups equal participation in elections, not the right to form
coalitions with other crossover voters.8' The Court determined that, in
the absence of a majority-minority district, a minority group's ability to
elect a preferred candidate is not inferior to white voters' ability.82 The
establishment of equal opportunity for minority groups under § 2 does
not impose on districting bodies the duty to "give minority voters the
most potential, or83the best potential, to elect a candidate by attracting
crossover voters.,
Second, the Court rejected the petitioner's claim that § 2 should extend to crossover districts. The Court reasoned that the petitioner's proposed result would create an unmanageable standard and infuse race into
nearly every districting decision.84 If § 2 were read to mandate crossover
districts to correct vote dilution, courts would be forced to replace the
fairly efficient standard for determining if the minority group would constitute a majority of the voting age population with a complex and predictive determination involving voter-turnouts, levels of proportionality,
crossover likelihood, polling inquiries, and voter trends. 85 This new standard would apply to every redistricting jurisdiction nationwide, and
would force courts to base every districting decision, at least partially, on
racial classifications.86
Although the Court held that § 2 did not require states to protect
crossover districts, the plurality nonetheless acknowledged that states
were free to create crossover districts if the state did not violate other
state prohibitions.8 7 The plurality noted that crossover districts can foster
cooperation between majority and minority groups and reduce the impact
of racial polarization in elections.88 Justice Kennedy also recognized that
a districting body faced with defending a § 2 suit could point to crossover districting as evidence of attempts to provide minority groups with an
equal voting opportunity, and lack of cohesion in the white majority voting group.89
D. ConcurringOpinion
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, argued that the Voting
Rights Act does not authorize vote dilution claims in any circumstance,
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.

1243-49.
1243.
1244 (citing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 49 n.15 (1986)).
1243.
1247.
1244-45.
1247.
1248.
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and that the Gingles framework was a "disastrous misadventure in judicial policymaking."' 9° The concurring Justices argued that the Act only
guarantees a right of access to the ballot, 91and that claims of racial gerrymandering are non-justiciable because there are no judicially discernible and manageable standards to decide such claims.92
E. Dissent
Justice Souter-joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyerdissented, and argued restricting § 2 claims to majority-minority districts
uses an arbitrary threshold to deny minorities in certain districts the opportunity to elect their chosen representatives. 93 In disputing the plurality's concerns over extending the role of race-based determinations in
electoral politics, Justice Souter argued that crossover districts foster
racial understanding and cooperation, and will actually serve to minimize
racial polarization. He also maintained that the plurality's workable
standard argument is inexact and does not justify ignoring a § 2 claim,
citing the already lengthy and racially-based analysis
that courts must
95
requirements.
Gingles
the
determine
to
undertake
Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Souter's dissent, and argued separately that Congress should clarify the debate regarding § 2's appropriate
coverage in light of the plurality's decision.96 In a separate dissent, Justice Breyer proposed extending § 2 claims to districts where the minority
population
and percentage of majority crossover equaled a two-to-one
97
ratio.
III. ANALYSIS

The plurality opinion in Bartlettproperly limits claims of vote dilution to majority-minority districts. By narrowly interpreting the first
Gingles requirement and not extending § 2 claims to crossover districts,
the Court rightly refused to extend the Voting Rights Act's mandate of
equal opportunity for minority voters into statutory permission for partisan preferences and minority spoils. Had the Court extended § 2 to
mandate the creation of crossover districts, three damaging consequences
would have resulted.
First, the Court would have created a new right for groups to form
winning coalitions that only benefit protected minorities, which was not
part of the Voting Rights Act's equal protection guarantee. Second, the
90.

Id. at 1250 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Holder v.

Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 893 (1994).

91.
92.
93.

Id. (citing Holder,512 U.S. at 893).
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 123 (1986).
Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1254 (Souter, J., dissenting).

94.

Id. at 1255.

95.
96.
97.

Id. at 1257.
Id. at 1260 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1261 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Court would have broadened political gerrymandering by replacing a
workable standard with a complex, racially-derived substitute. Third, the
Court would have reversed the current trend away from identity politics
and racial polarization by requiring racial inquiries in all districting questions and propagating a spoils system.
A. Expanding § 2 to CrossoverDistricts is Beyond the Scope of the Voting Rights Act
1. Equality or Opportunity?
The Voting Rights Act provides minority groups with a right to
That right can be defined as the equal opportunity to participate in
election voting; it is violated only if a member of a protected minority
class has "less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice." 99 Therefore, a § 2 violation has occurred only when a minority
group's opportunity, or ability, to elect their chosen candidate has been
denied or abridged by a redistricting plan.'0°
vote. a8

The first requirement in Gingles provides the necessary framework
to allow courts to determine if there was a violation of § 2. Requiring a
protected minority group to demonstrate a majority of voters in a new
district is essential because, if that group could not constitute a majority
in the new district, they do not possess the ability to elect their candidate.
Therefore, without an ability to elect a preferred candidate through majority voting, there is no right or opportunity that a districting body could
deny. 10 1 If a protected group is a proportional minority in a given district,
their failure to elect a preferred candidate would lie in their already insufficient demographics, not in discriminatory districting. In crossover districts, dilution of minority voting power cannot occur because the minority group does not have any power that can be diluted. As the Court
noted in Gingles, "Unless minority voters possess the potential to elect
representatives in the absence of the challenged structure or practice,
' 2
they cannot claim to have been injured by that structure or practice. 10
The dissent contends that the plurality's narrow interpretation of
Gingles is inconsistent with functionalist approaches in previous dilution
cases. 10 3 But this interpretation seems misleading. In Voinovich, the
Court stated the Gingles test "cannot be applied mechanically and without regard to the nature of the claim,"' °0' but in that case the vote dilution
98.
42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006).
99.
Id.
100.
See id.
See Carvin & Fisher, supranote 47, at 17-18.
101.
102. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 n.17 (1986).
See Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S.Ct. 1231, 1255 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting); see also
103.
Note, supranote 2, at 2608.
Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 158 (1993).
104.
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claims involved "packing," or reverse-dilution, of minorities into supermajorities. 0 5 In that situation, the Court would have correctly modified
the first Gingles requirement because the petitioners sought to disperse
their "super-majority" in a single district into sufficiently large numerical
minorities across multiple districts.1°6 Due to petitioners' unique circumstances-they sought to alleviate reverse-dilution through the creation of multiple new districts in which they would constitute a numerical
minority of voters-the first Gingles requirement, which requires a numerical majority, would have been fatal to their claim. 10 7 Accordingly,
the Supreme Court held that certain § 2 claims could necessitate modification or exclusion of the Gingles factors.1° 8 In Bartlett, however, no
such situation existed, and the Gingles framework did not require adjustment. Therefore, it would be illogical for the Court to discard the first
requirement by allowing crossover district claims.
2. A Right to Successful Coalitions?
Nowhere in the text of the Voting Rights Act is there a promise extending the right to form coalitions, crossover-voting factions, or other
advantageous political alliances to elect minority-preferred candidates.' °9
If a minority group cannot form a winning coalition, their ability to elect
a candidate has not been denied-no group has a right to a winning coalition." 0 A group's inability to form coalitions is based on failures of
persuasion and influence, not voter discrimination. Any special privilege
to force district arrangements to benefit minority-led coalitions would
grant minority groups special immunity to "pull, haul, and trade to find
common political ground,""' a result the Court specifically rejected in
De Grandy.
The Court's holding in Bartlettis consistent with previous cases on
this issue, 1 2 and granting minorities the right to form winning coalitions
would have presented significant problems. In De Grandy, Justice Souter
wrote that minority groups had the same advantages and disadvantages
with regard to forming voting coalitions." 3 Holding that § 2 did not define dilution as a failure to maximize a minority's political leverage, he

105. Id.
at 153.
106.
Id. at158 (holding that "[tihe first Gingles precondition, the requirement that the group be
sufficiently large to constitute a majority in a single district, would have to modified or eliminated
when analyzing the influence-dilution claim we assume, arguendo, to be actionable today .. .
[t]complaint isnot that
black voters have been deprived of the ability to constitute a majority, but of
the possibility of being a sufficiently large minority to elect their candidate of choice with the assistance of cross-over votes from the white majority").
107.
Id.
108. Id.
109. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).
110. See Johnson v.De Grandy, 512 U.S.997, 1027 (1994).
lid.l at1020.
112. See Bartlett v.Strickland, 129 S.Ct. 1231, 1236 (2009) (plurality
opinion).
113. De Grandy, 512 U.S.at1017.
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concluded that "one is not entitled to suspect (much
less infer) dilution
'
from mere failure to guarantee a political feast. 14
In a § 2 crossover district claim, the group claiming denial or abridgement of voting rights is not a protected minority class, but a "coalition comprised of the protected class, plus an additional group of nonminority citizens, who happen to share the protected group's political preferences."11 5 Section 2 does not extend special treatment to voting coalitions, whether led by minority groups or majority ones. 1 6 An extension
of § 2 would give minority group-led coalitions preferential treatment
and violate the17 "basic principles of judicial neutrality and political evenhandedness."
B. Expanding § 2 EncouragesPoliticalGerrymanderingUnder the
Guise of Racial Equality
Legislative redistricting and the resulting challenges, while ostensibly motivated by racial inequalities, are commonly used for partisan political advantage. 118 The history of discrimination in election rights is
long and undeniable, and a large number of decisions are based on goodfaith efforts to remedy that past, but parties in vote dilution disputes are
often separated by political party as well as by race. 1 9 In Southern states,
political divides mirror racial ones, with African-Americans supporting
Democrats by a wide margin. 120
In Voinovich, Ashcroft, and LULAC, partisan goals took precedent
over racial equality concerns.1 21 In Voinovich, Republican members of
the state apportionment board approved the redistricting plan, while local
Democrats challenged it with support from party officials.1 22 In Ashcroft,
the Supreme Court found "[t]he goal of the Democratic leadershipblack and white" was to increase minority influence in Georgia to maintain political power. 123 And in LULAC, Democrats implemented the redistricting plan by "carefully construct[ing] democratic districts with incredibly convoluted lines and 2Pack[ing] heavily Republican suburban
areas into just a few districts."12 These cases demonstrate that both sides
114.

Id.

115.
Carvin & Fisher, supra note 47, at 18.
116.
Id.
117.
Id.
118.
See Note, supra note 2, at 2599.
119.
See Carvin & Fisher, supra note 47, at 18; Kareem U. Crayton, Beat 'Em or Join 'Em?
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(2008).
120.
See Crayton, supra note 119, at 554-55.
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Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 469.
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of the aisle use racial gerrymandering to achieve their political objectives.
Gerrymandering encompasses "any redistricting practice which
maximizes the political advantage or votes of one group, and minimizes
the political advantage or votes of another." 125 Typically, evidence of
gerrymandering includes irregularities in the shape, size, number, and
uniformity of electoral districts.126 Although an irregularly shaped district
has traditionally been a trademark of gerrymandering, recent studies have
shown that it also occurs in regularly shaped districts whose boundaries
127
are based on political divisions and traditional geographic barriers.
Gerrymandering in American politics is both old and persistent. Patrick Henry is credited as the first gerrymanderer128 in his attempt to
hinder James Madison's election to Congress. As former Congressman
and political scientist Robert Luce said, "gerrymandering has become so
general and familiar a procedure
that it may fairly be called a characteris' 29
tic of American politics."
In certain instances Democrats deplore redistricting as political gerrymandering, and Republicans defend it. In others, Republicans cry foul,
while Democrats support it. Redistricting plans are either a deplorable
political tool or a moral and legal imperative, depending on who stands
to benefit. Expanding § 2 claims to include the mandatory creation of
crossover districts would only increase this political manipulation and
allow partisan political interests to further commandeer voting rights
legislation.
Allowing crossover claims would expose legislative districts across
the country to further gerrymandering and racially-based determinations. 130 If minorities were not required to constitute a numerical majority-or form a crossover coalition through political persuasion-then § 2
131
could be used to challenge virtually any redistricting plan with ease.
The number of potential crossover claims is staggering when one considers that "[a]ny district with a cognizable group of minorities which elects
a white Democrat is, ipso facto, a 'coalition' district,"' 132 meaning a minority group had formed a coalition with whites to elect the candidate.
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See, e.g., Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1244 (2009) (plurality opinion).
131.
Note, supra note 2, at 2603.
132.
Carvin & Fisher, supranote 47, at 24.

129.

2010]

BARTLETT V. STRICKLAND

The Bartlett dissent's assertion that expanding § 2 to crossover dis1 33
tricts would only conserve an "uncertain amount of judicial resources"
seems implausible. If the first Gingles principle acted as a flexible guideline, rather than a required precondition, courts would have to assess the
validity of the other two Gingles factors and then engage in a totality-ofthe-circumstances examination regarding crossover voters, racial voting
bloc cohesion, and numerous other factors in non-majority districts. Even
if Justice Souter is correct in stating that courts already do this under
current § 2 standards, there is enormous potential for an increase in cognizable claims based on crossover districts.
The relative importance of judicial efficiency, workability, and consistency against allowing a new type of § 2 claim should be weighed
carefully. On one hand, if the new standard results in an unmanageable
number of cases, petitioners who have faced legitimate voting rights violations will have a smaller chance of receiving relief, and parties seeking political windfall may flood the courts. On the other hand, expanding
§ 2 claims may lead to the creation of new crossover districts and foster
greater political cooperation between minorities and whites. While there
is potential for progress by expanding § 2, the likely strains on the judicial system, in addition to problems of preferential treatment for minority
coalitions and political gerrymandering, outweigh the dissent's expansive
goal.
C. Away from Identity Politics: § 2 Should Not be Expanded to Include
CrossoverDistricts
The election of President Obama shows that the role of race in
American politics is changing. As courts continue to address racial redistricting and voter dilution claims in this new political landscape, they
must balance the need to remedy past racial discrimination in voting
rights with the current trend away from identity politics and towards a
more race-neutral generation of voters. As Justice O'Connor noted in
Ashcroft, "[t]he purpose of the Voting Rights Act is to . . 34. foster our
transformation to a society that is no longer fixated on race."'
There are indications, in addition to President Obama's election,
that racial polarization is abating in American electoral politics. 35 African-Americans and whites might still have largely different opinions
about proper government priorities, pressing issues, and policy viewpoints, 136 but racial crossover voting is increasing and fewer Americans
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are choosing candidates based on their skin color. 137 Although many
scholars have tried to determine the state of racially polarized voting to
predict future trends, they have reached different results. 138 Some scholars base their findings on complex statistical analysis of electoral districts in the South. 139 Others simply accept that racially polarized voting
is either here to stay or near its end.1 40 This disparity in results is due to
the extremely large and volatile number of variables involved with analyzing electoral results, including: incumbency, registration figures, voter
turnout, partisanship, national elections, and other political concerns.
There are, nonetheless, indications that voters' electoral choices are
increasingly based less on the race of the candidates.14 One empirical
study analyzing election results in 2,400 different American cities at two
separate periods found that African-American candidates do equally well
in at-large districts as in African-American majority districts, 142 and that
"the waning efficacy of district elections has been due to a general reduction in the racial polarization of voters."'143 Another study examined election returns in three Southern states to determine whether Africant44
Americans needed majority districts to elect candidates of their choice.
In re-drawn districts where the majority of voters shifted from AfricanAmericans to whites, no Georgia legislator lost to a white candidate in
1996 or 1998.145 The overall findings of the study show that, although
racial polarization is still evident in the South, white voter crossover has
increased, and African-American candidates are attracting white voters
in increasing numbers.' 46 Indeed, studies show that white Democratic
voters in the South vote for white and African-American Democratic
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candidates at nearly the same rate. 147 This research indicates that racial
polarization continues to lose footing in our electoral process. 148
If the Court extended § 2 to include crossover districts, it would unnecessarily involve race in election districting 149 even as elections become increasingly race-neutral. District planning committees would have
to consider the racial proportionality of each new district to avoid liability from the influx of new § 2 claims brought by groups alleging denial of
their right to form advantageous political coalitions. Similarly, courts
would be forced to consider the proportions of minority groups, their
voting cohesion, turnout percentages, and ability to attract white voters in
every redistricting violation claim. 5 ° Rather than deemphasizing racial
factors in election law cases, extending § 2 would require courts to make
racially-based assumptions in nearly every decision.
The Bartlett dissent's argument that recognizing crossover districts
would encourage states to create them-and in turn precipitate collaboration between minorities and whites--overlooks a major problem: granting the valuable right to form winning coalitions to only protected minorities would create a racial spoils system, and generate controversy and
resentment among voters outside the coalition. A system that required
districting bodies to create majority-minority districts, and mandated the
maximization of minority group power to influence elections, would
further entrench racial separation in the electoral process and inhibit
crossover collaboration. Whereas the plurality allows districting bodies
to create crossover districts 151 to encourage inter-racial coalitions, the
dissent forces their creation without mention or consideration of the negative impact on inter-racial relations. This oversight would lead to greater racial polarization and away from
the color-blind goals that Justice
52
O'Connor mentioned in Ashcroft.1
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in Bartlett benefits minority and
white voters alike. By refusing to extend § 2 to crossover districts, the
Court correctly limited the influence that race-and its stereotypes, connotations, and assumptions-will have in the American electoral process.
Racial stereotypes continue to wane in the political sphere, and new generations, unencumbered by the prejudices of previous ones, are exercising their right to vote with an increasingly post-racial outlook. U.S. Con147. Id. at 1240-41 ("In general, we find that these [black congressional] incumbents attract
about one-third of the white general election vote, a result that is in line with levels of white support
for white Democratic candidates for other federal offices in the South.").
148.
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gressman John Lewis-a leader of the Civil Rights Movement and one
of the longest serving African-American members of Congress-said
this of minority districting: "We have changed. We've come a great disSouth, I think people
tance. It's not just in Georgia, but in the American
53
are preparing to lay down the burden of race."'
In this climate, the Court has attempted to keep racial polarization
and identity politics off the ballot. While significant obstacles remain to
achieve complete racial equality in our society and remedy previous discrimination, expanding a spoils system that mixes perverse political manipulation and gerrymandering with racial sensitivities is not the solution.
In Bartlett, the Court refused to extend a nonexistent right to form
profitable political coalitions, maintained an effective standard for addressing vote dilution claims, and advanced the notion, to borrow from
Chief Justice Roberts, that the most effective way to prevent discrimination on the basis of race is to stop propagating laws that discriminate on
the basis of race. 154
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